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Call Now: 904-383-7448Upon proof of citation pursuant to Code Section 53-7-62, the probate court may proceed to make an account, hear evidence upon any contested question, and make a final settlement between the personal representative and the heirs or beneficiaries. The settlement may be enforced by a judgment, writ of fieri facias, execution, or attachment for contempt.
(Code 1981, §53-7-63, enacted by Ga. L. 1996, p. 504, § 10.)
This section carries forward the provisions of former OCGA Sec. 53-7-164.
- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1873, § 2599, and former Code 1933, § 113-2202, are included in the annotations for this Code section.
- Because an administrator was personally served with a copy of the removal petition and the "citation and rule nisi," and never raised any objection to the alleged procedural defect in the answer or during the hearing, the administrator's claim that the probate court erred in ordering an accounting during the removal proceeding because the administrator was not served with a citation to appear before the court for a settlement of accounts, as required by O.C.G.A. § 53-7-63, was meritless; hence, the probate court's order was not void. Ray v. Nat'l Health Investors, Inc., 280 Ga. App. 44, 633 S.E.2d 388 (2006).
- Estate distribution plan providing for $50,000 in extra compensation to the estate administrator was upheld as the challenging sibling did not show that the payment varied the terms of the will, which was not in the record, and the administrator was permitted to petition the probate court for such additional compensation. After hearing any objections, the probate court allowed such extra compensation as the court deemed reasonable in consideration of the years of contentious litigation that was involved. In re Estate of Nesbit, 299 Ga. App. 496, 682 S.E.2d 641 (2009).
Sounder and better construction of this statute, touching the enforcement of judgments rendered by the ordinary (now probate judge) against executors and administrators on citations to account, is that mere money liabilities, when no specific fund is involved, are enforceable only by execution against the property, and not by attachment against the person. Paschal v. Melton, 174 Ga. 910, 164 S.E. 757 (1932) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-2202).
- Provision that the ordinary (now probate judge) may "hear evidence upon any contested question, and settle finally between the distributee and administrator" means that in the hearing of such citation it is within the power of the court of ordinary (now probate court) to decide any presented question which it is necessary for the court to decide in order to determine whether the administrator has discharged all his duties with respect to the assets of the estate, and consequently how the administrator's account should be settled with the distributees. Brooks v. Brooks, 184 Ga. 872, 193 S.E. 893 (1937) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-2202).
- Statute does not restrict and confine the remedy of an accounting merely as against the administrator individually or as administrator; the statute's purpose is to require an accounting of the property of the estate that went into the administrator's hands, and could be maintained whether brought against one as administrator, or jointly as administrator and as an individual. Rowland v. Rowland, 204 Ga. 603, 50 S.E.2d 343 (1948) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-2202).
- There was evidence and legal authority to support the probate court's ruling that retirement funds belonged to the decedent's son because the son was named as beneficiary, and the funds did not pass into the decedent's estate because the executor testified that the executor concluded that the retirement funds were not an estate asset so the executor did not attempt to collect the funds from the son; resolution of the issue of the retirement proceeds in the context of a petition for settlement of accounts under O.C.G.A. § 53-7-63 fell within the probate court's jurisdiction, and the probate court did not err in failing to transfer the claim to the superior court under O.C.G.A. § 53-7-75 because the claim involved a conflict between the will and a designation of beneficiary, and not the construction of the will itself. In re Estate of Long, 307 Ga. App. 896, 706 S.E.2d 704 (2011).
Court of ordinary (now probate court) has jurisdiction of matters pertaining to the estates of deceased persons, jurisdiction over administrators, jurisdiction to compel administrators to account for the assets of an estate in their possession or custody, and jurisdiction in such cases to attach and punish for contempt. Melton v. Jenkins, 50 Ga. App. 615, 178 S.E. 754 (1935) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-2202).
When an administrator is cited for settlement before the court of ordinary (now probate court), under former Code 1933, § 113-2201, and one issue involved is whether certain certificates of deposit in a bank are the property of the estate and should be administered, the ordinary (now probate judge) in making settlement of the account between the administrator and the distributees, has jurisdiction to pass upon such issue, and the ordinary's decision therein becomes res judicata as to all distributees who are present at the hearing. Brooks v. Brooks, 184 Ga. 872, 193 S.E. 893 (1937) (decided under former Code 1933, § 113-2202).
- Case was remanded for a probate court to determine whether, and in what amount, any beneficiary owed funds to a decedent's estate, and to order such reimbursements, if the probate court found it appropriate based on the evidence adduced at the hearing because the executor showed projected and net distributions to the estate, accounting for the amounts owed by the beneficiaries, and evidence was adduced on that issue at the hearing, yet the probate court's order was silent thereon; a final settlement of accounts must resolve all pending issues. In re Estate of Long, 307 Ga. App. 896, 706 S.E.2d 704 (2011).
Cited in Davis v. Harper, 54 Ga. 180 (1875); Porter v. Watson, 51 Ga. App. 848, 181 S.E. 680 (1935); Chapalas v. Papachristos, 185 Ga. 544, 195 S.E. 737 (1937); Robinson v. Georgia Sav. Bank & Trust Co., 185 Ga. 688, 196 S.E. 395 (1938); McCord v. Walton, 192 Ga. 279, 14 S.E.2d 723 (1941); Manry v. Manry, 196 Ga. 365, 26 S.E.2d 706 (1943); Salter v. Salter, 209 Ga. 511, 74 S.E.2d 241 (1953); Hartsfield v. Hartsfield, 87 Ga. App. 707, 75 S.E.2d 276 (1953); Goodman v. Little, 213 Ga. 178, 97 S.E.2d 567 (1957); In re Estate of Sims, 246 Ga. App. 451, 540 S.E.2d 650 (2000).
- 31 Am. Jur. 2d, Executors and Administrators, §§ 867, 886, 887, 900, 904.
- 34 C.J.S., Executors and Administrators, § 1007 et seq.
- Right of executor or administrator to contest, or appeal from, court's rejection of claim against decedent's estate, 129 A.L.R. 922.
Refusal or failure of executor, administrator, guardian, conservator, trustee, receiver, or other fiduciary to pay over, or account for, funds, as contempt, 134 A.L.R. 927.
Total Results: 1
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2006-06-26
Citation: 631 S.E.2d 689, 280 Ga. 652, 2006 Fulton County D. Rep. 1950, 2006 Ga. LEXIS 447
Snippet: is controlled adversely to Greenway by OCGA § 53-7-63, which empowers the probate court in an action