O.C.G.A.
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
(a) A plaintiff who prevails in an action under this article shall be entitled to all damages allowed by law as proven by the evidence, including costs and expenses of litigation and reasonable attorney’s fees.
(b) If the abusive litigation is in a civil proceeding of a court of record and no damages other than costs and expenses of litigation and reasonable attorney’s fees are claimed, the procedures provided in Code Section 9-15-14 shall be utilized instead.
(c) No motion filed under Code Section 9-15-14 shall preclude the filing of an action under this article for damages other than costs and expenses of litigation and reasonable attorney’s fees. Any ruling under Code Section 9-15-14 is conclusive as to the issues resolved therein.
History
(Code 1981, § 51-7-83, enacted by Ga. L. 1989, p. 408, § 2.)
Annotations
Law reviews. - For article, ‘‘Of Frivolous Litigation and Runaway Juries: A
View from the Bench,’’ see 41 Ga. L. Rev. 431 (2007).
JUDICIAL DECISIONS Litigation expenses and attorney fees cannot be awarded until the claimant has prevailed on the claimant’s underlying abusive litigation claim. Williams v. Clark-Atlanta Univ., Inc., 200 Ga. App. 51, 406 S.E.2d 559 (1991). Appellate review of attorney fees. - An award of attorney fees under both subsections (a) and (b) of O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 was reviewable on direct appeal
along with a judgment under O.C.G.A. § 51-7-83. Hallman v. Emory Univ., 225 Ga. App. 247, 483 S.E.2d 362 (1997). Attorney’s fees denied. - Creditor’s motion to amend the creditor’s claim for sanctions against the debtor under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 to state a claim under O.C.G.A. § 51-7-81 was denied as the amendment was untimely and inequitable, and resolution of the claim under the
former section was conclusive. In re Fowler, No. 03-92256-MGD, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 2322 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. July 10, 2006). Attorney’s fees improper before underlying suit terminated. - Trial court erred in charging a jury on attorney’s fees under O.C.G.A. § 51-7-81 because a claim under § 51-7-81 could not be brought as a counterclaim and was premature. The jury awarded fees against both the buyers and buyers’ counsel, which was only per-
mitted under § 51-7-81 and not under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11; because the jury may have based the jury’s award on an improper theory, a new trial on attorney’s fees was required. Goldsmith v. Peterson, 307 Ga. App. 26, 703 S.E.2d 694 (2010). Cited in First Union Nat’l Bank v. Cook, 223 Ga. App. 374, 477 S.E.2d 649 (1996); Great W. Bank v. Southeastern Bank, 234 Ga. App. 420, 507 S.E.2d 191 (1998).
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
19
cases (
3 in the last 5 years), 1991–2025 · leading case:
Coen v. Aptean, Inc., 838 S.E.2d 860 (Ga. 2020).
Coen v. Aptean, Inc., 838 S.E.2d 860 (Ga. 2020).
· cites it 41× “As explained below, we conclude that punitive damages generally may be recovered in an abusive litigation lawsuit (as long as the lawsuit is not solely to recover damages for injury to peace, happiness, or feelings),1 because the text of OCGA § 51-7-83 (a) indicates that…”
Coen v. Aptean, Inc. Et Al., 816 S.E.2d 64 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018).
· cites it 20× “In this regard, the trial court found that OCGA § 51-7-83 10 and precedent of this Court required *70 that special damages be specifically pled in the complaint to support an abusive litigation claim.”
Hallman v. Emory Univ., 483 S.E.2d 362 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997).
· cites it 22× “is an independent cause of action based upon the successful termination of the action upon which it is based and is not procedurally ancillary and post-judgment, as is OCGA § 9-15-14, except when only attorney fees are sought under OCGA § 51-7-83 (b). Hutchison v. Divorce &…”
Condon v. Vickery, 606 S.E.2d 336 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004).
· cites it 4× “, includes, in OCGA § 51-7-83 (b), a specific reference to “the procedures provided in Code Section 9-15-14.”
Sharp v. Greer, Klosik & Daugherty, 568 S.E.2d 503 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002).
· cites it 4× “Sharp contends that he complied with the statutory requirements of OCGA § 51-7-83 (b) simply by pleading for punitive damages and damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress and RICO violations, regardless of whether he is successful in obtaining them.”
Betallic, Inc. v. Deavours, 439 S.E.2d 643 (Ga. 1994).
· cites it 4× “In those instances where the only damages sustained by the abusive litigation plaintiff consist of attorney fees and expenses of litigation, however, OCGA § 51-7-83 (b) provides that OCGA § 9-15-14 represents the sole avenue of recovery.”
Freeman v. Wheeler, 627 S.E.2d 86 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006).
· cites it 2× “As to attorney fees and expenses of litigation under OCGA § 9-15-14, the superior court’s prior ruling denying Freeman’s claims to these damages was conclusive, so summary judgment was properly granted to the defendants on this claim in the present action.”
Davis v. Butler, 522 S.E.2d 548 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999).
· cites it 2× “408, § 2; OCGA §§ 51-7-83; 51-7-85; Hallman v. Emory Univ.”
Great W. Bank v. Se. Bank, 507 S.E.2d 191 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998).
· cites it 2× “14 See OCGA §§ 51-7-83 (b), (c); 51-7-85. 15 684 FSupp.”
Swafford v. Bradford, 484 S.E.2d 300 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997).
· cites it 2× “Pretermitting consideration of the propriety of assessing these fees against only one party petitioner and consideration of whether the award of attorney fees is permissible under OCGA § 48-5-296, we find the trial court erred as a matter of law in awarding judgment against…”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.