One counsel per party in concluding arguments.

- The phrase "in no case shall more than one counsel be heard in conclusion" limits argument to one counsel per party, not to one counsel per side. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. LaRoche, 173 Ga. App. 298, 325 S.E.2d 908 (1985).

Court did not err in permitting two plaintiff's attorneys to give final argument, where one gave the opening argument and only one was heard in conclusion. Goforth v. Wigley, 178 Ga. App. 558, 343 S.E.2d 788 (1986).

Court committed reversible error in denying plaintiff's second counsel opportunity to present argument to jury, even though other counsel conducted entire examination of witnesses. Heard, Leverette & Adams v. Stone, 167 Ga. App. 113, 306 S.E.2d 72 (1983).

Double counsel procedure upheld.

- Where both the plaintiff and the defendant employed double counsel, and one attorney for the plaintiff began closing argument, the two defense attorneys then argued, and the plaintiff's second attorney concluded the argument, this procedure did not violate O.C.G.A. § 9-10-182. Williams v. Greenfield Equip. Co., 184 Ga. App. 239, 361 S.E.2d 199, cert. denied, 184 Ga. App. 911, 361 S.E.2d 199 (1987).

Although the trial court may have erred in permitting two members of the law firm representing a defendant to participate in the closing argument, the plaintiff has not suggested how the plaintiff was harmed, since the plaintiff's counsel had the concluding argument. Bridges v. Schier, 195 Ga. App. 583, 394 S.E.2d 408 (1990); Parker v. Hospital Auth., 214 Ga. App. 113, 446 S.E.2d 766 (1994).

Two counsel can argue in middle argument.

- Appellate court improperly overruled Limbrick v. State, 152 Ga. App. 615 (1979) as: (1) O.C.G.A. §§ 17-8-70 and9-10-182 were to be construed under the substantive law in effect when the 1982 Code was enacted; (2) the statutory limitation of one counsel "heard in conclusion" applied to the party exercising the privilege of the final jury argument chronologically; (3) the construction harmonized all parts of the statutes and gave a sensible and intelligent effect to each part of the statutes; (4) the first parts of O.C.G.A. §§ 17-8-70 and9-10-182 provided that two attorneys could present argument on behalf of a party without leave of court; and (5) if the second parts of the statutes were construed as limiting the middle and concluding argument to one attorney, it rendered the first parts of the statutes meaningless. Sheriff v. State, 277 Ga. 182, 587 S.E.2d 27 (2003).

Cited in Morris v. West, 183 Ga. 214, 187 S.E. 861 (1936); Taylor v. Powell, 158 Ga. App. 339, 280 S.E.2d 386 (1981); White v. Cline, 174 Ga. App. 448, 330 S.E.2d 386 (1985); Fabe v. Floyd, 199 Ga. App. 322, 405 S.E.2d 265 (1991); City of Monroe v. Jordan, 201 Ga. App. 332, 411 S.E.2d 511 (1991); Bentley v. B.M.W., Inc., 209 Ga. App. 526, 433 S.E.2d 719 (1993).

ALR.

- Prejudicial effect of trial court's denial, or equivalent, of counsel's right to argue case, 38 A.L.R.2d 1396.