O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 50-21-28 (2019)

Venue of actions

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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All tort actions against the state under this article shall be brought in the state or superior court of the county wherein the tort giving rise to the loss occurred; provided, however, that wrongful death actions may be brought in the county wherein the tort giving rise to the loss occurred or the county wherein the decedent died, and provided, further, that in any case in which an officer or employee of the state may be included as a defendant in his or her individual capacity, the action may be brought in the county of residence of such officer or employee. All actions against the state for losses sustained in any other state shall be brought in the county of residence of any officer or employee residing in this state upon whose actions or omissions the claim against the state is based.

History

Code 1981, § 50-21-28, enacted by Ga. L. 1992, p. 1883, § 1; Ga. L. 2017, p. 628, § 1/SB 126.

Annotations

Editor’s notes. - Ga. L. 2017, p. 628, § 2/SB 126, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that the amendment of this Code section shall apply only to causes of action filed on or after July 1, 2017.

Law reviews. - For article, ‘‘Trial Practice and Procedure,’’ see 53 Mercer L. Rev. 475 (2001). For annual survey of administrative law, see 56 Mercer L. Rev. 31 (2004). For annual survey of tort law, see 68 Mercer L. Rev. 279 (2016). For annual survey on trial practice and procedure, see 69 Mercer L. Rev. 321 (2017).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS County of death controls. - Venue of a wrongful death action against the Department of Transportation arising from a highway auto accident was in the county where the death occurred, not where the accident took place. Evans v. DOT, 226 Ga. App. 74, 485 S.E.2d 243 (1997), aff ’d, 269 Ga. 400, 499 S.E.2d 321 (1998). Venue proper where pain and suffering occurred. - In an action under the Georgia Tort Claims Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-20 et seq., against a state hospital for negligent acts occurring in Richmond County, venue was proper in DeKalb County, where the patients underwent multiple corrective surgeries allegedly arising out of the alleged negligence because under O.C.G.A. §§ 50-21-22(3) and 50-21-28 a tort action could be brought against the state in the county where economic loss, pain and suffering, mental anguish, and other elements of actual damages occurred. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga. v. Jordan, 335 Ga. App. 703, 782 S.E.2d 809 (2016). Constitutionality. - O.C.G.A. § 50-21-28 does not violate Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Par. IX, providing for venue in certain civil actions in the county where the defendant resides. Campbell v. Department of Cors., 268 Ga. 408, 490 S.E.2d 99 (1997). Enactment of O.C.G.A. § 50-21-28 was

a valid exercise of the General Assembly’s authority pursuant to Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX, and establishes the proper venue in actions brought under the Georgia Tort Claims Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-20 et seq., against the state as the sole defendant. Campbell v. Department of Cors., 268 Ga. 408, 490 S.E.2d 99 (1997). O.C.G.A. § 50-21-28 establishes the proper venue in actions brought under the Georgia Tort Claims Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-21-20 et seq., and against the state as the sole defendant. Doe #102 v. Department of Cors., 268 Ga. 582, 492 S.E.2d 516 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1047, 118 S. Ct. 1363, 140 L. Ed. 2d 512 (1998). Venue limitation set forth in O.C.G.A. § 50-21-28 is constitutional even though it is inconsistent with the joint tortfeasor venue provision of the constitution; moreover, because it is a special venue provision that is controlling and exclusive because of its use of the word ‘‘shall,’’ it establishes the proper venue in tort actions against the state even when the state is not the sole tortfeasor. Dean v. Tabsum, Inc., 272 Ga. 831, 536 S.E.2d 743 (2000). Cited in EHCA Cartersville, LLC v. Turner, 280 Ga. 333, 626 S.E.2d 482 (2006); Ga. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Dougherty County, 330 Ga. App. 581, 768 S.E.2d 771 (2015).

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 16 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1997–2022 · leading case: Campbell v. Dep't of Corr., 490 S.E.2d 99 (Ga. 1997).
Campbell v. Dep't of Corr., 490 S.E.2d 99 (Ga. 1997). · cites it 31× “DOC moved to transfer the action to Baldwin County claiming venue is controlled by OCGA § 50-21-28, the venue provision of the Georgia Tort Claims Act, OCGA § 50-21-20 et seq.”
Dean v. Tabsum, Inc., 536 S.E.2d 743 (Ga. 2000). · cites it 31× “The issue raised in this granted interlocutory appeal is whether OCGA § 50-21-28, which provides that venue under the Georgia Tort Claims Act (GTCA) 1 is in the county where the loss occurred, is unconstitutional because it conflicts with the joint tortfeasor venue provision of…”
Ehca Cartersville, LLC v. Turner, 626 S.E.2d 482 (Ga. 2006). · cites it 6× “In Campbell, the plaintiff contended that OCGA § 50-21-28, which provides that venue in tort actions against the State under the Georgia Tort Claims Act is in the county where the loss occurred, contravened the joint tortfeasor venue provision of our Constitution.”
Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. v. Jordan, 782 S.E.2d 809 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016). · cites it 10× “The trial court denied BOR and MCG’s motions to transfer the cases to Richmond County, finding that venue was proper in DeKalb County pursuant to OCGA § 50-21-28. These interlocutory appeals ensued.”
Dep't of Transp. v. Evans, 499 S.E.2d 321 (Ga. 1998). · cites it 10× “Evans filed suit against the Georgia Department of Transportation (DOT) for the wrongful death of her 18-year-old daughter, which resulted from a vehicular collision on a wet highway that Evans contended was negligently repaired and maintained by DOT.”
DOE 102 v. Dep't of Corr., 492 S.E.2d 516 (Ga. 1997). · cites it 6× “In the alternative, the DOC asked that venue be transferred to Baldwin County as required by OCGA § 50-21-28, the venue provision of the GTCA.”
Dep't of Transp. v. King, 798 S.E.2d 492 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017). · cites it 2× “I agree with the conclusion of the trial court, therefore, that “[i]n looking at [King’s] Ante Litem Notice as a whole” the notice effectively did communicate a specific dollar amount, although it did so 1 OCGA § 50-21-29 (b) (1) provides: in any action or claim for damages…”
Evans v. Dep't of Transp., 485 S.E.2d 243 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997). · cites it 4× “Accordingly, venue is governed by OCGA § 50-21-28 which provides: "All tort actions against the state under this article shall be brought in the state or superior court of the county wherein the loss occurred; provided, however, that, in any case in which an officer or employee…”
Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Georgia v. Winter, 771 S.E.2d 201 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015). · cites it 2× “Compare OCGA § 50-21-28 (which provides, among other things, that tort actions against the state “shall be brought in *532 the state or superior court of the county wherein the loss occurred”) (emphasis supplied).”
Georgia Dep't of Human Servs. v. Dougherty Cnty., Georgia, 768 S.E.2d 771 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015). · cites it 2× “2 Our legislature has since enacted OCGA § 50-21-28, which provides, in pertinent part, that “[a]ll tort actions against the [S]tate .”
Doe v. Dep't of Corr., 481 S.E.2d 837 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997). · cites it 6× “Among other grounds of appeal, she asserts that OCGA § 50-21-28, the portion of the 1992 Georgia Tort Claims Act which places venue in the state or superior court of the county where the loss occurred, is in direct conflict with the venue provisions of Ga.”
Gonzalez v. Dep't of Transp., 594 S.E.2d 783 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004). · cites it 4× “11 In this regard, OCGA § 50-21-28 mandates that “[a] 11 tort actions against the state under this article shall be brought in the state or superior court of the county wherein the loss occurred.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.