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Call Now: 904-383-7448All rights of action accruing against any electric membership corporation growing out of the acquisition of rights of way or easements or the occupying of lands of others by such electric membership corporations shall be barred at the end of 12 months from the date of the accrual of such cause of action; and in cases where any such electric membership corporation is in possession of the lands of others without having condemned the property as provided, and such electric membership corporation is using any such land of another for any of the purposes for which an electric membership corporation may be created under this article, and the owners of the land took no legal steps to prevent the occupation of the land by the electric membership corporation, the rights of the owner of the land shall be limited to whatever damages may have been caused to his realty by such occupation; and this limitation shall apply to all persons whether sui juris or not.
(Ga. L. 1939, p. 312, § 3; Code 1933, § 34C-205, enacted by Ga. L. 1981, p. 1587, § 1.)
- One-year statute of limitations under O.C.G.A. § 46-3-204 is constitutional because the statute does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Georgia Constitution and is not unconstitutionally vague. Daniel v. Amicalola Elec. Mbrshp. Corp., 289 Ga. 437, 711 S.E.2d 709 (2011).
- Trial court properly denied summary judgment to an electrical plant operator on nearby landowners' nuisance claims. O.C.G.A. § 46-3-204 governed the acquisition of rights of way and did not apply to noise pollution claims, and the evidence as to whether the noise and vibrations from the plant were abatable nuisances or permanent nuisances was in sharp conflict. Oglethorpe Power Corp. v. Forrister, 303 Ga. App. 271, 693 S.E.2d 553 (2010).
- Trial court correctly concluded that O.C.G.A. § 46-3-204 applied to the class member claims. The class was defined to include owners of land onto which the electric company unlawfully entered to erect structures; thus, the developer and other potential class members could not avoid the limiting language of the Code section by seeking equitable relief in the form of deed reformation because the Code section applied to "all rights of action." Boston Creek Holdings, LLLP v. Amicalola Elec. Mbrshp. Corp., 320 Ga. App. 375, 739 S.E.2d 811 (2013).
- Property owners' claims against a utility were not time-barred because the owners filed suit within two months of the utility's alleged trespass and conversion as the destruction of more vegetation by the utility, which had previously clear cut trees on the owners' property, was new. Given the evidence that a utility representative disclaimed any easement or other right to enter the property again after the first incident, the second entry could not be deemed as a matter of law to be part of a continuing trespass. Daniel v. Amicalola Elec. Mbrshp. Corp., 289 Ga. 437, 711 S.E.2d 709 (2011).
- Property owners' argument that a utility defrauded the owners by claiming that the utility had no easement and no plan to enter the owners' property again did not toll the owners' claims relating to the entry of the owners' property because the trespass was completed and would not recur, and no matter what, the utility could not put back the trees and vegetation the utility had clear-cut, so the conversion was complete. There was no allegation, much less evidence, that the utility misled the owners as to a damages action. Daniel v. Amicalola Elec. Mbrshp. Corp., 289 Ga. 437, 711 S.E.2d 709 (2011).
Cited in Starr v. Central Ga. Elec. Membership Corp., 143 Ga. App. 528, 239 S.E.2d 241 (1977); Webster v. Snapping Shoals Elec. Membership Corp., 176 Ga. App. 265, 335 S.E.2d 637 (1985).
- 26 Am. Jur. 2d, Eminent Domain, §§ 136. 171 et seq.
27 Am. Jur. 2d, Eminent Domain, §§ 910, 911, 912, 917.
- 29 C.J.S., Electricity, § 59.
- Effect of fraud to toll the period for bringing action prescribed in statute creating the right of action, 15 A.L.R.2d 500.
Settlement negotiations as estopping reliance on statute of limitations, 39 A.L.R.3d 127.
Fraud as extending statutory limitations period for contesting will or its probate, 48 A.L.R.4th 1094.
(Ga. L. 1937, p. 644, § 7; Code 1933, § 34C-301, enacted by Ga. L. 1981, p. 1587, § 1.)
- 18 Am. Jur. 2d, Corporations, §§ 273, 277, 283, 284, 286-294, 296-299.
- 18 C.J.S., Corporations, §§ 98-105.
Total Results: 1
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2011-06-27
Citation: 711 S.E.2d 709, 289 Ga. 437, 2011 Fulton County D. Rep. 1935, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 507
Snippet: statute of limitation contained *712 in OCGA § 46-3-204. We then affirm in part and reverse in part the