CopyCited 12 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 13, 1995 | 454 S.E.2d 510, 95 Fulton County D. Rep. 914
...The unified government meets the statutory criteria of an “active municipality.” See OCGA §
36-30-7.1. More particularly, the Act recognizes the right of a municipality, as that term is defined in the Act, to grant a franchise to an electric supplier. OCGA §
46-3-14 (b)....
...n requirements the municipality deems wise. OCGA §
36-34-2 (7). Payment of a franchise fee is a plausible prerequisite to the grant of a franchise. See City of Calhoun v. N. Ga. EMC, supra. While the EMC reads the second and third sentences of OCGA §
46-3-14 (b) as a limitation on a municipality’s ability to charge a franchise fee, we do not....
...Rather, the sentences set forth the method certain municipalities are required to use to calculate the franchise fees to be charged non-primary electric suppliers and those who supply electricity to less than a majority or plurality of the electric meters in a wholly new municipality. OCGA §
46-3-14 (b) does not forbid a municipality exercising its right to condition the grant of a franchise from charging franchise fees to electric suppliers. See OCGA §
46-3-14 (c). We therefore conclude that the unified government is authorized pursuant to OCGA §
46-3-14 (b) to assess franchise fees against the EMC.
The Court of Appeals opined that the unified government’s authority under its charter to grant franchises and to prescribe conditions therefor conflicts with OCGA §
46-3-201 (b) (10), a pro...
CopyCited 8 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 2, 1994 | 443 S.E.2d 469, 94 Fulton County D. Rep. 1512
...There is no constitutional provision which would prohibit the City from requiring that NGEMC obtain a street franchise. Likewise, the Act itself is certainly not a general law of this state which provides for such a prohibition on the City’s authority under OCGA §
36-34-2 (7). OCGA §
46-3-14 (c).
The question thus becomes whether the City is further authorized to condition its grant of the requisite street franchise upon NGEMC’s payment of a franchise fee....
...There is no constitutional provision which would prohibit the City from imposing such a condition. NGEMC urges, however, that the Act is a general law of this state which does provide for such a limitation on the City’s authority under OCGA §
36-34-2 (7). In this regard, NGEMC relies upon OCGA §
46-3-14 (b), which provides, in relevant part, that
[n]o municipality may, by unreasonably withholding or conditioning ....
...shall pay the municipality for street franchise rights a sum of money calculated and payable in the same manner and on the same basis as is utilized with respect to the payment, if any, by the primary supplier (other than the municipality itself) for the same or substantially identical rights.
The first sentence of OCGA §
46-3-14 (b) is certainly a general limitation on the City’s authority under OCGA §
36-34-2 (7) to deny NGEMC a street franchise....
...To the extent that NGEMC has rights under the Act as a “secondary supplier,” those rights may not be defeated, impaired, or interfered with by means of the City’s imposition of an unreasonable condition upon the grant of a street franchise. However, nothing in the first sentence of OCGA §
46-3-14 (b) purports to prohibit the City from conditioning its grant of a street franchise to NGEMC upon the payment of a reasonable franchise fee.
Unlike the first sentence, the second sentence of OCGA §
46-3-14 (b) does relate to the specific topic of the imposition of franchise fee as a condition of the grant of a street franchise to a “secondary supplier.” Under NGEMC’s interpretation, the second sentence of OCGA §
46-3-14 (b) exempts a “secondary supplier” from being charged a franchise fee where the “municipality itself” is also the “primary sup*207plier.”
However, the introductory language of the second sentence of OCGA §
46-3-14 (b) provides that “any secondary supplier within a municipality ....
...shall pay the municipality for street franchise rights a sum of money. . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) The clear import of this language is that “any secondary supplier” can be charged a “sum of money” for a street franchise.
The remaining language of the second sentence of OCGA §
46-3-14 (b) does not otherwise qualify the import of the introductory language that “any secondary supplier” can be charged a street franchise fee....
...hich the franchise fee of “any secondary supplier” is to be “calculated” and made “payable.”
Since the “municipality itself” is specifically excluded from the controlling class of “primary suppliers,” the second sentence of OCGA §
46-3-14 (b) is a statutory preservation of the right of a “municipality” under OCGA §
36-34-2 (7) to charge “any secondary supplier” a franchise fee, even where the “municipality itself’ is also the “primary supplier.” “[A]ny se...
