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Call Now: 904-383-7448Whenever any real property is sold under or by virtue of an execution issued for the collection of state, county, municipal, or school taxes or for special assessments, the defendant in fi. fa. or any person having any right, title, or interest in or lien upon such property may redeem the property from the sale by the payment of the amount required for redemption, as fixed and provided in Code Section 48-4-42:
(Orig. Code 1863, § 820; Code 1873, § 898; Code 1882, § 898; Civil Code 1895, § 909; Civil Code 1910, § 1169; Code 1933, § 92-8301; Ga. L. 1937, p. 491, § 2; Code 1933, § 91A-430, enacted by Ga. L. 1978, p. 309, § 2; Ga. L. 1980, p. 10, § 9; Ga. L. 2016, p. 758, § 1/SB 379; Ga. L. 2016, p. 793, § 1/HB 51.)
The 2016 amendments. The first 2016 amendment, effective July 1, 2016, deleted "the redemption price or" following "payment of" near the end of the introductory paragraph. The second 2016 amendment, effective July 1, 2016, made identical changes.
- For annual survey of real property law, see 57 Mercer L. Rev. 331 (2005). For annual survey of real property law, see 58 Mercer L. Rev. 367 (2006). For annual survey of real property law, see 68 Mercer L. Rev. 231 (2016). For annual survey on real property, see 69 Mercer L. Rev. 251 (2017).
- It is not necessary for those seeking and entitled to redeem to tender the amount of tax fi. fas. issued subsequently to the sale. LaRoche v. Kinchlo, 154 Ga. 547, 114 S.E. 706 (1922).
- Though there is incompatibility in selling land under both a tax fi. fa. and a fi. fa. founded on the judgment of a court at the same time, the sale is not void. The result is to annex to the sale as against both fi. fas. the statutory incident of redemption. The property is redeemable by refunding the whole amount paid by the purchaser, with the statutory premium thereon, but not by refunding a less amount measured by the taxes due. Clower v. Fleming, 81 Ga. 247, 7 S.E. 278 (1888).
- Right of redemption is not given when land is sold under execution issued for an assessment to meet interest or principal, or the cost of draining the land in a drainage district. Sigmon-Reinhardt Co. v. Atkins Nat'l Bank, 163 Ga. 136, 135 S.E. 720 (1926).
- In a purchaser's quiet title action against the executor of a testatrix's estate, the trial court did not err in adopting the report of a special master and in decreeing that fee simple title to the land was vested in the purchaser because the purchaser acquired title to the property by virtue of a tax sale and deed, which was conducted in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 48-4-1 et seq.; a title search showed the testatrix's nephew as holding record title to the property, but out of caution, both the nephew and the executor were served with notice of the tax sale, the tax commissioner met with the executor prior to the sale and offered to accept payment for the back taxes, but the executor failed to do so, and the property was sold to the purchaser, with the overage going to the nephew, and the executor did not timely seek to exercise a right of redemption under O.C.G.A. § 48-4-40. Mann v. Blalock, 286 Ga. 541, 690 S.E.2d 375 (2010).
- Judgment sustaining a general demurrer (now motion to dismiss) to an intervention seeking to cancel tax deeds, which intervention is on grounds that the levy was excessive and that an interest less than the fee was conveyed, will not bar subsequent intervention by an owner within the redemption period, seeking to redeem the property as provided by law. Forrester v. Lowe, 192 Ga. 469, 15 S.E.2d 719 (1941).
Statute makes no exception in favor of minors for redeeming property sold under a tax execution. Dawson v. Dawson, 106 Ga. 45, 32 S.E. 29 (1898).
- Superior courts are empowered to issue injunctions, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. I, Para. IV; O.C.G.A. § 15-6-8, and nothing in O.C.G.A. § 48-4-40(1) deprives them of that power in the arena of redemption of property following a tax sale. Am. Lien Fund, LLC v. Dixon, 286 Ga. 562, 690 S.E.2d 415 (2010).
Cited in Southerland v. Bradshaw, 252 Ga. 294, 313 S.E.2d 92 (1984); Funderburke v. Kellet, 257 Ga. 822, 364 S.E.2d 845 (1988); Tavakolian v. Agio Corp., 283 Ga. App. 881, 642 S.E.2d 903 (2007); DRST Holdings, Ltd. v. Agio Corp., 282 Ga. 903, 655 S.E.2d 586 (2008); DLT List, LLC v. M7VEN Supportive Hous. & Dev. Group, 301 Ga. 131, 800 S.E.2d 362 (2017).
- As to excess tax sale funds, a redeeming creditor can only make a claim for the funds in the amount of the pre-tax sale lien that gave the creditor the right to redeem. SunTrust Bank v. Cowan, 344 Ga. App. 604, 812 S.E.2d 13 (2018).
- No construction, however liberal, which could be given this statute granting the privilege of redeeming land sold for taxes to the owner thereof, can inure to the benefit of a party, if the owner be a corporation, and it a mere stockholder therein. Carver Cotton Gin Co. v. Barrett & Caswell, 66 Ga. 526 (1881).
Wife, who is a beneficiary of a homestead estate sold under tax fi. fa. against the husband, can redeem the property. Lamar v. Sheppard, 80 Ga. 25, 5 S.E. 247 (1887).
Trustee in bankruptcy, as a creditor of a bankrupt, can redeem land sold under tax fieri facias if the trustee desires. In re Rogers & Williams, 3 F. Supp. 116 (S.D. Ga. 1933).
- LLC that purchased a debtor's home at a tax sale held pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 48-4-1 was entitled to an order lifting the stay that was imposed when the debtor declared Chapter 13 bankruptcy so the LLC could foreclose the deed the LLC received; although the debtor had the right under O.C.G.A. § 48-4-40 to redeem title to the home at the time the debtor declared bankruptcy because the time for doing so had not expired under state law, the debtor lost that right when the debtor failed to pay the LLC the amount it spent to purchase the tax deed, and the debtor's attempt to pay that amount in increments through the debtor's plan failed because the home was not property of the debtor's bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541. Harvest Assets, LLC v. Edwards (In re Edwards), Bankr. (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Nov. 13, 2014).
- O.C.G.A. § 48-4-45 does not provide that the interest must have been held at the time of the tax sale. The statute requires notice to lienholders who exist at the time of any attempted foreclosure of the right of redemption. Therefore, such lienholders are not barred from the right of redemption by reason of having acquired their interest subsequent to the tax sale. Leathers v. McClain, 255 Ga. 378, 338 S.E.2d 666 (1986).
- Chapter 13 debtor had a right of redemption under Georgia state law as of the debtor's petition date as the debtor obtained an interest in the property when the property was re-conveyed to the debtor prior to the redemption deadline. Although the tax sale purchaser held legal title to the property, the bundle of rights retained by the debtor was property of the debtor's bankruptcy estate. In re Jimerson, 564 Bankr. 430 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2017).
- Order disbursing excess tax sale funds to the assignee of the redeemer was reversed because the assignee could not show justifiable or good faith reliance on case law that had been overturned and, therefore, had no vested rights to the excess funds or that the issue was moot because it had already spent the funds. SunTrust Bank v. Cowan, 344 Ga. App. 604, 812 S.E.2d 13 (2018).
- Year for redemption of property sold for taxes runs from the date of the sale and not from the time when the sheriff's deed is recorded. Boyd v. Wilson, 86 Ga. 379, 12 S.E. 744 (1890).
- An appellant was entitled to fee simple title to a 50-acre tract as a predecessor in interest who purchased the property from the county after the county had purchased the property at a tax sale did not make an out-of-time redemption under former Code 1933, § 92-8301 (see now O.C.G.A. § 48-4-40(2)) as the extension of the right to redeem was not enacted until after the death of the initial purchaser, who was the predecessor's parent; the notice requirement in O.C.G.A. § 48-4-45 also was not enacted at that time. Selph v. Williams, 284 Ga. 349, 667 S.E.2d 40 (2008).
Tender after the time allowed by law for redemption under a tax sale is without efficacy, and an allegation thereof should be stricken on demurrer (now motion to dismiss). Allen v. Gates, 145 Ga. 652, 89 S.E. 821 (1916).
- Although the statute affords a positive right to redeem only within the specified period, the statute does not inhibit the purchaser from according redemption after the period has expired as a matter of grace. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Bank of Tignall, 182 Ga. 233, 185 S.E. 108 (1936); Caffey v. Parris, 186 Ga. 303, 197 S.E. 898 (1938).
- After statutory redemption period has expired, the right to redeem is gone, and there is no power even in a court of equity to authorize redemption of the property in such cases. Boroughs v. Lance, 213 Ga. 143, 97 S.E.2d 357 (1957).
- The declaration in O.C.G.A. § 48-4-40(1) that one entitled to redeem the property may do so within 12 months did not preclude the trial court from acting after those 12 months had passed. The taxpayer seeking redemption sought an injunction preserving the parties' status quo well before the passage of 12 months. Am. Lien Fund, LLC v. Dixon, 286 Ga. 562, 690 S.E.2d 415 (2010).
- Oral agreement to buy a homeowner's association's lien and indebtedness against real property was required to be in writing and signed by the party to be charged pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 13-5-30(4); because the buyer did not acquire an interest in the property until after the date of redemption, contrary to O.C.G.A. §§ 48-4-40 and48-4-41, the redemption was void. DRST Holdings, Ltd. v. Brown, 290 Ga. 317, 720 S.E.2d 626 (2012).
- When Chapter 13 debtor proposed an extension plan prior to the date when the right of redemption would have expired under Georgia state law, without regard to an extension provided by 11 U.S.C. § 108, the debtor did not reside on that property, and the Chapter 13 plan would pay the redemption amount in full, plus interest, then the redemption amount could be paid over the length of the plan regardless of whether applicable state law required a lump sum payment. In re Jimerson, 564 Bankr. 430 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2017).
- Tender on an offer to redeem property from taxes not only must be in due time and manner, but be continuous, with a continuous offer to pay; and if such continuity is not otherwise shown, at least bringing money into court on filing suit is necessary in place of continuous offer by pleading. Durham v. Crawford, 196 Ga. 381, 26 S.E.2d 778 (1943).
- Relative to the right of the owner to redeem the land, the sale will not be considered as complete until payment of the purchase money by the bidder. The owner has 12 months from the time of such payment within which to tender the money to the purchaser for the purpose of redemption. Wood v. Henry, 107 Ga. 389, 33 S.E. 410 (1899). See also Cason v. United Realty & Auction Co., 158 Ga. 584, 123 S.E. 894 (1924).
- Under requirement either that continuous good tender be made or that actual money be paid into court, mere deposit with the clerk of a draft drawn on bank of another state, payable to order of the defendant and unendorsed, would not suffice as tender on an offer to redeem property from taxes; because the draft was not endorsed; because its payment could be stopped or refused, and because there was no showing that the plaintiff had funds sufficient for payment of the draft on deposit with the drawee bank. Durham v. Crawford, 196 Ga. 381, 26 S.E.2d 778 (1943).
- Tender on offer to redeem property from a tax sale was ineffective when it is made to the purchaser at a tax sale instead of to the purchaser's grantee, after the grantee had paid the full tax money and consideration to the purchaser, and the person offering to redeem knew of such status of the property. Durham v. Crawford, 196 Ga. 381, 26 S.E.2d 778 (1943).
- Under maxim that "he who would have equity must do equity", not only must the party seeking equitable relief from a tax sale have paid or tendered sum due to the other party, but one must have done so before filing of suit, unless tender, or offer to restore be excused upon some equitable ground. Durham v. Crawford, 196 Ga. 381, 26 S.E.2d 778 (1943).
- Defendant's motion for summary judgment on the estates' claims pertaining to the redemption of the disputed property sold at a tax sale was properly granted because there was no evidence of record demonstrating an actual, present bona fide offer on behalf of the estates to pay the redemption price before the suit was filed as there was no evidence of any pre-suit communications on behalf of either estate that included an actual, present bona fide offer to pay the redemption price that had been provided by the defendant's attorney; and the administrator of the two estates did not have the money to pay the redemption price and had not obtained the probate court's approval to seek redemption of the property on the estates' behalf. Strong v. JWM Holdings, LLC, 341 Ga. App. 309, 800 S.E.2d 380 (2017).
- As to right of owner to redeem land which has been sold at tax sale, sale is not to be considered as complete until payment of purchase money by bidder. Zugar v. Scarbrough, 186 Ga. 310, 197 S.E. 854 (1938).
- When a purchaser at a tax sale was represented at the sale by the county tax collector, who, instead of paying amount of bid to the sheriff, merely paid the sheriff's costs and advertising fee and, in an adjustment of the sheriff's account as tax collector, settled with the county commissioners by deducting the taxes from credits to which the sheriff was entitled, there was no such payment of purchase money as to cause period of redemption to commence. Zugar v. Scarbrough, 186 Ga. 310, 197 S.E. 854 (1938).
- Fact that "excess" was never paid to the sheriff or settled in any manner furnishes grounds that the tax sale was not complete, relative to the owner's right to redeem. Zugar v. Scarbrough, 186 Ga. 310, 197 S.E. 854 (1938).
- Allegation that within one year after a tax sale the redeemer tendered to one who had taken title under the purchaser at the tax sale the amount of the purchase price of the property at the sale plus ten percent interest thereon from date, is subject to special demurrer (now motion to dismiss) if it does not show the amount of the purchase price or of the tender. Forrester v. Lowe, 192 Ga. 469, 15 S.E.2d 719 (1941).
When one seeking in a court of equity to redeem property sold for taxes admits stated amounts to have been paid for the property at the sale, but fails to allege payment or tender of such amounts before filing such action, the petition should be dismissed on demurrer (now motion to dismiss). Allen v. Gates, 145 Ga. 652, 89 S.E. 821 (1916).
Trial court did not err in granting a purchaser's motion to dismiss a redemption company's action to enforce redemption of real property because both the company's pre-suit tender to the purchaser and the subsequent tender to the bank that held a security deed on the property long after adding the bank as a party to the redemption action failed to meet the legal requirement of O.C.G.A. § 48-4-40 that tender to the proper party be made prior to the filing of suit; tender should have been made to the bank, which had already been named as the grantee in a security deed by the purchaser of the tax deed before suit was filed. Cmty. Renewal & Redemption v. Nix, 288 Ga. 439, 704 S.E.2d 759 (2011).
Allegation that person to whom tender was made refused it and stated that it was unnecessary to make any further tender of any kind, as the person would not surrender the property save at the end of litigation, is sufficient to show a waiver of further tender, but does not supply the deficiencies in the allegations that there had been an actual tender of amounts, alleged in an indefinite way, the plaintiffs relying on actual tender as well as waiver. Allen v. Gates, 145 Ga. 652, 89 S.E. 821 (1916).
Successor in interest to the owner of property had successfully redeemed the property from the purchaser of a tax deed by tendering an adequate amount, O.C.G.A. § 48-4-40(2), although it was refused by the purchaser; the court rejected the purchaser's claim that the purchaser acquired title by prescription under O.C.G.A. § 48-4-48 because the prescriptive period was not met and the purchaer's possession of the unfenced, uninhabited property was not sufficiently adverse. Nix v. 230 Kirkwood Homes, LLC, 300 Ga. 91, 793 S.E.2d 402 (2016).
After a tax deed holder had waived the requirement of tender by refusing to communicate with the successor in title to property sold at a tax sale, the fact that the successor in title had paid less than the amount required for redemption into the trial court's registry did not prevent the successor in title from redeeming the property when the successor stood ready, willing, and able to pay the redemption price. Mark Turner Props., Inc. v. Evans, 274 Ga. 547, 554 S.E.2d 492 (2001).
- Purchaser at tax sale acquires a defeasible title, under which the purchaser is entitled to a deed from the officer selling the property, and can convey the purchaser's own defeasible title to another person, subject only to the right of redemption. If the amount required for redemption is paid or sufficiently tendered, such payment or tender revests title in the owner, but otherwise, at the expiration of the redemption period, title becomes absolute in the purchaser or the purchaser's grantee. Durham v. Crawford, 196 Ga. 381, 26 S.E.2d 778 (1943).
Upon tender by the owner for the purpose of redeeming the owner's property from a tax sale, the purchaser's inchoate, qualified, or defeasible estate terminates. Bowman v. Poole, 212 Ga. 261, 91 S.E.2d 770 (1956).
When no redemption is made during the time in which redemption is authorized, the purchaser acquires under the tax deed an absolute and unconditional title to the land sold. Thereupon the owner and all other parties authorized by law to redeem lose their redemption rights and cease to have any interest in the land. Forrester v. Lowe, 192 Ga. 469, 15 S.E.2d 719 (1941).
- O.C.G.A. § 48-4-40 does not require that a party's valid interest in property must be recorded in the county's deed books before the party is entitled to redeem the property. Freeman v. Eastern Sav. Bank, 271 Ga. 439, 520 S.E.2d 902 (1999).
- Purchaser at a tax sale may convey the property before expiration of the redemption period, in which case the vendee acquires the inchoate or defeasible title which passed to the vendor under the tax sale, subject to the right of an owner to redeem within the time prescribed by this statute. Braswell v. Palmer, 191 Ga. 262, 11 S.E.2d 889 (1940).
Trial court properly granted summary judgment to an association, and the association's employee and a board member, on the claims by a property purchaser against them for extortion and removal of liens arising out of the purchaser's failure to pay association fees after purchasing seven properties in a subdivision through a tax sale resulting from unpaid property taxes; while it was true that the purchaser did not obtain a fee simple absolute title, and that title could be restored to specified predecessors through redemption or before the purchaser gave notice pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 48-4-45, the purchaser did receive title sufficient to trigger automatic membership in the association and was thus required to pay the association's assessed fees. Croft v. Fairfield Plantation Prop. Owners Ass'n, 276 Ga. App. 311, 623 S.E.2d 531 (2005).
Trial court erred by granting summary judgment to appellee because the homeowners' association's assignment of a lien for unpaid association dues the association relied upon to show the association possessed a property interest that authorized the association's redemption of the property indicated a different name than the property owners and the appellee had already obtained the excess tax sale funds based on the association's asserted lien resulting from the redemption. Postell v. Trinitec Portfolio Svcs., LLC, 341 Ga. App. 283, 799 S.E.2d 597 (2017).
- If cotenant redeemed property by payment of redemption money to the purchaser at tax sale, such redemption did not divest the other cotenant of title to that tenant's interest in the property. The effect of the redemption would be to restore title to the same owners who held the title before the tax sale. Andrews v. Walden, 208 Ga. 340, 66 S.E.2d 801 (1951).
- During the time allowed for redemption, a purchaser's title is inchoate and the purchaser does not have the right to be put in possession of the property. Elrod v. Owensboro Wagon Co., 128 Ga. 361, 57 S.E. 712 (1907).
- Since rents accruing within 12 months after a tax sale may not be used to supplement cash tendered in a redemption, and a purchaser at a tax sale is not entitled to rents, issues, and profits accruing between the time of the purchaser's purchase and the redemption of the property, rent for the premises after the legal sale, not paid by the tenant purchaser, is recoverable up to the time the purchaser's deed became absolute. Beckham v. Lindsey, 22 Ga. App. 174, 95 S.E. 745 (1918).
- 30 Am. Jur. 2d, Executions, § 522 et seq. 72 Am. Jur. 2d, State and Local Taxation, § 889 et seq.
- 85 C.J.S., Taxation, § 1354 et seq.
- Constitutionality of statute extending period for redemption from judicial or tax sale, or sale upon mortgage foreclosure, 1 A.L.R. 143; 38 A.L.R. 229; 89 A.L.R. 966.
Effect of purchase by cotenant in possession of common property at foreclosure sale thereof, 6 A.L.R. 297; 54 A.L.R. 874; 85 A.L.R. 1535.
Effect of imprisonment to extend time for redemption from judicial, execution, or tax sale, 18 A.L.R. 531.
Right after redemption from tax sale or forfeiture to maintain action for trespass committed between sale or forfeiture and redemption, 33 A.L.R. 302.
Payment of tax or redemption from tax sale by public officer for benefit of owner, 66 A.L.R. 1035.
Necessity and sufficiency of statement in notice of application for tax deed, or notice to redeem from tax sale, as regards time for redemption, 82 A.L.R. 502.
Judgment as lien on judgment debtor's equity of redemption in land sold for taxes, 91 A.L.R. 647.
Unexpired right of redemption as affecting status of purchaser at judicial or execution sale as sole conditional own within insurance policy, 91 A.L.R. 1439.
Deed from purchaser of tax title to former owner or lienor as a conveyance of a new title or a redemption, as regards rights or liens of third persons subordinate to tax lien, 106 A.L.R. 887.
Right of creditor or mortgagee to redeem from his own sale, 108 A.L.R. 993.
Constitutionality of statutory provisions relating to current taxes of tax delinquent property, 113 A.L.R. 1092.
Right and remedy of mortgagee who for protection of his security pays taxes on, or redeems from tax sale of, mortgaged property, 123 A.L.R. 1248.
Statute limiting period for attack on tax title as affecting remaindermen in respect of a tax sale during life tenancy, 124 A.L.R. 1145.
Right of true owner to recover proceeds of sale or lease of real property made by another in the belief that he was the owner of the property, 133 A.L.R. 1443.
Payment, tender, or deposit of tax as condition of injunction against issuance of tax deed upon ground that it had become barred by lapse of time or that the property had been redeemed, 134 A.L.R. 543.
What amounts to a sale at retail within tax statutes or ordinances, 139 A.L.R. 372.
Refusal of tender, made under protest, of amount required for redemption from tax sale, 142 A.L.R. 1198.
Retroactive application, to previous sales, of statutes reducing period of redemption from tax sales, as unconstitutional impairment of contract obligations, 147 A.L.R. 1123.
Sufficiency of tax redemption notice which includes more than one tax assessment for which land was sold, or more than one tract of land, 155 A.L.R. 1198.
Statutes providing for refund to purchaser at invalid tax sale as applicable where sale antedated the statute, 157 A.L.R. 399.
Right of person under disability to redeem from tax sale, 159 A.L.R. 1467.
One in adverse possession as within class of persons entitled to redeem from tax sale, 164 A.L.R. 1285.
What constitutes "execution" of tax deed beginning or ending period for redemption from tax sale, 166 A.L.R. 853.
Statutory limitation of period for attack on tax deed as affected by failure to comply with statutory requirement as to notice before tax deed, 5 A.L.R.2d 1021.
Effect of certificate, statement (or refusal thereof), or error by tax collector or other public officer regarding unpaid taxes or assessments against specific property, 21 A.L.R.2d 1273.
Who may redeem, from a tax foreclosure or sale, property to which title or record ownership is held by corporation, 54 A.L.R.2d 1172.
Applicability of tax redemption statutes to separate mineral estates, 56 A.L.R.2d 621.
What judgment creditors, other than the one on whose execution the sale was made, may redeem from execution sale, 58 A.L.R.2d 467.
Right of interested party receiving due notice of tax sale or of right to redeem to assert failure or insufficiency of notice to other interested party, 45 A.L.R.4th 447.
Total Results: 20
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2017-05-15
Citation: 301 Ga. 131, 800 S.E.2d 362, 2017 WL 2061686, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 374
Snippet: interest in or lien upon such property See OCGA § 48-4-40. Redemption places title to the real property back
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2017-03-06
Citation: 300 Ga. 670, 797 S.E.2d 895, 2017 WL 875095, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 165
Snippet: 297 Ga. 237, 239 (773 SE2d 236) (2015); OCGA § 48-4-40 (providing that “the defendant in fi. fa. or any
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2016-11-07
Citation: 300 Ga. 91, 793 S.E.2d 402, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 727
Snippet: supra, 288 Ga. at 442 (2) (b). See also OCGA § 48-4-40. However, CRR’s failure to meet this prerequisite
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2015-06-01
Snippet: the property by giving notice under OCGA § 48-4-40 et seq. (“the barment statutes) to all parties
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2015-06-01
Citation: 297 Ga. 237, 773 S.E.2d 236, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 367
Snippet: by giving notice under *240 OCGA § 48-4-40 et seq. (“the barment statutes”) to all parties
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2014-03-03
Citation: 294 Ga. 640, 755 S.E.2d 675, 2014 Fulton County D. Rep. 357, 2014 WL 819430, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 171
Snippet: OCGA § 48-4-1 et seq. 3 See OCGA § 48-4-40 et seq. 4 The appeal has taken a
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2012-09-10
Citation: 291 Ga. 549, 731 S.E.2d 683, 2012 Fulton County D. Rep. 2746, 2012 WL 3890210, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 692
Snippet: foreclosure of all rights of redemption. See OCGA §§ 48-4-40 and 48-4-45. Nancy Karlen claimed to have had an
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2012-07-02
Citation: 291 Ga. 316, 729 S.E.2d 323, 2012 Fulton County D. Rep. 2156, 2012 WL 2512747, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 639
Snippet: 5, 7 (673 SE2d 205) (2009); see also OCGA §§ 48-4-40 — 48-4-48 (redemption of property sold for taxes)
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2012-01-09
Citation: 290 Ga. 317, 720 S.E.2d 626, 2012 Fulton County D. Rep. 73, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 11
Snippet: interest in the property as required by OCGA § 48-4-40 or was a creditor of the defendant in fi. fa. at
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2011-03-07
Citation: 709 S.E.2d 214, 289 Ga. 67, 2011 Fulton County D. Rep. 540, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 175
Snippet: absolute 12-month right of redemption under OCGA § 48-4-40(1) had not expired and, as a result, Brown held
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2011-01-10
Citation: 704 S.E.2d 759, 288 Ga. 439, 2011 Fulton County D. Rep. 45, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 3
Snippet: reasons that follow, we affirm. 1. Under OCGA § 48-4-40, the article of the Georgia Code governing redemption
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2010-03-01
Citation: 690 S.E.2d 415, 286 Ga. 562, 2010 Fulton County D. Rep. 535, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 178
Snippet: right to redeem her real property under OCGA § 48-4-40 et seq., after ALF purchased the property at a
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2010-02-08
Citation: 690 S.E.2d 375, 286 Ga. 541, 2010 Fulton County D. Rep. 328, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 145
Snippet: to exercise a right of redemption under OCGA § 48-4-40. See, e.g., Community Renewal and Redemption v
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2009-11-23
Citation: 687 S.E.2d 463, 286 Ga. 284, 2009 Fulton County D. Rep. 3642, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 734
Snippet: Foxworthy, Inc., for $51,406.88. Under OCGA § 48-4-40 (1), the Safios had an initial period of 12 months
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2008-09-22
Citation: 667 S.E.2d 40, 284 Ga. 349, 2008 Fulton County D. Rep. 2943, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 754
Snippet: statutory 12-month period in § 92-8301 (current OCGA § 48-4-40(a)), the right to redeem had not been foreclosed
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2008-07-11
Citation: 664 S.E.2d 201, 284 Ga. 262, 2008 Fulton County D. Rep. 2387, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 623
Snippet: blow when the General Assembly amended OCGA § 48-4-40 in 1978 to again provide for a period of adverse
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2008-01-08
Citation: 655 S.E.2d 586, 282 Ga. 903, 2008 Fulton County D. Rep. 73, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 6
Snippet: its foreclosure option until May of 2005. OCGA § 48-4-40(1). However, the fact that the equity of redemption
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2005-11-07
Citation: 621 S.E.2d 722, 279 Ga. 840, 2005 Fulton County D. Rep. 3352, 2005 Ga. LEXIS 762
Snippet: Justices concur. NOTES [1] Pursuant to OCGA § 48-4-40, a person whose property has been sold for a tax
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2003-09-15
Citation: 586 S.E.2d 235, 277 Ga. 41, 2003 Fulton County D. Rep. 2712, 2003 Ga. LEXIS 723
Snippet: redeem the property by giving notice under OCGA § 48-4-40, et seq., ("the barment statutes") to all parties
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2001-11-05
Citation: 554 S.E.2d 492, 274 Ga. 547, 2001 Fulton County D. Rep. 3324, 2001 Ga. LEXIS 860
Snippet: within 12 months from the date of the sale," OCGA § 48-4-40(1), but it is uncontroverted that they failed to