O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 51-1-14 (2019)

Violent injury or attempt to commit injury

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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Any violent injury or illegal attempt to commit a physical injury upon a person is a tort for which damages may be recovered.

History

(Orig. Code 1863, § 2911; Code 1868, § 2918; Code 1873, § 2969; Code 1882,

§ 2969; Civil Code 1895, § 3827; Civil Code 1910, § 4423; Code 1933, § 105-602.)

Annotations

Cross references. - Assault and battery generally, T. 16, C. 5, Art. 2. Rape, § 16-6-1. Law reviews. - For comment on

Mims v. Boland, 110 Ga. App. 477, 138 S.E.2d 902 (1964), see 2 Ga. St. B. J. 133 (1965).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Cause of action for personal injury. - Actions ex delicto both by the common law and the law of Georgia unquestionably include actions for injuries to the person. Goebel v. Hodges, 83 Ga. App. 574, 64 S.E.2d 207 (1951). Unlawful touching constitutes physical injury. - Any unlawful touching of a person’s body, even though no actual physical hurt may ensue therefrom, since it violates a personal right, constitutes a physical injury to that person. Interstate Life & Accident Co. v. Brewer, 56 Ga. App. 599, 193 S.E. 458 (1937). Unlawful touching need not be direct, but may be indirect, as by the precipitation upon the body of a person of any material substance. Interstate Life & Accident Co. v. Brewer, 56 Ga. App. 599, 193 S.E. 458 (1937). Mere striking of silver coin thrown by defendant against plaintiff ’s body amounted in law to physical injury. Interstate Life & Accident Co. v. Brewer, 56 Ga. App. 599, 193 S.E. 458 (1937). Actual touching of victim not required. - Evidence supported an award of damages for the tort of assault and intentional infliction of emotional distress when the parent of a child in daycare harassed the daycare provider by tailgating the provider, cutting the provider off, and running the provider off the road. Edwards v. Sabat, 263 Ga. App. 852, 589 S.E.2d 618 (2003). Summary judgment inappropriate. - When a merchant’s employee detained three suspected shoplifters, and the detainees brought claims of assault and battery, summary judgment in favor of the merchant was inappropriate since the plaintiffs testified that the employee detained the plaintiff ’s an unreasonable

amount of time and was physically and verbally abusive. Brown v. Super Disc. Mkts., Inc., 223 Ga. App. 174, 477 S.E.2d 839 (1996). Summary judgment was improperly granted to the defendant after the plaintiff basketball referee testified that the defendant coach intentionally slammed the coach’s body into the plaintiff and bumped the plaintiff backwards and that the coach’s conduct was highly offensive. Darnell v. Houston County Bd. of Educ., 234 Ga. App. 488, 506 S.E.2d 385 (1998). Jury instructions. - The court having properly instructed the jury as to the relative rights of the parties under the pleadings and the evidence, it was not error to fail to give in charge the definition of a tort as contained in this section. Christy Bros. Circus v. Turnage, 38 Ga. App. 581, 144 S.E. 680, overruled on other grounds, Ob-Gyn Assocs. v. Littleton, 259 Ga. 663, 386 S.E.2d 146 (1989), overruled on other grounds, Lee v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 272 Ga. 583, 533 S.E.2d 82 (2000), overruled on other grounds, Shores v. Modern Transp. Servs., 262 Ga. App. 293, 585 S.E.2d 664 (2003). Remedies for Fourth Amendment violation by police officers. - See Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 737 F.2d 894 (11th Cir. 1984), aff ’d in part and rev’d and vacated in part en banc, 774 F.2d 1495 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1115, 106 S. Ct. 1970, 90 L. Ed. 2d 654 (1986). Cited in Dodd v. Slater, 101 Ga. App. 362, 114 S.E.2d 170 (1960); Roberts v. Harrell, 230 Ga. 454, 197 S.E.2d 704 (1973); Bowling v. Janmar, Inc., 142 Ga. App. 53, 234 S.E.2d 849 (1977); Capitol T.V. Serv., Inc. v. Derrick, 163 Ga. App. 65, 293 S.E.2d 724 (1982); Luckie v. Piggly-Wiggly S., Inc., 173 Ga. App. 177,

325 S.E.2d 844 (1984); Gardner v. Rogers, 224 Ga. App. 165, 480 S.E.2d 217 (1996); Sam’s Wholesale Club v. Riley, 241 Ga. App. 693, 527 S.E.2d 293 (1999); Wallace v. Stringer, 250 Ga. App. 850, 553 S.E.2d

166 (2001); Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322 (N.D. Ga. 2002); Draper v. Reynolds, 278 Ga. App. 401, 629 S.E.2d 476 (2006).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 74 Am. Jur. 2d, Torts, § 17 et seq. C.J.S. - 6A C.J.S., Assault, § 4 et seq. ALR. - Civil action for assault upon female person, 6 ALR 985. Civil liability growing out of mutual combat, 30 ALR 199; 47 ALR 1092. Recovery for physical consequences of fright resulting in physical injury, 76 ALR 681; 98 ALR 402. Punitive or exemplary damages for assault, 123 ALR 1115. Proof to establish or negative self-defense in civil action for death from intentional act, 17 ALR2d 597. Civil liability of insane or other mentally disordered person for assault or battery, 77 ALR2d 625. Liability under Jones Act or seaworthiness doctrine for injuries caused by assault, 22 ALR3d 624. Admissibility of evidence of character or reputation of party in civil action for as-

sault on issues other than impeachment, 91 ALR3d 718. Assault: criminal liability as barring or mitigating recovery of punitive damages, 98 ALR3d 870. Admissibility of evidence of character or reputation of party in civil action for sexual assault on issues other than impeachment, 100 ALR3d 569. Employee’s act or threat of physical violence as bar to unemployment compensation, 20 ALR4th 637. Liability for injury to martial arts participant, 47 ALR4th 403. Workers’ compensation law as precluding employee’s suit against employer for third person’s criminal attack, 49 ALR4th 926. Parking facility proprietor’s liability for criminal attack on patron, 49 ALR4th 1257. Permissibility of in-court demonstration to show effect of injury in action for bodily injury, 82 ALR4th 980.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 22 cases (5 in the last 5 years), 1984–2026 · leading case: Luckie v. Piggly-Wiggly S., Inc., 325 S.E.2d 844 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984).
Luckie v. Piggly-Wiggly S., Inc., 325 S.E.2d 844 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984). · cites it 4× “" OCGA § 51-1-14. Since the actionable conduct constituting the tort of assault is specifically set forth by statute, the applicable standard of conduct under the circumstances needs no further explication.”
Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322 (N.D. Ga. 2002). · cites it 2× “Assault and Battery Under Georgia law, “[a] physical injury done to another shall give a right of action to the injured person, whatever may be the intention of the person causing the injury, unless he is justified under some rule of law.” O.C.G.A. § 51-1-13 (2000). “Any violent…”
Gibbons v. McBride, 124 F. Supp. 3d 1342 (S.D. Ga. 2015). · cites it 2× “§ 51-1-13 and O.C.G.A. § 51-1-14, statutes which define the scope of tort law in Georgia; • In Count XIV, Mr.”
Tante v. Herring, 453 S.E.2d 686 (Ga. 1994). · cites it 2× “, assault or battery, OCGA § 51-1-14, intentional infliction of emotional distress, or negligent transmission of an infectious disease (based on the Herrings’ allegation that Tante infected Mrs.”
Sam's Wholesale Club v. Riley, 527 S.E.2d 293 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999). · cites it 2× “1 After Sam’s failed to file an answer or other entry of appearance for over 90 days, Riley moved for a default judgment, which the trial court granted by order dated November 17, 1997.”
R. O. C. v. Est. of Bryant, 632 S.E.2d 429 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006). · cites it 3× “, or granted a new trial on the basis that an intentional tort was committed and proven under OCGA § 51-1-14. 5 She further argues that the uncontradicted evidence proved that Bryant’s conveyance of his property to *655 Gamier and Singleton was fraudulent according to former…”
Porter v. Massarelli, 692 S.E.2d 722 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010). · cites it 2× “er to the extent he reasonably believes such force is necessary to prevent death or great bodily injury to himself or another or to prevent commission of forcible felony), citing OCGA § 16-3-21 (a); Gardner, supra at 169 (4) (where jury could find that officer’s conduct toward…”
Gardner v. Rogers, 480 S.E.2d 217 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996). · cites it 2× “See OCGA § 51-1-14. Based on our holding in Division 1, a jury could conclude that Rogers’ conduct toward plaintiff was not justified and that Rogers’ conduct placed plaintiff in fear of an illegal, unauthorized physical contact.”
Edwards v. Sabat, 589 S.E.2d 618 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003). · cites it 2× “OCGA § 51-1-14 provides that “[a]ny violent injury or illegal attempt to commit a physical injury upon a person is a tort for which damages may be recovered.”
Jefferson Ins. Co. of New York v. Dunn, 482 S.E.2d 383 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997). · cites it 2× “It does not distinguish between the intentional tort of battery, such as is defined at OCGA § 51-1-14 and any of the crimes involving battery as proscribed by OCGA §§.”
Wallace v. Stringer, 553 S.E.2d 166 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001). · cites it 2× “” (a) OCGA § 51-1-14 provides that “[a]ny violent injury or illegal attempt to commit a physical injury upon a person is a tort for which damages may be recovered.”
Darnell v. Houston Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 506 S.E.2d 385 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998). · cites it 2× “Here, although Moneypenny claimed that he did not touch Darnell, West testified that he saw what appeared to be physical contact.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.