O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 48-5-49 (2019)

Determination of eligibility of applicant for homestead exemption; appeal

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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(a) The official receiving an application for homestead exemption shall determine the eligibility of the applicant to claim the exemption and, whether the application is approved or disapproved, he shall then transfer the application to the county board of tax assessors for final determination by the board as to eligibility and value as provided by law. (b) The applicant shall have the right of appeal from the decision of the board of assessors to the county board of equalization as provided in Code Section 48-5-311.

History

Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 145, § 5; Code 1933, § 91A-1113, enacted by Ga. L.

1978, p. 309, § 2; Ga. L. 1979, p. 5, § 31; Ga. L. 1981, p. 1857, § 14.

Annotations

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Statute does not violate due process clause. - Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 145, § 5 (see now subsection (a) of O.C.G.A. § 48-5-49) does not deny taxpayers a chance to be heard before either the tax commissioner or the board of tax assessors. The rights of an applicant for a homestead exemption are further safeguarded by Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 145, § 5 (see now subsection (b) of O.C.G.A. § 48-5-49), allowing the right of appeal from a decision of the board. This statute is not, for any reason assigned, violative of the due process clause of the Constitution. Duncan v. Proctor, 195 Ga. 499, 24 S.E.2d 791, 1943 Ga. LEXIS 533 (1943). Statute does not violate homestead provisions of constitution. - Procedure contained in this statute, providing for determination of the eligibility of a resident to receive the homestead exemption, is not violative of Ga. Const. 1877, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. VII (see now Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII,

Sec. II, Para. I-IV), upon which this statute is based. Duncan v. Proctor, 195 Ga. 499, 24 S.E.2d 791, 1943 Ga. LEXIS 533 (1943). Right to appeal. - County’s recalculations of the taxpayers’ homestead exemptions involved the value of the exemptions, bringing the taxpayers within O.C.G.A. § 48-5-49, which permitted an appeal under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311. Since the county had not given the taxpayers notice under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-306 of the taxpayers’ right to appeal, the taxpayers were entitled to equitable relief requiring the county to: (1) provide taxpayers with proper notice of and the right to appeal changes in the homestead exemptions; (2) stop collecting taxes referenced in bills sent without proper notice; and (3) refund any tax money collected based on bills issued without such notice. Fulton County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Marani, 299 Ga. App. 580, 683 S.E.2d 136, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 909 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C2072, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 18 (Ga. Jan. 12, 2010).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. 40 Am. Jur. 2d, Homestead, § 13 et seq.

C.J.S. 40 C.J.S., Homesteads, § 41.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 1 case, 2009–2009 · leading case: Fulton Cnty. Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Marani, 683 S.E.2d 136 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009).
Fulton Cnty. Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Marani, 683 S.E.2d 136 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009). · cites it 8× “The County’s strict interpretation of OCGA § 48-5-311 ignores *584 specific language relating to homestead exemptions in OCGA § 48-5-49. That Code section authorizes the BTA to determine both a property owner’s eligibility for an exemption and the value of the exemption.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.