O.C.G.A. § 9-10-90 (2019)

Annotations

Law reviews. For article summarizing law relating to jurisdiction and venue over domestic and foreign corporations in Georgia, and service therein, see 21 Mercer L. Rev. 457 (1970).

For comment on Griffin v. Air S., Inc., 324 F. Supp. 1284 (N.D. Ga. 1971), see 8 Ga. St. B. J. 414 (1972). For note discussing problems with venue in Georgia, and proposing statutory revisions to improve the resolution of venue questions, see 9 Ga. St. B.J. 254 (1972).

For article, “Foreign Corporations in Georgia,” see 10 Ga. St. B.J. 243 (1973). For comment on Coe & Payne Co. v. Wood-Mosaic Corp., 230 Ga. 58, 195 S.E.2d 399 (1973), see 10 Ga. St. B.J. 164 (1973). For note advocating the adoption of a statute incorporating the doctrine of forum non conveniens, see 7 Ga. L. Rev. 744 (1973). For note analyzing the long arm statute and suggesting some reforms, see 11 Ga. L. Rev. 149 (1976). For article discussing 1976 to 1977 developments in Georgia’s long arm statute, see 29 Mercer L. Rev. 265 (1977). For article examining waiver of objections to venue and lack of personal jurisdiction by default, see 12 Ga. L. Rev. 181 (1978). For article surveying Georgia cases in the area of trial practice and procedure from June 1977 through May 1978, see 30 Mercer L. Rev. 239 (1978). For article surveying Georgia cases in the area of trial practice and procedure from June 1979 through May 1980, see 32 Mercer L. Rev. 225 (1980).

For comment on World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 100 S. Ct. 559, 62 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1980), and Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 100 S. Ct. 591, 62 L. Ed. 2d 516 (1980), regarding minimum contacts and state jurisdiction, see 15 Ga. L. Rev. 19 (1980). For survey article on trial practice and procedure, see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 299 (1982). For comment, “Jurisdiction over Nonresidents in Georgia: Crowder v. Ginn,” see 17 Ga. L. Rev. 201 (1982). For note, “Getting Personal With Our Neighbors - A Survey of Southern States’ Exercise of General Jurisdiction and A Proposal for Extending Georgia’s LongArm Statute,” see 25 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 1177 (2009). For article, “Georgia’s Unconstitutional Business Venue Provision: A Kingdom with Impermissible Borders,” see 69 Mercer L. Rev. 433 (2018). For article, “Personal Jurisdiction and the Fairness Factor(s),” see 72 Emory L.J. 781 (2023).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS This section is remedial in nature and does not affect the substantive rights of a defendant; therefore, it is not subject to constitutional attack as a retroactive law as to causes of action pending at the time of enactment. Ballew v. Riggs, 244 Ga. 232, 259 S.E.2d 482, 1979 Ga. LEXIS 1201 (1979) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-1090). O.C.G.A. § 9-10-90 does not deny due process by defining the term “nonresident” as used in the long arm statute, O.C.G.A. Art. 4, Ch. 10, T. 9, so as to include a person who was a Georgia resident at the time a claim arose against the person out of a motor vehicle collision occurring in Georgia, but who subsequently became a resident of another state before personal service was perfected upon the person in the other state in accordance with the long arm statute. Crowder v. Ginn, 248 Ga. 824, 286 S.E.2d 706, 1982 Ga. LEXIS 1094 (1982). Service of process under long-arm statute. - The two-year statute of limi-

tations on actions for personal injury was not tolled throughout the period of defendants’ alleged absence from the state, where there was no showing that the defendants could not have been served with process pursuant to the long-arm statute, O.C.G.A. Art. 4, Ch. 10, T. 9. Towns v. Brown, 177 Ga. App. 504, 339 S.E.2d 926, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 1464 (1986). O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4(e)(1) did not govern service of process in a manufacturer’s breach of contract action against a distributor because the distributor was not “authorized to transact business in the State” as that phrase was used in O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4(e)(1); the distributor did not show that the distributor was a corporation incorporated or domesticated under the laws of Georgia, because the distributor pointed to no evidence that the distributor obtained the requisite certificate of authority to transact business in the state from the Georgia Secretary of State pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 14-2-

1501(a) and because the distributor was a nonresident subject to the long-arm statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-10-90 et seq. Kitchen Int’l, Inc. v. Evans Cabinet Corp., 310 Ga. App. 648, 714 S.E.2d 139, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 622 (2011). Trial court was authorized to obtain personal jurisdiction over a child’s parent under Georgia’s long arm statute, O.C.G.A. §§ 9-10-90 and 9-10-91(6), because the child’s grandparents petitioned for visitation rights after the parent became a nonresident by moving to Arizona to attend college and reside there upon graduation. Oglesby v. Deal, 311 Ga. App. 622, 716 S.E.2d 749, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 805 (2011). Out-of-state corporation not subject to personal jurisdiction but subject to general jurisdiction. - In a product liability action, the Long Arm Statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-10-90, did not apply to an out-of-state corporation that was authorized to do business in Georgia, and it was not subject to specific personal jurisdiction in Georgia. However, because the appellant was registered and authorized to do business in Georgia, the appellant was subject to the general jurisdiction of Georgia’s courts under Klein’s general-jurisdiction holding. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. McCall, 312 Ga. 422, 863 S.E.2d 81, 2021 Ga. LEXIS 626 (2021). Service on corporation authorized to do business in state. - Georgia’s long arm statute, O.C.G.A. Art. 4, Ch. 10, T. 9, does not apply to service on a corporation that is authorized to do business in the state. Teledata World Servs., Inc. v. Tele-Mart, Inc., 242 Ga. App. 842, 531 S.E.2d 372, 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS 357 (2000). O.C.G.A. § 9-10-90 merely provides an alternate means of service to O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91 upon one who was a resident of Georgia at the time the cause of action arose and who subsequently moved to another state before service could be perfected in Georgia. Stone v. First Nat’l Bank, 159 Ga. App. 812, 285 S.E.2d 207, 1981 Ga. App. LEXIS 2827 (1981). This section, in defining the term “nonresident” to include foreign corporations, describes specifically the

foreign corporations included within the term. Bauer Int’l Corp. v. Cagle’s, Inc., 225 Ga. 684, 171 S.E.2d 314, 1969 Ga. LEXIS 612 (1969) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-1090). The long arm statute, O.C.G.A. § 910-90 et seq., did not apply to service of process upon a foreign corporation doing business within this state and having an agent within this state. Cherokee Warehouses Inc. v. Babb Lumber Co., 244 Ga. App. 197, 535 S.E.2d 254, 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS 665 (2000), cert. denied, No. S00C1603, 2001 Ga. LEXIS 135 (Ga. Feb. 2, 2001). Section not retroactive. - This section, which enumerates nonresident corporations as among those against which actions may be brought in this state, has no effect upon any cause of action originating prior to the effective date of the Georgia Nonresident Motorists’ Act, Ga. L. 1957, p. 649. Buckhead Doctors’ Bldg., Inc. v. Oxford Fin. Cos., 120 Ga. App. 516, 171 S.E.2d 365, 1969 Ga. App. LEXIS 840 (1969). But see Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. R.D.C., Inc., 334 F. Supp. 1163, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10329 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-90). This section, which defines “nonresident” to include certain foreign corporations, does not apply to cause of action arising prior to the effective date of the amendment. Smith v. O’Neal Steel, Inc., 225 Ga. 778, 171 S.E.2d 519, 1969 Ga. LEXIS 643 (1969). But see Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. R.D.C., Inc., 334 F. Supp. 1163, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10329 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-90). The 1968 amendment to this section, which included corporation within meaning of “nonresident,” does not apply to a factual situation arising before the amendment. Griffin v. Air S., Inc., 324 F. Supp. 1284, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14056 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-90). The 1968 amendment to this section is applied retroactively. Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. R.D.C., Inc., 334 F. Supp. 1163, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10329 (N.D. Ga. 1971). But see Buckhead Doctors’ Bldg., Inc. v. Oxford Fin. Cos., 120 Ga. App. 516, 171 S.E.2d 365, 1969 Ga. App. LEXIS 840 (1969); Smith v. O’Neal Steel,

Inc., 225 Ga. 778, 171 S.E.2d 519, 1969 Ga. LEXIS 643 (1969); Griffin v. Air S., Inc., 324 F. Supp. 1284, 1971 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14056 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-90). Inmate in out-of-state prison. - An inmate in a federal prison in South Carolina was a nonresident subject to long arm jurisdiction, even though the inmate had been a Georgia resident at the time the tort cause of action arose in Georgia, and the inmate stated the inmate’s intention to return to Georgia upon the inmate’s release from prison. Cooper v. Edwards, 235 Ga. App. 48, 508 S.E.2d 708. How a person becomes a nonresident. - O.C.G.A. § 9-10-90 does not require that a person both intend to and actually establish a residence outside the state to become a nonresident, and thus, either a change in residence or a change in domicile would suffice to make a person a nonresident. Cooper v. Edwards, 235 Ga. App. 48, 508 S.E.2d 708. Guarantying note sufficient to confer jurisdiction. - Trial court did not err in denying the guarantors’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction a bank’s action to recover on promissory notes securing loans to a limited liability company (LLC) and on guaranties of those loans because the guarantors transacted business in Georgia within the meaning of the Long Arm Statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-1091(1), and given the guarantors’ purposeful personal dealings with the bank, dealings which bestowed substantial benefits to the guarantors and induced substantial action by the bank to the bank’s detriment, neither reasonableness nor fair

play nor substantial justice would be offended by haling the guarantors into a Georgia court and exercising jurisdiction over the guarantors; the guarantors understood that the LLC was formed for the sole purpose of developing property in Georgia, the bank’s claims arose out of the guarantors’ Georgia activities, the guarantors pointed to no evidence showing that litigating the action in Georgia would unduly burden the guarantors, and Georgia had an interest in adjudicating the dispute because the dispute involved both a significant loss suffered by a Georgia financial institution and real property located in the state. Paxton v. Citizens Bank & Trust of W. Ga., 307 Ga. App. 112, 704 S.E.2d 215, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 1103 (2010). Defendants not residents when suit filed. - Trial court did not err in denying a motion filed by a corporate president and the president’s spouse to dismiss a corporation’s action against them or, in the alternative, to transfer the case because the trial court’s application of the relation-back statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-1115(c), did not violate the constitutional right of the president and the spouse to be sued in the county where they resided under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI; because the president and the wife were not residents of Georgia when the suit was filed, the proper venue had to be determined pursuant to Georgia’s Long Arm Statute, O.C.G.A. §§ 9-10-91 and