O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 51-7-46 (2019)

Immunity of grand jurors from action for malicious prosecution; liability of person instigating presentment

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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(a) No member of a grand jury shall be subject to an action for malicious prosecution based upon a presentment made by the grand jury.

(b) If a presentment is made at the instigation of a third person, from malice on his part and without probable cause, he shall be liable to an action for malicious prosecution just as if he were named as prosecutor.

History

(Orig. Code 1863, § 2927; Code 1868, § 2934; Code 1873, § 2985; Code 1882, § 2985; Civil Code 1895, § 3846; Civil Code 1910, § 4442; Code 1933, § 105-807.)

Annotations

Cross references. - Grand juries generally, § 15-12-60 et seq. JUDICIAL DECISIONS Grand jury immune from malicious prosecution action. - The grand jury as a body and its members individually, being an arm of the law and a part of the machinery of government, are not subject to question in any court for its or their action in the performance of grand jury duties, and no rule of law of which the court has any knowledge is better settled than this. Cook v. Sikes, 210 Ga. 722, 82 S.E.2d 641 (1954). As to grand jury, no writ of prohibition will lie since it is not an inferior court. Almand v. Brock, 227 Ga. 586, 182 S.E.2d 97 (1971).

Defendant officer did not instigate prosecution of plaintiff. - Because the undisputed facts of the second officer’s limited participation as a backup officer did not amount to the ‘‘instigation’’ that would cause the second officer to be named as a ‘‘prosecutor’’ in a claim of malicious prosecution under Georgia law, the malicious prosecution claim against the second officer was required to be dismissed. Proescher v. Bell, 966 F. Supp. 2d 1350 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 21, 2013). Cited in Thornton v. Marshall, 92 Ga. 548, 17 S.E. 926 (1893).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 38 Am. Jur. 2d, Grand Jury, § 38. C.J.S. - 3B C.J.S., Grand Juries, § 224. ALR. - Immunity of prosecuting offi-

cer from action for malicious prosecution, 34 ALR 1504; 56 ALR 1255; 118 ALR 1450. Liability of attorney, acting for client, for malicious prosecution, 46 ALR4th 249.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 1 case, 2013–2013 · leading case: Proescher v. Bell, 966 F. Supp. 2d 1350 (N.D. Ga. 2013).
Proescher v. Bell, 966 F. Supp. 2d 1350 (N.D. Ga. 2013). · cites it 6× “See O.C.G.A. § 51-7-46(b). The malicious-prosecution claim against him is required to be dismissed.”
— 51-7-46(b) — 1 case
Proescher v. Bell, 966 F. Supp. 2d 1350 (N.D. Ga. 2013). “See O.C.G.A. § 51-7-46(b). The malicious-prosecution claim against him is required to be dismissed.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.