O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 9-10-182 (2019)

Number of counsel who may argue case

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)

Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.

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Not more than two counsel for each side shall be permitted to argue any case, except by express leave of the court; and in no case shall more than one counsel be heard in conclusion.

History

Ga. L. 1924, p. 75, § 1; Code 1933, § 81-1004.

Annotations

JUDICIAL DECISIONS One counsel per party in concluding arguments. - The phrase “in no case shall more than one counsel be heard in conclusion” limits argument to one counsel per party, not to one counsel per side. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. LaRoche, 173 Ga. App. 298, 325 S.E.2d 908, 1985 Ga. App. LEXIS 1513 (1985). Court did not err in permitting two plaintiff’s attorneys to give final argument, where one gave the opening argument and only one was heard in conclusion. Goforth v. Wigley, 178 Ga. App. 558, 343 S.E.2d 788, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 1701 (1986). Court committed reversible error in denying plaintiff’s second counsel opportunity to present argument to jury, even though other counsel conducted entire examination of witnesses. Heard, Leverette & Adams v. Stone, 167 Ga. App. 113, 306 S.E.2d 72, 1983 Ga. App. LEXIS 2413 (1983). Double counsel procedure upheld. - Where both the plaintiff and the defendant employed double counsel, and one attorney for the plaintiff began closing argument, the two defense attorneys then argued, and the plaintiff’s second attorney concluded the argument, this procedure did not violate O.C.G.A. § 9-10-182. Williams v. Greenfield Equip. Co., 184 Ga. App. 239, 361 S.E.2d 199, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 2196 (1987).

Although the trial court may have erred in permitting two members of the law firm representing a defendant to participate in the closing argument, the plaintiff has not suggested how the plaintiff was harmed, since the plaintiff’s counsel had the concluding argument. Bridges v. Schier, 195 Ga. App. 583, 394 S.E.2d 408, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 620 (1990), overruled in part, Sheriff v. State, 277 Ga. 182, 587 S.E.2d 27, 2003 Ga. LEXIS 844 (2003); Parker v. Hospital Auth., 214 Ga. App. 113, 446 S.E.2d 766, 1994 Ga. App. LEXIS 787 (1994), cert. denied, No. S94C1784, No. S94A0525, 1994 Ga. LEXIS 1158 (Ga. Nov. 10, 1994), overruled in part, Sheriff v. State, 277 Ga. 182, 587 S.E.2d 27, 2003 Ga. LEXIS 844 (2003). Two counsel can argue in middle argument. - Appellate court improperly overruled Limbrick v. State, 152 Ga. App. 615 (1979) as: (1) O.C.G.A. §§ 17-8-70 and 9-10-182 were to be construed under the substantive law in effect when the 1982 Code was enacted; (2) the statutory limitation of one counsel “heard in conclusion” applied to the party exercising the privilege of the final jury argument chronologically; (3) the construction harmonized all parts of the statutes and gave a sensible and intelligent effect to each part of the statutes; (4) the first parts of O.C.G.A. §§ 17-8-70 and 9-10-182 provided that two attorneys could present argument on

behalf of a party without leave of court; and (5) if the second parts of the statutes were construed as limiting the middle and concluding argument to one attorney, it rendered the first parts of the statutes meaningless. Sheriff v. State, 277 Ga. 182, 587 S.E.2d 27, 2003 Ga. LEXIS 844 (2003). Presentation of closing arguments by two counsels representing two different entities. - In a negligence case

stemming from a motor vehicle collision, O.C.G.A. § 9-10-182 did not apply because the defendant employer and the defendant employee had leave of court to present separate closing arguments; and the plaintiff’s rebuttal was the final concluding argument. Smith v. Laney, 358 Ga. App. 754, 856 S.E.2d 355, 2021 Ga. App. LEXIS 126 (2021).

RESEARCH REFERENCES ALR. Prejudicial effect of trial court’s denial,

or equivalent, of counsel’s right to argue case, 38 A.L.R.2d 1396.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 15 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1983–2021 · leading case: Sheriff v. State, 587 S.E.2d 27 (Ga. 2003).

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Sheriff v. State, 587 S.E.2d 27 (Ga. 2003). · cites it 9× “The trial court sustained the objection, construing the second sentence of OCGA § 17-8-70 to mean that each side is entitled to have only one attorney make the closing argument for that side. On appeal, the Court of Appeals agreed that appellant was entitled to have only one…”

Fabe v. Floyd, 405 S.E.2d 265 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991). · cites it 4× “Pretermitting whether OCGA § 9-10-182 and Uniform Superior Court Rule 13.”

Goforth v. Wigley, 343 S.E.2d 788 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986). · cites it 4× “Appellant Goforth contends the trial court erred in allowing, over objection, the plaintiffs Wigley in final arguments to have one of their attorneys give the opening and the other of their attorneys to give the concluding argument, in violation of OCGA § 9-10-182. “Not more…”

City of Monroe v. Jordan, 411 S.E.2d 511 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991). · cites it 2× “OCGA § 9-10-182; Bridges v. Schier, 195 Ga.”

Wakily v. State, 483 S.E.2d 313 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997). · cites it 2× “3 provides that “[n]ot more than two attorneys shall be permitted to argue any case for any party except by leave of court; in no event shall more than one attorney for each party be heard in concluding argument.”

Bridges v. Schier, 394 S.E.2d 408 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990). · cites it 2× “The plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in permitting two members of the law firm representing the defendant to participate in the closing argument.”

Steverson v. Eason, 390 S.E.2d 424 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990). · cites it 2× “Steverson argues that the trial court erred in allowing both defense attorneys to speak in closing argument and that this violates OCGA § 9-10-182 (formerly Code Ann. § 81-1004) and Uniform Superior Court Rule 13.”

S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. LaRoche, 325 S.E.2d 908 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985). · cites it 2× “The plaintiff bases his contention that both defendants should not have been allowed to make closing arguments on OCGA § 9-10-182, which provides as follows: “Not more than two counsel for each side shall be permitted to argue any case, except by express leave of the court; and…”

Bentley v. B.M.W., Inc., 433 S.E.2d 719 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993). · cites it 2× “See OCGA § 9-10-182; City of Monroe v. Jordan, 201 Ga.”

Heard, Leverette & Adams, P. C. v. Stone, 306 S.E.2d 72 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983). · cites it 2× “OCGA § 9-10-182 (Code Ann. § 81-1004) provides that “ [n]ot more than two counsel for each side shall be permitted to argue any case, except by express leave of the court.”

White v. Cline, 330 S.E.2d 386 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985). · cites it 2× “Appellant’s enumeration regarding the court’s permitting only one of his two attorneys (one retained by his insurer and the other his private attorney) to participate in the closing argument is patently without merit.”

Parker v. Hosp. Auth., 446 S.E.2d 766 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994). · cites it 2× “Lonas to split the closing argument, and the appellant contends that such procedure violated OCGA § 9-10-182. That Code section “has been interpreted to limit participation in the closing argument to one counsel per party.”

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