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O.C.G.A.Title 9Chapter 10

O.C.G.A. § 9-10-93 (2023)

Venue

Edition and currency
O.C.G.A. 2023 print volume: Georgia laws through the 2023 session at the latest. The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations for this section are from the 2023 print volume of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). Georgia Acts after that are not in this text. The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
Other sources
CURRENTO.C.G.A. 2023 print volume: Georgia laws through the 2023 session at the latest cited 1984–2019 30citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 30 opinions since 1984.

Venue in cases under this article shall lie in any county wherein a substantial part of the business was transacted, the tortious act, omission, or injury occurred, or the real property is located. Where an action is brought against a resident of this state, any nonresident of this state who is involved in the same transaction or occurrence and who is suable under the provisions of this article may be joined as a defendant in the county where a resident defendant is suable. Under such circumstances, jurisdiction and venue of the court of and over such nonresident defendant shall not be affected or lost if at trial a verdict or judgment is returned in favor of such resident defendant. If such resident defendant is dismissed from the action prior to commencement of the trial, the action against the nonresident defendant shall not abate but shall be transferred to a court in a county where venue is proper.

History

Ga. L. 1966, p. 343, § 4; Ga. L. 1968, p. 1419, § 1; Ga. L. 1970, p. 443, § 3; Ga. L. 1997, p. 480, § 1.

Annotations

Cross references. Venue of actions against noncitizens found in state, § 9-10-33. Law reviews. For article, “The Georgia Long Arm Statute: A Significant Advance in the Concept of Personal Jurisdiction,” see 4 Ga. St. B.J. 13 (1967). For article, “An Introduction to the New Georgia Corporation Law,” see 4 Ga. St. B. J. 419 (1968). For note discussing the 1970 amend-

ments to the long arm statute as an enlargement of in personam jurisdiction, see 22 Mercer L. Rev. 451 (1971). For note discussing problems with venue in Georgia, and proposing statutory revisions to improve the resolution of venue questions, see 9 Ga. St. B.J. 254 (1972). For article, “Foreign Corporations in Georgia,” see 10 Ga. St. B.J. 243 (1973). For note discussing some complications of filing suit against a nonresident in a multiparty action or against a resident who might implead a nonresident under the venue rules, see 11 Ga. L. Rev. 149 (1976).

For article discussing venue and jurisdictional requirements for third party practice, see 13 Ga. L. Rev. 13 (1978). For article discussing Georgia’s long arm statute, prejudgment attachment and habeas corpus, with respect to judicial developments in practice and procedure in the fifth circuit, see 30 Mercer L. Rev. 925 (1979). For comment on World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 100 S. Ct. 559, 62 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1980), and Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 100 S. Ct. 591, 62 L. Ed. 2d 516 (1980), regarding mini-

mum contacts and state jurisdiction, see 15 Ga. L. Rev. 19 (1980). For comment, “Jurisdiction over Nonresidents in Georgia: Crowder v. Ginn,” see 17 Ga. L. Rev. 201 (1982). For survey article on trial practice and procedure, see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 299 (1982). For annual survey of trial practice and procedure, see 38 Mercer L. Rev. 383 (1986). For article commenting on the 1997 amendment of this Code section, see 14 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 9 (1997).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS This section is merely an elaboration of residence in Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VI, Sec. XIV, Par. VI (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VI). Scott v. Crescent Tool Co., 296 F. Supp. 147, 1968 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9665 (N.D. Ga. 1968) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-93). Forum selection clauses in payday lending actions. - District court correctly found that forum selection clauses in class borrowers’ payday lending agreements were unenforceable as against Georgia public policy in the borrowers’ suit alleging usury violations, and the term “county” in O.C.G.A. § 16-17-2 referred only to Georgia counties, not out of state counties, since Georgia venue provisions commonly use the term “county” or “counties” in reference to Georgia counties, without explicitly saying so. The lenders’ argument - that by using the term “county” instead of “Georgia county” in § 16-17-2(c)(1), the General Assembly opened a back door for out-of-state forum selection clauses - would effectively “hide elephants in mouseholes.” Davis v. Oasis Legal Fin. Operating Co., LLC, 936 F.3d 1174, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 26064 (11th Cir. 2019). Venue properly lies in county where business transacted. - Where all the business transacted by the defendants is consummated in the same county in which the action is brought, there is no justification for an allegation of improper venue under this section. Palm Beach Inv. Properties, Inc. v. Dingman, 126 Ga. App. 17, 189 S.E.2d 906, 1972 Ga. App. LEXIS 1028 (1972) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-93).

In a dispute between siblings over corporate funds, venue was proper with respect to the sisters in Forsyth County, Georgia since a substantial amount of the sisters’ activities which gave rise to the brothers’ claims were transacted in Forsyth County. Stubblefield v. Stubblefield, 296 Ga. 481, 769 S.E.2d 78, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 100 (2015). Internet car seller purposefully transacted business in the State of Georgia when its agent conducted business negotiations with a buyer who lived in Georgia and when the seller delivered the vehicle in the state, so as to have established sufficient minimum contacts with the State of Georgia to authorize Georgia’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over the seller under the Georgia Long Arm Statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91; moreover, the state court correctly resolved the factual conflict created by the seller’s affidavits and supporting documentation in favor of the buyer so as to find, for purposes of the motion to dismiss, that the buyer had not been provided with, nor agreed to, that part of the agreement containing the forum selection clause. Aero Toy Store, LLC v. Grieves, 279 Ga. App. 515, 631 S.E.2d 734, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 626 (2006). Venue established in county where nonresident transacted business. - Where the sole general partner was a nonresident, personal jurisdiction may be exercised under Ga. L. 1970, p. 443, § 1 (see O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91) by the courts of this state as if the person were a resident, and venue was established in the county

where the business was transacted. Reading Assocs., Ltd. v. Reading Assocs. of Ga., Inc., 236 Ga. 906, 225 S.E.2d 899, 1976 Ga. LEXIS 1065 (1976). Substantial parts of the business. - Since substantial parts of the business under a gasoline supply contract were transacted in both Union County and Hall County, there was no basis for reversing the trial court’s finding, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-10-93, that venue was in Hall County for purposes of a breach of contract action under the agreement. Dickey v. Clipper Petroleum, Inc., 280 Ga. App. 475, 634 S.E.2d 425, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 768 (2006). Action against nonresident motor common carrier. - Even though a nonresident interstate motor common carrier was registered in Georgia and had a registered agent for service of process, venue of a personal injury action against the carrier and nonresident driver was proper only in the county in which the accident occurred. Southern Drayage, Inc. v. Williams, 216 Ga. App. 721, 455 S.E.2d 418, 1995 Ga. App. LEXIS 241 (1995). While the trial court held that, under O.C.G.A. § 9-10-93, venue did not appear to be properly established in a case between plaintiff former husband and defen-

dant former wife regarding division of marital assets and breach of contract, a review of the record did not reveal any evidence regarding venue except for the wife’s representation in her brief that the husband resided in Cobb County, Georgia, where the action was filed, and that the bulk of the marital assets were located in DeKalb County, Georgia; thus, the trial court’s ruling regarding venue was reversed. Barolia v. Pirani, 260 Ga. App. 513, 580 S.E.2d 297, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 423 (2003). Venue proper. - Trial court’s finding that the a corporate president and the president’s spouse were subject to a corporation’s suit in Fulton County pursuant to the Georgia Long Arm Statute was not error because the brokers sued the corporation in Fulton County, thereby submitting themselves to jurisdiction and venue on the corporation’s counterclaim; thus, the brokers were “suable” on the corporation’s claims in Fulton County, and under O.C.G.A. § 9-10-93, Fulton County was the proper venue as to the president and the spouse. Cartwright v. Fuji Photo Film U.S.A., Inc., 312 Ga. App. 890, 720 S.E.2d 200, 2011 Ga. App. LEXIS 976 (2011), cert. denied, No. S12C0600, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 306 (Ga. Mar. 19, 2012).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. 77 Am. Jur. 2d, Venue, §§ 1 et seq., 8 et seq., 43 et seq., 48 et seq. C.J.S. 92A C.J.S., Venue, § 7. ALR. Guardianship of incompetent or infant as affecting venue of action, 111 A.L.R. 167. State or country deemed to be the place

of tort causing personal injury or death, as regards principle that law of place of tort governs, 77 A.L.R.2d 1266. Long-arm statutes: in personam jurisdiction over nonresident based on ownership, use, possession, or sale of real property, 4 A.L.R.4th 955. Place where corporation is doing business for purposes of state venue statute, 42 A.L.R.5th 221.

The 20 cases that cite O.C.G.A. § 9-10-93 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
REDFord v. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co., 497 S.E.2d 596 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998).
cites § 9-10-93 28×cited by 7 cases
Reversed by Ford v. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. (1999): the Supreme Court of Georgia's own opinion in this case.
Where it cites § 9-10-93
“Under OCGA § 9-10-93, venue "shall lie in any county wherein a substantial part of the business was transacted, the tortious act, omission, or injury occurred, or the real property is located.”
2
GREENDickey v. Clipper Petroleum, Inc., 634 S.E.2d 425 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006).
cites § 9-10-93 8×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 9-10-93
“*477 As enacted in 1966, the predecessor to OCGA § 9-10-93 provided that “[v]enue in cases under this article shall lie in any county wherein the business was transacted, the tortious act, omission, or injury occurred, or the real property is located.”
Later courts cite it for
“a trial court may not grant a motion for directed verdict based on a failure of proof of damages unless there is 'a complete absence of any competent evidence on this issue” · 2 citing courts
3
GREENGranite Loan Solutions, LLC v. King, 779 S.E.2d 86 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015).
cites § 9-10-93 4×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 9-10-93
“OCGA § 9-10-93 addresses venue in these circumstances: .”
Later courts cite it for
“we review a ruling on a motion to set aside for abuse of discretion and affirm if there is any evidence to support it.” · 2 citing courts
4
GREENClassic Com. Servs., Inc. v. Baldwin, 784 S.E.2d 44 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016).
cites § 9-10-93 2×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 9-10-93
“” OCGA § 9-10-93. The same reasoning would apply to the trial court’s initial determination that Baldwin was not a Georgia resident at the time of filing of the complaint.”
5
GREENCartwright v. Fuji Photo Film U.S.A., Inc., 720 S.E.2d 200 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011).
cites § 9-10-93 4×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 9-10-93
“(b) Because the trial court is authorized to exercise personal jurisdiction over the Cartwrights in this case under the Long Arm Statute, the determination of the proper venue is governed by OCGA § 9-10-93, which states, in relevant part, as follows: “Where an action is brought…”
Later courts cite it for
“the provisions of ocga 9-11-15 (c) should be liberally construed to effect its purpose of ameliorating the impact of the statute of limitation.” · 2 citing courts
6
GREENRepub. Title Co. v. Andrews., 819 S.E.2d 889 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018).
cites § 9-10-93 2×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 9-10-93
“2 See OCGA § 9-10-93 ("Venue in cases under this article shall lie in any county wherein .”
Later courts cite it for
“the contemplated procedures of the two proceedings are entirely distinct from each other.” · 2 citing courts
7
GREENAbrams v. Massell, 586 S.E.2d 435 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003).
cites § 9-10-93 2×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 9-10-93
“” OCGA § 9-10-93. In a case like this, involving claims of breach of contract, constructive trust, and an injunction of the probate proceedings, the Georgia Constitution requires that suit be brought in the county of the defendant’s residence, Ga.”
Later courts cite it for
“thus, the parol evidence rule bars any attempt to contradict, vary or supplement the consideration stated in an integrated contract.” · 2 citing courts
8
GREENGoodman v. Vilston, Inc, 399 S.E.2d 241 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990).
cites § 9-10-93 4×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 9-10-93
“” OCGA § 9-10-93. Accordingly, given that the DeKalb County courts had jurisdiction over appellant pursuant to OCGA § 9-10-91 (4), long arm *720 venue against appellant lay in DeKalb County, the county where the real property is located, and not in Gwinnett County where the…”
9
GREENInsituform Tech., Inc. v. Amerik Supplies, Inc., 850 F. Supp. 2d 1336 (N.D. Ga. 2012).
cites § 9-10-93 2×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 9-10-93
“The declaratory-judgment complaint itself incorrectly identifies the Georgia vouchment statute as O.C.G.A. § 9-10-93. . Civil Action No. l:10-cv-2717-TCB.”
10
GREENLizzie Davis v. Oasis Legal Fin. Operating Co., 936 F.3d 1174 (11th Cir. 2019).
cites § 9-10-93 1×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 9-10-93
“We think the district court got it right. Georgia venue provisions commonly use the term “county” or “counties” in refence to Georgia counties, without explicitly saying so.”
Later courts cite it for
“public policy is an amorphous concept...accordingly, it has been held that, the delicate and undefined power of courts to declare a contract void as contravening public policy should be exercised with great caution.” · 4 citing courts
11
GREENTampa Motel Mgmt. Co. v. Stratton of Florida, Inc., 366 S.E.2d 804 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988).
cites § 9-10-93 2×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 9-10-93
“When personal jurisdiction of a nonresident is acquired under the provisions of the Long Arm Statute (OCGA § 9-10-91), venue as to the nonresident is determined by OCGA § 9-10-93, which states that “[v]enue in cases under this article shall lie in any county wherein the business…”
Later courts cite it for
“once the three-month period following the filing or delivery of the arbitration award has expired, any attempt to vacate or modify the award . . . cannot be made.” · 2 citing courts
12
GREENPanhandle Fire Prot., Inc. v. Batson-Cook Co., 653 S.E.2d 802 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007).
cites § 9-10-93 2×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 9-10-93
“135, 138-139 (2) ( 366 SE2d 804 ) (1988), Panhandle appears to argue in its appellate brief that even if the GAC applies, venue would be improper in the superior court because the venue provisions of the Georgia Long Arm Statute, OCGA § 9-10-93, allegedly trump those of the GAC…”
13
GREENBarolia v. Pirani, 580 S.E.2d 297 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003).
cites § 9-10-93 4×cited by 2 cases
Where it cites § 9-10-93
“While the trial court held that, under OCGA § 9-10-93, * venue did not appear to be properly established in this case, our review of the record does not reveal any evidence regarding venue except for Barolia’s representation in her brief that Pirani, the defendant in…”
14
GREENCooper v. Edwards, 508 S.E.2d 708 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998).
cites § 9-10-93 2×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 9-10-93
“546, 548 (3) ( 417 SE2d 160 ) (1992); OCGA § 9-10-93. *51 Decided October 30, 1998.”
Later courts cite it for
“a concurrence of actual residence and intent to remain. ...” · 1 citing court
15
GREENCunningham v. Est. of Cunningham, 697 S.E.2d 280 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010).
cites § 9-10-93 2×cited by 4 cases
Later courts cite it for
“any court shall transfer to the appropriate court in the state any civil case in which it determines that jurisdiction or venue lies elsewhere.” · 2 citing courts
16
GREENS. Drayage, Inc. v. Williams, 455 S.E.2d 418 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995).
cites § 9-10-93 2×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 9-10-93
“See OCGA § 9-10-93. In light of the foregoing, we hold that the trial court erred in denying Southern Drayage and Armstrong’s motion to transfer venue.”
17
GREENGowdey v. REM Assocs., 335 S.E.2d 309 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985).
cites § 9-10-93 2×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 9-10-93
“Venue in an action under the “long arm statute” is determined by OCGA § 9-10-93, which provides that “[v]enue in cases under this article shall lie in any county wherein the business was transacted .”
18
GREENTurem v. Sinowski & Jones, 395 S.E.2d 60 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990).
cites § 9-10-93 2×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 9-10-93
“OCGA § 9-10-93. And, as joint obligors on the fee arrangement, whatever it was, all defendants may be sued in Cobb County (§ 9-10-31); and mere failure to make proof of service of the appellant-defendants who resided elsewhere (OCGA § 9-11-4 (g)) does not remove jurisdiction…”
Later courts cite it for
“sets forth a plain statutory consequence of the receipt or payment of money under a departure,” · 2 citing courts
19
GREENUnger v. Bryant Equip. Sales & Servs., Inc., 335 S.E.2d 109 (Ga. 1985).
cites § 9-10-93 2×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 9-10-93
“In granting the application for certiorari we were concerned with two questions: 1) Whether Farmtronix and Bryant could be joined as joint tortfeasors under the facts of the case; and 2) Whether venue was proper in Sumter County under the principle of “transacting business”…”
20
GREENCoe v. Peterson, 323 S.E.2d 715 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984).
cites § 9-10-93 4×cited by 2 cases
Where it cites § 9-10-93
“The court next dealt with the defendant’s claims with reference to the fact that he should have been served as a sojourner in the county where the suit was filed, i.”

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
198420012019

One bar per year. Tallest: 4 cases in 2015. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

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Ga. Ct. App.25Ga.311th Cir.1N.D. Ga.1
By subsection

Courts have not cited this section by subsection, so its cases are not split up here. The Leading cases tab lists the cases that cite it most heavily.

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Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: O.C.G.A. 2023 print volume: Georgia laws through the 2023 session at the latest. Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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