O.C.G.A.
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
(a) Testamentary capacity exists when the testator has a decided and rational desire as to the disposition of property. (b) An incapacity to contract may coexist with the capacity to make a will. (c) An insane individual generally may not make a will except during a lucid interval. A monomaniac may make a will if the will is in no way connected with the monomania. In all such cases, it must appear that the will expresses the wishes of the testator unbiased by the insanity or monomania with which the testator is affected. (d) Neither advancing age nor weakness of intellect nor eccentricity of habit or thought is inconsistent with the capacity to make a will.
History
Code 1981, § 53-4-11, enacted by Ga. L. 1996, p. 504, § 10.
Annotations
Cross references. - Capacity of parties to enter into contracts, § 13-3-20 et seq. Law reviews. - For article, ‘‘The Georgia Law of Insanity,’’ see 3 Ga. B.J. 28
(1941). For survey article on wills, trusts, guardianships, and fiduciary administration, see 59 Mercer L. Rev. 447 (2007). For note discussing early development of rules governing capacity to make will in Georgia, see 24 Ga. B.J. 257 (1961).
COMMENT This section carries over the concepts of former OCGA Secs. 53-2-21, 53-2-23, and
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
21
cases (
1 in the last 5 years), 1999–2024 · leading case:
Meadows v. Beam, 807 S.E.2d 339 (Ga. 2017).
Meadows v. Beam, 807 S.E.2d 339 (Ga. 2017).
· cites it 10× “” OCGA § 53-4-11 (a). A showing of testamentary capacity requires a showing that the testator was sane or of sound mind.”
Wilson v. Lane, 614 S.E.2d 88 (Ga. 2005).
· cites it 8× “747, 747 ( 57 SE 69 ) (1906); OCGA § 53-4-11 (a) (“testamentary capacity exists when the testator has a decided and rational desire as to the disposition of property”); see also Morris v.”
Patterson-Fowlkes v. Chancey, 732 S.E.2d 252 (Ga. 2012).
· cites it 4× “492 ( 614 SE2d 88 ) (2005); OCGA § 53-4-11 (a). Indeed, testamentary capacity may be possessed by weak-minded or feeble individuals.”
Horton v. Hendrix, 662 S.E.2d 227 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008).
· cites it 2× “Nevertheless, Susan points out that because the capacity to contract is a higher standard than the capacity to make a will (OCGA § 53-4-11 (b)), the jury may have erroneously considered the mother’s capacity to make these wills in determining whether the mother had the capacity…”
Lillard v. Owens, 641 S.E.2d 511 (Ga. 2007).
· cites it 2× “Appellees presented evidence that in the weeks prior to and after his execution of the October will the testator was taking prescribed narcotic drugs which had as possible side effects hallucination, disorientation, and impaired mental and physical performance, was taking an…”
Harper v. Harper, 554 S.E.2d 454 (Ga. 2001).
· cites it 2× “” OCGA § 53-4-11 (d). There is no evidence that Grandson ever encouraged Testator to change his will or that he arranged for the execution of the new instrument.”
Mosley v. Warnock, 651 S.E.2d 696 (Ga. 2007).
· cites it 2× “550, 551 (1) ( 361 SE2d 173 ) (1987); OCGA§ 53-4-11 (a) (“[tjestamentary capacity exists when the testator has a decided and rational desire as to the disposition of property’).”
Dawson v. Dawson, 597 S.E.2d 114 (Ga. 2004).
· cites it 4× “) Former OCGA § 53-4-11 (b) (identical to current OCGA § 53-2-30 (c)).”
Woods v. Stonecipher., 824 S.E.2d 633 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019).
· cites it 4× “" OCGA § 53-4-11 (a). The requirement of testamentary capacity is fulfilled with a showing that the testator understood that the will had the effect of disposing of her property at the time of her death, was capable of remembering generally what property was subject to…”
Ashford v. Van Horne, 580 S.E.2d 201 (Ga. 2003).
· cites it 2× “Singelmann, supra at 897 (a testator need not have had specific or exact knowledge of his income or assets).”
Caswell v. Caswell, 675 S.E.2d 19 (Ga. 2009).
· cites it 2× “The will was admitted into evidence at trial without redaction so the jury was aware of the existence and stated effect of the in terrorem provision.”
Amerson v. Pahl, 734 S.E.2d 399 (Ga. 2012).
· cites it 2× “307, 308 (1) ( 720 SE2d 600 ) (2012) (citations and punctuation omitted); see OCGA § 53-4-11 (a). The maker’s testamentary capacity is assessed at the time the will is executed.”
— 53-4-11(a) — 1 case
Wilson v. Lane, 614 S.E.2d 88 (Ga. 2005).
“747, 747 ( 57 SE 69 ) (1906); OCGA § 53-4-11 (a) (“testamentary capacity exists when the testator has a decided and rational desire as to the disposition of property”); see also Morris v.”
— 53-4-11(b) — 1 case
Dawson v. Dawson, 597 S.E.2d 114 (Ga. 2004).
“) Former OCGA § 53-4-11 (b) (identical to current OCGA § 53-2-30 (c)).”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
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treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.