O.C.G.A.
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
This part shall be known and may be cited as the ‘‘High-voltage Safety Act.’’
History
(Code 1981, § 46-3-30, enacted by Ga. L. 1992, p. 2141, § 1.)
Annotations
Editor’s notes. - Ga. L. 1992, p. 2141, § 1, redesignated former Code Section 46-3-30 as present Code Section 46-3-32.
Law reviews. - For annual survey article discussing workers’ compensation law, see 51 Mercer L. Rev. 549 (1999).
JUDICIAL DECISIONS Constitutionality. - The High-Voltage Safety Act, O.C.G.A. § 46-3-30, does not
deprive injured persons of due process by abolishing a common law claim, since the
legislature has the authority to abolish such claims prior to their accrual; nor is the Act unconstitutionally vague. Santana v. Georgia Power Co., 269 Ga. 127, 498 S.E.2d 521 (1998). Requirement of notice is clear. - The language of the Georgia High-voltage Safety Act, O.C.G.A. § 46-3-30 et seq., is clear and unambiguous in its requirement that notice
be given before work is commenced in proximity to high-voltage lines, and in its provision that lack of such notice insulates an owner of the lines from liability. Jackson Elec. Mbrshp. Corp. v. Smith, 276 Ga. 208, 576 S.E.2d 878 (2003). Cited in Brown v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 209 Ga. App. 99, 432 S.E.2d 675 (1993).
Notes of Decisions
Allen v. King Plow Co., 490 S.E.2d 457 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997).
· cites it 20× “Allen maintains that Hartley is strictly liable for her husband's death under the High-Voltage Safety Act, OCGA § 46-3-30 et seq., and that defendant King Plow is liable for Hartley's tort under the provisions of OCGA § 51-2-5(5).”
Preston v. Georgia Power Co., 489 S.E.2d 573 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997).
· cites it 16× “Preston originally appealed to the Supreme Court because he contended the constitutionality of the High-voltage Safety Act, OCGA §§ 46-3-30 through 46-3-40, was called into question.”
Malvarez v. Georgia Power Co., 300 S.E.2d 145 (Ga. 1983).
· cites it 6× “Georgia Power denies that the lines were within eight feet of the building but contends that if they were, then it is absolutely protected from liability by the provisions of OCGA § 46-3-30 et seq. (Code Ann. § 34B-201 etseq.”
Green v. Moreland, 407 S.E.2d 119 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991).
· cites it 6× “The phrase “person responsible for the work to be done” is defined in OCGA § 46-3-30 (2) and, when read in conjunction with OCGA § 46-3-33 (a), requires the person or persons immediately responsible for the operation of machinery within eight feet of a high-voltage line to give…”
Callaway v. Crown Crafts, Inc., 477 S.E.2d 435 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996).
· cites it 4× “The Callaways filed suit contending that the defendants were strictly liable under OCGA § 46-3-30 et seq., the High-voltage Safety Act, because they failed to turn off the power source even though Callaway and his fellow workman would be working within the danger area of the…”
Whitmire v. Georgia Power Co., 607 S.E.2d 213 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004).
· cites it 8× “She claimed that Georgia Power failed to take safety precautions required by the High-voltage Safety Act (HVSA) (OCGA § 46-3-30 et seq.) to protect Mr. Whitmire from electrocution; that UPC failed to comply with provisions of the HVSA requiring it to receive notice from C&B…”
Pappas v. Hill-Staton Engineers, Inc., 358 S.E.2d 625 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987).
· cites it 4× “Appellants brought a wrongful death action against Staton, Hill-Staton, and the EMC, alleging negligence and violation of the Crane Act, OCGA § 46-3-30 et seq., against EMC and violation of the Crane Act against Hill-Staton and Staton.”
Johnson v. Richardson, 414 S.E.2d 698 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992).
· cites it 6× “OCGA § 46-3-30 (2) provides, in relevant part, that the “ ‘[p]erson responsible for the work to be done’ means a person, or his agent, who physically operates, erects, handles, stores, or transports any tools, machinery, equipment, supplies, materials, or apparatus .”
City of Dalton v. Gene Rogers Constr. Co., 479 S.E.2d 171 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996).
· cites it 4× “The City argues on appeal that the trial court erred in finding its third party indemnity action against Rogers Construction under the High-voltage Safety Act, OCGA § 46-3-30 et seq., was barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act.”
Santana v. Georgia Power Co., 498 S.E.2d 521 (Ga. 1998).
· cites it 2× “Based on that record, the trial court granted summary judgment to Georgia Power on the ground that the High-voltage Safety Act (HVSA), OCGA § 46-3-30 et seq., relieved Georgia Power from liability because of appellants’ and their employer’s failure to give statutorily-required…”
Leonardson v. Georgia Power Co., 436 S.E.2d 690 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993).
· cites it 2× “1 Although no notice of the work adjacent to its power line was given to Georgia Power pursuant to the High-Voltage Safety Act (OCGA § 46-3-30 et seq.), “[o]ne whose injury is caused by negligent installation or maintenance of high-voltage lines, even where such injury occurs…”
— 46-3-30(2) — 1 case
Allen v. King Plow Co., 490 S.E.2d 457 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997).
“Allen maintains that Hartley is strictly liable for her husband's death under the High-Voltage Safety Act, OCGA § 46-3-30 et seq., and that defendant King Plow is liable for Hartley's tort under the provisions of OCGA § 51-2-5(5).”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.