Statutes void when statutes attempt to waive state's right to tax.

- To the extent that former Code 1933, §§ 15-301 through 15-304 (see O.C.G.A. §§ 50-2-22,50-2-23, and50-2-24) attempted to waive the state's sovereign right to tax, the statutes were void. The petition, seeking to prevent taxation of private property located upon lands belonging to the United States, alleged no cause of action, and it was not error for the court to dismiss the same on demurrer (now motion to dismiss). IBM Corp. v. Evans, 213 Ga. 333, 99 S.E.2d 220 (1957).

Taxation of private property upon United States' lands.

- Former Code 1933, §§ 15-301 through 15-304 (see O.C.G.A. §§ 50-2-22,50-2-23, and50-2-24) offended Ga. Const. 1945, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. II (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. I) and were, to the extent that they undertook to waive the sovereign right of Georgia to tax, absolutely void. The sole ground upon which the petition seeks to defeat the county's attempt to tax the private property located upon lands belonging to the United States being the abortive attempt by the legislature to waive the state's right to tax, the petition alleged no cause of action, and the court did not err in sustaining the demurrers (now motion to dismiss) and dismissing the petition. IBM Corp. v. Evans, 213 Ga. 333, 99 S.E.2d 220 (1957).

State taxation must not interfere with business of United States.

- Former Code 1933, §§ 15-301 through 15-304 (see O.C.G.A. §§ 50-2-22,50-2-23, and50-2-24) must be construed in pari materia with Ga. Const. 1945, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. II (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. I, Para. I). When thus construed, the statutes mean that the United States has no right to prevent taxation so long as such taxation in no wise interferes with the business of the United States. Taxing the private property could not conceivably interfere with the government's business. IBM Corp. v. Evans, 213 Ga. 333, 99 S.E.2d 220 (1957).

Cession of complete and general jurisdiction over United States lands.

- The 1927 Act of cession of jurisdiction (see O.C.G.A. §§ 50-2-22,50-2-23, and50-2-24) is not an Act of repeal or amendment of prior Acts. It is a new and general statute by which this state makes a complete and general cession of jurisdiction to the federal government over all lands held by the United States for "purposes of government." Former Code 1933, § 15-302 (see O.C.G.A. § 50-2-23) was in no wise contrary to Ga. Const. 1877, Art. III, Sec. VII, Para. XVII (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. V, Para. IV). Bowen v. United States, 134 F.2d 845 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 764, 63 S. Ct. 1320, 87 L. Ed. 1714 (1943).

Former Code 1933, § 15-302 (see O.C.G.A. § 50-2-23) was a partial cession of jurisdiction; while former Code 1933, § 15-303 described the time of vesting. Neither purported to condition state consent upon federal acceptance. DeKalb County v. Henry C. Beck Co., 382 F.2d 992 (5th Cir. 1967).

O.C.G.A.

§ 50-2-23 as offer to cede criminal jurisdiction to United States. - This section amounts to an offer to cede criminal jurisdiction to the United States which, to become effective, must be accepted in the proper manner by the United States, and the burden of showing such acceptance rests with the defendant in a criminal case who contends that the state court is without jurisdiction to try the defendant for an offense against state laws allegedly committed within the confines of the military installation. Dobbins v. State, 114 Ga. App. 403, 151 S.E.2d 549 (1966).

Requisite showing of federal acceptance of jurisdiction.

- After a deputy sheriff arrested the defendant for driving under the influence and driving without a license in a park and, at the subsequent trial, the arresting officer testified that the park was federal property, managed by the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers, assuming that the park was federal property used by the Department of Defense, since the defendant failed to make the requisite showing of federal acceptance of criminal jurisdiction, the trial court properly declined to dismiss the prosecution. Jackson v. State, 183 Ga. App. 594, 359 S.E.2d 457 (1987).

Laws in federal territory derive their authority and force from United States.

- Any law existing in territory over which the United States has "exclusive" sovereignty must derive its authority and force from the United States and is for that reason federal law, even though having its origin in the law of the state within the exterior boundaries of which the federal area is situated. Mater v. Holley, 200 F.2d 123 (5th Cir. 1952).

Lands acquired by United States free from certain state interference.

- When lands are acquired in any other way by the United States within the limits of a state than by purchase with her consent, they will hold the lands subject to the qualification that if upon them forts, arsenals, or other public buildings are erected for the use of the general government, such buildings, with their appurtenances, as instrumentalities for the execution of its powers, will be free from any such interference and jurisdiction of the state as would destroy or impair their effective use for the purposes designed. Brittain v. Reid, 220 Ga. 794, 141 S.E.2d 903 (1965).

State possesses jurisdiction over robbery in post office.

- When a robbery occurred in a United States post office, the defendant's contention that the federal government had exclusive jurisdiction over the offense since the robbery occurred on federal property was without merit. Harris v. State, 186 Ga. App. 756, 368 S.E.2d 527 (1988).

Arrest on Dobbins Air Force Base was lawful.

- Trial court did not err in concluding that a defendant's arrest on Dobbins Air Force Base was lawful based on evidence that the State of Georgia retained criminal jurisdiction over lands in the state used for federal military purposes, including a Department of the Army jurisdiction statement specifically for Dobbins recognizing the the United States did not have exclusive jurisdiction over the property. Devega v. State, 286 Ga. 448, 689 S.E.2d 293 (2010).

Cited in Shea v. Gehan, 70 Ga. App. 229, 28 S.E.2d 181 (1943); Powers v. State, 261 Ga. App. 296, 582 S.E.2d 237 (2003).

Taxation of property of public utilities on federal property.

- State has jurisdiction, for purposes of taxation, of property of public utilities located on property in this state belonging to the federal government. 1952-53 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 186.

Board usually has no authority to regulate post-secondary educational institutions.

- State Board of Education is without authority to regulate post-secondary educational institutions which are operated on federal military bases, unless the authority to do so is granted by federal statute, regulation, or consent. 1978 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 78-67.

Coroner has no authority to sign death certificate of civilian employee of the United States army who committed suicide on a military reservation within the boundaries of a county of Georgia. 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 75-97.

Building safety council has no right or duty to inspect: (a) properties of the federal government such as military reservations; or (b) properties, such as military housing projects, owned by the government but leased to private persons for nongovernmental uses. 1948-49 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 394.

Federal installations purchasing distilled spirits directly from distiller.

- Military or naval installation which is located on property that has been ceded to the United States by this state has the right to buy distilled spirits directly from the distiller without the payment of Georgia tax or warehouse charges. 1948-49 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 591.

Juvenile court does not have jurisdiction on military base.

- Fort Stewart remains in the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government and the Juvenile Court of Liberty County does not have jurisdiction over juveniles who have allegedly committed delinquent acts on the military base. 1994 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U94-10.

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 63C Am. Jur. 2d, Public Lands, § 125. 77 Am. Jur. 2d, United States, § 33 et seq.

ALR.

- Applicability of statute or municipal regulations to contracts for performance of work on land owned or leased by federal government, 127 A.L.R. 827.