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2018 Georgia Code 48-4-47 | Car Wreck Lawyer

TITLE 48 REVENUE AND TAXATION

Section 4. Tax Sales, 48-4-1 through 48-4-112.

ARTICLE 3 REDEMPTION OF PROPERTY SOLD FOR TAXES

48-4-47. Tender of redemption price before action to cancel tax deed.

  1. After notice to foreclose the right of redemption as provided for in this article has been given, no action shall be filed, allowed, sanctioned, or maintained for the purpose of setting aside, canceling, or in any way invalidating the tax deed referred to in the notice or the title conveyed by the tax deed unless and until the plaintiff in the action pays or legally tenders to the grantee in the deed or to his successors the full amount of the redemption price for the property, as provided for in this article.
  2. Subsection (a) of this Code section shall apply unless it clearly appears that:
    1. The tax or special assessment for the collection of which the execution under or by virtue of which the sale was held was not due at the time of the sale; or
    2. Service or notice was not given as required in this article.

(Ga. L. 1937, p. 491, § 2; Code 1933, § 91A-437, enacted by Ga. L. 1978, p. 309, § 2.)

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Tender requirement does not violate due process.

- Delinquent taxpayers could not maintain a suit to set aside a tax deed because they failed to pay or tender the redemption amount required under O.C.G.A. § 48-4-47. O.C.G.A. § 48-4-47 did not violate their due process rights, although the redemption amount of $112,416 dwarfed the original $2,000 in unpaid taxes due to the addition of taxes and penalties under O.C.G.A. § 48-4-42. Saffo v. Foxworthy, Inc., 286 Ga. 284, 687 S.E.2d 463 (2009), cert. denied, 560 U.S. 939, 130 S. Ct. 3360, 176 L. Ed. 2d 1246 (2010).

Effect of plaintiff's financial inability to make tender.

- Plaintiff's financial inability to make the tender of the amount owed does not alter the requirements of this statute. Ayer v. Lamar County, 194 Ga. 712, 22 S.E.2d 606 (1942).

Collateral attack on ownership of property.

- Plaintiffs were barred from collaterally attacking the validity of the county's ownership of property at the time of the demolition of a home on the property since there was no tender of the redemption price to the county regarding the property and there was nothing in the record to indicate that taxes, which formed the basis for the tax sale of the property, were not due at the time of sale or that the county failed to provide proper notice or service of the county's bar of redemption. Hill v. Mayor of Savannah, 233 Ga. App. 742, 505 S.E.2d 35 (1998).

Tender of redemption price not required since notice not given to redeeming party.

- Trial court erred by finding that the failure of the plaintiff to tender the full amount of the redemption price for the property at issue before filing suit barred that action under the statute since the plaintiff claimed that the plaintiff did not receive the statutorily required notice. H & C Dev., Inc. v. Bershader, 248 Ga. App. 546, 546 S.E.2d 907 (2001).

Exception to tender requirement found.

- Because an exception to the tender requirement that the redemption price be tendered before the validity of a tax deed could be challenged applied, as it appeared that the tax or special assessment for the collection of which the execution under or by virtue of which the sale was held was not due at the time of the sale based on the property's tax-exempt status, the appeals court rejected a claim that trustees for the property lacked standing to contest the tax sale because they did not tender the amount of unpaid taxes for which the property was sold. Marathon Inv. Corp. v. Spinkston, 281 Ga. 888, 644 S.E.2d 133 (2007).

Because there was evidence in the form of a taxpayer's averment that there were no taxes due at the time of a tax sale, relieving the taxpayer of the obligation to make a complete tender prior to seeking redemption of the taxpayer's property under O.C.G.A. § 48-4-47(b)(1), a trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in granting an interlocutory injunction to maintain the status quo, pending resolution of the issues presented. Am. Lien Fund, LLC v. Dixon, 286 Ga. 562, 690 S.E.2d 415 (2010).

Failure to give notice of right to redemption.

- O.C.G.A. § 48-4-47 was inapplicable in a redemption company's action against a purchaser to enforce redemption of real property because the purchaser had not given the statutorily required notice of foreclosure of the right to redemption at any time since the purchaser's purchase of the property by tax deed. Cmty. Renewal & Redemption v. Nix, 288 Ga. 439, 704 S.E.2d 759 (2011).

Cited in Southerland v. Bradshaw, 252 Ga. 294, 313 S.E.2d 92 (1984).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 72 Am. Jur. 2d, State and Local Taxation, § 723.

C.J.S.

- 85 C.J.S., Taxation, § 1441 et seq.

ALR.

- Necessity of recording tax deed to protect title as against interest derived from former owner, 65 A.L.R. 1015.

Tax title or deed as subject to attack for want of notice of application for tax deed or of expiration of redemption period, where a statute makes tax deed conclusive evidence of matters preliminary to its issuance or limits attack thereon to specific grounds or exempts deed from attack for procedural irregularities or omissions, 134 A.L.R. 796.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 48-4-47

Total Results: 6  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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Saffo v. Foxworthy, Inc., 687 S.E.2d 463 (Ga. 2009).

Cited 13 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 23, 2009 | 286 Ga. 284, 2009 Fulton County D. Rep. 3642

...Barnes, Ellen M. Taylor, William A. Castings, Jr., Vincent D. Hyman, Janet S. Todd, Thurbert E. Baker, Atty. Gen., R.O. Lerer, Deputy Atty. Gen., Atlanta, for appellees. NAHMIAS, Justice. The appellants contend the trial court erred in relying on OCGA § 48-4-47 to dismiss their complaint against the appellees to recover property sold at a tax sale to satisfy unpaid property taxes. OCGA § 48-4-47 provides that once the right of redemption has been foreclosed by the providing of notice to the delinquent taxpayer and the passing of the barment date, the delinquent taxpayer cannot file or maintain suit to invalidate the tax deed witho...
...and the resulting tax deed. The appellants argue that the trial court nevertheless erred in dismissing their complaint, because an exception to the statutory payment or tender requirement applies and because the payment or tender requirement of OCGA § 48-4-47 violates their constitutional due process rights....
...reiterated an earlier order referring Foxworthy's counterclaim to a special master for a report and recommendation. The Saffos appealed. [1] 2. The Saffos raise two claims on appeal. First, they argue that the trial court erred in holding that OCGA § 48-4-47 bars their suit challenging the validity of the tax sale and resulting tax deed to Foxworthy. Second, they contend that OCGA § 48-4-47 violates their constitutional right to due process of law....
...Service of the notice of foreclosure of the right of redemption bars the filing or continuance of any action to set aside, cancel, or in any way invalidate the tax deed referred to in the notice or the title conveyed by the tax deed, unless the plaintiff first pays or tenders the full redemption amount. See OCGA § 48-4-47(a)....
...The Code provides only two exceptions to the payment or tender requirement: (1) where it clearly appears that the unpaid taxes which triggered the tax sale were not actually due at the time of the tax sale; and (2) where it clearly appears that "[s]ervice or notice was not given as required in this article." See OCGA § 48-4-47(b)(1),(2). With this background, we turn to the Saffos' two claims. 3. The Saffos contend the trial court erred in applying OCGA § 48-4-47 to bar their lawsuit challenging the tax sale and resulting tax deed to Foxworthy because they were not given timely notice of foreclosure of the right of redemption....
...redeemed at any time before June 20, 2002, by payment of the redemption price as fixed and provided for by law." (Emphasis supplied.) See OCGA § 48-4-46. Thus, the Saffos argue that the second exception to the payment or tender requirement of OCGA § 48-4-47 applies, because it clearly appears that "[s]ervice or notice [of foreclosure of the right of redemption] was not given as required in this article." OCGA § 48-4-47(b)....
...Foxworthy caused a second Notice of Foreclosure of Equity of Redemption to be served on them on November 4, 2004, which specified a barment date of December 28, 2004. The Saffos clearly received much more than the requisite 30 days' notice, and OCGA § 48-4-47(a) bars not only the "fil[ing]" of a suit to set aside a tax deed without payment or tender of the redemption amount, but also "maintain[ing]" such a suit. It is undisputed that the Saffos never paid or tendered the redemption amount. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in dismissing the Saffos' complaint for failing to pay or tender the redemption amount as required by OCGA § 48-4-47....
...ess would start all over again. What the Saffos seek is not simply an opportunity to be heard before a neutral decision maker, but an opportunity to be heard that will result in the return of their property to them without having to pay for it. OCGA § 48-4-47 does not violate the Saffos' due process rights simply because, in effect, it prevents them and others unwilling or unable to pay or tender the redemption amount from forcing the taxing authority, the new owner, and the trial court to enga...
...But procedures may be harsh without being unconstitutional. In this case, the Saffos have failed to make out a valid claim that their due process rights have been violated. Accordingly, we reject their due process challenge to the constitutionality of OCGA § 48-4-47....
...239(1), 430 S.E.2d 1 (1993). While I find the majority's legal analysis to be sound under the current state of the law, I write because I nevertheless believe the result to be harsh and not in keeping with protecting homeowners' rights. Particularly problematic is OCGA § 48-4-47(a), which requires the homeowner to pay the full redemption price as a condition to maintaining a suit over the validity of the tax sale....
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Am. Lien Fund, LLC v. Dixon, 690 S.E.2d 415 (Ga. 2010).

Cited 6 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 1, 2010 | 286 Ga. 562, 2010 Fulton County D. Rep. 535

...ALF notes that Dixon tendered to it $6,019.97, an amount she calculated based on the purported unpaid property taxes. ALF returned the tender. In support of its argument that Dixon can continue her suit only by making a full and proper tender, ALF looks to OCGA § 48-4-47, which provides: (a) After notice to foreclose the right of redemption as provided for in this article has been given, no action shall be filed, allowed, sanctioned, or maintained for the purpose of setting aside, canceling, or in any way...
...l assessment for the collection of which the execution under or by virtue of which the sale was held was not due at the time of the sale; or (2) Service or notice was not given as required in this article. Although ALF is correct in noting that OCGA § 48-4-47(a) generally provides that one who wishes to redeem the property must make a complete tender in order to challenge the tax deed, ALF has ignored OCGA § 48-4-47(b)(1), which specifically creates an exception when "it clearly appears that ... [t]he tax ... was not due at the time of the *418 sale." That is exactly what Dixon contends; she avers that she paid her 2003, 2004, and 2005 taxes, and thus asserts that no tax was due at the time of the tax sale. ALF contends that OCGA § 48-4-47(b)'s language stating that the exception to the tender requirement will apply only if it "clearly appears" that the taxes were not due, means that the trial court must first make a factual finding as to what "clearly appears" in order to apply an exception under OCGA § 48-4-47(b)....
...However, ALF cites to no statutory language or case law stating that a factual resolution of what "clearly appears" from the evidence is an issue to be decided by the trial court alone, and we find none. Here, there is a factual dispute as to whether Dixon falls into the exception provided in OCGA § 48-4-47(b); she avers she paid her taxes and nothing was owed at the time of the tax sale....
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Cmty. Renewal & Redemption v. Nix, 704 S.E.2d 759 (Ga. 2011).

Cited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jan 10, 2011 | 288 Ga. 439, 2011 Fulton County D. Rep. 45

...BOA was added as a party to the complaint in early 2004, and more than three years later, in June 2007, CRR filed a motion of unconditional tender of redemption price in the trial court, purporting to completely and continuously tender to Nix and/or BOA. (a) CRR argues the trial court erred in applying OCGA § 48-4-47 to bar its suit because tender of the redemption price is required only after notice to foreclose the right of redemption is provided. [1] It is undisputed that Nix has not given the statutorily required notice of foreclosure of the right to redemption at any time since her purchase of the property by tax deed. Thus, contrary to the conclusion of the trial court, OCGA § 48-4-47 is inapplicable to the instant case....
...City of Atlanta, 281 Ga. 652, 653(2), 642 S.E.2d 100 (2007) (motion to dismiss properly granted if allegations disclose with certainty that plaintiff not entitled to relief under any state of provable facts). Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur. NOTES [1] OCGA § 48-4-47(a) provides, in pertinent part, that after notice to foreclose the right of redemption has been given, no action to invalidate the tax deed may be filed or maintained unless "the plaintiff in the action pays or legally tenders to the grant...
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Marathon Inv. Corp. v. Spinkston, 644 S.E.2d 133 (Ga. 2007).

Cited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Apr 24, 2007 | 281 Ga. 888, 2007 Fulton County D. Rep. 1373

...of a tax deed can be challenged does not apply if "it clearly appears that . . . [t]he tax or special assessment for the collection of which the execution under or by virtue of which the sale was held was not due at the time of the sale. . . ." OCGA § 48-4-47(b)(1)....
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Southerland v. Bradshaw, 313 S.E.2d 92 (Ga. 1984).

Cited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 14, 1984 | 252 Ga. 294

...We find no merit in this enumeration of error. 2. In his second enumeration of error appellant also contends there remain issues of fact concerning the sufficiency of tender, therefore, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to appellee. We agree. OCGA § 48-4-47 (a) (Code Ann....
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Karlen v. Reliance Equities, LLC, 291 Ga. 549 (Ga. 2012).

Cited 2 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 10, 2012 | 731 S.E.2d 683, 2012 Fulton County D. Rep. 2746

...persons [referenced in this statute] who reside in the county in which the property is located.”). The special master also ruled that Karlen was prohibited from challenging the validity of the tax sale due to her failure to tender the statutory redemption amount. See OCGA § 48-4-47 (a) (after notice of foreclosure of right of redemption, title conveyed by tax deed will not be invalidated unless plaintiff legally tenders the full amount of the property redemption price)....