O.C.G.A. § 17-8-70 (2019)

Annotations

Law reviews. - For annual survey of criminal law, see 56 Mercer L. Rev. 153 (2004).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Separately represented jointly tried defendants. - O.C.G.A. § 17-8-70 was not intended to act as a limitation on rights of separately represented, jointly tried defendants. Instead, the final portion of that section is a limitation on the number of attorneys who may present closing arguments on behalf of any one defendant tried jointly. McDuffie v. Jones, 248 Ga. 544, 283 S.E.2d 601 (1981), overruled on other grounds, West v. Waters, 272 Ga. 591, 533 S.E.2d 88 (2000). Second sentence of this section applies to the party exercising the privilege of the final jury argument chronologically. Limbrick v. State, 152 Ga. App. 615, 263 S.E.2d 502 (1979). Appellate court improperly overruled Limbrick v. State, 152 Ga. App. 615 (1979) as: (1) O.C.G.A. §§ 9-10-182 and 17-8-70 were to be construed under the substantive law in effect when the 1982 Code was enacted; (2) the statutory limitation of one counsel ‘‘heard in conclusion’’ applied to the party exercising the privilege of the final jury argument chronologically; (3) the construction harmonized all parts of the statutes and gave a sensible and intelligent effect to each part of the statutes;

(4) the first parts of §§ 9-10-182 and 17-8-70 provided that two attorneys could present argument on behalf of a party without leave of court; and (5) if the second parts of the statutes were construed as limiting the middle and concluding argument to one attorney, it rendered the first parts of the statutes meaningless. Sheriff v. State, 277 Ga. 182, 587 S.E.2d 27 (2003). Discretion of court. - Generally, order and extent of argument is entirely within discretion of trial court. Little v. State, 157 Ga. App. 462, 278 S.E.2d 17 (1981). Closing argument. - Trial court did not err in refusing the defendant’s request to allow both of the defendant’s retained attorneys to present the defendant’s closing argument as the plain language of the statute regarding closing argument, O.C.G.A. § 17-8-70, expressly limited closing argument to one counsel for each side. Sheriff v. State, 258 Ga. App. 423, 574 S.E.2d 449 (2002). Appellate court erred in affirming the trial court’s refusal to permit both of the defendant’s attorneys to argue in the middle of the state’s opening and concluding

argument under O.C.G.A. § 17-8-70, and the error was not harmless as, although the defendant’s right to make a closing argument was not completely abridged since one of the defendant’s attorneys was allowed to address the jury, the evidence of the defendant’s guilt was not so overwhelming that it rendered any other ver-

sion of the events virtually without belief, and the convictions were reversed. Sheriff v. State, 277 Ga. 182, 587 S.E.2d 27 (2003). Cited in Godfrey v. State, 243 Ga. 302, 253 S.E.2d 710 (1979); Wells v. State, 177 Ga. App. 419, 339 S.E.2d 392 (1986).

RESEARCH REFERENCES C.J.S. - 22A C.J.S., Criminal Procedure and Rights of the Accused, § 754 et seq. ALR. - Appearance of additional counsel in civil case after impaneling of jury, 56 A.L.R.2d 971.

Am. Jur. Proof of Facts. - Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel, 183 Am. Jur. POF 3d 161