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2018 Georgia Code 51-7-3 | Car Wreck Lawyer

TITLE 51 TORTS

Section 7. False Arrest, False Imprisonment, Malicious Prosecution, and Abusive Litigation, 51-7-1 through 51-7-85.

ARTICLE 1 FALSE ARREST

51-7-3. Lack of probable cause defined; question for jury.

Lack of probable cause shall exist when the circumstances are such as to satisfy a reasonable man that the accuser had no ground for proceeding but his desire to injure the accused. Lack of probable cause shall be a question for the jury, under the direction of the court.

(Orig. Code 1863, § 2937; Code 1868, § 2944; Code 1873, § 2995; Code 1882, § 2995; Civil Code 1895, § 3856; Civil Code 1910, § 4452; Code 1933, § 105-1003.)

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Burden of proof, in these cases, is on plaintiff. Joiner v. Ocean S.S. Co., 86 Ga. 238, 12 S.E. 361 (1890).

Although O.C.G.A. § 51-7-3 provides that lack of probable cause "shall be a question for the jury," there is nothing to send to the jury when the plaintiff does not at least raise some evidence creating an issue of fact on the matter. Pinkston v. City of Albany, 196 Ga. App. 43, 395 S.E.2d 587 (1990); Britt v. Whitehall Income Fund, 891 F. Supp. 1578 (M.D. Ga. 1993).

Probable cause was demonstrated as matter of law.

- What facts and circumstances amount to probable cause is a pure question of law, but the burden of proof to show lack of probable cause is on the plaintiff and there is nothing to send to the jury if the plaintiff does not raise some evidence creating an issue of fact as to each element of the tort of false arrest; thus, the defendant bank was properly granted summary judgment on the plaintiff patron's claim for false arrest when: (1) it was undisputed that the patron refused to leave the bank after being repeatedly asked by bank representatives to do so; (2) such refusal clearly provided probable cause within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 51-7-3 for the patron's arrest for criminal trespass under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-21(b); and (3) such probable cause defeated an element of the false arrest claim. Mohamud v. Wachovia Corp., 260 Ga. App. 612, 580 S.E.2d 259 (2003).

Evidence sufficient to convict.

- When security guard in a grocery store was concerned about the defendant from the time the defendant entered the store because of the defendant's apparent intoxication and suspicious comments, but the guard did not confront the defendant until a crime was committed in the guard's presence, the record is devoid of evidence to suggest that the security guard acted out any motivation other than a desire to protect the property and patrons of the store and to prevent the defendant from disrupting the store or offending the other shoppers. Amason v. Kroger Co., 204 Ga. App. 695, 420 S.E.2d 314 (1992).

When the victim of and witnesses to robbery had identified the defendant from a photo lineup, there was both sufficient information to provide probable cause for the defendant's arrest and no evidence of malice in the application for the arrest warrant, and therefore no action for false arrest and malicious prosecution. Franklin v. Consolidated Gov't, 236 Ga. App. 468, 512 S.E.2d 352 (1999).

Summary judgment precluded by factual issues.

- Summary judgment was properly denied on a parent's false arrest claim under O.C.G.A. § 51-7-1 arising out of an accusation by store employees that the parent's nine-year-old child stole from the store because whether an arrest took place when employees led the child back into the store to be questioned about the alleged theft, whether the employees had probable cause to do so under O.C.G.A. § 51-7-3, and whether the employees acted maliciously under O.C.G.A. § 51-7-2 were issues of fact to be resolved by a jury. Todd v. Byrd, 283 Ga. App. 37, 640 S.E.2d 652 (2006), overruled on other grounds, Ferrell v. Mikula, 295 Ga. App. 326, 672 S.E.2d. 7 (2008).

In a malicious prosecution case brought against a medical professional company and the company's owning doctor by the company's former office manager and a former part-time worker after those former employees were charged with theft and fraud but the charges were dismissed, the trial court erred by granting the company summary judgment since there existed genuine issues of material fact as to whether a new chief operating officer hired for the company, and an agent for the company, had misrepresented the officer's knowledge that the part-time worker had been re-hired by the company to work on an office manual and paid accordingly. However, there existed no evidence that the owning doctor made any knowing misrepresentations to the investigating detective since the owning doctor had no knowledge that the part-time worker had been rehired at any time. Barnette v. Coastal Hematology & Oncology, P. C., 294 Ga. App. 733, 670 S.E.2d 217 (2008).

Summary judgment improper.

- Trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of a corporation and the corporation's president in an employee's action alleging malicious prosecution and malicious arrest because genuine issues of fact remained as to the issues of probable cause and malice; although the president averred that the president did not know that the employee was not licensed when the president hired the employee, the affidavits the employee submitted indicated otherwise. McKissick v. S. O. A., Inc., 299 Ga. App. 772, 684 S.E.2d 24 (2009).

Trial court erred in granting summary judgment to a police officer in an arrestee's action alleging false arrest because a question of fact remained as to whether the officer apprehended the arrestee for disorderly conduct knowing that there was no probable cause to do so when nothing in the arrestee's testimony suggested that the arrestee either cursed the officer or physically obstructed the officer at any time before being handcuffed; the officer failed to provide undisputed evidence showing that an arrest for physical obstruction was justified, and the officer was not aware at the time of the arrest that the arrestee had an outstanding warrant for failure to appear. Jones v. Warner, 301 Ga. App. 39, 686 S.E.2d 835 (2009).

Cited in Brookshier v. Williams, 19 Ga. App. 685, 91 S.E. 1056 (1917); Hayes v. Irwin, 541 F. Supp. 397 (N.D. Ga. 1982); Nunnally v. Revco Disct. Drug Ctrs. of Ga., Inc., 170 Ga. App. 320, 316 S.E.2d 608 (1984); Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 737 F.2d 894 (11th Cir. 1984); Carruth v. Roberts, 189 Ga. App. 247, 375 S.E.2d 499 (1988); McGonagil v. Treadwell, 216 Ga. App. 850, 456 S.E.2d 260 (1995); Northern Telecom, Inc. v. Wilkerson, 219 Ga. App. 710, 466 S.E.2d 221 (1995); Stanford v. City of Manchester, 246 Ga. App. 129, 539 S.E.2d 845 (2000); Fleming v. U-Haul Co., 246 Ga. App. 681, 541 S.E.2d 75 (2000).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 52 Am. Jur. 2d, Malicious Prosecution, § 50 et seq.

10A Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, False Imprisonment, § 64.

C.J.S.

- 54 C.J.S., Malicious Prosecution, § 29 et seq.

ALR.

- Pleading good faith or lack of malice in mitigation of damages in action for false arrest or imprisonment, 49 A.L.R.2d 1460.

Defendant's state of mind necessary or sufficient to warrant award of punitive damages in action for false arrest or imprisonment, 93 A.L.R.3d 1109.

No results found for Georgia Code 51-7-3.