O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 50-14-2 (2019)

Certain privileges not repealed

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)

Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.

Find cases: SyfertCases citing this section GA-LEGlegis.ga.gov (official) JustiaJustia CornellLII Search CasesGoogle Scholar

This chapter shall not be construed so as to repeal in any way: (1) The attorney-client privilege recognized by state law to the extent that a meeting otherwise required to be open to the public under this chapter may be closed in order to consult and meet with legal counsel pertaining to pending or potential litigation, settlement, claims, administrative proceedings, or other judicial actions brought or to be brought by or against the agency or any officer or employee or in which the agency or any officer or employee may be directly involved; provided, however, the meeting may not be closed for advice or consultation on whether to close a meeting; and (2) Those tax matters which are otherwise made confidential by state law.

History

Code 1981, § 50-14-2, enacted by Ga. L. 1988, p. 235, § 1; Ga. L. 2012, p. 218, § 1/HB 397.

Annotations

Code Commission notes. - Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1990, the subsection designation ‘‘(a)’’ was deleted since

this Code section contains no subsection (b). Law reviews. - For survey article on local government law, see 59 Mercer L. Rev. 285 (2007).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Attorney-client exception. - Closed meeting of the board of county commissioners with the county attorney about zoning litigation came within the

attorney-client exception of O.C.G.A. § 50-14-2. Schoen v. Cherokee County, 242 Ga. App. 501, 530 S.E.2d 226 (2000). Meeting may not be closed to discuss

potential litigation under the attorney-client exception unless the governmental entity can show a realistic and tangible threat of legal action against it or its officer or employee. The threat must go beyond a mere fear or suspicion of being sued. Claxton Enter. v. Evans County Bd. of Comm’rs, 249 Ga. App. 870, 549 S.E.2d 830 (2001). Grand jury presentments questioning the propriety of certain policies of county commissioners did not amount to pending

or potential litigation so the attorney-client privilege did not apply to a meeting conducted to fashion a response to the presentments, and the commissioners violated O.C.G.A. § 50-14-1(b) by conducting an executive session concerning the presentments. Decatur County v. Bainbridge Post Searchlight, Inc., 280 Ga. 706, 632 S.E.2d 113 (2006). Cited in Mullis Tree Serv. v. Bibb County, 828 F. Supp. 53 (M.D. Ga. 1993).

RESEARCH REFERENCES ALR. - Attorney-client exception under state law making proceedings by pub-

lic bodies open to the public, 34 A.L.R.5th 591.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 8 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1983–2023 · leading case: Claxton Enter. v. Evans Cnty. Bd. of Commissioners, 549 S.E.2d 830 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).

Sort: Relevance Newest Treatment

Claxton Enter. v. Evans Cnty. Bd. of Commissioners, 549 S.E.2d 830 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001). · cites it 14× “Also, the trial court found that the July 6 meeting was properly closed because even though Swain was not a county employee, the matter for discussion fell within the attorney-client exception, OCGA § 50-14-2 (1). The court determined that the “statements and circumstances…”

Schoen v. Cherokee Cnty., 530 S.E.2d 226 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000). · cites it 2× “OCGA § 50-14-2 (1). It is undisputed that the closed meeting was with the county attorney and was about the Landon Group litigation.”

Decatur Cnty. v. Bainbridge Post Searchlight, Inc., 632 S.E.2d 113 (Ga. 2006). · cites it 12× “OCGA § 50-14-2 (1). The Commissioners contend that the trial court erred in finding that this “attorney-client” exception does not apply in this case.”

Johnson v. Bd. of Com'rs, Bibb Cnty., 690 S.E.2d 912 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010). · cites it 2× “501, 502-503 (1) ( 530 SE2d 226 ) (2000) (an exception from the open meetings requirement for meetings “to consult and meet with legal counsel pertaining to pending or potential litigation,” provided in OCGA § 50-14-2 (1), necessarily includes reaching a decision whether to…”

Local Div. 732 v. Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 303 S.E.2d 1 (Ga. 1983). · cites it 2× “OCGA § 50-14-2 (Code Ann. § 40-3303). In addition, at the time of the February 22 meeting, the Sunshine Law applied only to “meetings .”

Matthew Charles Cardinale v. Matt Westmoreland, in His Pers. Capacity (Ga. Ct. App. 2023). · cites it 2× “) OCGA § 50-14-2 (1). With these principles in mind, we conclude that the decision by the council members to enter into an executive session was a discretionary act, rather than a ministerial act.”

Gumz v. Irvin, 685 S.E.2d 392 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009). · cites it 2× “10 Defendants asserted that the conference was protected by attorney-client privilege pursuant to OCGA § 50-14-2 (1). The trial court ruled at the hearing that Ingram’s presence defeated the privilege.”

Mullis Tree Serv. v. Bibb Cnty., 828 F. Supp. 53 (M.D. Ga. 1993). · cites it 2× “potential litigation____” O.C.G.A. § 50-14-2. Thus, plaintiffs’ argument on this ground has no merit.”

— 50-14-2(1) — 1 case

Decatur Cnty. v. Bainbridge Post Searchlight, Inc., 632 S.E.2d 113 (Ga. 2006). “OCGA § 50-14-2 (1). The Commissioners contend that the trial court erred in finding that this “attorney-client” exception does not apply in this case.”

Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.