Syfert Injury Law Firm

Your Trusted Partner in Personal Injury & Workers' Compensation

Call Now: 904-383-7448

2018 Georgia Code 17-8-70 | Car Wreck Lawyer

Link to State of Georgia Official Statute 2018 Georgia Code Annotated (sourced from legal.resource.org)
O.C.G.A. 17-8-70 Case Law from Google Scholar Amendments to OCGA 17-8-70

TITLE 17 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Section 8. Trial, 17-8-1 through 17-8-76.

ARTICLE 4 CONDUCT AND ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL

17-8-70. Number of counsel permitted to argue case.

Not more than two counsel shall be permitted to argue any case for each side, except by express leave of the court. In no case shall more than one counsel for each side be heard in conclusion.

(Ga. L. 1924, p. 75, § 1; Code 1933, § 27-2202.)

U.S. Code.

- Closing arguments, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 29.1.

Law reviews.

- For annual survey of criminal law, see 56 Mercer L. Rev. 153 (2004).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Separately represented jointly tried defendants.

- O.C.G.A. § 17-8-70 was not intended to act as limitation on rights of separately represented, jointly tried defendants. Instead, the final portion of that section is a limitation on the number of attorneys who may present closing arguments on behalf of any one defendant tried jointly. McDuffie v. Jones, 248 Ga. 544, 283 S.E.2d 601 (1981), overruled on other grounds, West v. Waters, 272 Ga. 591, 533 S.E.2d 88 (2000).

Second sentence of this section applies to the party exercising the privilege of the final jury argument chronologically. Limbrick v. State, 152 Ga. App. 615, 263 S.E.2d 502 (1979).

Appellate court improperly overruled Limbrick v. State, 152 Ga. App. 615 (1979) as: (1) O.C.G.A. §§ 9-10-182 and17-8-70 were to be construed under the substantive law in effect when the 1982 Code was enacted; (2) the statutory limitation of one counsel "heard in conclusion" applied to the party exercising the privilege of the final jury argument chronologically; (3) the construction harmonized all parts of the statutes and gave a sensible and intelligent effect to each part of the statutes; (4) the first parts of §§ 9-10-182 and17-8-70 provided that two attorneys could present argument on behalf of a party without leave of court; and (5) if the second parts of the statutes were construed as limiting the middle and concluding argument to one attorney, it rendered the first parts of the statutes meaningless. Sheriff v. State, 277 Ga. 182, 587 S.E.2d 27 (2003).

Discretion of court.

- Generally, order and extent of argument is entirely within discretion of trial court. Little v. State, 157 Ga. App. 462, 278 S.E.2d 17 (1981).

Closing argument.

- Trial court did not err in refusing the defendant's request to allow both of the defendant's retained attorneys to present the defendant's closing argument as the plain language of the statute regarding closing argument, O.C.G.A. § 17-8-70, expressly limited closing argument to one counsel for each side. Sheriff v. State, 258 Ga. App. 423, 574 S.E.2d 449 (2002).

Appellate court erred in affirming the trial court's refusal to permit both of the defendant's attorneys to argue in the middle of the state's opening and concluding argument under O.C.G.A. § 17-8-70, and the error was not harmless as, although the defendant's right to make a closing argument was not completely abridged since one of the defendant's attorneys was allowed to address the jury, the evidence of the defendant's guilt was not so overwhelming that it rendered any other version of the events virtually without belief, and the convictions were reversed. Sheriff v. State, 277 Ga. 182, 587 S.E.2d 27 (2003).

Cited in Godfrey v. State, 243 Ga. 302, 253 S.E.2d 710 (1979); Wells v. State, 177 Ga. App. 419, 339 S.E.2d 392 (1986).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

C.J.S.

- 23A C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 1686.

ALR.

- Appearance of additional counsel in civil case after impaneling of jury, 56 A.L.R.2d 971.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 17-8-70

Total Results: 2  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

Copy

Simmons v. State, 466 S.E.2d 205 (Ga. 1996).

Cited 67 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 12, 1996 | 266 Ga. 223, 96 Fulton County D. Rep. 618

...Simmons further contends that the trial court erred by allowing procedural and substantive improprieties during the State's closing argument. (a) Simmons maintains that the trial court erred by allowing two attorneys for the State to make closing arguments, thus violating OCGA § 17-8-70....
...on January 13, 1995. The notice of appeal was filed on January 18, 1995. The case was docketed in this Court on May 16, 1995, and was argued on September 11, 1995. [2] In no case shall more than one counsel for each side be heard in conclusion. OCGA § 17-8-70....
Copy

Sheriff v. State, 587 S.E.2d 27 (Ga. 2003).

Cited 14 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 6, 2003 | 277 Ga. 182, 2003 Fulton County D. Rep. 2983

...Ga. 182 SHERIFF v. The STATE. No. S03G0492. Supreme Court of Georgia. October 6, 2003. *28 Buford & Buford, Floyd M. Buford, Jr., Macon, for appellant. Kelly R. Burke, Dist. Atty., Amy E. Smith, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee. BENHAM, Justice. OCGA § 17-8-70 provides that "[n]ot more than two counsel shall be permitted to argue any case for each side, except by express leave of the court. In no case shall more than one counsel for each side be heard in conclusion." We granted a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals to examine that court's construction of the second sentence of § 17-8-70 in Sheriff v....
...e's two arguments. OCGA § 17-8-71. Sheriff's two attorneys asked that both of them be permitted to give a portion of Sheriff's closing argument, and the State objected. The trial court sustained the objection, construing the second sentence of OCGA § 17-8-70 to mean that each side is entitled to have only one attorney make the closing argument for that side. On appeal, the Court of Appeals agreed that appellant was entitled to have only one attorney make his closing argument. Citing a number of cases involving OCGA § 9-10-182, the civil counterpart of § 17-8-70, the Court of Appeals concluded that "the prohibition against more than one counsel for each side being heard in conclusion necessarily applies to both the State and the defense...." Sheriff v....
...closing argument applied only "to the party exercising the privilege of the final jury argument chronologically, the `last say.'" This Court granted Sheriff's petition for a writ of certiorari to examine the Court of Appeals' interpretation of OCGA § 17-8-70 and the overruling of the holding in Limbrick. 1. We note initially that OCGA § 17-8-70 is not an accurate codification of the law. OCGA § 17-8-70 and its civil counterpart, § 9-10-182, share a common genesis in Ga....
...stated: "Not more than two counsel for each side shall be permitted to argue any case, except by express leave of the court; and in no case shall more than one counsel be heard in conclusion." In the recodification, Code Ann. § 27-2202 became OCGA § 17-8-70, and stated: "Not more than two counsel shall be permitted to argue any case for each side, except by express leave of the court. In no case shall more than one counsel for each side be heard in conclusion." It is readily apparent that OCGA § 17-8-70 was substantively modified in the 1982 recodification....
...ted to argue any cause for each side, except by express leave of the court; and in no case shall more than one counsel be heard in conclusion." Code 1933, § 27-2202. 2. The issue before us is the meaning of "in conclusion," the final phrase of OCGA § 17-8-70....
...Hogsed, 230 Ga. 232, 233, 196 S.E.2d 428 (1973). In Limbrick v. State, supra, 152 Ga.App. 615, 263 S.E.2d 502, the Court of Appeals held that the limitation to one counsel was applicable only to the concluding argument, stating that the last clause of § 17-8-70 "forbids more than one counsel to present the last argument to be heard by the jury....
...ding portion of final argument...." In McDuffie v. Jones, 248 Ga. 544(2), 283 S.E.2d 601 (1981), overruled on other grounds in West v. Waters, 272 Ga. 591, 533 S.E.2d 88 (2000), faced with a case in which the trial court construed the last clause of § 17-8-70 as permitting only one of two jointly-tried defendants to present the concluding argument, this Court construed the final portion of § 17-8-70 as a limitation on the number of attorneys who may present closing argument on behalf of any one defendant tried jointly. [3] In Simmons v. State, 266 Ga. 223(6)(a), 466 S.E.2d 205 (1996), overruled on other grounds in Wall v. State, 269 Ga. 506, 500 S.E.2d 904 (1998), this Court declined to reach the merits of the defendant's contention that the State had violated § 17-8-70 by having two attorneys make closing arguments....
...However, as noted by this Court, Simmons failed to object at trial and, even if he had *31 preserved the error for appellate review, Simmons had not established harm, a necessary prerequisite to reversible error. Id. The Court of Appeals has developed a second line of cases interpreting OCGA §§ 9-10-182 and 17-8-70 as limiting participation in closing argument to one counsel per party and construing the middle argument as that party's "concluding argument" which then is deemed limited by the last clause in the statute to one attorney's participation....
...The Court of Appeals' decision in the case at bar is the most recent case in which the court held that the statutory limitation of one counsel being heard in conclusion is applicable to both the party with the opening and closing arguments and the party with the middle argument. [6] Faced with conflicting constructions of § 17-8-70 and its identical civil counterpart, we conclude that the sounder interpretation is that set forth in Limbrick v....
...Cline, supra, 174 Ga.App. 448(1), 330 S.E.2d 386. It is the construction that harmonizes all parts of the statute and gives "a sensible and intelligent effect to each part" ( Houston v. Lowes of Savannah, 235 Ga. 201, 203, 219 S.E.2d 115 (1975)), since the first part of §§ 17-8-70 and 9-10-182 provides that two attorneys can present argument on behalf of a party without leave of court....
...y present the middle argument. We also note that trial courts should construe Rule 13.3 of the Uniform Superior Court Rules and the Uniform State Court Rules [8] in accordance with our holding herein. 3. Applying the appropriate construction of OCGA § 17-8-70 to the case at bar, we conclude the trial court erred when it refused to permit both of appellant's attorneys to participate in the middle argument....
...522(1), 448 S.E.2d 687 (1994); McDuffie v. Jones, supra, 248 Ga. at 547, 283 S.E.2d 601; Stephens v. State, 233 Ga.App. 32(2), 503 S.E.2d 311 (1998) (all recognizing a presumption of harm when a party is denied the closing argument to which it is statutorily entitled under OCGA § 17-8-70)....
...the enactment of later laws. OCGA § 1-1-2. [3] The two defendants were each given the opportunity to present an opening argument since one defendant had presented no evidence and the other had presented only his testimony. The trial court construed § 17-8-70's precursor as permitting one concluding argument per trial....
...ide" that was added in the recodification process and which we have concluded in Division 1 is not a part of the statute. [7] Wells v. State, 177 Ga.App. 419, 421(2), 339 S.E.2d 392 (1986), where the Court of Appeals construed the first part of OCGA § 17-8-70 as limiting the number of attorneys "assisting in the case" on behalf of a party, is overruled....