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Call Now: 904-383-7448No appeal shall be dismissed because of any defect in the notice of appeal, bond, or affidavit of indigence or because of the failure of the lower court, agency, or other tribunal to transmit the pleadings or other record; but the superior court shall at any time permit such amendments and enter such orders as may be necessary to cure the defect.
(Code 1933, § 6-115, enacted by Ga. L. 1972, p. 738, § 5.)
- People's right to litigate with governmental bodies should not be decided on technicalities any more than one citizen's right to litigate with another citizen. City of Atlanta v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness of Atlanta, Inc., 240 Ga. 96, 239 S.E.2d 515 (1977).
- When a notice of appeal from a probate court decision is filed in a timely fashion, the superior court is vested with discretion in determining whether to dismiss the appeal. If the superior court finds that the filing of the notice of appeal in superior court has caused an unreasonable as well as inexcusable delay in the transmission of the record from the probate court, the appeal should be dismissed. Otherwise, the superior court is authorized to retain the appeal. In that event, the superior court has ample authority to enter an order directing that the probate court transmit the record to the superior court so that the appeal can be decided. Mack v. Demming, 248 Ga. 117, 281 S.E.2d 591 (1981).
Filing an independent suit, rather than a notice of appeal in the lower tribunal, was sufficient to vest the superior court with jurisdiction to decide an appeal from an adverse decision of the mayor and city council, and the superior court was bound to make the determination whether the procedural irregularity caused unreasonable or inexcusable delay. Hanson v. Wilson, 257 Ga. 5, 354 S.E.2d 126 (1987).
- Superior court correctly dismissed defendant's appeal from the city court to the superior court, because such appeal from the city court erroneously taken to the superior court to be transferred to the appellate court was not authorized by O.C.G.A. § 5-3-27. Sawyer v. City of Atlanta, 257 Ga. App. 324, 571 S.E.2d 146 (2002).
Cited in Sims v. American Cas. Co., 131 Ga. App. 461, 206 S.E.2d 121 (1974); Judd v. Valdosta/Lowndes County Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 147 Ga. App. 128, 248 S.E.2d 196 (1978); Zornes v. State, 262 Ga. 757, 426 S.E.2d 355 (1993); Adams v. State, 234 Ga. App. 696, 507 S.E.2d 538 (1998); Register v. Elliott, 285 Ga. App. 741, 647 S.E.2d 406 (2007).
- 5 Am. Jur. 2d, Appellate Review, §§ 264, 307, 341, 915.
- 4 C.J.S., Appeal and Error, §§ 415, 470, 600, 737.
Total Results: 2
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2002-10-15
Citation: 571 S.E.2d 343, 275 Ga. 616, 2002 Fulton County D. Rep. 2974, 2002 Ga. LEXIS 917
Snippet: death, and this interest vested immediately. OCGA § 53-2-7(a). Thus, petitioner's status was that of a tenant
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1995-06-12
Citation: 265 Ga. 466, 458 S.E.2d 121
Snippet: testamentary plan "to the injury of" Caveators. OCGA § 53-2-7. Under the undisputed evidence, Harris did not