O.C.G.A. § 9-10-93 (2019)

Annotations

Cross references. Venue of actions against noncitizens found in state, § 9-10-33. Law reviews. For article, “The Georgia Long Arm Statute: A Significant Advance in the Concept of Personal Jurisdiction,” see 4 Ga. St. B.J. 13 (1967). For article, “An Introduction to the New Georgia Corporation Law,” see 4 Ga. St. B. J. 419 (1968). For note discussing the 1970 amend-

ments to the long arm statute as an enlargement of in personam jurisdiction, see 22 Mercer L. Rev. 451 (1971). For note discussing problems with venue in Georgia, and proposing statutory revisions to improve the resolution of venue questions, see 9 Ga. St. B.J. 254 (1972). For article, “Foreign Corporations in Georgia,” see 10 Ga. St. B.J. 243 (1973). For note discussing some complications of filing suit against a nonresident in a multiparty action or against a resident who might implead a nonresident under the venue rules, see 11 Ga. L. Rev. 149 (1976).

For article discussing venue and jurisdictional requirements for third party practice, see 13 Ga. L. Rev. 13 (1978). For article discussing Georgia’s long arm statute, prejudgment attachment and habeas corpus, with respect to judicial developments in practice and procedure in the fifth circuit, see 30 Mercer L. Rev. 925 (1979). For comment on World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 100 S. Ct. 559, 62 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1980), and Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 100 S. Ct. 591, 62 L. Ed. 2d 516 (1980), regarding mini-

mum contacts and state jurisdiction, see 15 Ga. L. Rev. 19 (1980). For comment, “Jurisdiction over Nonresidents in Georgia: Crowder v. Ginn,” see 17 Ga. L. Rev. 201 (1982). For survey article on trial practice and procedure, see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 299 (1982). For annual survey of trial practice and procedure, see 38 Mercer L. Rev. 383 (1986). For article commenting on the 1997 amendment of this Code section, see 14 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 9 (1997).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS This section is merely an elaboration of residence in Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VI, Sec. XIV, Par. VI (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI). Scott v. Crescent Tool Co., 296 F. Supp. 147, 1968 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9665 (N.D. Ga. 1968) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-93). Forum selection clauses in payday lending actions. - District court correctly found that forum selection clauses in class borrowers’ payday lending agreements were unenforceable as against Georgia public policy in the borrowers’ suit alleging usury violations, and the term “county” in O.C.G.A. § 16-17-2 referred only to Georgia counties, not out of state counties, since Georgia venue provisions commonly use the term “county” or “counties” in reference to Georgia counties, without explicitly saying so. The lenders’ argument - that by using the term “county” instead of “Georgia county” in § 16-17-2(c)(1), the General Assembly opened a back door for out-of-state forum selection clauses - would effectively “hide elephants in mouseholes.” Davis v. Oasis Legal Fin. Operating Co., LLC, 936 F.3d 1174, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 26064 (11th Cir. 2019). Venue properly lies in county where business transacted. - Where all the business transacted by the defendants is consummated in the same county in which the action is brought, there is no justification for an allegation of improper venue under this section. Palm Beach Inv. Properties, Inc. v. Dingman, 126 Ga. App. 17, 189 S.E.2d 906, 1972 Ga. App. LEXIS 1028 (1972) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-93).

In a dispute between siblings over corporate funds, venue was proper with respect to the sisters in Forsyth County, Georgia since a substantial amount of the sisters’ activities which gave rise to the brothers’ claims were transacted in Forsyth County. Stubblefield v. Stubblefield, 296 Ga. 481, 769 S.E.2d 78, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 100 (2015). Internet car seller purposefully transacted business in the State of Georgia when its agent conducted business negotiations with a buyer who lived in Georgia and when the seller delivered the vehicle in the state, so as to have established sufficient minimum contacts with the State of Georgia to authorize Georgia’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over the seller under the Georgia Long Arm Statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91; moreover, the state court correctly resolved the factual conflict created by the seller’s affidavits and supporting documentation in favor of the buyer so as to find, for purposes of the motion to dismiss, that the buyer had not been provided with, nor agreed to, that part of the agreement containing the forum selection clause. Aero Toy Store, LLC v. Grieves, 279 Ga. App. 515, 631 S.E.2d 734, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 626 (2006). Venue established in county where nonresident transacted business. - Where the sole general partner was a nonresident, personal jurisdiction may be exercised under Ga. L. 1970, p. 443, § 1 (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91) by the courts of this state as if the person were a resident, and venue was established in the county

where the business was transacted. Reading Assocs., Ltd. v. Reading Assocs. of Ga., Inc., 236 Ga. 906, 225 S.E.2d 899, 1976 Ga. LEXIS 1065 (1976). Substantial parts of the business. - Since substantial parts of the business under a gasoline supply contract were transacted in both Union County and Hall County, there was no basis for reversing the trial court’s finding, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-10-93, that venue was in Hall County for purposes of a breach of contract action under the agreement. Dickey v. Clipper Petroleum, Inc., 280 Ga. App. 475, 634 S.E.2d 425, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 768 (2006). Action against nonresident motor common carrier. - Even though a nonresident interstate motor common carrier was registered in Georgia and had a registered agent for service of process, venue of a personal injury action against the carrier and nonresident driver was proper only in the county in which the accident occurred. Southern Drayage, Inc. v. Williams, 216 Ga. App. 721, 455 S.E.2d 418, 1995 Ga. App. LEXIS 241 (1995). While the trial court held that, under O.C.G.A. § 9-10-93, venue did not appear to be properly established in a case between plaintiff former husband and defen-

dant former wife regarding division of marital assets and breach of contract, a review of the record did not reveal any evidence regarding venue except for the wife’s representation in her brief that the husband resided in Cobb County, Georgia, where the action was filed, and that the bulk of the marital assets were located in DeKalb County, Georgia; thus, the trial court’s ruling regarding venue was reversed. Barolia v. Pirani, 260 Ga. App. 513, 580 S.E.2d 297, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 423 (2003). Venue proper. - Trial court’s finding that the a corporate president and the president’s spouse were subject to a corporation’s suit in Fulton County pursuant to the Georgia Long Arm Statute was not error because the brokers sued the corporation in Fulton County, thereby submitting themselves to jurisdiction and venue on the corporation’s counterclaim; thus, the brokers were “suable” on the corporation’s claims in Fulton County, and under O.C.G.A. § 9-10-93, Fulton County was the proper venue as to the president and the spouse. Cartwright v. Fuji Photo Film U.S.A., Inc., 312 Ga. App. 890, 720 S.E.2d 200, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 976 (2011), cert. denied, No. S12C0600, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 306 (Ga. Mar. 19, 2012).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. 77 Am. Jur. 2d, Venue, §§ 1 et seq., 8 et seq., 43 et seq., 48 et seq. C.J.S. 92A C.J.S., Venue, § 7. ALR. Guardianship of incompetent or infant as affecting venue of action, 111 A.L.R. 167. State or country deemed to be the place

of tort causing personal injury or death, as regards principle that law of place of tort governs, 77 A.L.R.2d 1266. Long-arm statutes: in personam jurisdiction over nonresident based on ownership, use, possession, or sale of real property, 4 A.L.R.4th 955. Place where corporation is doing business for purposes of state venue statute, 42 A.L.R.5th 221.