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Call Now: 904-383-7448As used in this Code section, the term "appeal administrator" means the clerk of the superior court.
(1.1) The grand jury shall be authorized to conduct a hearing following its receipt of the report of the appeal administrator under paragraph (2) of subsection (a.1) of this Code section and to remove one or more members of the board of equalization for failure to perform the duties required under this Code section.
"I, ______________, agree to serve as a member of the board of equalization of the County of ______________ and will decide any issue put before me without favor or affection to any party and without prejudice for or against any party. I will follow and apply the laws of this state. I also agree not to discuss any case or any issue with any person other than members of the board of equalization except at any appeal hearing. I shall faithfully and impartially discharge my duties in accordance with the Constitution and laws of this state, to the best of my skill and knowledge. So help me God.
____________________________________________
Signature of member or alternate member"
In addition to the oath of office prescribed in this paragraph, the presiding or chief judge of the superior court or the appeal administrator shall charge each member and alternate member of the county board of equalization with the law and duties relating to such office.
(C.1) The operations of the appeal administrator under this Code section shall, for budgeting purposes, constitute a distinct budget unit within the county budget that is separate from the operations of the clerk of the superior court. The appeal administrator budget unit shall contain a separate line item for the compensation of the appeal administrator for the performance of duties required under this Code section as well as separate line items for resources, facilities, and personnel as specified under subparagraphs (B) and (C) of this paragraph.
(A.1) The commissioner shall establish by rule and regulation a uniform appeal form that the taxpayer may use. Such uniform appeal form shall require the initial assertion of a valuation of the property by the taxpayer.
(B.1) The taxpayer or his or her agent or representative may submit in support of his or her appeal an appraisal given, signed, and certified as such by a real property appraiser as classified by the Georgia Real Estate Commission and the Georgia Real Estate Appraisers Board which was performed not later than nine months prior to the date of assessment. The board of tax assessors shall consider the appraisal upon request. Within 45 days of the receipt of the taxpayer's appraisal, the board of tax assessors shall notify the taxpayer or his or her agent or representative of acceptance of the appraisal or shall notify the taxpayer or his or her agent or representative of the reasons for rejection.
(B.2) The taxpayer or his or her agent or representative may submit in support of his or her appeal the most current report of the sales ratio study for the county conducted pursuant to Code Section 48-5-274. The board of tax assessors shall consider such sales ratio study upon request of the taxpayer or his or her agent or representative.
(B.3) Any assertion of value by the taxpayer on the uniform appeal form made to the board of tax assessors shall be subject to later amendment or revision by the taxpayer by submission of written evidence to the board of tax assessors.
(B.4) If more than one property of a taxpayer is under appeal, the board of equalization, arbitrator, or hearing officer, as the case may be, shall, upon request of the taxpayer, consolidate all such appeals in one hearing and shall announce separate decisions as to each parcel or item of property. Any appeal from such a consolidated hearing to the superior court as provided in subsection (g) of this Code section shall constitute a single civil action and, unless the taxpayer specifically so indicates in the taxpayer's notice of appeal, shall apply to all such parcels or items of property.
(B.5) Within ten days of a final determination of value under this Code section and the expiration of the 30 day appeal period provided by subsection (g) of this Code section, or, as otherwise provided by law, with no further option to appeal, the county board of tax assessors shall forward such final determination of value to the tax commissioner.
The hearing officer shall swear in all witnesses, perform the powers, duties, and authority of a county or regional board of equalization, and determine the fair market value of the real property or wireless property based upon the testimony and evidence presented during the hearing. Any issues other than fair market value and uniformity raised in the appeal shall be preserved for appeal to the superior court. The board of tax assessors shall have the burden of proving its opinion of value and the validity of its proposed assessment by a preponderance of evidence. At the conclusion of the hearing, the hearing officer shall notify both parties of the decision verbally and shall either send both parties the decision in writing or deliver the decision by hand to each party, with written receipt.
If, at any time during the appeal under this subsection, the taxpayer and the county board of tax assessors execute a signed written agreement on the fair market value and any other issues raised: the appeal shall terminate as of the date of such signed agreement; the fair market value as set forth in such agreement shall become final; and subsection (c) of Code Section 48-5-299 shall apply.
The taxpayer or the board of tax assessors may appeal the decision of the hearing officer to the superior court as provided in subsection (g) of this Code section.
(9.1) The provisions contained in this subsection may be waived at any time by written consent of the taxpayer and the county board of tax assessors.
The provisions in subsection (c) of Code Section 48-5-299 shall apply to the valuation, unless otherwise waived in writing by both parties, as to:
In the event of the absence of an individual from such individual's residence because of duty in the armed forces, the filing requirements set forth in paragraph (3) of subsection (f) of this Code section shall be tolled for a period of 90 days. During this period, any member of the immediate family of the individual, or a friend of the individual, may notify the tax receiver or the tax commissioner of the individual's absence due to military service and submit written notice of representation for the limited purpose of the appeal. Upon receipt of this notice, the tax receiver or the tax commissioner shall initiate the appeal.
A notice of appeal to a board of tax assessors under subsection (e), (e.1), (f), or (g) of this Code section shall be deemed filed as of the date of the United States Postal Service postmark, receipt of delivery by statutory overnight delivery, or, if the board of tax assessors has adopted a written policy consenting to electronic service, by transmitting a copy to the board of tax assessors via e-mail in portable document format using all e-mail addresses provided by the board of tax assessors. Service by mail, statutory overnight delivery, or electronic transmittal is complete upon such service. Proof of service may be made within 45 days of receipt of the annual notice of current assessment under Code Section 48-5-306 to the taxpayer by certificate of the taxpayer, the taxpayer's attorney, or the taxpayer's employee by written admission or by affidavit. Failure to make proof of service shall not affect the validity of service.
When a taxpayer authorizes an agent, representative, or attorney in writing to act on the taxpayer's behalf, and a copy of such written authorization is provided to the county board of tax assessors, all notices required to be provided to the taxpayer under this Code section, including those regarding hearing times, dates, certifications, notice of changes or corrections, or other official actions, shall be provided to the taxpayer and the authorized agent, representative, or attorney. Upon agreement by the county board of tax assessors and the taxpayer's agent, representative, or attorney, notices required by this Code section to be sent to the taxpayer or the taxpayer's agent, representative, or attorney may be sent by e-mail. The failure to comply with this subsection with respect to a notice required under this Code section shall result in the tolling of any deadline imposed on the taxpayer under this Code section with respect to that notice.
(a.1)Appeal administrator.
(a.2)Establishment of boards of equalization.
Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, there is established in each county of this state a county board of equalization to consist of three members and three alternate members appointed in the manner and for the term set forth in this Code section. In those counties having more than 10,000 parcels of real property, the county governing authority, by appropriate resolution adopted on or before November 1 of each year, may elect to have selected one additional county board of equalization for each 10,000 parcels of real property in the county or for any part of a number of parcels in the county exceeding 10,000 parcels.
Notwithstanding any part of this subsection to the contrary, at any time the governing authority of a county makes a request to the grand jury of the county for additional alternate members of boards of equalization, the grand jury shall appoint the number of alternate members so requested to each board of equalization, such number not to exceed a maximum of 21 alternate members for each of the boards. The alternate members of the boards shall be duly qualified and authorized to serve on any of the boards of equalization of the county. The members of each board of equalization may designate a chairperson and two vice chairpersons of each such board of equalization. The appeal administrator shall have administrative authority in all matters governing the conduct and business of the boards of equalization so as to provide oversight and supervision of such boards and scheduling of appeals. Any combination of members or alternate members of any such board of equalization of the county shall be competent to exercise the power and authority of the board. Any person designated as an alternate member of any such board of equalization of the county shall be competent to serve in such capacity as provided in this Code section upon appointment and taking of oath.
(e.1)Appeals to hearing officer.
(A) For any dispute involving the value or uniformity of a parcel of nonhomestead real property with a fair market value in excess of $500,000.00 as shown on the taxpayer's annual notice of current assessment under Code Section 48-5-306, at the option of the taxpayer, an appeal may be submitted to a hearing officer in accordance with this subsection. If such taxpayer owns nonhomestead real property contiguous to such qualified nonhomestead real property, at the option of the taxpayer, such contiguous property may be consolidated with the qualified property for purposes of the hearing under this subsection.
Individuals desiring to serve as hearing officers and who are either state certified general real property appraisers or state certified residential real property appraisers as classified by the Georgia Real Estate Commission and the Georgia Real Estate Appraisers Board for real property appeals or are designated appraisers by a nationally recognized appraiser's organization for wireless property appeals shall complete and submit an application, a list of counties the hearing officer is willing to serve, disqualification questionnaire, and resume and be approved by the Georgia Real Estate Commission and the Georgia Real Estate Appraisers Board to serve as a hearing officer. Such board shall annually publish a list of qualified and approved hearing officers for Georgia.
The appeal administrator shall furnish any hearing officer so selected the necessary facilities.
An appeal shall be effected by e-mailing, if the county board of tax assessors has adopted a written policy consenting to electronic service, or by filing with the county board of tax assessors a notice of appeal to a hearing officer within 45 days from the date of mailing the notice of assessment pursuant to Code Section 48-5-306. A written objection to an assessment of real property or wireless property received by a county board of tax assessors stating the taxpayer's election to appeal to a hearing officer and showing the location of the real property or wireless property contained in the assessment notice shall be deemed a notice of appeal by the taxpayer.
The county board of tax assessors may for no more than 90 days review the taxpayer's written appeal, and if changes or corrections are made by the county board of tax assessors, the board shall notify the taxpayer in writing of such changes. Within 30 days of the county board of tax assessors' mailing of such notice, the taxpayer may notify the county board of tax assessors in writing that the changes or corrections made by the county board of tax assessors are not acceptable, in which case, the county board of tax assessors shall, within 30 days of the date of mailing of such taxpayer's notification, send or deliver all necessary documentation to the appeal administrator, in paper or electronic format as agreed upon by the county board of tax assessors and appeal administrator, and mail a copy to the taxpayer or, alternatively, forward the appeal to the board of equalization if so elected by the taxpayer and such election is included in the taxpayer's notification that the changes are not acceptable. If, after review, the county board of tax assessors determines that no changes or corrections are warranted, the county board of tax assessors shall notify the taxpayer of such decision. The taxpayer may elect to forward the appeal to the board of equalization by notifying the county board of tax assessors within 30 days of the mailing of the county board of tax assessor's notice of no changes or corrections. Upon the expiration of 30 days following the mailing of the county board of tax assessors' notice of no changes or corrections, the county board of tax assessors shall certify the notice of appeal and send or deliver all necessary documentation to the appeal administrator, in paper or electronic format as agreed upon by the county board of tax assessors and appeal administrator, for the appeal to the hearing officer, or board of equalization if elected by the taxpayer, and mail a copy to the taxpayer. If the county board of tax assessors fails to respond in writing, either with changes or no changes, to the taxpayer within 180 days after receiving the taxpayer's notice of appeal, the property valuation asserted by the taxpayer on the property tax return or the taxpayer's notice of appeal shall become the assessed fair market value for the taxpayer's property for the tax year under appeal.
(A) The appeal administrator shall randomly select from such list a hearing officer who shall have experience or expertise in hearing or appraising the type of property that is the subject of appeal to hear the appeal, unless the taxpayer and the county board of tax assessors mutually agree upon a hearing officer from such list. The appeal administrator shall notify the taxpayer and the taxpayer's attorney in compliance with subsection (o) of this Code section of the name of the hearing officer and transmit a copy of the hearing officer's disqualification questionnaire and resume provided for under paragraph (2) of this subsection. If no hearing officer is appointed or if no hearing is scheduled within 180 days after the county board of tax assessors receives the taxpayer's notice of appeal, the property valuation asserted by the taxpayer on the property tax return or the taxpayer's notice of appeal shall become the assessed fair market value for the taxpayer's property for the tax year under appeal, and subsection (c) of Code Section 48-5-299 shall apply. The hearing officer, in conjunction with all parties to the appeal, shall set a time and place to hear evidence and testimony from both parties. The hearing shall take place in the county where the property is located, or such other place as mutually agreed to by the parties and the hearing officer. The hearing officer shall provide electronic or written notice to the parties personally or by registered or certified mail or statutory overnight delivery not less than ten days before the hearing. Such written notice shall advise each party that he or she may request a list of witnesses, documents, or other written evidence to be presented at the hearing by the other party. Such request must be made not less than ten days prior to the hearing date, and such information shall be provided to the requesting party not less than seven days prior to the time of the hearing. Any failure to comply with this requirement shall be grounds for an automatic continuance or for exclusion of such witnesses, documents, or other written evidence.
(g.1)Valuation.
The valuation established or announced by any county board of equalization, arbitrator, hearing officer, or superior court; and
Any written agreement or settlement of valuation reached by the county board of tax assessors and the taxpayer as permitted by this Code section.
(Ga. L. 1913, p. 123, § 6; Ga. L. 1918, p. 230, § 1; Ga. L. 1931, p. 7, § 85; Code 1933, § 92-6912; Ga. L. 1958, p. 387, § 1; Ga. L. 1972, p. 1094, §§ 1-9; Ga. L. 1973, p. 709, § 1; Ga. L. 1974, p. 609, §§ 2-4; Ga. L. 1975, p. 1090, §§ 1, 2; Ga. L. 1976, p. 276, § 1; Ga. L. 1976, p. 366, § 1; Ga. L. 1976, p. 1744, § 1; Ga. L. 1977, p. 588, § 1; Ga. L. 1977, p. 903, § 1; Ga. L. 1977, p. 1009, § 1; Code 1933, § 91A-1449, enacted by Ga. L. 1978, p. 309, § 2; Ga. L. 1979, p. 519, § 2; Ga. L. 1980, p. 1722, § 1; Ga. L. 1981, p. 1554, § 5; Ga. L. 1983, p. 576, § 2; Ga. L. 1983, p. 1158, § 1; Ga. L. 1984, p. 22, § 48; Ga. L. 1984, p. 352, § 3; Ga. L. 1986, p. 419, § 1; Ga. L. 1988, p. 220, §§ 1, 2; Ga. L. 1988, p. 487, §§ 1, 2; Ga. L. 1990, p. 1122, § 4; Ga. L. 1990, p. 1361, § 1; Ga. L. 1991, p. 664, § 1; Ga. L. 1991, p. 1110, § 2; Ga. L. 1992, p. 1678, § 1; Ga. L. 1992, p. 2352, § 1; Ga. L. 1993, p. 435, §§ 1, 2; Ga. L. 1993, p. 1777, § 3; Ga. L. 1994, p. 318, §§ 1, 2; Ga. L. 1994, p. 787, §§ 1, 2; Ga. L. 1994, p. 1051, § 1; Ga. L. 1994, p. 1088, § 1; Ga. L. 1994, p. 1823, § 2; Ga. L. 1995, p. 10, § 48; Ga. L. 1999, p. 1043, § 3; Ga. L. 2000, p. 136, § 48; Ga. L. 2000, p. 873, §§ 2, 3; Ga. L. 2000, p. 1589, § 3; Ga. L. 2001, p. 495, § 1; Ga. L. 2004, p. 455, § 3; Ga. L. 2006, p. 769, § 1/SB 597; Ga. L. 2008, p. 1149, §§ 4, 5, 6/HB 1081; Ga. L. 2009, p. 216, §§ 1, 2/SB 240; Ga. L. 2010, p. 1104, §§ 2-1, 4-3, 6-1/SB 346; Ga. L. 2013, p. 655, § 5/HB 197; Ga. L. 2014, p. 672, § 4/HB 755; Ga. L. 2015, p. 1219, §§ 15, 16/HB 202; Ga. L. 2016, p. 166, § 5/SB 258; Ga. L. 2016, p. 864, § 48/HB 737; Ga. L. 2017, p. 774, § 48/HB 323; Ga. L. 2018, p. 162, § 2/HB 374.)
The 2015 amendment added subsections (a) and (a.1); redesignated former subsection (a) as subsection (a.2); in subsection (a.2), added "of boards of equalization." to the subsection catchline, substituted "this state" for "the state" near the beginning of paragraph (1), added paragraph (1.1), substituted "The members of each board of equalization" for "The grand jury of any such county" at the beginning of the third sentence of paragraph (2), substituted "The appeal administrator shall have administrative authority in all matters governing the conduct and business of the boards of equalization so as to provide oversight and supervision of such boards and scheduling of appeals" for "The chairperson and vice chairpersons shall be vested with full administrative authority in calling and conducting the business of the board" in the middle of paragraph (2), and, in paragraph (4), substituted "counties, shall specify which appeal administrator" for "counties and shall specify which clerk of the superior court" and added ", and shall provide for funding from each participating county for the operations of the appeal administrator as required by subparagraph (d)(4)(C.1) of this Code section"; rewrote subsection (b); in subsection (c), added "of board of equalization members." to the subsection catchline, substituted "cause such appointees to appear before the clerk of the superior court for the purpose of taking and executing in writing the oath of office. The clerk of the superior court may utilize any means necessary for such purpose, including, but not limited to, telephonic or other communication, regular first-class mail, or issuance of and delivery" for "issue and deliver" in paragraph (4), and, in paragraph (5), inserted "presiding or" and substituted "the appeal administrator" for "his or her designee" in the last sentence; in subsection (d), added "of board of equalization members" to the subsection catchline, added commas to the introductory phrase of the first sentence of paragraph (2), substituted "(e)(1)(D)" for "(e)(5)(B)" in paragraph (3), and rewrote paragraph (4); rewrote subsections (e) and (e.1); repealed former subsections (f) and (g) and reenacted the present provisions of subsections (f) and (g) in their place; added subsection (g.1); rewrote subsections (h) and (i); in subsection (k), added "of board of equalization members" to the subsection catchline, designated the previously existing provisions as paragraph (1), added paragraph (2), and, in paragraph (1), substituted "paragraph" for "subsection" and added "or attending approved appraisal courses" in the last sentence; in subsection (m), substituted "reduction" for "deduction" near the beginning of the first sentence, in the second sentence, deleted "on the amount of the deduction" following "include interest" near the beginning, substituted "the due date" for "November 15" near the middle, deleted "the final installment was due or was" following "or the date" near the middle, and substituted "the final determination of value was made" for "the refund is paid or 60 days from the date of the final determination, whichever is earlier", and rewrote paragraph (2); in subsection (n), deleted "and showing in the subject line of the email message the words 'STATUTORY ELECTRONIC SERVICE' in capital letters" at the end of the first sentence, and substituted "annual notice of current assessment under Code Section 48-5-306" for "notice of current assessment" in the second sentence; and rewrote subsection (o). See Editor's notes for effective date and applicability.
The 2016 amendments. The first 2016 amendment, effective April 26, 2016, added paragraph (e)(9). The second 2016 amendment, effective May 3, 2016, part of an Act to revise, modernize, and correct the Code, revised punctuation in division (b)(2)(B)(i) and paragraph (h)(3) and, near the beginning of subparagraph (h)(1)(A), substituted "employee who" for "employee, that".
The 2017 amendment, effective May 9, 2017, part of an Act to revise, modernize, and correct the Code, deleted the boldface catchline in subparagraph (e)(2)(A), which read: "Appeal to board of equalization.", substituted "to whom" for "who" in subparagraphs (e)(2)(B), (e)(2)(C), and (e)(6)(A); and substituted "This paragraph" for "This subsection" at the beginning of the last sentence of paragraph (e)(9).
The 2018 amendment, effective July 1, 2018, rewrote subsections (e) and (e.1); in subparagraph (f)(3)(A), substituted "documentation" for "papers" near the middle; in division (f)(3)(C)(iii), substituted "21 days" for "ten days" in the second sentence, substituted the present provisions of the third sentence for the former provisions, which read: "Such written notice shall advise each party that documents or other written evidence to be presented at the hearing by a party must be provided to the other party not less than seven days prior to the time of the hearing and that any failure to comply with this requirement, unless waived by mutual written agreement of such parties, shall be grounds for a continuance or for exclusion of such documents or other written evidence."; and, in paragraph (g)(2), substituted "during normal business hours" for "but in no event later than 30 days from the date of the notice" at the end of the seventh sentence, and substituted "reach an agreement" for "agree on a fair market value" and substituted "20 days" for "ten days" in the twelfth sentence.
- This Code section is partially derived from the decisions in Vestel v. Edwards, 143 Ga. 368, 85 S.E. 187 (1915); Ogletree v. Woodward, 150 Ga. 691, 105 S.E. 243 (1920); Turner v. Wade, 254 U.S. 64, 41 S. Ct. 27, 65 L. Ed. 134 (1920).
- Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1987, a semicolon was deleted following "minutes of the board" in the second sentence of paragraph (d)(3), "prima-facie" was substituted for "prima facie" in the first sentence of paragraph (e)(4).
Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 2010, "the" was inserted preceding "superior court" in the fifth sentence of paragraph (e.1)(10); and "an arbitration" was substituted for "a arbitration" in the first sentence of subparagraph (f)(3)(A).
Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 2015, "separate line items" was substituted for "separate lines items" near the end of subparagraph (d)(4)(C.1).
Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 2018, "Valuation" heading was added to subsection (g.1.).
Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 2018, "Notice to representative" heading was added to subsection (o).
- Ga. L. 1999, p. 1043, § 4, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that the amendment to this Code section is applicable to all assessments and proceedings commenced on or after January 1, 2000.
Ga. L. 2006, p. 769, § 2/SB 597, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that the 2006 amendment of this Code section shall apply with respect to all tax appeals filed with the county boards of tax assessors on or after that date.
Ga. L. 2009, p. 216, § 3/SB 240, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that the amendments to this Code section shall be applicable to all property tax appeals submitted to arbitration or appealed to the superior court on or after April 29, 2009.
Ga. L. 2015, p. 1219, § 27/HB 202, not codified by the General Assembly, provides, in part, that Sections 13 and 15 of this Act shall become effective on July 1, 2015, and that Sections 9, 12, and 15 of this Act shall be applicable to all appeals filed on or after January 1, 2016. Ga. L. 2015, p. 1219, § 15/HB 202, purported, in part, to amend subsections (a) through (e) but actually amended subsections (a) through (e.1).
- For article surveying developments in Georgia local government law from mid-1980 through mid-1981, see 33 Mercer L. Rev. 187 (1981). For annual survey of state and local taxation, see 38 Mercer L. Rev. 337 (1986). For annual survey of state and local taxation, see 42 Mercer L. Rev. 421 (1990). For article, "Procedure and Problems in Georgia Ad Valorem Tax Appeals," see 26 Ga. St. B. J. 98 (1990). For survey article on real property law for the period from June 1, 2002 to May 31, 2003, see 55 Mercer L. Rev. 397 (2003). For survey article on administrative law, see 60 Mercer L. Rev. 1 (2008). For survey article on real property law, see 60 Mercer L. Rev. 345 (2008). For annual survey on real property law, see 61 Mercer L. Rev. 301 (2009). For article, "Administrative Law," see 63 Mercer L. Rev. 47 (2011). For survey article on local government law, see 67 Mercer L. Rev. 147 (2015). For survey article on real property law, see 67 Mercer L. Rev. 193 (2015). For article, "A Taxing Exception: Southern LNG, Inc. v. MacGinnitie's Narrow Interpretation of the Mandamus Exception," see 66 Mercer L. Rev. 855 (2015). For note on the 1992 amendment of this Code section, see 9 Ga. St. U. L. 329 (1992).
- Even if the General Assembly has vested some judicial powers in the county boards of equalization, such action is not violative of Ga. Const. 1945, Art. VI, Sec. I, Para. I (see now Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. I, Para. I). Tax Assessors v. Chitwood, 235 Ga. 147, 218 S.E.2d 759 (1975).
Statute does not deny due process or equal protection. Webb v. Board of Tax Assessors, 235 Ga. 790, 221 S.E.2d 810 (1976).
- Statute provides for ample notice and a hearing, and the statute also provides for an appeal to the superior court, which constitutes a de novo action. Therefore, the statute does not violate the due process clause of the state and federal Constitutions. Webb v. Board of Tax Assessors, 235 Ga. 790, 221 S.E.2d 810 (1976).
- With respect to a challenge to a tax re-valuation of property, a pre-deprivation remedy under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311(e)(6)(D)(iii)(I), allowing a taxpayer to pay less than the full amount of the tax assessed, and a post-deprivation remedy under § 48-5-311(e)(6)(D)(iii)(II), allowing a refund in the event the tax assessor lost in the appeals process, met federal and state due process requirements. Hooten v. Thomas, 297 Ga. App. 487, 677 S.E.2d 670 (2009).
Denial of the taxpayer's hearing provided for by this statute violates the taxpayer's due process rights. Ward v. Landrum, 140 Ga. App. 497, 231 S.E.2d 347 (1976).
Procedure described in this statute satisfies requirements of due process and equal protection, insofar as these require notice and an opportunity to be heard. Griggs v. Greene, 230 Ga. 257, 197 S.E.2d 116 (1973).
Statute meets constitutional due process requirements so long as the statute affords a review by an unbiased board. Stewart County v. Thompson, 224 Ga. 303, 161 S.E.2d 877 (1968).
- Allowing a taxpayer's right to a hearing on the assessment of the taxpayer's property to be cut off by the passage of time, or the independent action of other parties, violates the taxpayer's due process rights unless caused by culpable or negligent conduct on the part of the taxpayer. Ward v. Landrum, 140 Ga. App. 497, 231 S.E.2d 347 (1976).
- O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311(g)(2), requiring a county board of tax assessors to schedule a settlement conference within 45 days of the taxpayer's notice of appeal, and providing that the taxpayer's stated value be adopted if the board elected not to schedule a conference, did not usurp the superior court's jurisdiction or violate the separation of powers clause, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Par. III. Hall County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Westrec Props., 303 Ga. 69, 809 S.E.2d 780 (2018).
- Agreement in which a company committed itself to represent a taxpayer's interests before the board of equalization was not void as constituting the unauthorized practice of law. Grand Partners Joint Venture I v. Realtax Resource, Inc., 225 Ga. App. 409, 483 S.E.2d 922 (1997).
- Public has an interest in the proper administration of the revenue laws and the solvency of its fisc, while the taxpayer is entitled to know promptly and precisely the extent of the taxpayer's tax liability. Lackey v. DeKalb County, 156 Ga. App. 309, 274 S.E.2d 705 (1980).
- Procedure for securing uniformity in tax assessments in a county was former Code 1933, § 92-6911 (see O.C.G.A. § 48-5-306) placed upon county tax assessors, and if their action displeases a taxpayer, the taxpayer's remedy was arbitration as provided in former Code 1933, § 92-6912 (see O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311). Grafton v. Turner, 227 Ga. 809, 183 S.E.2d 458 (1971).
Taxpayers have an adequate and complete remedy at law for the contention that the taxpayers tax digest lacks the uniformity required under the Constitution of Georgia. Tax Assessors v. Chitwood, 235 Ga. 147, 218 S.E.2d 759 (1975); Chilivis v. Backus, 236 Ga. 88, 222 S.E.2d 371 (1976); Gordon County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Aldon Indus., 237 Ga. 527, 228 S.E.2d 905 (1976).
- Taxpayers were not entitled to injunctive relief in a class action against a county board of tax assessors alleging that spot reappraisals violated the taxpayers' constitutional right to equal protection under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 since O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311 provided an adequate remedy at law. Glynn County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Haller, 273 Ga. 649, 543 S.E.2d 699 (2001).
Provisions of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-17(a) regarding dismissal for failure to prosecute in the name of a real party in interest apply to O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311. Spencer v. Lamar County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 202 Ga. App. 742, 415 S.E.2d 332 (1992).
Appointments subject to O.C.G.A. § 15-12-81. - Trial court did not err in granting a citizen's motion for a writ of mandamus compelling a superior court clerk's compliance, with respect to the appointments of county board of equalization (BOE) members, with the public notice requirements of O.C.G.A. § 15-12-81 because there was no error in granting mandamus to require the clerk to comply with her mandatory duties under § 15-12-81; because BOE members are appointed by the grand jury, O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311(c)(2), their appointments are plainly subject to the provisions of § 15-12-81. Everetteze v. Clark, 286 Ga. 11, 685 S.E.2d 72 (2009).
- Statutory design of appeal to the county board of equalization and then to the superior court contemplates that findings as to fair market value shall be made. Hodsdon v. Duckett, 135 Ga. App. 922, 219 S.E.2d 634 (1975).
When tax assessors fail to use same standard in assessing property of same class as affirmatively shown by facts alleged in a petition for injunctive relief and declaration of illegality of tax assessment, there is no merit in the contention that the plaintiffs have an adequate and complete remedy by arbitration (now hearing and trial) under this statute. Colvard v. Ridley, 218 Ga. 490, 128 S.E.2d 732 (1962).
- Mere fact that property had been assessed for taxes at a certain value after arbitration (now appeal) under this statute in a previous tax year would not prevent the taxing authorities from fixing the valuation different for a succeeding year, even though no improvements had been made on the property since the arbitration (now appeal). Hutchins v. Williams, 212 Ga. 754, 95 S.E.2d 674 (1956).
Fee awards afforded to the taxpayer the additional relief to which the taxpayer was statutorily entitled under O.C.G.A. §§ 9-11-54(c)(1) and48-5-311(g)(4)(B)(ii). Fulton County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Toro Props. VI, LLC, 329 Ga. App. 26, 763 S.E.2d 496 (2014).
- Rendering the fee awards after the expiration of the term of the court of the valuation orders did not frustrate judicial economy or violate Georgia's public policy as O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311(g)(4)(B)(ii) contained no time limitation dictating when a taxpayer must move or a court must award litigation costs and attorney fees. Fulton County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Toro Props. VI, LLC, 329 Ga. App. 26, 763 S.E.2d 496 (2014).
- Fact that the taxpayer objected to an assessment and invoked arbitration does not estop the taxpayer from attacking an award in equity as void since the court was without jurisdiction of the subject matter. Such a judgment is void and may be attacked collaterally as a mere nullity in any court by any party when it becomes material to that party's interest. Montgomery v. Suttles, 191 Ga. 781, 13 S.E.2d 781 (1941).
- Special law which incorporated the pre-1972 version of this statute was not repealed implicitly or explicitly by the subsequent 1972 enactment. Boynton v. Lenox Square, Inc., 232 Ga. 456, 207 S.E.2d 446 (1974).
When a local law incorporates this statute using the language "as amended," the law is not construed to include future amendments, but only those made prior to the passage of the local law. Medical Ass'n v. Joint City, 132 Ga. App. 188, 207 S.E.2d 673 (1974).
- Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311, the requirement that property be "uniformly assessed" means that the property be assessed uniformly with other property included in the county's own tax digest. Williams v. DeKalb County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 249 Ga. 164, 289 S.E.2d 235 (1982).
In determining whether a county board of tax assessors has "uniformly assessed" the value of certain property pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311, it is not significant that the board of tax assessors of a neighboring county might have assessed it differently, and thus the trial court did not err in excluding the taxpayer's evidence of the neighboring county's tax digest. Williams v. DeKalb County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 249 Ga. 164, 289 S.E.2d 235 (1982).
- Superior Court had jurisdiction to order equalization of tax digests and, no appeal having been taken from the order, the court could enjoin the county tax commissioner from collecting taxes until such time as the county board of tax assessors had complied with the order. Wallace v. Meyer, 260 Ga. 253, 394 S.E.2d 350 (1990).
- Notice of appeal to board of equalization stating that assessment in question reflected unrealistic values which had been placed on referenced property did not raise issue of uniformity or equalization of the assessment and could not be raised for the first time on appeal to the superior court. DeKalb County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Kendall, Inc., 164 Ga. App. 374, 295 S.E.2d 345 (1982).
- Appeal procedure outlined in subsection (f) of O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311 does not contemplate the filing of a "complaint" or "answer," and a default judgment will not lie for failure to file defensive pleadings in a de novo hearing on appeal in the superior court from a property evaluation. Rogers v. DeKalb County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 247 Ga. 726, 279 S.E.2d 223 (1981).
- Taxpayers did not have a takings claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the procedures of O.C.G.A. § 48-5-380 or O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311 provide adequate remedies. Brian Realty Corp. v. DeKalb County, 229 Ga. App. 209, 493 S.E.2d 595 (1997).
- Plain language of O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311(g)(2) required a county board of tax assessors to schedule and notice a settlement conference with taxpayers within 45 days of receipt of the taxpayers' notices of appeal, and provided that the appeal terminated and the taxpayer's stated value was adopted if the board elected not to schedule a conference. Hall County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Westrec Props., 303 Ga. 69, 809 S.E.2d 780 (2018).
- Summary judgment for a county board of tax assessors (BTA) in a taxpayer's suit seeking injunctive relief and a writ of mandamus compelling a board of equalization (BOE) to adjudicate its appeal of a reassessment for one tax year was reversed as: (1) there were no objective criteria in place for choosing businesses for audits when the taxpayer was chosen for a four-year audit; (2) there was evidence that the BTA attempted to thwart the taxpayer's statutory right to prompt adjudication of its appeal before the BOE under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311; and (3) there was a jury question as to whether the audit was begun by an accounting firm or the BTA for an improper purpose in violation of O.C.G.A. § 48-5-299(a). Parisian, Inc. v. Cobb County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 263 Ga. App. 332, 587 S.E.2d 771 (2003).
- Because O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311(f)(3)(A) specifies the effect of the failure of the board of assessors to accept or reject the taxpayer's appraisal within 45 days, that language must be enforced. Fulton County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Fast Evictions, LLC, 314 Ga. App. 178, 723 S.E.2d 461 (2012).
- Trial court did not err by deciding that a county board of tax assessors failed to timely reject a taxpayer's certified appraisals of the taxpayer's real property pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311(f)(3)(A) because the board completely failed to show when the board made the board's decision to reject the appraisals; the board notified the taxpayer that the board rejected the taxpayer's appraisal and adopted a different recommended value 53 days after the taxpayer submitted the appraisal, but there was no indication in the record of when the board made the board's decision. Fulton County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Fast Evictions, LLC, 314 Ga. App. 178, 723 S.E.2d 461 (2012).
- Board of Assessors failed to prove its contention that a 2011 sale of taxable property by Freddie Mac did not qualify as an arm's length, bona fide sale for purposes of limiting the assessment value of the property in the next year under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2(3). CPF Invs., LLLP v. Fulton County Bd. of Assessors, 330 Ga. App. 744, 769 S.E.2d 159 (2015).
- Trial court erred in granting a citizen a writ of quo warranto revoking county board of equalization (BOE) members' appointments because, although BOE members were public officers subject to quo warranto, the citizen's petition for a writ of quo warranto was subject to dismissal when the citizen did not seek leave of court prior to filing the complaint. Everetteze v. Clark, 286 Ga. 11, 685 S.E.2d 72 (2009).
Cited in Board of Tax Assessors v. Clary, 161 Ga. App. 828, 290 S.E.2d 110 (1982); Stoddard v. Board of Tax Assessors, 163 Ga. App. 499, 295 S.E.2d 170 (1982); Noble v. Joint City-County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 672 F.2d 872 (11th Cir. 1982); Monroe County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Remick, 165 Ga. App. 616, 300 S.E.2d 203 (1983); Richmond County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Richmond Bonded Whse. Corp., 173 Ga. App. 278, 325 S.E.2d 891 (1985); Haldi v. DeKalb County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 178 Ga. App. 521, 344 S.E.2d 236 (1986); Stoddard v. Grady County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 190 Ga. App. 445, 379 S.E.2d 234 (1989); Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Collins, 921 F.2d 1237 (11th Cir. 1991); Gwinnett County v. Ackerman/Indian Trail Ass'n, 198 Ga. App. 723, 402 S.E.2d 794 (1991); Inland Container Corp. v. Paulding County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 220 Ga. App. 878, 470 S.E.2d 702 (1996); Fulton County Tax Comm'r v. GMC, 234 Ga. App. 459, 507 S.E.2d 772 (1998); White Cloud Charter, Inc. v. DeKalb County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 238 Ga. App. 805, 520 S.E.2d 708 (1999); Interstate North Sporting Club v. Cobb County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 250 Ga. App. 221, 551 S.E.2d 91 (2001); Fulton County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Harmon Bros. Charter Serv., 261 Ga. App. 534, 583 S.E.2d 179 (2003); Ferdinand v. City of East Point, 288 Ga. App. 152, 653 S.E.2d 529 (2007); In re Powell-Garvey Co., Bankr. (Bankr. S.D. Ga. June 13, 2006).
- In addition to other statutory qualifications, since an arbitrator (now member of board of equalization) acts in a quasi-judicial capacity, the arbitrator must possess the judicial qualifications of fairness, disinterestedness, and impartiality. Hill v. Board of Tax Equalizers, 227 Ga. 145, 179 S.E.2d 243 (1971).
- Contention that a member of the board of tax equalizers was disqualified because of a relationship to the defendant came too late when made at the jury trial. Statute sets the method for objection on this ground. Murray v. Richardson, 134 Ga. App. 676, 215 S.E.2d 715 (1975).
- O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311 provided a plain and adequate remedy at law to a taxpayer's challenge that a county's tax assessment and appraisal system deprived the taxpayer of due process of law, equal protection of the law, and lacked uniformity as required under the provisions of the Constitution of Georgia. Vann v. DeKalb County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 186 Ga. App. 208, 367 S.E.2d 43, cert. denied, 186 Ga. App. 919, 367 S.E.2d 43 (1988); Arnold v. Gwinnett County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 207 Ga. App. 759, 429 S.E.2d 146 (1993).
Taxpayer, whose challenge to the constitutionality of the board's methodology for assessing taxes is inextricably bound to the basic issue of uniformity of assessment of real property located within the county, may appeal under the provisions of subsection (e) and (f) (now (g)) of O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311 "as to matters of taxability, uniformity of assessment, and value." Vann v. DeKalb County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 186 Ga. App. 208, 367 S.E.2d 43, cert. denied, 186 Ga. App. 919, 367 S.E.2d 43 (1988).
To assert the taxpayer's constitutional issue before the superior court in a de novo appeal, the taxpayer must have timely raised the issue before the board of equalization. Vann v. DeKalb County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 186 Ga. App. 208, 367 S.E.2d 43, cert. denied, 186 Ga. App. 919, 367 S.E.2d 43 (1988).
Even though the statutes providing for ad valorem taxation of motor vehicles do not specifically provide for apportionment, the statutes are not unconstitutional since the assessment of value may be challenged through the appeal procedure of O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311 and the owner thereby has the opportunity to establish that a vehicle has acquired a tax situs in another state. East W. Express, Inc. v. Collins, 264 Ga. 774, 449 S.E.2d 599 (1994).
- Judgment of the trial court granting a company mandamus relief was reversed because the judgment did not show that the State Revenue Commissioner, in refusing to accept the company's ad valorem tax returns as a gas company, violated a clear legal duty, failed to act, or engaged in arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable actions because the company was not authorized to engage in the business of a gas company under O.C.G.A. § 46-1-1(5) nor be a natural-gas company as defined in 15 U.S.C. § 717a(6). Riley v. Southern LNG, Inc., 300 Ga. 689, 797 S.E.2d 878 (2017).
- Trial court properly ruled that the moratorium in O.C.G.A. § 48-5B-1 applied to the subject property in the de novo appeal of the value determination and was not a waived issue because the board of tax assessors, the arbitrator, and the board of equalization had all made determinations as to value and the applicability of the moratorium, thus, it was properly before the trial court. SPH Glynn, LLC v. Glynn County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 326 Ga. App. 196, 756 S.E.2d 282 (2014).
- Denial of an exemption of a portion of taxability was not subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Gwinnett County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Network Publications, Inc., 208 Ga. App. 15, 429 S.E.2d 696 (1993).
- Appeals process of O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311 was "efficient" in addition to being "plain" and "speedy" both on its face and as applied to the instant taxpayers. Accordingly, the case was barred by the Tax Injunction Act of 1937, 28 U.S.C. § 1341, since the case sought a federal court injunction over a state tax assessment when a "plain, speedy, and efficient" remedy existed under state law. Amos v. Glynn County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 347 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2003).
Burden of proof is on the taxpayers, when the taxpayers are the parties who initiate an appeal to the superior court. Hawkins v. Grady County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 180 Ga. App. 834, 350 S.E.2d 790 (1986).
- Corporate taxpayers were barred from seeking refunds pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 48-5-380 of ad valorem taxes paid on vehicles with tax situses in other states because the taxpayers failed to follow the appeal procedures provided by O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311. DeKalb County v. Genuine Parts Co., 225 Ga. App. 376, 484 S.E.2d 57 (1997).
County and the county tax commission were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law in an action filed by a trucking company seeking a refund for ad valorem taxes the company paid, as it was undisputed at trial that the company failed to timely file for either an apportionment in two subject years, as required by Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. r. 560-11-7-.02, and that the company did not appeal the company's ad valorem assessment within 45 days of the assessment in either year, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311; furthermore, O.C.G.A. § 48-5-380, which allowed a taxpayer to seek a refund up to three years after paying an erroneous or illegal tax, did not apply. Trans Link Motor Express, Inc. v. Dougherty County, 265 Ga. App. 10, 592 S.E.2d 859 (2003).
Whether an appeal is procedurally defective is a judicial decision, not a clerical determination, and the County Board of Tax Assessors should have certified the taxpayer's appeal to the superior court instead of concluding that the notice of appeal was defective. Fulton County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Boyajian, 271 Ga. 881, 525 S.E.2d 687 (2000).
- Provisions of paragraph (e)(3) and subparagraphs (e)(6)(A) and (e)(6)(B) of O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311 are directory rather than mandatory because a county board of equalization can become so swamped with appeals that the board cannot hear all pending cases within such short statutory time periods. Moreton Rolleston, Jr., Living Trust v. Glynn County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 240 Ga. App. 405, 523 S.E.2d 600 (1999), cert. denied, 2000 Ga. LEXIS 97 (2000).
If the county board of equalization, in the exercise of due diligence and with reasonable justification for delay, sets a hearing at the earliest available date, which date falls outside of the statutory time period, there has been substantial compliance with O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311. Moreton Rolleston, Jr., Living Trust v. Glynn County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 240 Ga. App. 405, 523 S.E.2d 600 (1999), cert. denied, 2000 Ga. LEXIS 97 (2000).
- Because a county board of tax assessors certified appeals filed by 16 taxpayers to the superior court notifying the Clerk of the Court that the clerk was required to assign these appeals for trial at the first term following the filing of the appeals, any requirement that the taxpayers had to also make demand for trial at the first term was clearly redundant and, therefore, unnecessary; thus, the trial court properly found that an excusable delay from obtaining a trial at the first term was shown, warranting denial of the board's motion to dismiss the appeals. Glynn County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Paulding, 270 Ga. App. 851, 608 S.E.2d 317 (2004).
No presumption of correctness attaches to assessments of the property of taxpayers who take an appeal to the superior court. Hawkins v. Grady County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 180 Ga. App. 834, 350 S.E.2d 790 (1986).
- Trial court's ruling in a tax appeal that the tax value for the property was limited to the value set by the board of equalization was error because O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311(g)(3) provided that tax appeals to the superior court were de novo actions, and thus the trial court's determination of value in the tax appeal was not restricted to the valuation of the board of equalization; the dicta in Gwinnett County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Ackerman/Indian Trail Assn., 198 Ga. App. 723, 402 S.E.2d 794 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991), was disapproved to the extent that the opinion conflicted with the holding that a tax appeal required a trial de novo, regardless of which party filed the appeal, and that the trial court was not bound by the board of equalization's findings. Fulton County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. NABISCO, 296 Ga. App. 884, 676 S.E.2d 41 (2009).
- O.C.G.A. § 48-5-7.2(e) expressly requires a tax board, upon denying an application for preferential assessment, to notify the applicant in the same manner that notices of assessment are given pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 48-5-306, and appeals from the denial of an application for preferential assessment by the board of tax assessors shall be made in the same manner that other property tax appeals are made pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311; in light of a tax board's failure to provide an applicant with the proper statutory notice, the board's argument that the applicant failed to exhaust the applicant's administrative remedies was without merit. Chatham County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Emmoth, 278 Ga. 144, 598 S.E.2d 495 (2004).
§ 48-5-380 distinguished. - While the appeal process of O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311 is available to address any asserted error in an ad valorem real property tax assessment, the refund process established by O.C.G.A. § 48-5-380 is intended only to correct errors of fact or law which have resulted in erroneous or illegal taxation. Gwinnett County v. Gwinnett I Ltd. Partnership, 265 Ga. 645, 458 S.E.2d 632 (1995).
Taxpayer need not comply with the appeal procedure provided in subsection (e) of O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311 prior to proceeding under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-380. Marconi Avionics, Inc. v. DeKalb County, 165 Ga. App. 628, 302 S.E.2d 384 (1983).
- When the appellant and the board of tax assessors entered into a stipulation that the board of equalization would adopt the position of the board of tax assessors, therefore eliminating the need to appeal to the board of equalization, and then the appellant filed an appeal to the superior court, a judgment rendered by the superior court would be reversed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because jurisdiction cannot be conferred by agreement or consent. Barland Co. v. Bartow County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 172 Ga. App. 61, 322 S.E.2d 316 (1984).
Superior Court properly dismissed the taxpayer's action questioning the validity of a second tax assessment which was issued to correct an earlier assessment for the same tax year since the case was subject to appeal to and decision by the county board of equalization. Dean v. Fulton County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 218 Ga. App. 760, 463 S.E.2d 64 (1995).
Property owners improperly challenged a tax re-valuation by a county in a Georgia trial court because the owners had an adequate remedy at law pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311 in an appeal to a county board of tax equalization (BOE) as the BOE had to first address procedural errors and errors in methodology to value the property under § 48-5-311(e)-(g); constitutional claims, such as claims of the uniformity of assessment under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. III also had to be addressed first before the BOE. Hooten v. Thomas, 297 Ga. App. 487, 677 S.E.2d 670 (2009).
- Because the superior court should not have exercised the court's equitable jurisdiction when the property owners failed to exhaust their administrative remedies under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311 through the county board of equalization, the superior court's judgment for declaratory relief in favor of the property owners at summary judgment was reversed; instead, the superior court should have dismissed the property owners' suit for failing to state a claim. Chatham County Bd. of Assessors v. Jepson, 261 Ga. App. 771, 584 S.E.2d 22 (2003).
When a taxpayer challenged an assessment, but paid the taxes, the taxpayer could not bring an action in the courts for a declaratory judgment to determine the validity of the assessment until the taxpayer exhausted the taxpayer's statutory administrative options under either O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311 or O.C.G.A. § 48-5-380. Wilmington Trust Co. v. Glynn County, 265 Ga. App. 704, 595 S.E.2d 562 (2004).
Trial court had jurisdiction of taxpayer's action to find reassessments invalid for failure of the county board of tax assessors to follow provisions of O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311 requiring a response to the taxpayer's assessment appeal. Moreton Rolleston, Jr. Living Trust v. Glynn County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 228 Ga. App. 371, 491 S.E.2d 812 (1997), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 230 Ga. 539, 497 S.E.2d 274 (1998).
- When a taxpayer files a "motion to dismiss" in the superior court based on the failure of the board of equalization to set a hearing date on the taxpayer's appeal within 15 days of receipt of the taxpayer's notice of appeal from the decision of the board of tax assessors, which decision the taxpayer is attempting to overturn, the denial of the motion to dismiss is favorable to the taxpayer and establishes no ground for reversal of the trial court's judgment. Williamson v. DeKalb County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 168 Ga. App. 47, 308 S.E.2d 55 (1983).
- Assessment of a penalty for a breach of a conservation use covenant is an assessment for which a property owner has the right to appeal pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311. Oconee County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Thomas, 282 Ga. 422, 651 S.E.2d 45 (2007).
- Taxpayer was not entitled to costs and expenses for having to appear at the hearing of the county board of equalization on the taxpayer's initial appeal and for having to appeal to the superior court in order to have the board rule on the taxpayer's request. Hulse v. Joint City-County Bd. of Assessors, 219 Ga. App. 309, 464 S.E.2d 890 (1995).
Trial court erred in awarding a property owner $7,515.00 in attorney fees under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311(g)(4)(B)(ii) against a county board of tax assessors after a jury valued the property in question substantially lower than the board's valuation; the record did not support the trial court's conclusion that the property was returned for taxation by operation of law pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 48-5-20(a)(2), and the board did not waive the board's objection to the fees, because the trial court did not hold a hearing on the issue of the attorney's fees, O.C.G.A. § 9-11-46(a), and the board therefore did not have an opportunity to object to the award. Fulton County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Butner, 258 Ga. App. 68, 573 S.E.2d 100 (2002).
As a taxpayer did not pay the prior year's taxes, the taxes paid by the taxpayer for the prior year were deemed the taxpayer's tax return for the tax year under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-20(a)(2), so the taxpayer was not required to file a separate tax return on the taxpayer's property, and the taxpayer's late return was a nullity; therefore, upon the taxpayer's successful appeal of an assessment of the taxpayer's property, an award of costs and attorneys fees was mandatory under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311(g)(4)(B)(ii). Simmons v. Bd. of Tax Assessors, 268 Ga. App. 411, 602 S.E.2d 213 (2004).
Owner was entitled to attorney fees under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311(g)(4)(B)(ii) in an appeal of a property valuation because the final determination of value on appeal to the trial court was 85 percent or less of the valuation set by the board of tax assessors; it was irrelevant that the owner's appeal to the trial court dealt with a "freeze" of the property value under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-299(c) and not a new determination of value. Fulton County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Lamb, 298 Ga. App. 618, 680 S.E.2d 656 (2009).
Order awarding a city attorney fees pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311(g)(4)(B)(ii) in the city's appeal of a county's tax assessment of the city's property was error because § 48-5-311(g)(4)(B)(ii) only applied when there was a final determination of value on appeal, and the city's appeal related not to value, but to taxability; valuation was not an issue, and, thus, the city did not satisfy the condition precedent to an award of fees under § 48-5-311(g)(4)(B)(ii). O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311(g)(4)(B)(ii) did not permit an award of attorney fees or litigation costs when, as here, the sole issue was taxability. Clayton County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. City of Atlanta, 299 Ga. App. 233, 682 S.E.2d 328 (2009).
Final property valuation that was set by operation of law pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 48-5-299(c) based on a prior tax year appeal did not preclude an award of attorney's fees and costs under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311(g)(4)(B)(ii). Fulton County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. LM Atlanta Airport, LLC, 313 Ga. App. 439, 721 S.E.2d 640 (2011).
In a tax appeal, the trial court erred by denying the taxpayer's request for attorney fees under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311(g)(4)(B)(ii) because it was successful against the county board of tax assessors and the capped value met the statutory threshold mandating that the taxpayer shall recover costs of litigation and reasonable attorney's fees incurred in the action. SPH Glynn, LLC v. Glynn County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 326 Ga. App. 196, 756 S.E.2d 282 (2014).
- Taxpayer was not required to file an appeal pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311 contesting the denial of the taxpayer's reduction in the value of the taxpayer's merchandise for one tax year as the taxpayer was no longer challenging the taxpayer's property tax assessment for one tax year, but was seeking to avoid a multi-year audit that the taxpayer attributed to an improper motive. Parisian, Inc. v. Cobb County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 263 Ga. App. 332, 587 S.E.2d 771 (2003).
Trial court erred in awarding costs and attorney fees to the taxpayers after the jury valued their improved real property as the jury's valuation figure was 85.8 percent and the applicable statute provided that the valuation figure had to be 85 percent or less of the equalization board's figure in order for an award of costs and attorney fees to be permitted; the trial court erred because the court deducted the undisputed value of an improvement on the land from the jury's verdict, but a proper valuation of the fair market value of the property dictated that the value of that improvement be included in determining whether the valuation was 85 percent or less of the equalization board's valuation for the purpose of awarding fees and costs. Stephens County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Shirley, 263 Ga. App. 743, 589 S.E.2d 263 (2003).
- In a taxpayer's appeal from a real estate tax valuation assessment, the trial court erred in holding that the value of a parcel of real property was the value set out in the taxpayer's appraisal since within 45 days of receiving the taxpayer's certified appraisal, the county board of tax assessors voted to reject the taxpayer's appraisal value, and within another 45 days, the board certified the appeal in compliance with O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311(f)(3)(A). Thus, the value remained to be determined by an arbitrator in accordance with the procedures set out in § 48-5-311(f). Fulton County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Greenfield Inv. Group, LLC, 313 Ga. App. 195, 721 S.E.2d 128 (2011).
The 30 day limit in paragraph (g)(2) of O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311 applies to boards of assessors as well as to taxpayers. Stoddard v. Cone, 250 Ga. 852, 301 S.E.2d 641 (1983).
Failure of the board of tax assessors to give 30-day notice of appeal to taxpayers deprived the superior court of jurisdiction and such failure was not an amendable or curable defect. Fulton County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. CPS Four Hundred, Ltd., 213 Ga. App. 1, 443 S.E.2d 645 (1994).
- When a landowner seeks to appeal the county tax assessor's assessed valuation of the landowner's property, but the notice of appeal is not filed with the board of tax assessors and does not state the grounds for appeal, the superior court does not err in dismissing the landowner's complaint to enjoin the county tax commissioner from selling the landowner's property because of unpaid taxes. Davis v. Holland, 251 Ga. 86, 303 S.E.2d 455 (1983).
- O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311 did not give a board of tax assessors the discretion to refuse to certify a notice of appeal based on the taxpayer's failure to be present at the hearing. Fulton County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Jones, 264 Ga. 828, 452 S.E.2d 99 (1995).
- County's recalculations of the taxpayers' homestead exemptions involved the value of the exemptions, bringing the taxpayers within O.C.G.A. § 48-5-49, which permitted an appeal under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311. Since the county had not given the taxpayers notice under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-306 of the taxpayers' right to appeal, the taxpayers were entitled to equitable relief requiring the county to: (1) provide taxpayers with proper notice of and the right to appeal changes in the homestead exemptions; (2) stop collecting taxes referenced in bills sent without proper notice; and (3) refund any tax money collected based on bills issued without such notice. Fulton County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Marani, 299 Ga. App. 580, 683 S.E.2d 136 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C2072, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 18 (Ga. 2010).
- Superior court erred in granting a county's motion to dismiss a taxpayer's appeal when, although the taxpayer had not offered an explanation as to the basis for the taxpayer's appeal, the board of tax assessors thereafter certified the case to the superior court and, in connection with the docketing of the case in that court, the taxpayer filed a form in which the taxpayer stated that the taxpayer was filing the appeal "under Ga. Code No.48-5-311 . . . regarding taxability and value." Vaughters v. DeKalb County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 198 Ga. App. 589, 402 S.E.2d 340 (1991).
Because the taxpayers' notice of appeal of the valuation of their property was filed with the County Board of Tax Assessors (BTA) and the trial court on the same day, which was within the statutory time limitation of O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311(g)(2), the BTA received the required notice initiating the taxpayers' appeal; filing the notice in the trial court did not render the notice ineffective. Fulton County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Love, 296 Ga. App. 613, 676 S.E.2d 256 (2009).
- When a reassessment notice was properly mailed to a taxpayer pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 48-5-306 and the taxpayer's request for a late appeal was denied by the board of tax assessors, the taxpayers were not entitled to declaratory relief or to mandamus because O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311 prescribes a time limit for filing appeals, the appeal was not filed within that period, and the board was powerless to extend the period. Dillard v. Denson, 243 Ga. App. 458, 533 S.E.2d 101 (2000).
- Trial court erred in dismissing the taxpayers' appeal, when, although the taxpayers' enumerated errors to the superior court were not clearly defined, a liberal reading of the notice of appeal indicated that the taxpayers were challenging the assessed value of their property based on an alleged error in computation. Andrew v. DeKalb County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 194 Ga. App. 274, 390 S.E.2d 115 (1990).
Judicial power to determine taxability is vested in the board of equalization. Bouy v. Kiley, 238 Ga. 47, 230 S.E.2d 861 (1976).
- General Assembly has invested county boards of tax equalization with ample authority to remedy deficiencies in an ad valorem tax digest. The board is authorized to order the entire digest recompiled if such action is necessary to obtain uniformity. Tax Assessors v. Chitwood, 235 Ga. 147, 218 S.E.2d 759 (1975).
- County board of equalization has full authority to fashion an adequate and appropriate legal remedy to redress grievances of taxpayers regarding the valuation of individual parcels of land and the uniformity of the county tax assessments. Tax Assessors v. Chitwood, 235 Ga. 147, 218 S.E.2d 759 (1975); Chilivis v. Kell, 236 Ga. 226, 223 S.E.2d 117, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 891, 97 S. Ct. 249, 50 L. Ed. 2d 174 (1976).
Time for appeal begins to run on the day notice is received by the taxpayer. Hamilton v. Edwards, 245 Ga. 810, 267 S.E.2d 246 (1980).
- There is no power or authority given the board of tax assessors or any members thereof to extend the period in which an appeal may be filed by the taxpayer, and the attempted extension of the time for filing such an appeal is void. Tift v. Tift County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 234 Ga. 155, 215 S.E.2d 3 (1975).
- Letter expressing no more than dissatisfaction with an assessment does not specifically state the grounds for appeal. Ledbetter Trucks, Inc. v. Floyd County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 143 Ga. App. 323, 238 S.E.2d 440 (1977), rev'd on other grounds, 240 Ga. 791, 242 S.E.2d 596 (1978).
- Prior communications with a firm employed by the board of tax assessors to assist the board in making valuations do not excuse taxpayers from complying with the requirement for filing a notice of appeal from the official notice given by the board of tax assessors. Peagler v. Georgetown Assocs., 232 Ga. 848, 209 S.E.2d 186 (1974).
- Board of Equalization sent notice according to the statutory requirements as Property Tax Advisers, LLC, while retained and authorized to act on behalf of the taxpayer, was not an attorney who could be served under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311(o), and the taxpayer admitted receiving a copy of the notice that was sent via certified mail. Dickey v. Fulton County Bd. of Assessors, 333 Ga. App. 346, 776 S.E.2d 480 (2015).
- County board of equalization may fashion a remedy in light of evidence that there is a lack of uniformity of property assessment within the county. Such nonuniformity within the county need not be raised by an appellant before the county board of equalization. The board need only find reason to believe that property is not uniformly assessed. Therefore, a taxpayer who in good faith returns the taxpayer's property at the property's fair market value and does not have the taxpayer's return changed would seem to be entitled to present evidence to the county board of equalization that there is a lack of uniformity within the county. Adams v. Smith, 415 F. Supp. 787 (N.D. Ga. 1976), aff'd, 568 F.2d 1232 (5th Cir. 1978).
- After the taxpayer raised the issue of uniformity of taxation in the taxpayer's appeal, the county board of equalization was required to specifically decide the issue and to specify the reasons for the board's determination. Hulse v. Joint City-County Bd. of Assessors, 219 Ga. App. 309, 464 S.E.2d 890 (1995).
Errors in the hearing before the board of equalization are waived if not objected to at the equalizers' hearing. Murray v. Richardson, 134 Ga. App. 676, 215 S.E.2d 715 (1975).
- When a taxpayer challenges the procedure used by the county tax officials in carrying forward assessments from one year to the next, rather than attacking the validity of the tax digest or the amount of the assessment, the taxpayer is not required to appeal to the county board of equalization. Smith v. Day, 237 Ga. 48, 226 S.E.2d 588 (1976).
- An appeal brought under former Code 1933, § 92-6912 (see now O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311) to the superior court from a county tax assessment was a "complaint" pursuant to Ga. L. 1966, p. 609 § 3 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-11-3), which was required to be answered by responsive pleading pursuant to Ga. L. 1966, p. 609, § 12 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12). Hall County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Reed, 142 Ga. App. 556, 236 S.E.2d 532 (1977).
- O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311 does not require a county or city governing authority to vote to approve an appeal by the board of tax assessors; the plain meaning of the Code section is that the governing authority be notified of appeals by the board of tax assessors from assessment changes of 15 percent or less so that, within 10 days of receipt of such notice, the governing authority may choose to prohibit the appeal by majority vote. Hall County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Peachtree Doors, Inc., 214 Ga. App. 613, 448 S.E.2d 476 (1994).
- Although mailed within 30 days of date on which decision of board of equalization was sent by registered mail, an appeal from the board's decision was not timely because the appeal was not received until two days after expiration of the 30-day time limit imposed by statute. Camden County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Proctor, 155 Ga. App. 650, 271 S.E.2d 902 (1980).
- Since the policy of the law is in favor of deciding tax appeals on the merits, even at the expense of procedural technicalities, Ga. L. 1972, p. 624, § 1 (see now O.C.G.A. § 5-6-48 (b)), which allowed amendments of notices of appeal from superior courts, also applied to notices of appeal to the superior courts from administrative boards. Mundy v. Clayton County Tax Assessors, 146 Ga. App. 473, 246 S.E.2d 479 (1978).
While the notice of appeal that the board of tax assessors sent to the taxpayer was insufficient to perfect the appeal of the board of tax assessors to the superior court because it did not specifically state the grounds for the appeal, the superior court erred in dismissing the appeal; the superior court should have allowed the board of assessors to cure the defect by amending the notice of appeal since notices of appeal could be amended and a policy existed to decide tax appeals on their merits. Fulton County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Layton, 261 Ga. App. 356, 582 S.E.2d 520 (2003).
- When questions of fact are presented by such an appeal, the law requires a de novo investigation by trial before a jury. Hall County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Reed, 142 Ga. App. 556, 236 S.E.2d 532 (1977).
- When it is the express command of a statute that appeal cases be tried by a jury at the first term after the appeal has been entered, it would appear to be the duty of the clerk to place the appeal upon the trial calendar for the first term after docketing. McCauley v. Bd. of Tax Assessors, 243 Ga. 844, 257 S.E.2d 266 (1979).
- Dismissal of appeal on the ground that the appeal was not brought to trial at the first term is proper when the appellant fails to request that the appeal be placed at the head of the calendar and given the preference to which it is entitled under the law. The provision of this statute, requiring the appeal from the board's decision to be heard before a jury at the first term following the filing of the appeal, concerns and affects both the public interest and the interest of the taxpayer since the public has an interest in the proper administration of the revenue laws and the solvency of its fisc, while the taxpayer is entitled to know promptly and precisely the extent of the taxpayer's tax liability. Thus, dismissal will result from a failure to obtain a trial at the first term unless a reasonable excuse is shown. DeKalb County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Stone Mountain Indus. Park, 147 Ga. App. 503, 249 S.E.2d 318 (1978).
Default judgment will not lie for failure to file defensive pleadings in a de novo hearing on appeal in the superior court from a property evaluation. Hall County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Reed, 142 Ga. App. 556, 236 S.E.2d 532 (1977).
Under Ga. L. 1966, p. 609, § 55 and Ga. L. 1967, p. 226, § 24 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-11-55) in conjunction with former Code 1933, § 92-6912 (see now O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311) an appeal did not automatically become in default upon failure to timely file responses, when the statutory design contemplated that findings as to fair market value shall be made. Hall County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Reed, 142 Ga. App. 556, 236 S.E.2d 532 (1977).
- Under Ga. L. 1966, § 55 and Ga. L. 1967, p. 226, § 24 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-11-55) a case did not automatically become in default upon the failure to timely file responses if the action involves unliquidated damages. Hall County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Reed, 142 Ga. App. 556, 236 S.E.2d 532 (1977).
Having failed to appeal from the decision of the board of equalization, a party could not at a later date successfully institute an original action in the superior court to raise the issue of taxability. Bouy v. Kiley, 238 Ga. 47, 230 S.E.2d 861 (1976).
Failure of limited liability companies (LLC) to satisfy the requirement of O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311(e)(2)(A) barred any further right to appeal because the letters and returns the LLCs' representative submitted months before the assessment notices were mailed did not excuse the LLCs from complying with the requirement of O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311(e)(2)(A) that a taxpayer mail or file a notice of appeal within 30 days from the date of mailing the notice pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 48-5-306; because the LLCs failed to comply with O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311(e) so as to effectuate an appeal to the county board of equalization, the LLCs' appeals to the superior court should have been dismissed. Hall County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Avalon Hills Partners, LLC, 307 Ga. App. 520, 705 S.E.2d 674 (2010).
Trial court properly dismissed a taxpayer group's suit seeking a rollback of 2009 assessed values to the 2008 assessed values because whether the moratorium under O.C.G.A. § 48-5B-1 applied should have been raised in an administrative appeal under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311 and, by failing to pursue the taxpayers' remedy, the taxpayers' complaint was subject to dismissal. We, the Taxpayers v. Bd. of Tax Assessors, 292 Ga. 31, 734 S.E.2d 373 (2012).
- Only those decisions of the board of equalization on questions presented to the board or incident thereto may be relitigated in the superior court. Camp v. Boggs, 240 Ga. 127, 239 S.E.2d 530 (1977).
Trial court properly dismissed a taxpayer's appeal from a purported denial of a homestead exemption on grounds that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case as the taxpayer failed to show both an application for and the denial of a homestead exemption, and failed to exhaust any and all of the applicable administrative remedies under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311. Carter v. Fayette County, 287 Ga. App. 175, 651 S.E.2d 108 (2007).
Reviewing court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider value and uniformity in an appeal of a decision of the Hall County Board of Equalization (BOE) as a hospital did not present those issues in the underlying administrative tax case, which was limited to O.C.G.A. § 48-5-41(a)(5), and the statute's application; further, as there was no Hall County Board of Tax Assessors decision concerning value and uniformity that could have been appealed to the BOE, there was no appeal to the BOE on those issues that could have been waived by mutual agreement and initiated, instead, in the reviewing court under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311(g)(1). Hall County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Northeast Ga. Health Sys., 317 Ga. App. 389, 730 S.E.2d 715 (2012).
When appellant raises only a question of value before the board of equalization, the appellant cannot raise a new claim of uniformity for the first time on appeal to the superior court. Camp v. Boggs, 240 Ga. 127, 239 S.E.2d 530 (1977).
- Matters of taxability, uniformity of assessment, and value must be raised before the county board of equalization in order to raise the matters on appeal to the superior court, notwithstanding that the action in superior court is de novo. Williams v. DeKalb County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 249 Ga. 164, 289 S.E.2d 235 (1982).
- When a taxpayer appeals an assessment of the board of tax assessors to the board of equalization, and from the decision of the latter to the superior court for a de novo hearing, the taxpayer is not permitted to raise in the superior court appeal issues which were not raised in the original appeal to the board of equalization. However, when the original appeal to the board of equalization is not included in the record, and when it is not contended that such original appeal failed to raise the question of valuation, an appellant is not estopped in an appeal to the superior court from an adverse decision of the board of equalization from urging at the de novo hearing that the valuation set is excessive. Mundy v. Clayton County Tax Assessors, 146 Ga. App. 473, 246 S.E.2d 479 (1978).
When a board of equalization fails to answer some of the questions submitted by the taxpayer, such failure should be enumerated as error on a de novo appeal. Accordingly, relief by way of injunction or mandamus is inappropriate because a taxpayer must raise the issue before the board and exhaust the taxpayer's remedies by the statutorily provided appeal. Wilkes v. Redding, 242 Ga. 78, 247 S.E.2d 872 (1978).
- Because the nonprofit charitable institution had already carried the institution's burden of proving entitlement to a charitable exemption, the burden of proof showing that the institution was not entitled to the exemption on an appeal was on the board of tax assessors. Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Baptist Vill., Inc., 269 Ga. App. 848, 605 S.E.2d 436 (2004).
- What transpired at the hearing would not be admissible if objected to in the de novo investigation at trial before jury. Murray v. Richardson, 134 Ga. App. 676, 215 S.E.2d 715 (1975).
References to prior proceedings and procedures should be omitted as the references have no relevance in a de novo matter. Weeks v. Gwinnett County Bd. of Tax Equalization, 139 Ga. App. 37, 227 S.E.2d 865 (1976), overruled on other grounds by Gilmer County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Spence, 309 Ga. App. 482, 711 S.E.2d 51 (2011).
- Board of tax assessors' findings of fact are not deemed prima facie correct on appeals to the superior court, but are evidence which the jury may consider, along with other evidence, in resolving the issue before the jury. Weeks v. Gwinnett County Bd. of Tax Equalization, 139 Ga. App. 37, 227 S.E.2d 865 (1976), overruled on other grounds by Gilmer County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Spence, 309 Ga. App. 482, 711 S.E.2d 51 (2011).
- Nothing in the language of O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311 prohibits a tax consulting firm from writing a letter to the board of tax assessors requesting certification of an appeal to superior court. Interstate North Sporting Club v. Cobb County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 250 Ga. App. 221, 551 S.E.2d 91 (2001).
No presumption of correctness attaches to the assessments of the board of equalization on appeal to the superior court. Hodsdon v. Duckett, 135 Ga. App. 922, 219 S.E.2d 634 (1975).
- An appeal before a county board of equalization provides an adequate remedy at law for the determination of county taxpayers' questions, making unnecessary the exercise of the equitable powers of the superior court. Wilkes v. Redding, 242 Ga. 78, 247 S.E.2d 872 (1978).
- Board of equalization is the appropriate forum for deciding a taxpayer's constitutional and procedural issues as well as questions of uniformity, valuation, and taxability; therefore, an action in equity and mandamus in the superior court raising those issues is unauthorized. Wilkes v. Redding, 242 Ga. 78, 247 S.E.2d 872 (1978).
- Trial court did not err by denying a group of property owners their request for mandamus relief in the nature of finding that the county board of tax assessors certified their property tax appeals because it was undisputed that the tax appeals were physically delivered to the trial court and that it had ruled that such appeals were certified to it, thus, the property owners received the relief sought regarding certification. Newton Timber Co., L.L.L.P. v. Monroe County Bd. of Tax Assessors, Ga. , 755 S.E.2d 770 (2014).
- Absent certification of the taxpayers' appeal by the county board of tax assessors, the filing of the appeal under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311(g)(4)(A) did not occur and the requirement that the case be placed on the first available trial calendar was not yet triggered. Monroe County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Wilson, 336 Ga. App. 404, 785 S.E.2d 67 (2016).
- Judgment setting the value for improved residential real property owned by the property owners at $ 291,000 was appropriate because an appraiser gave expert opinion testimony that the fair market value of the property was $291,000 and other expert witnesses opined that the county employed appraisal methods in ways that systemically produced incorrect or arbitrary estimates of fair market value for residential properties. Gilmer County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. McHugh, 309 Ga. App. 145, 709 S.E.2d 311 (2011).
- There was no merit in the Gilmer County Board of Tax Assessor's claim that the superior court erred in allowing the property owners to challenge the uniformity of the tax assessment. The property owners did not base the owners' uniformity challenge solely upon the amount of taxes paid by the specific developer who owned property within the owners' subdivision; the owners also based the owners' challenge upon the amount of taxes paid by numerous other taxpayers in the county to whose properties the property owners contended an absorption rate had been misapplied. Gilmer County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. McHugh, 309 Ga. App. 145, 709 S.E.2d 311 (2011).
- When the owner of commercial property successfully appealed an assessment of the property's value by a board of equalization, and the value determined on appeal was less than 80 percent of the value assessed by the board, the taxpayer was entitled to an award of costs, including attorney fees and litigation costs because O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311(g)(4)(B)(ii) became effective prior to the assessment. Pulaski County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. JFS Props., 274 Ga. App. 520, 618 S.E.2d 151 (2005).
- When taxpayers challenging an assessment filed an appeal from the verdict of the first jury that tried the case, it was error, following retrial, to deny the taxpayers attorney fees in connection with the appeal from the first jury verdict. "Action" in O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311(g)(4)(B)(ii) does not limit recovery to attorney fees incurred in the trial court. Buckler v. DeKalb County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 288 Ga. App. 332, 654 S.E.2d 184 (2007).
Taxpayer was entitled to an award of attorney fees of $37,475 under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311(g)(4)(B)(ii) because the jury's valuation of the taxpayer's property was less than 85 percent of the value assessed by the county board of assessors. Although the county later lowered the property's value, the taxpayer had already appealed three times from the original value, and the attorney's fee amendment was intended to ensure that valuations were accurate from the outset. Fulton County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. White, 302 Ga. App. 512, 691 S.E.2d 341 (2010).
Tax assessor waived the assessor's argument that the company was not entitled to attorney fees under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311(g)(4)(B)(ii) on the grounds that the bank failed to file a property tax return or that the bank was the real party in interest. Fulton County Bd. of Assessors v. Calliope Props., LLC, 312 Ga. App. 875, 720 S.E.2d 312 (2011).
- Because the value was less than 85 percent of the valuation set by the board of assessors, the trial court awarded the owner attorney fees under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311(g)(4)(B)(ii). The amount of the fee award was within the range of the evidence adduced at the hearing, and the award was not manifestly unreasonable on its face. Fulton County Bd. of Assessors v. Calliope Props., LLC, 315 Ga. App. 405, 727 S.E.2d 198 (2012).
- Command stated under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311(g)(4)(A), specifically, that non-jury trials in appeals from a board of equalization to the superior court were to be held within 40 days of filing, was directory rather than mandatory, making erroneous the superior court's dismissal of the appeals upon a failure to hold a hearing within that time period. Jasper County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Thomas, 289 Ga. App. 38, 656 S.E.2d 188 (2007).
- In a gas company's suit against the state revenue commissioner for mandamus compelling the commissioner to accept its property tax returns under O.C.G.A. §§ 48-1-2(21) and48-5-511(a), remand was proper to determine if the company had an acceptable alternative remedy in its pending county tax appeals under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311, if the commissioner could be made a party to those appeals by joinder or some other procedure. Southern LNG, Inc. v. MacGinnitie, 294 Ga. 657, 755 S.E.2d 683 (2014).
Georgia Open Meetings Law, O.C.G.A. § 50-14-1 et seq., applies to proceedings both of a county board of tax assessors and of a county board of equalization. 1995 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U95-22.
Persons holding office as members of a county board of equalization by virtue of a one-year appointment under prior law, former Code 1933, § 91A-1449(c), continue in office until their successors can be "commissioned and qualified." As the current statute, O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311(c), provides no mechanism to appoint for a term beginning prior to January 1, 1984, current members thus hold over in office until such time after December 31, 1983, as their successor is commissioned and qualified. 1983 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U83-30.
- Purchaser/possessor of a piece of property under a bond for title can be subjected to ad valorem taxation for that parcel and once the Board of Tax Assessors chooses to assess the property against the occupant, and not the seller of the property, the occupant should receive the tax notices required by O.C.G.A. § 48-5-306, and be treated as "the taxpayer" entitled to appeal under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311. 1989 Op. Att'y Gen. U89-17.
- Appellants contesting a decision rendered by a county board of equalization in superior court must pay the advance court cost deposit set forth in O.C.G.A. §§ 9-15-4 and15-6-77. 1985 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U85-17, following 1974 Op. Att'y Gen. U74-46.
- When county tax assessors make a change in property valuation and send out notice thereof in which the date set for a hearing is more than ten days after the mailing of the notice, such notice is not a notice of final assessment, but only of a proposed assessment. 1970 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U70-141.
Payment of ad valorem property taxes would not prejudice a taxpayer's appeal brought pursuant to former Code 1933, § 92-6912 (see now O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311). If successful in such an appeal, the taxpayer would be entitled to a refund under former Code 1933, Ch. 92-39A (see now O.C.G.A. § 48-5-380). 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 75-55.
- Party who files notice of appeal to the superior court bears burden of cost deposit under former Code 1933, §§ 24-2727 and 24-3406 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 9-15-4 and15-6-77). 1974 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U74-46.
Possibility of conflict of interest between the grand jury and county board of equalization would not constitute a disqualification for service upon either body, but would be a question for the court at the time of jury selection. 1973 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U73-111.
- 72 Am. Jur. 2d, State and Local Taxation, §§ 701, 710.
- 50A C.J.S., Juries, §§ 367, 473, 483 et seq., 494, 495. 84 C.J.S., Taxation, §§ 787 et seq., 888 et seq.
- Notice to property owners of increase in assessment or valuation by board of equalization or review, 24 A.L.R. 331; 84 A.L.R. 197.
Construction and application of statute prohibiting or restricting reassessment after assessment and payment of taxes, 85 A.L.R. 107.
Power of board of tax review to receive evidence as to assessable value, without notice to taxpayer, 113 A.L.R. 990.
Standing of one taxpayer to complain of underassessment or nonassessment of property of another for state and local taxation, 9 A.L.R.4th 428.
Total Results: 20
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2018-01-29
Citation: 809 S.E.2d 780
Snippet: conference as required by the 2015 amendment to OCGA § 48-5-311 (g) (2), 2015 Ga. L. 2015, p. 1219 et seq. ("the
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2017-03-06
Citation: 300 Ga. 689, 797 S.E.2d 878, 2017 WL 875046, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 158
Snippet: Chatham County property tax appeals under OCGA § 48-5-311. In Southern LNG, Inc. v. MacGinnitie, 294 Ga
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2014-06-30
Snippet: stated, was to be recorded, pursuant to OCGA § 48-5-311 (h).2 Hicks declined this request. Thereafter
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2014-06-30
Citation: 295 Ga. 385, 761 S.E.2d 35, 2014 WL 2924946, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 532
Snippet: stated, was to be recorded, pursuant to OCGA § 48-5-311 (h). 2 Hicks declined this request
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2014-03-10
Citation: 295 Ga. 29, 755 S.E.2d 770, 2014 Fulton County D. Rep. 442, 2014 WL 902258, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 189
Snippet: which heard the appeals in March 2010. See OCGA § 48-5-311 (e) (1) (A). 2 Not satisfied with the
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2014-03-03
Citation: 294 Ga. 657, 755 S.E.2d 683
Snippet: in the form of tax appeals brought under OCGA § 48-5-311. The court said that Southern could raise, and
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2012-11-19
Citation: 292 Ga. 74, 734 S.E.2d 397, 2012 Fulton County D. Rep. 3602, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 949
Snippet: Madison County Board of Equalization. See OCGA § 48-5-311.1 The Board of Equalization denied the appeal
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2012-11-19
Citation: 292 Ga. 31, 734 S.E.2d 373, 2012 Fulton County D. Rep. 3600, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 944
Snippet: or otherwise in the manner set forth in OCGA § 48-5-311, and that the failure to do so precluded the trial
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2011-11-29
Citation: 290 Ga. 204, 719 S.E.2d 473, 2011 Fulton County D. Rep. 3849, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 946
Snippet: if necessary, to the superior court. *209OCGA § 48-5-311 (e) (1) (A), (g) (2009). See also Glynn County
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2009-10-19
Citation: 685 S.E.2d 72, 286 Ga. 11, 2009 Fulton County D. Rep. 3302, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 643
Snippet: statutory requirements as prescribed in OCGA § 48-5-311 for appointment thereto. The court also issued
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2007-09-24
Citation: 282 Ga. 422, 651 S.E.2d 45, 2007 Fulton County D. Rep. 2919, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 592
Snippet: the meaning of the word, “assessment.” OCGA § 48-5-311 (e) (1) (A) permits taxpayers to “appeal from
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2006-06-12
Citation: 632 S.E.2d 87, 280 Ga. 608, 2006 Fulton County D. Rep. 1830, 2006 Ga. LEXIS 397
Snippet: Machine Co., 76 Ga. at 378. [6] See, e.g., OCGA §§ 48-5-311 (providing taxpayers an avenue to appeal county
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2004-06-28
Citation: 598 S.E.2d 495, 278 Ga. 144, 2004 Fulton County D. Rep. 2126, 2004 Ga. LEXIS 538
Snippet: to the Board of Equalization pursuant to OCGA § 48-5-311. OCGA § 48-5-7.2(e) expressly required the Board
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2001-03-02
Citation: 543 S.E.2d 699, 273 Ga. 649, 2001 Fulton County D. Rep. 771, 2001 Ga. LEXIS 207
Snippet: taxpayers have an adequate remedy at law under OCGA § 48-5-311.[1] Therefore, we reverse. 1. The board asserts
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2000-01-18
Citation: 525 S.E.2d 687, 271 Ga. 881
Snippet: appeals to the superior courts, we affirm. 1. OCGA § 48-5-311(g) provides the procedure for appealing adverse
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1999-03-15
Citation: 514 S.E.2d 422, 270 Ga. 724, 99 Fulton County D. Rep. 1051, 1999 Ga. LEXIS 305
Snippet: challenge the assessment in an appeal under § 48-5-311. We granted certiorari in both cases to consider
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1998-02-02
Citation: 269 Ga. 31, 495 S.E.2d 33, 98 Fulton County D. Rep. 386, 1998 Ga. LEXIS 50
Snippet: County Board of Equalization pursuant to OCGA § 48-5-311 (e) (1), and the Board affirmed the assessment
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1995-06-30
Citation: 458 S.E.2d 632, 265 Ga. 645
Snippet: means of the appeal process provided in OCGA § 48-5-311. The Court of Appeals, relying largely on Marconi
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1995-01-17
Citation: 264 Ga. 828, 452 S.E.2d 99, 95 Fulton County D. Rep. 259, 1995 Ga. LEXIS 9
Snippet: that decision to the superior court under OCGA § 48-5-311, but the board of tax assessors refused to certify
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1994-10-31
Citation: 264 Ga. 774, 449 S.E.2d 599, 94 Fulton County D. Rep. 3581, 1994 Ga. LEXIS 864
Snippet: for in Code Section 48-5-311 . . . ." OCGA § 48-5-450. In subsection (e) of § 48-5-311, provision is made