...We granted a petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals in Georgia Public Svc. Comm. v. Sawnee Elec. Membership Corp., 242 Ga.App. 156, 529 S.E.2d 186 (2000), to examine the application of OCGA § 46-3-8(a), the large-load customer choice exception to the Georgia Territorial Electric Service Act, OCGA § 46-3-1 et seq....

...noting that residential customers are the only customer clients in this State who have not had the opportunity to benefit from the lower cost of large-load rates and that the Act expressly prohibits discrimination between classes of consumers, OCGA § 46-3-11(a), thereby prohibiting any distinctions between the treatment of residential and commercial customers....

...ct with Marriott and sought, moreover, to enjoin service of electrical power to Marriott by Georgia Power. JEMC appeals the grant of summary judgment to Marriott and Georgia Power. We reverse. The Georgia Territorial Electric Service Act, under OCGA § 46-3-1 et seq., provides that a new consumer, "having single-metered service and a connected load which, at the time of initial full operation of the premises, is 900 kilowatts or greater," may choose between the primary and secondary electrical suppliers in the consumer's geographical area....

...While the Court of Appeals did not agree with the trial court’s assessment of the status of the unified government, it concluded that the unified government was not a “municipality” that was authorized to charge a franchise fee under the Georgia Electric Service Territorial Act (“the Act”), OCGA § 46-3-1 et seq.1 Athens-Clarke County v....

...The unified government meets the statutory criteria of an “active municipality.” See OCGA § 36-30-7.1. More particularly, the Act recognizes the right of a municipality, as that term is defined in the Act, to grant a franchise to an electric supplier. OCGA § 46-3-14 (b)....

...n requirements the municipality deems wise. OCGA § 36-34-2 (7). Payment of a franchise fee is a plausible prerequisite to the grant of a franchise. See City of Calhoun v. N. Ga. EMC, supra. While the EMC reads the second and third sentences of OCGA § 46-3-14 (b) as a limitation on a municipality’s ability to charge a franchise fee, we do not....

...Rather, the sentences set forth the method certain municipalities are required to use to calculate the franchise fees to be charged non-primary electric suppliers and those who supply electricity to less than a majority or plurality of the electric meters in a wholly new municipality. OCGA § 46-3-14 (b) does not forbid a municipality exercising its right to condition the grant of a franchise from charging franchise fees to electric suppliers. See OCGA § 46-3-14 (c). We therefore conclude that the unified government is authorized pursuant to OCGA § 46-3-14 (b) to assess franchise fees against the EMC. The Court of Appeals opined that the unified government’s authority under its charter to grant franchises and to prescribe conditions therefor conflicts with OCGA § 46-3-201 (b) (10), a pro...

Carley, Justice. Resolution of the instant appeal requires an interpretation and application of OCGA § 46-3-1 et seq., the Georgia Territorial Electric Service Act (Act)....

...There is no constitutional provision which would prohibit the City from requiring that NGEMC obtain a street franchise. Likewise, the Act itself is certainly not a general law of this state which provides for such a prohibition on the City’s authority under OCGA § 36-34-2 (7). OCGA § 46-3-14 (c). The question thus becomes whether the City is further authorized to condition its grant of the requisite street franchise upon NGEMC’s payment of a franchise fee....

...There is no constitutional provision which would prohibit the City from imposing such a condition. NGEMC urges, however, that the Act is a general law of this state which does provide for such a limitation on the City’s authority under OCGA § 36-34-2 (7). In this regard, NGEMC relies upon OCGA § 46-3-14 (b), which provides, in relevant part, that [n]o municipality may, by unreasonably withholding or conditioning ....

...shall pay the municipality for street franchise rights a sum of money calculated and payable in the same manner and on the same basis as is utilized with respect to the payment, if any, by the primary supplier (other than the municipality itself) for the same or substantially identical rights. The first sentence of OCGA § 46-3-14 (b) is certainly a general limitation on the City’s authority under OCGA § 36-34-2 (7) to deny NGEMC a street franchise....

...To the extent that NGEMC has rights under the Act as a “secondary supplier,” those rights may not be defeated, impaired, or interfered with by means of the City’s imposition of an unreasonable condition upon the grant of a street franchise. However, nothing in the first sentence of OCGA § 46-3-14 (b) purports to prohibit the City from conditioning its grant of a street franchise to NGEMC upon the payment of a reasonable franchise fee. Unlike the first sentence, the second sentence of OCGA § 46-3-14 (b) does relate to the specific topic of the imposition of franchise fee as a condition of the grant of a street franchise to a “secondary supplier.” Under NGEMC’s interpretation, the second sentence of OCGA § 46-3-14 (b) exempts a “secondary supplier” from being charged a franchise fee where the “municipality itself” is also the “primary sup*207plier.” However, the introductory language of the second sentence of OCGA § 46-3-14 (b) provides that “any secondary supplier within a municipality ....

...shall pay the municipality for street franchise rights a sum of money. . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) The clear import of this language is that “any secondary supplier” can be charged a “sum of money” for a street franchise. The remaining language of the second sentence of OCGA § 46-3-14 (b) does not otherwise qualify the import of the introductory language that “any secondary supplier” can be charged a street franchise fee....

...hich the franchise fee of “any secondary supplier” is to be “calculated” and made “payable.” Since the “municipality itself” is specifically excluded from the controlling class of “primary suppliers,” the second sentence of OCGA § 46-3-14 (b) is a statutory preservation of the right of a “municipality” under OCGA § 36-34-2 (7) to charge “any secondary supplier” a franchise fee, even where the “municipality itself’ is also the “primary supplier.” “[A]ny se...

...tch its electric supplier for its wet-food manufacturing and distribution facility in Hartwell, Georgia from Georgia Power Company to Walton Electric Membership Corporation. Georgia Power objected under the Territorial Electric Service Act, OCGA § 46-3-1 et seq. (“Territorial Act”), asserting that it had the right to continue servicing the premises because they were not new premises and Nestle did not meet the requirements of the Territorial Act to switch electric suppliers....

...Morgan, Atlanta, for appellant. Troutman Sanders, Robert P. Edwards, Jr., Thurbert E. Baker, Atty. Gen., Alex F. Sponseller, Daniel S. Walsh, Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellees. THOMPSON, Justice. In 1973 the legislature enacted the Georgia Territorial Electric Service Act (OCGA § 46-3-1 et seq.) to provide a mechanism for assigning territories to electrical suppliers....

...ance, Ordinance No. 493. This ordinance imposed a four percent gross receipts tax on the revenues of “each secondary supplier (including specifically Electric Membership Corporations whether or not operated for profit), within the meaning of OCGA § 46-3-1 et seq., distributing and selling electric power within the City which is not otherwise paying a franchise fee pursuant to a franchise agreement....

...otherwise had no common right to do. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U. S. 519 (10 LE 274) (1839); McCullough v. Maryland, 17 U. S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (4 LE 579) (1819). Indeed, NGEMC possesses a franchise granted by the State of Georgia by virtue of OCGA § 46-3-170 et seq....