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Call Now: 904-383-7448As used in this article, the term "nonresident" includes an individual, or a partnership, association, or other legal or commercial entity (other than a corporation) not residing, domiciled, organized, or existing in this state at the time a claim or cause of action under Code Section 9-10-91 arises, or a corporation which is not organized or existing under the laws of this state and is not authorized to do or transact business in this state at the time a claim or cause of action under Code Section 9-10-91 arises. The term "nonresident" shall also include an individual, or a partnership, association, or other legal or commercial entity (other than a corporation) who, at the time a claim or cause of action arises under Code Section 9-10-91, was residing, domiciled, organized, or existing in this state and subsequently becomes a resident, domiciled, organized, or existing outside of this state as of the date of perfection of service of process as provided by Code Section 9-10-94.
(Ga. L. 1968, p. 1419, § 2; Ga. L. 1977, p. 586, § 1.)
- For article summarizing law relating to jurisdiction and venue over domestic and foreign corporations in Georgia, and service therein, see 21 Mercer L. Rev. 457 (1970). For article, "Foreign Corporations in Georgia," see 10 Ga. St. B.J. 243 (1973). For article discussing 1976 to 1977 developments in Georgia's long arm statute, see 29 Mercer L. Rev. 265 (1977). For article examining waiver of objections to venue and lack of personal jurisdiction by default, see 12 Ga. L. Rev. 181 (1978). For article surveying Georgia cases in the area of trial practice and procedure from June 1977 through May 1978, see 30 Mercer L. Rev. 239 (1978). For article surveying Georgia cases in the area of trial practice and procedure from June 1979 through May 1980, see 32 Mercer L. Rev. 225 (1980). For survey article on trial practice and procedure, see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 299 (1982). For note discussing problems with venue in Georgia, and proposing statutory revisions to improve the resolution of venue questions, see 9 Ga. St. B.J. 254 (1972). For note advocating the adoption of a statute incorporating the doctrine of forum non conveniens, see 7 Ga. L. Rev. 744 (1973). For note analyzing the long arm statute and suggesting some reforms, see 11 Ga. L. Rev. 149 (1976). For note, "Getting Personal With Our Neighbors - A Survey of Southern States' Exercise of General Jurisdiction and A Proposal for Extending Georgia's Long-Arm Statute," see 25 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 1177 (2009). For comment on Griffin v. Air S., Inc., 324 F. Supp. 1284 (N.D. Ga. 1971), see 8 Ga. St. B.J. 414 (1972). For comment on Coe & Payne Co. v. Wood-Mosaic Corp., 230 Ga. 58, 195 S.E.2d 399 (1973), see 10 Ga. St. B.J. 164 (1973). For comment on World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 100 S. Ct. 559, 62 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1980), and Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 100 S. Ct. 591, 62 L. Ed. 2d 516 (1980), regarding minimum contacts and state jurisdiction, see 15 Ga. L. Rev. 19 (1980). For comment, "Jurisdiction over Nonresidents in Georgia: Crowder v. Ginn," see 17 Ga. L. Rev. 201 (1982).
This section is remedial in nature and does not affect the substantive rights of a defendant; therefore, it is not subject to constitutional attack as a retroactive law as to causes of action pending at the time of enactment. Ballew v. Riggs, 244 Ga. 232, 259 S.E.2d 482 (1979) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-90).
O.C.G.A. § 9-10-90 does not deny due process by defining the term "nonresident" as used in the long arm statute, O.C.G.A. Art. 4, Ch. 10, T. 9, so as to include a person who was a Georgia resident at the time a claim arose against the person out of a motor vehicle collision occurring in Georgia, but who subsequently became a resident of another state before personal service was perfected upon the person in the other state in accordance with the long arm statute. Crowder v. Ginn, 248 Ga. 824, 286 S.E.2d 706 (1982).
- The two-year statute of limitations on actions for personal injury was not tolled throughout the period of defendants' alleged absence from the state, where there was no showing that the defendants could not have been served with process pursuant to the long-arm statute, O.C.G.A. Art. 4, Ch. 10, T. 9. Towns v. Brown, 177 Ga. App. 504, 339 S.E.2d 926 (1986).
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4(e)(1) did not govern service of process in a manufacturer's breach of contract action against a distributor because the distributor was not "authorized to transact business in the State" as that phrase was used in O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4(e)(1); the distributor did not show that the distributor was a corporation incorporated or domesticated under the laws of Georgia, because the distributor pointed to no evidence that the distributor obtained the requisite certificate of authority to transact business in the state from the Georgia Secretary of State pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1501(a) and because the distributor was a nonresident subject to the long-arm statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-10-90 et seq. Kitchen Int'l, Inc. v. Evans Cabinet Corp., 310 Ga. App. 648, 714 S.E.2d 139 (2011).
Trial court was authorized to obtain personal jurisdiction over a child's parent under Georgia's long arm statute, O.C.G.A. §§ 9-10-90 and9-10-91(6), because the child's grandparents petitioned for visitation rights after the parent became a nonresident by moving to Arizona to attend college and reside there upon graduation. Oglesby v. Deal, 311 Ga. App. 622, 716 S.E.2d 749 (2011).
- Georgia's long arm statute, O.C.G.A. Art. 4, Ch. 10, T. 9, does not apply to service on a corporation that is authorized to do business in the state. Teledata World Servs., Inc. v. Tele-Mart, Inc., 242 Ga. App. 842, 531 S.E.2d 372 (2000).
O.C.G.A. § 9-10-90 merely provides an alternate means of service to O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91 upon one who was a resident of Georgia at the time the cause of action arose and who subsequently moved to another state before service could be perfected in Georgia. Stone v. First Nat'l Bank, 159 Ga. App. 812, 285 S.E.2d 207 (1981).
This section, in defining the term "nonresident" to include foreign corporations, describes specifically the foreign corporations included within the term. Bauer Int'l Corp. v. Cagle's, Inc., 225 Ga. 684, 171 S.E.2d 314 (1969) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-90).
The long arm statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-10-90 et seq., did not apply to service of process upon a foreign corporation doing business within this state and having an agent within this state. Cherokee Warehouses Inc. v. Babb Lumber Co., 244 Ga. App. 197, 535 S.E.2d 254 (2000).
- This section, which enumerates nonresident corporations as among those against which actions may be brought in this state, has no effect upon any cause of action originating prior to the effective date of the Georgia Nonresident Motorists' Act, Ga. L. 1957, p. 649. Buckhead Doctors' Bldg., Inc. v. Oxford Fin. Cos., 120 Ga. App. 516, 171 S.E.2d 365 (1969). But see Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. R.D.C., Inc., 334 F. Supp. 1163 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-90).
This section, which defines "nonresident" to include certain foreign corporations, does not apply to cause of action arising prior to the effective date of the amendment. Smith v. O'Neal Steel, Inc., 225 Ga. 778, 171 S.E.2d 519 (1969). But see Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. R.D.C., Inc., 334 F. Supp. 1163 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-90).
The 1968 amendment to this section, which included corporation within meaning of "nonresident," does not apply to a factual situation arising before the amendment. Griffin v. Air S., Inc., 324 F. Supp. 1284 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-90).
The 1968 amendment to this section is applied retroactively. Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. R.D.C., Inc., 334 F. Supp. 1163 (N.D. Ga. 1971). But see Buckhead Doctors' Bldg., Inc. v. Oxford Fin. Cos., 120 Ga. App. 516, 171 S.E.2d 365 (1969); Smith v. O'Neal Steel, Inc., 225 Ga. 778, 171 S.E.2d 519 (1969); Griffin v. Air S., Inc., 324 F. Supp. 1284 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-90).
- An inmate in a federal prison in South Carolina was a nonresident subject to long arm jurisdiction, even though the inmate had been a Georgia resident at the time the tort cause of action arose in Georgia, and the inmate stated the inmate's intention to return to Georgia upon the inmate's release from prison. Cooper v. Edwards, 235 Ga. App. 48, 508 S.E.2d 708 (1998).
- O.C.G.A. § 9-10-90 does not require that a person both intend to and actually establish a residence outside the state to become a nonresident, and thus, either a change in residence or a change in domicile would suffice to make a person a nonresident. Cooper v. Edwards, 235 Ga. App. 48, 508 S.E.2d 708 (1998).
- Trial court did not err in denying the guarantors' motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction a bank's action to recover on promissory notes securing loans to a limited liability company (LLC) and on guaranties of those loans because the guarantors transacted business in Georgia within the meaning of the Long Arm Statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(1), and given the guarantors' purposeful personal dealings with the bank, dealings which bestowed substantial benefits to the guarantors and induced substantial action by the bank to the bank's detriment, neither reasonableness nor fair play nor substantial justice would be offended by haling the guarantors into a Georgia court and exercising jurisdiction over the guarantors; the guarantors understood that the LLC was formed for the sole purpose of developing property in Georgia, the bank's claims arose out of the guarantors' Georgia activities, the guarantors pointed to no evidence showing that litigating the action in Georgia would unduly burden the guarantors, and Georgia had an interest in adjudicating the dispute because the dispute involved both a significant loss suffered by a Georgia financial institution and real property located in the state. Paxton v. Citizens Bank & Trust of W. Ga., 307 Ga. App. 112, 704 S.E.2d 215 (2010).
- Trial court did not err in denying a motion filed by a corporate president and the president's spouse to dismiss a corporation's action against them or, in the alternative, to transfer the case because the trial court's application of the relation-back statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-11-15(c), did not violate the constitutional right of the president and the spouse to be sued in the county where they resided under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI; because the president and the wife were not residents of Georgia when the suit was filed, the proper venue had to be determined pursuant to Georgia's Long Arm Statute, O.C.G.A. §§ 9-10-91 and9-10-93. Cartwright v. Fuji Photo Film U.S.A., Inc., 312 Ga. App. 890, 720 S.E.2d 200 (2011), cert. denied, No. S12C0600, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 306 (Ga. 2012).
Cited in Hare v. United Airlines Corp., 295 F. Supp. 860 (N.D. Ga. 1968); Hamilton v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 119 Ga. App. 361, 167 S.E.2d 228 (1969); O'Neal Steel, Inc. v. Smith, 120 Ga. App. 106, 169 S.E.2d 827 (1969); Dill v. Guthrie, 120 Ga. App. 527, 171 S.E.2d 359 (1969); O'Neal Steel, Inc. v. Smith, 121 Ga. App. 8, 172 S.E.2d 479 (1970); Smith v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 425 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1970); Parham v. Edwards, 346 F. Supp. 968 (S.D. Ga. 1972); Droke House Publishers, Inc. v. Aladdin Distrib. Corp., 352 F. Supp. 1062 (N.D. Ga. 1972); Williamson v. Perret's Farms, Inc., 128 Ga. App. 687, 197 S.E.2d 754 (1973); Rainwater v. Vazquez, 133 Ga. App. 173, 210 S.E.2d 380 (1974); Europa Hair, Inc. v. Browning, 133 Ga. App. 753, 212 S.E.2d 862 (1975); Tecumseh Prods. Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 134 Ga. App. 102, 213 S.E.2d 522 (1975); Thrift v. Vi-Vin Prods., Inc., 134 Ga. App. 717, 215 S.E.2d 709 (1975); Nelson Assocs. v. Grubbs, 135 Ga. App. 947, 219 S.E.2d 607 (1975); Mutual Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Reynolds, 147 Ga. App. 810, 250 S.E.2d 556 (1978); Bergen v. Martindale-Hubbell, Inc., 245 Ga. 742, 267 S.E.2d 10 (1980); Lyons Mfg. Co. v. Gross, 519 F. Supp. 812 (S.D. Ga. 1981); Smith v. Griggs, 164 Ga. App. 15, 296 S.E.2d 87 (1982); Calhoun v. Somogyi, 190 Ga. App. 502, 379 S.E.2d 595 (1989); Bailey v. Hall, 199 Ga. App. 602, 405 S.E.2d 579 (1991); Fisher v. Muzik, 201 Ga. App. 861, 412 S.E.2d 548 (1991); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Klein, 262 Ga. 599, 422 S.E.2d 863 (1992); Gordon v. Coles, 207 Ga. App. 889, 429 S.E.2d 297 (1993); Pratt & Whitney Can., Inc. v. Sanders, 218 Ga. App. 1, 460 S.E.2d 94 (1995); Ford v. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co., 231 Ga. App. 11, 497 S.E.2d 596 (1998); Andrews v. Stark, 264 Ga. App. 792, 592 S.E.2d 438 (2003); Connor v. Oconee Fed. S&L Ass'n, 338 Ga. App. 632, 791 S.E.2d 207 (2016).
- 25 Am. Jur. 2d, Domicil, §§ 3, 10 et seq.
- 21 C.J.S., Courts, § 100 et seq.
- Solicitation within state of orders for goods to be shipped from other state as doing business within state within statutes prescribing conditions of doing business or providing for service of process, 101 A.L.R. 126; 146 A.L.R. 941.
Effect of agreement by foreign corporation to install article with the state to bring transaction within state control, 101 A.L.R. 356.
What amounts to doing business in a state within statute providing for service of process in action against nonresident natural person or persons doing business in state, 10 A.L.R.2d 200.
Long-arm statutes: in personam jurisdiction over nonresident based on ownership, use, possession, or sale of real property, 4 A.L.R.4th 955.
In personam jurisdiction, in libel and slander action, over nonresident who mailed allegedly defamatory letter from outside state, 83 A.L.R.4th 1006.
Execution, outside of forum, of guaranty of obligations under contract to be performed within forum state as conferring jurisdiction over nonresident guarantors under "long-arm" statute or rule of forum, 28 A.L.R.5th 664.
Total Results: 4
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 2021-09-21
Snippet: enacted such a long-arm statute in Georgia, OCGA § 9-10-90 et seq. (the “Long Arm Statute”). OCGA §
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1999-03-08
Citation: 514 S.E.2d 201, 270 Ga. 730, 99 Fulton County D. Rep. 923, 1999 Ga. LEXIS 252
Snippet: a claim or cause of action ... arises." OCGA § 9-10-90. When "a partnership is spoken of by its partnership
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1992-12-03
Citation: 422 S.E.2d 863, 262 Ga. 599, 92 Fulton County D. Rep. 3094, 1992 Ga. LEXIS 998
Snippet: purport to use the Georgia Long Arm Statute (OCGA § 9-10-90 et seq.) (Long Arm Statute) as a basis for personal
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia | Date Filed: 1984-10-31
Citation: 322 S.E.2d 487, 253 Ga. 566, 1984 Ga. LEXIS 995
Snippet: including former residents as defined in OCGA § 9-10-90. This provision is not applicable to a Georgia