CopyCited 488 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 18, 2013 | 751 S.E.2d 337, 2013 Fulton County D. Rep. 3507
...o made the request had no special or exclusive access to the records.19 See id. With respect to actions for judicial enforcement of the Act, it provided that “[sjuch actions may be brought by any person, firm, corporation, or other entity,” OCGA §
50-18-73 (a) (2012) (emphasis supplied), and the Act notably did not limit the authority to commence an enforcement action to persons who had made a request for records or to persons with a special or personal interest in the requested records.20 In addition, the Act authorized the Attorney General — who represents the public interest, of course — to bring actions to enforce the Act. OCGA §
50-18-73 (a)....
...e right at least as to the award of such fees. But although the Act provided for attorney fees, the fees were not automatic for a prevailing party. They instead were available only when a party had acted “without substantial justification,” OCGA §
50-18-73 (b) (2012), and in that respect, the fees authorized by the Act were not much different from the fees authorized under the law generally applicable in civil actions....
CopyCited 42 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 13, 2020 | 308 Ga. 265
...This provision plainly contemplates that a private person (or
firm, corporation, or other entity) can bring an action to enforce the
Act to protect the public from closed-door politics. See City of College
Park,
304 Ga. at 489. It follows that, although only a prosecutor
Act, in OCGA §
50-18-73 (a), refers only to the Attorney General in relation to
the authority to seek civil penalties).
empowered to initiate a criminal prosecution on behalf of the State
may seek a criminal penalty under OCGA §
50-14-6, any person,
firm, co...
CopyCited 19 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Apr 17, 2017 | 799 S.E.2d 225
...663, 663 (2) (604 SE2d 161) (2004). Although we do not agree with the trial court’s conclusion regarding the remedial adequacy of civil penalties, that does not save Blalock’s claim. Because the Act provides its own cause of action for enforcement in OCGA §
50-18-73 (a), that provision is plainly a “complete and convenient” alternative to mandamus....
...Such actions may be brought by any person, firm, corporation, or other entity In addition, the Attorney General shall have authority to bring such actions in his or her discretion as maybe appropriate to enforce compliance with [the Act] and to seek either civil or criminal penalties or both.
OCGA §
50-18-73 (a)....
...as Blalock. The text of the Act, while authorizing “any person, firm, corporation, or other entity” to bring an action to enforce compliance, also refers only to the Attorney General in relation to the authority to seek civil penalties. See OCGA §
50-18-73 (a)....
...isions do afford Blalock an adequate alternative remedy to mandamus. As noted above, the Act authorizes “any person, firm, corporation, or other entity” to bring an “action[ ] ... to enforce compliance with the provisions of [the Act].” OCGA §
50-18-73 (a)....
...mond County Hosp. Auth.,
252 Ga. at 19 (newspaper publisher sued under the Act to compel disclosure of certain records in the custody of county hospital authority).
We acknowledge that, despite the existence of an express right of action under OCGA §
50-18-73 (a), our courts — including this Court — have entertained mandamus actions to compel the disclosure of records under the Act, apparently without consideration of whether mandamus was an appropriate avenue of relief....
...*889278 Ga. at 663. While the availability of civil discovery to obtain requested records may certainly constitute an adequate alternative to mandamus in a given case, we emphasize that, where a litigant is authorized to bring a cause of action under OCGA §
50-18-73 (a), this right of action will always constitute an adequate alternative that precludes the availability of mandamus, whether or not civil discovery or some other enforcement mechanism may also be available.
Blalock’s petition also sought the recovery of attorney fees. See OCGA §
50-18-73 (b) (authorizing recovery of attorney fees in enforcement actions under the Act)....
CopyCited 9 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 6, 2020 | 310 Ga. 279
...PHOEBE PUTNEY HEALTH SYSTEM, INC.
BETHEL, Justice.
In Geer v. Phoebe Putney Health System,
350 Ga. App. 127, 128
(828 SE2d 108) (2019), the Court of Appeals held that Georgia’s anti-
SLAPP statute, OCGA §
9-11-11.1, could not be invoked to strike a
counterclaim for attorney fees brought under OCGA §
50-18-73 (b)
in response to a suit to enforce a request under Georgia’s Open
Records Act....
...relief. Phoebe
Putney answered the complaint and asserted multiple defenses to
Geer’s claims, including that it is not subject to the Open Records
Act. Along with its answer, Phoebe Putney also filed a counterclaim
for attorney fees under OCGA §
50-18-73 (b), which provides:
In any action brought to enforce the provisions of
[the Open Records Act] in which the court determines
that either party acted without substantial justification
either in not complying with...
...records, provides certain disclosure exceptions, and prescribes civil
and criminal penalties for Act violations. See OCGA §§
50-18-71, -
50-18-72, 50-18--74 (a). The Act gives superior courts jurisdiction
over actions brought to enforce the provisions of the Act. See OCGA
§
50-18-73 (a)....
...Appellate review
of an order granting or denying an anti-SLAPP motion is
de novo.
(Citations, punctuation and emphasis omitted.)
306 Ga. at 261-263
(2) (b).
3. The anti-SLAPP statute cannot be used to strike claims for
attorney fees under OCGA §
50-18-73 (b).
Geer has asserted that Phoebe Putney’s counterclaim to his
Open Records Act action should be stricken pursuant to the anti-
SLAPP statute....
...er the
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the State of
Georgia in connection with an issue of public concern” under OCGA
§
9-11-11.1 (c). Geer then asserts that Phoebe Putney’s counterclaim
for attorney fees under OCGA §
50-18-73 (b) is meritless and
intended solely to chill those rights by driving up the cost of
litigating his dispute under the Open Records Act and that the
counterclaim should therefore be stricken pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-
11.1 (b) (1)....
...strike until the resolution of the underlying litigation because,
absent emergency circumstances, OCGA §
9-11-11.1 (d) requires the
trial court to hear a motion to strike within 30 days.
But Geer’s arguments miss the key aspect of a claim for
attorney fees brought under OCGA §
50-18-73 (b) that distinguishes
it from other types of claims that might be stricken pursuant to the
anti-SLAPP statute: a trial court must evaluate a claim for attorney
fees under the Open Records Act “on the basis of the record as a
whole...
...The parties are ordinarily permitted to conduct discovery under
the anti-SLAPP statute only to the extent the nonmoving party is a
public figure and wishes to pursue discovery relating to the issue of
actual malice. See OCGA §
9-11-11.1 (b) (2), (d).
In contrast, the text of OCGA §
50-18-73 (b) makes clear that
the merits of a claim for attorney fees brought under the Open
Records Act cannot be reached without an evaluation of the merits
of the underlying dispute over the plaintiff’s claim for records....
...sought.” Unlike a defamation suit or other claim subject to the anti-
SLAPP statute that is to be evaluated at the pleading stage, while
proceedings in the underlying litigation remain pending and
unresolved, a claim for attorney fees under OCGA §
50-18-73 (b),
15
like the one Phoebe Putney brought here, is not yet ripe for
consideration by the trial court because it is not yet in possession of
“the record as a whole.” Thus, in this case, absent that...
...raised for the first time at the conclusion of the litigation. See OCGA
§§
9-15-14 (e) (permitting parties in civil actions to request an award
of attorney fees by motion at any time during the course of the action
and up to 45 days after the final disposition of the action);
50-18-73
(b) (requiring award of attorney fees under the Open Records Act to
be “on the basis of the record as a whole”)....
...court from sua sponte
awarding attorney fees should the trial court determine that a party
was entitled to such fees. See OCGA §§
9-15-14 (b) (permitting a
court to assess attorney fees “upon the motion of any party or the
court itself”);
50-18-73 (b) (“In any action brought to enforce the
provisions of this chapter in which the court determines that either
17
party acted without substantial justification either in not complying
with this chapte...
...The
question before us is whether there is any distinction between the
claim in that case and a claim for attorney fees raised in a responsive
pleading under the Open Records Act. We conclude today that there
is not.
We recognize, as any reasonable plaintiff also would, that by
enacting OCGA §
50-18-73 (b), the General Assembly has embedded
within any lawsuit to enforce the Open Records Act the potential for
attorney fees to be awarded against the plaintiff — even if the
defendant never makes a claim or request for fees....
...Phoebe Putney’s claim was, at worst, premature,
and it need not have brought a counterclaim in order to preserve its
right to later seek an award of attorney fees.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Phoebe Putney’s
20
request for attorney fees under OCGA §
50-18-73 (b) is not subject
to a motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Aug 13, 2024
...(Referencing e-mails between Milliron
and Mark E. Shamel, Esq., attached as Exhibit 1 to Milliron’s Affidavit, filed
in the trial court on October 6, 2022.)
3 Antonakakis also moved for “reasonable attorney’s fees and other
litigation costs reasonably incurred” pursuant to OCGA §
50-18-73 (b), which
provides in pertinent part that,
[i]n any action brought to enforce the provisions of this chapter in
which the court determines that either party acted without
substantial justification either in not compl...
...The trial court also
—————————————————————
4 Milliron elected not to include a transcript of this hearing in the
appellate record.
5 The trial court also held that Antonakakis was entitled to reasonable
attorney fees and costs under OCGA §
50-18-73 (b) and subsequently awarded
him $53,874.51 in fees without holding an evidentiary hearing on this issue.
7
concluded that Georgia Tech had designated “an open records
officer” as “the custo...
...submitted, [ ] the trial court correctly determined that the faulty
request [was] not a viable means to support Milliron’s action for an
injunction” and “properly dismissed his case.”6 Id. (citing OCGA §
50-18-71 (b) (3) (“The enforcement provisions of [OCGA §§]
50-18-73
and
50-18-74 shall be available only to enforce compliance and
punish noncompliance when a written request is made consistent
with this subsection and shall not be available when such request is
made orally.”)).
We granted Milli...
...agency, like here to a private contractor working for an agency. See
OCGA §
50-18-71 (b) (1) (B). In addition, actions seeking to “enforce
compliance” with the Open Records Act can be brought against such
custodians of public records. OCGA §
50-18-73 (a).
On appeal, Milliron asserts that his open records request was
properly served on Antonakakis because Antonakakis is the
custodian of the subject records, and the Open Records Act imposes
an obligation to produce public recor...
...OCGA §
50-18-71 (b) (1) (B). Notably,
19
an action “to enforce compliance with the provisions of” the Act may
also be brought “against persons or agencies having custody of
records open to the public.” OCGA §
50-18-73 (a) (emphasis
supplied).
Accordingly, the language of the Act contemplates and permits
that a request to inspect and copy public records can be made to
someone outside of an agency....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jul 6, 2006 | 280 Ga. 706, 2006 Fulton County D. Rep. 2191, 34 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2468
...d the Open Meetings Act by conducting the closed session and violated the Open Records Act by refusing to comply with the request for the grand jury presentments. Based on those findings, the trial court granted mandamus relief and, pursuant to OCGA §
50-18-73(b), awarded attorney's fees and costs to the Newspaper....
...523,
630 S.E.2d 384 (2006); Wiggins v. Bd. of Commissioners of Tift County,
258 Ga.App. 666, 668,
574 S.E.2d 874 (2002). However, the question of whether the Acts were violated nevertheless remains for resolution, because the trial court, acting pursuant to OCGA §
50-18-73(b), awarded attorney's fees and costs to the Newspaper....
...to the provisions of OCGA §
15-12-80, the grand jury submits to him or her for comment before presenting it to the superior court for publication. 4. Insofar as it found a violation of the Acts and awarded attorney's fees and costs pursuant to OCGA §
50-18-73(b), the trial court ruled correctly and its judgment is, therefore, affirmed....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 22, 2024 | 320 Ga. 170
...prosecutorial immunity from civil liability for private actions arising from the
performance of her official duties, including actions taken pursuant to the
6
further ruled that Miller had standing to bring the ORA
enforcement action under OCGA §
50-18-73 (a).
On November 7, 2023, the trial court granted Gonzalez’s
request for a certificate of immediate review, and this Court granted
her application for an interlocutory appeal on December 27, 2023.4
In her appellate brief, Gonz...
...ing as
anything other than the custodian of her office’s public records.16 An
action “to enforce compliance with the provisions of” the ORA may
be brought “against persons or agencies having custody of records
open to the public.” OCGA §
50-18-73 (a) (emphasis supplied)....
...Couch,
295 Ga. 469, 473-474 (2) (759 SE2d 804)
(2014) (citation and punctuation omitted).
27
records open to the public under this article to enforce compliance
with the provisions of this article.” See OCGA §
50-18-73 (a)....
Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Aug 13, 2024 | 320 Ga. 170
...(Referencing emails between Milliron and
Mark E. Shamel, Esq., attached as Exhibit 1 to Milliron’s Affidavit, filed in the
trial court on October 6, 2022.)
3 Antonakakis also moved for “reasonable attorney’s fees and other
litigation costs reasonably incurred” pursuant to OCGA §
50-18-73 (b), which
provides in pertinent part that,
[i]n any action brought to enforce the provisions of this chapter in
which the court determines that either party acted without
substantial justification either in not compl...
...————————————
4 Milliron elected not to include a transcript of this hearing in the
appellate record.
5 The trial court also held that Antonakakis was entitled to reasonable
attorney’s fees and costs under OCGA §
50-18-73 (b) and subsequently awarded
him $53,874.51 in fees without holding an evidentiary hearing on this issue.
7
18-70, et seq....
...court correctly determined that the faulty request [was] not a viable
means to support Milliron’s action for an injunction” and “properly
dismissed his case.”6 Id. (citing OCGA §
50-18-71 (b) (3) (“The
enforcement provisions of [OCGA]
50-18-73 and
50-18-74 shall be
available only to enforce compliance and punish noncompliance
when a written request is made consistent with this subsection and
shall not be available when such request is made orally.”)).
We granted Millir...
...agency, like here to a private contractor working for an agency. See
15
OCGA §
50-18-71 (b) (1) (B). In addition, actions seeking to “enforce
compliance” with the Open Records Act can be brought against such
custodians of public records. OCGA §
50-18-73 (a).
On appeal, Milliron asserts that his open records request was
properly served on Antonakakis because Antonakakis is the
custodian of the subject records, and the Open Records Act imposes
an obligation to produce public recor...
...OCGA §
50-18-71 (b) (1) (B). Notably,
an action “to enforce compliance with the provisions of” the Act may
also be brought “against persons or agencies having custody of
19
records open to the public.” OCGA §
50-18-73 (a) (emphasis
supplied).
Accordingly, the language of the Act contemplates and permits
that a request to inspect and copy public records can be made to
someone outside of an agency....
