Statutes attempting to waive state's right to tax.

- To the extent that former Code 1933, §§ 15-301 through 15-303 (see O.C.G.A. §§ 50-2-22 through50-2-24) attempted to waive the state's sovereign right to tax, the statutes were void. The petition, seeking to prevent taxation of private property located upon lands belonging to the United States, alleged no cause of action and it was not error for the court to dismiss the petition on demurrer (now motion to dismiss). IBM Corp. v. Evans, 213 Ga. 333, 99 S.E.2d 220 (1957).

Cession of complete and general jurisdiction over United States' lands.

- The 1927 Act of cession of jurisdiction (see O.C.G.A. §§ 50-2-22,50-2-23, and50-2-24) is not an act of repeal or amendment of prior Acts. It is a new and general statute by which this state makes a complete and general cession of jurisdiction to the federal government over all lands held by the United States for "purposes of government." Former Code 1933, § 15-301 (see O.C.G.A. § 50-2-22) was in no wise contrary to Ga. Const. 1877, Art. III, Sec. VII, Para. XVIII (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. V, Para. IV). Bowen v. United States, 134 F.2d 845 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 764, 63 S. Ct. 1320, 87 L. Ed. 1714 (1943).

Counties have right to tax private property located upon federal lands.

- Former Code 1933, §§ 15-301 through 15-303 (see O.C.G.A. §§ 50-2-22,50-2-23, and50-2-24) offended Ga. Const. 1945, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. II (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. I) and were, to the extent that the statutes undertook to waive the sovereign right of Georgia to tax, absolutely void. The sole ground upon which the petition sought to defeat the county's attempt to tax the private property located upon lands belonging to the United States being the abortive attempt by the legislature to waive the state's right to tax, the petition alleged no cause of action, and the court did not err in sustaining the demurrers (now motion to dismiss) and dismissing the petition. IBM Corp. v. Evans, 213 Ga. 333, 99 S.E.2d 220 (1957).

State taxation must not interfere with business of United States.

- Former Code 1933, §§ 15-301 through 15-303 (see O.C.G.A. §§ 50-2-22,50-2-23, and50-2-24) must be construed in pari materia with Ga. Const. 1945, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. II (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. I). When thus construed, the statutes mean that the United States has no right to prevent taxation so long as such taxation in no wise interferes with the business of the United States. Taxing the private property could not conceivably interfere with the government's business. IBM Corp. v. Evans, 213 Ga. 333, 99 S.E.2d 220 (1957).

Lands acquired by United States are free from certain state interference.

- When lands are acquired in any other way by the United States within the limits of a state than by purchase with her consent, they will hold the lands subject to the qualification that if upon them forts, arsenals, or other public buildings are erected for the use of the general government, such buildings, with their appurtenances, as instrumentalities for the execution of its powers, will be free from any such interference and jurisdiction of the state as would destroy or impair their effective use for the purposes designed. Brittain v. Reid, 220 Ga. 794, 141 S.E.2d 903 (1965).

State possesses jurisdiction over robbery in post office.

- When a robbery occurred in a United States post office, the defendant's contention that the federal government had exclusive jurisdiction over the offense since the robbery occurred on federal property was without merit. Harris v. State, 186 Ga. App. 756, 368 S.E.2d 527 (1988).

Cited in Dicks v. Dicks, 177 Ga. 379, 170 S.E. 245 (1933); DeKalb County v. Henry C. Beck Co., 382 F.2d 992 (5th Cir. 1967); Powers v. State, 261 Ga. App. 296, 582 S.E.2d 237 (2003).

No jurisdiction over national military park.

- Game and Fish Commission (now Department of Natural Resources) of this state does not have jurisdiction over the premises of the Chickamauga-Chattanooga National Military Park for the purpose of checking fishing licenses and other violations of fishing and hunting laws which might occur on the premises of the park. 1945-47 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 51.

Exclusive criminal jurisdiction.

- Although in earlier Acts consenting to acquisition and ceding jurisdiction over land for the park, criminal jurisdiction was specifically reserved by the State of Georgia, exclusive jurisdiction was ceded by this section. 1945-47 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 51.

Building safety council has no right or duty to inspect: (a) properties of the federal government such as military reservations; or (b) properties, such as military housing projects, owned by the government but leased to private persons for nongovernmental uses. 1948-49 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 394.

Juvenile court does not have jurisdiction on military base.

- Fort Stewart remains in the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government and the Juvenile Court of Liberty County does not have jurisdiction over juveniles who have allegedly committed delinquent acts on the military base. 1994 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U94-10.

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 77 Am. Jur. 2d, United States, § 33 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 91 C.J.S., United States, § 123 et seq.

ALR.

- Applicability of state statutes or municipal regulations to contracts for performance of work on land owned or leased by the federal government, 91 A.L.R. 779; 115 A.L.R. 371; 127 A.L.R. 827.

Applicability of statute or municipal regulations to contracts for performance of work on land owned or leased by federal government, 127 A.L.R. 827.