Tender requirement does not violate due process.

- Delinquent taxpayers could not maintain a suit to set aside a tax deed because the taxpayers failed to pay or tender the redemption amount required under O.C.G.A. § 48-4-47. O.C.G.A. § 48-4-47 did not violate their due process rights, although the redemption amount of $112,416 dwarfed the original $2,000 in unpaid taxes due to the addition of taxes and penalties under O.C.G.A. § 48-4-42. Saffo v. Foxworthy, Inc., 286 Ga. 284, 687 S.E.2d 463 (2009), cert. denied, 560 U.S. 939, 130 S. Ct. 3360, 176 L. Ed. 2d 1246 (2010).

Retroactive application not unconstitutional.

- Since a tax sale took place in 1995, application of the 1996 amendment that increased the amount of the annual premium from 10 percent to 20 percent was not unconstitutionally retroactive as neither the tax deed holder's rights to the property nor those of a successor in title had fully vested prior to the effective date of the amendment. Mark Turner Props., Inc. v. Evans, 274 Ga. 547, 554 S.E.2d 492 (2001).

One purpose of the 10 percent penalty is to make the purchaser whole for the use of the purchaser's money during the time it is tied up in the property. Southerland v. Bradshaw, 255 Ga. 455, 339 S.E.2d 579 (1986).

Purpose of requirement that payment be made to purchaser or heirs.

- By the terms of this statute, a prerequisite to redemption is that amounts required for redemption must be paid to the purchaser, or the purchaser's heirs, successors, or assigns in lawful money of the United States. The intent and purpose of this payment is to fully compensate the owner for what the owner paid plus a penalty. This purpose is defeated if payment is made to just anyone in the chain for the owner at the time is alone entitled to such payment. Herrington v. Old S. Inv. Co., 222 Ga. 428, 150 S.E.2d 623 (1966).

Computation of time period for which premium is due.

- By establishing the reference points of O.C.G.A. § 48-4-42 as "each year or fraction of a year which has elapsed between the date of the sale and the date on which the redemption payment is made", the General Assembly has demonstrated its intention to compute the time period for which a 10 percent premium is due as a 12-month year running from the date of sale. Southerland v. Bradshaw, 255 Ga. 455, 339 S.E.2d 579 (1986).

Effect of redemption.

- Limited liability company (LLC) was entitled to fee simple title to property conveyed by a warranty deed after the LLC redeemed the property under O.C.G.A. § 48-4-42 as to a 1984 tax deed held by a corporation because title had not ripened in the corporation under O.C.G.A. § 48-4-48 as the corporation had not established adverse possession. BX Corp. v. Hickory Hill 1185, LLC, 285 Ga. 5, 673 S.E.2d 205 (2009).

Failure to pay or tender to proper party as bar to action to redeem.

- When proper tender would have been to the holders under the security deed, failure to pay or tender to the holders the required amount for redemption is a bar to the prosecution of an action to redeem. Herrington v. Old S. Inv. Co., 222 Ga. 428, 150 S.E.2d 623 (1966).

Failure to exercise right of redemption.

- Transferee by tax deeds of tax lien encumbered property, following a tax sale of the property, held fee simple title to the property unencumbered by any competing tax liens after notice and expiration of the redemption period. Nat'l Tax Funding, L.P. v. Harpagon Co., 277 Ga. 41, 586 S.E.2d 235 (2003).

Agreement to redeem.

- In taxpayers' claim against a purchaser's assignee for rescission of a redemption agreement, the facts did not support rescission. The assignee's attorney did not defraud them or conceal any facts, but advised them to hire an attorney, and any failure to advise them of their legal rights was an opinion as to a matter of law and not a material fact. Boyd v. JohnGalt Holdings, LLC, 294 Ga. 640, 755 S.E.2d 675 (2014).

Failure to show property interest.

- Trial court erred by granting summary judgment to appellee because the homeowners' association's assignment of a lien for unpaid association dues the association relied upon to show the association possessed a property interest that authorized the association's redemption of the property indicated a different name than the property owners and the appellee had already obtained the excess tax sale funds based on the association's asserted lien resulting from the redemption. Postell v. Trinitec Portfolio Svcs., LLC, 341 Ga. App. 283, 799 S.E.2d 597 (2017).

Cited in Southerland v. Bradshaw, 252 Ga. 294, 313 S.E.2d 92 (1984); Leathers v. McClain, 255 Ga. 378, 338 S.E.2d 666 (1986); Davis v. Harpagon Co., LLC, 281 Ga. 250, 637 S.E.2d 1 (2006); Human v. Harpagon Co., LLC, 281 Ga. 372, 637 S.E.2d 684 (2006); Davis v. Harpagon Co., LLC, 283 Ga. 539, 661 S.E.2d 545 (2008).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 30 Am. Jur. 2d, Executions, §§ 533, 534. 72 Am. Jur. 2d, State and Local Taxation, § 723.

C.J.S.

- 85 C.J.S., Taxation, § 1434 et seq.

ALR.

- Statutes providing for refund to purchaser at invalid tax sale as applicable where sale antedated the statute, 157 A.L.R. 399.