Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, § 3-402 are included in the annotations for this Code section.

Substitution of parties under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-25 is not limited to those instances listed herein. Franklyn Gesner Fine Paintings, Inc. v. Ketcham, 252 Ga. 537, 314 S.E.2d 903 (1984).

Substitution accomplished on motion and notice.

- Substitution of parties upon the parties' death or when there is a transfer of interest is accomplished upon proper motion and notice to the parties. Franklin v. Sea Island Bank, 120 Ga. App. 654, 171 S.E.2d 866 (1969).

Valid substitution from voluntary appearance and acquiescence.

- When executor of a deceased party appears voluntarily and pleads as a party in the case, and the opposite party indicates in any manner of record the party's acquiescence to the substitution, a valid substitution will take place. Eubank v. Barber-Colman Co., 115 Ga. App. 217, 154 S.E.2d 638 (1967) (decided under former Code 1933, § 3-402).

Trial court did not err in dismissing a passenger's O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61 renewal action entirely as being void ab initio and in denying the passenger's request to substitute parties under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-25 because the passenger's renewed complaint was filed after the driver's death, and the passenger never attempted to substitute a new defendant before a hearing on a motion to dismiss. Cox v. Progressive Bayside Ins. Co., 316 Ga. App. 50, 728 S.E.2d 726 (2012).

Failure to challenge substitution.

- Trial court did not err by finding a bank had the power to enforce a note because the defendants did not object or respond to the motion to substitute the bank as the real party in interest; thus, the issue was waived. HWA Props., Inc. v. Cmty. & S. Bank, 322 Ga. App. 877, 746 S.E.2d 609 (2013).

Substitution on consent could not be challenged on appeal.

- Debtor could not challenge a judgment entered on remittitur by raising arguments regarding an assignee's payment of consideration for a judgment entered against the debtor, although the issue was not within the scope of the prior appeal as the debtor had consented to the assignee's substitution into the action in place of the bank as well as the assignment of the judgment to it. Martin v. Hamilton State Bank, 323 Ga. App. 185, 746 S.E.2d 750 (2013).

Invited error precluded objection on appeal.

- Former director's putative transferee could not argue on appeal that it was error to substitute an assignee in place of a creditor in the creditor's fraudulent transfer action as the transferee advised the trial court that the transferee had no objection to the substitution at the time. Am. Nat'l Holding Corp. v. EMM Credit, LLC, 323 Ga. App. 655, 748 S.E.2d 683 (2013).

Cited in Fuller v. Booth, 118 Ga. App. 685, 165 S.E.2d 318 (1968); Nelson v. Sing Oil Co., 122 Ga. App. 19, 176 S.E.2d 227 (1970); Burgess v. Nabers, 122 Ga. App. 445, 177 S.E.2d 266 (1970); Pendley v. Hunter, 138 Ga. App. 864, 227 S.E.2d 857 (1976); Continental Ins. Co. v. Weekes, 140 Ga. App. 791, 232 S.E.2d 80 (1976); Central Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wofford, 145 Ga. App. 836, 244 S.E.2d 899 (1978); Rives E. Worrell Co. v. Key Sys., 147 Ga. App. 383, 248 S.E.2d 686 (1978); Anderson v. Southeastern Capital Corp., 148 Ga. App. 164, 251 S.E.2d 55 (1978); Tabernacle Baptist Church v. Dorsey, 247 Ga. 675, 278 S.E.2d 378 (1981); Omark Indus., Inc. v. Alewine, 164 Ga. App. 397, 298 S.E.2d 259 (1982); Canada W., Ltd. v. City of Atlanta, 169 Ga. App. 907, 315 S.E.2d 442 (1984); Heslen v. Heslen, 199 Ga. App. 271, 404 S.E.2d 592 (1991); NationsBank v. Peavy, 227 Ga. App. 137, 488 S.E.2d 699 (1997); Blanton v. Duru, 247 Ga. App. 175, 543 S.E.2d 448 (2000); Southern LNG, Inc. v. MacGinnitie, 294 Ga. 657, 755 S.E.2d 683 (2014); Brown v. GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc., 331 Ga. App. 890, 770 S.E.2d 56 (2015), cert. denied, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 732 (Ga. 2015); Financial Education Services, Inc. v. State of Ga., 336 Ga. App. 606, 785 S.E.2d 544 (2016), cert. denied, 197 L. Ed. 2d 465 (U.S. 2017); Riley v. Southern LNG, Inc., 300 Ga. 689, 797 S.E.2d 878 (2017).

Substitution of personal representatives.

- Substitution of personal representatives of decedent pursuant to subsection (a) of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-25 in an action involving the decedent's negligence claim against the defendant did not result in addition of a new party or a new cause of action to the litigation. Pope v. GoodGame, 223 Ga. App. 672, 478 S.E.2d 636 (1996).

Substitution of estate administrator improper.

- State court erred when the court substituted a representative, who was the administrator of the descendent's estate, for the decedent's surviving spouse because O.C.G.A. § 9-11-25(b) did not authorize the substitution when there was no evidence that the spouse had become incompetent to manage the spouse's own legal affairs. Skyjack, Inc. v. Mois, 346 Ga. App. 26, 815 S.E.2d 239 (2018).

Order denying substitution was not a final appealable order.

- Trial court's order denying substitution of the decedent's administrator as a party, in place of the decedent, was not a final appealable order and as such did not dismiss the complaint, but left issues remaining to be resolved. Williams v. City of Atlanta, 263 Ga. App. 113, 587 S.E.2d 261 (2003).

Substitution does not divest court of venue.

- Because the executor stands in the shoes of the decedent, in essence keeping the suit and claims against the decedent alive, the substitution of a nonresident executor is, for purposes of venue, qualitatively the same as when a resident defendant moves out of the county; therefore, a party's death and the substitution of executors did not divest the superior court of venue. Abrams v. Massell, 262 Ga. App. 761, 586 S.E.2d 435 (2003).

Order making administrator of defendant who died before being served a defendant is not a substitution but the commencement of a new suit. Rowe v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 129 Ga. App. 251, 199 S.E.2d 319 (1973).

Procedure for suggestion of death is for protection of prospective respondent to motion for substitution of parties, and is for the purpose of enabling the respondent to place a limitation upon the period of time during which the movant may seek substitution of the parties. Anderson v. Southeastern Capital Corp., 243 Ga. 498, 255 S.E.2d 12 (1979); Berry v. Morton, 152 Ga. App. 117, 262 S.E.2d 263 (1979); Binns v. Binns, 193 Ga. App. 554, 388 S.E.2d 385 (1989).

Statement sufficient to suggest death.

- Statement of fact of death, which includes name of deceased and date of death, is a sufficient suggestion of death as contemplated by paragraph (a)(1) of this section to trigger the 180-day period allowed for filing a motion for substitution. Mullis v. Bone, 143 Ga. App. 407, 238 S.E.2d 748 (1977).

Movant seeking substitution not required to suggest death.

- Nothing in the Civil Practice Act (see O.C.G.A. Ch. 11, T. 9) requires movant seeking substitution of a party to make a suggestion of death as a prerequisite or condition to filing motion for substitution. Anderson v. Southeastern Capital Corp., 243 Ga. 498, 255 S.E.2d 12 (1979).

Movant seeking to substitute proper party is not required to make the suggestion of death, although the movant is permitted to do so; the movant's making of suggestion of death is anomalous, unnecessary, and gratuitous, since the effect of its filing is to limit time within which the motion for substitution could be made. Berry v. Morton, 152 Ga. App. 117, 262 S.E.2d 263 (1979).

If executor of deceased party desires protection of the 180-day limitation period, the executor can file a suggestion of death on the record and serve it on the other party's counsel. Having failed to so act, the executor cannot complain of lack of diligence on the part of the other party. Dubberly v. Nail, 166 Ga. App. 378, 304 S.E.2d 504 (1983).

Limitation period does not run until suggestion of death personally served.

- The 180 day limitation contained in paragraph (a)(1) of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-25 is not triggered when the surviving party to an action initiates the suggestion of death until personal service of the suggestion of death is made upon the nonparty representative of the deceased litigant's estate. Dubberly v. Nail, 166 Ga. App. 378, 304 S.E.2d 504 (1983); Ridley v. Polk Bros. Constr. Co., 170 Ga. App. 349, 317 S.E.2d 326 (1984).

When the plaintiff brought a medical malpractice action against the defendants and thereafter the plaintiff's attorney notified the court and all parties that the plaintiff had died but no motion for substitution of parties was made within the next 180 days, since the record showed no personal service of the suggestion of death upon the nonparty representative of the plaintiff's estate, the 180-day limitation of paragraph (a)(1) never commenced, and the trial court erred in dismissing the action. Ludy v. Giddens, 182 Ga. App. 111, 354 S.E.2d 703 (1987).

The 180-day limitation of paragraph (a)(1) of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-25 does not commence until the non-party representative of the estate has been served with the suggestion of death. Binns v. Binns, 193 Ga. App. 554, 388 S.E.2d 385 (1989).

Burden is upon representative of the deceased, not upon movant, to invoke limitation within which motion for substitution of parties may be made. Berry v. Morton, 152 Ga. App. 117, 262 S.E.2d 263 (1979).

No time limit for substitution until notice of death given.

- There is no time limit for substitution for death of a party until notice has been given, and even this time limit is subject to enlargement for good cause shown, in the discretion of the court. Jernigan v. Collier, 131 Ga. App. 162, 205 S.E.2d 450 (1974).

Service of suggestion of death on non-party as prerequisite to running.

- O.C.G.A. § 9-11-25 requires that the record reflect that the suggestion of death has been served upon all necessary parties, including the non-party representative of the estate, before the 180-day limitation begins to run. Until the record as to service is perfected, there is no duty to substitute; an acknowledgment of service for this purpose does not relate back to the day of service but starts the limitation period when the acknowledgment is filed. Northside Corp. v. Mosby, 214 Ga. App. 806, 449 S.E.2d 6 (1994).

Substitution to be within 180 days of suggestion of death.

- Time restriction provided in paragraph (a)(1) of this section is merely that if there is a suggestion of death in the record, then the movant who wishes to substitute must do so within 180 days of service of suggestion of death upon the movant. Berry v. Morton, 152 Ga. App. 117, 262 S.E.2d 263 (1979).

Action on a contract was properly dismissed when the pro se plaintiff failed to make a valid substitution of parties within 180 days after a suggestion of death was filed. Maddox v. Wilson, 219 Ga. App. 158, 464 S.E.2d 226 (1995).

Extension of period for substitution.

- Court may extend period for substitution if request is made before expiration of 180-day period. Jernigan v. Collier, 131 Ga. App. 162, 205 S.E.2d 450 (1974).

Right of court to dismiss for failure to timely move for substitution.

- Court has the right to dismiss under paragraph (a)(1) of this section, regardless of whether or not counsel for the deceased would be authorized to make a motion to dismiss. Jernigan v. Collier, 134 Ga. App. 137, 213 S.E.2d 495, aff'd, 234 Ga. 837, 218 S.E.2d 556 (1975).

Dismissal not mandatory.

- Even if no motion for substitution is made within the 180-day period, dismissal of the action is not mandatory, despite the use of the word "shall" in paragraph (a)(1) of this section. Jernigan v. Collier, 131 Ga. App. 162, 205 S.E.2d 450 (1974).

Entry of order required.

- Dismissal is not automatic under paragraph (a)(1) of this section, and entry of an order is required before dismissal can be effected. Jernigan v. Collier, 131 Ga. App. 162, 205 S.E.2d 450 (1974); Jernigan v. Collier, 234 Ga. 837, 218 S.E.2d 556 (1975).

No dismissal when no service of suggestion of death.

- When there was no personal service of the suggestion of death upon the nonparty representative of the decedent's estate, the 180-day limitation of paragraph (a)(1) of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-25 was never commenced, and the trial court erred in dismissing the action. Bledsoe v. Sutton, 174 Ga. App. 248, 329 S.E.2d 589 (1985).

Late substitution within discretion of court on showing of excusable neglect.

- Court may in the court's discretion permit motion for substitution made more than 180 days after death is suggested of record when failure to file such motion was the result of excusable neglect. Jernigan v. Collier, 234 Ga. 837, 218 S.E.2d 556 (1975); Anderson v. Southeastern Capital Corp., 243 Ga. 498, 255 S.E.2d 12 (1979).

Absent showing of excusable neglect dismissal proper.

- When the plaintiff fails to make a timely motion for substitution, as required by paragraph (a)(1) of Ga. L. 1966, p. 609, § 25 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-11-25), a motion to dismiss pursuant to Ga. L. 1966, p. 609, § 41 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-11-41(b)) is in order, at the hearing of which motion the plaintiff may show excusable neglect under Ga. L. 1966, p. 609, § 6 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-11-6(b)(2)), but upon the plaintiff's failure to satisfy requirements of that section, a motion to dismiss should be granted. Jernigan v. Collier, 234 Ga. 837, 218 S.E.2d 556 (1975).

Dismissal for untimely motion to substitute operates on the merits.

- Dismissal for failure to make timely substitution operates as a dismissal on the merits. Jernigan v. Collier, 131 Ga. App. 162, 205 S.E.2d 450 (1974).

When the plaintiff has failed to timely move for substitution, and has had a hearing and adverse determination on the issue of excusable neglect, a dismissal is, as it should be, upon the merits. Jernigan v. Collier, 234 Ga. 837, 218 S.E.2d 556 (1975).

Absent specification to the contrary.

- When no notice of substitution is made within 180 days after service of suggestion of death and defendant moves for dismissal on this ground, dismissal of the petition under Ga. L. 1966, p. 609, § 41 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-11-41) by the trial judge after notice and hearing, without specifying that it is "without prejudice," would bar any subsequent suit. Jernigan v. Collier, 131 Ga. App. 162, 205 S.E.2d 450 (1974).

Dismissal for want of prosecution distinguished.

- Dismissal under paragraph (a)(1) of Ga. L. 1966, p. 609, § 25 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-11-25) is different from dismissal under Ga. L. 1966, p. 609, § 41 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-11-41(e)) for want of prosecution, which is automatically obtained and does not operate as an adjudication on the merits. Jernigan v. Collier, 131 Ga. App. 162, 205 S.E.2d 450 (1974).

Right of voluntary dismissal not abridged by motion to dismiss hereunder.

- Plaintiff may voluntarily dismiss the plaintiff's suit at any time before the verdict or oral announcement of judgment by the trial court under Ga. L. 1966, p. 609, § 41 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-11-41(a)), and this right is not abridged by filing a motion to dismiss based upon the plaintiff's failure to comply with Ga. L. 1966, p. 609, § 25 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-11-25(a)(1)). Wofford v. Central Mut. Ins. Co., 242 Ga. 338, 249 S.E.2d 21 (1978).

Executor substituted after death of defendant not individually a party.

- When pending an action, the defendant dies, and the defendant's executor is substituted as party defendant, as provided by this section, the executor is not individually a party to the action and may not appeal in an individual capacity from an adverse judgment. Coogler v. Berry, 117 Ga. App. 614, 161 S.E.2d 428 (1968).

Death of defendant does not create "lack of an indispensable party" within the meaning of Ga. L. 1972, p. 689, § 7 or Ga. L. 1966, p. 609, § 41 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-11-19 or O.C.G.A. § 9-11-41(b)). Jernigan v. Collier, 234 Ga. 837, 218 S.E.2d 556 (1975).

Deceased person cannot be party to legal proceedings. Mathews v. Cleveland, 159 Ga. App. 616, 284 S.E.2d 634 (1981).

Action commenced in name of deceased person is not brought in name of a "natural person," because a deceased person has no capacity to be a "proper" litigant in the courts of this state. If no legal party plaintiff was named in the pleadings and shown to exist, the action is a mere nullity. Mathews v. Cleveland, 159 Ga. App. 616, 284 S.E.2d 634 (1981).

When an action is brought in name of plaintiff who is dead, complaint may not be amended by substituting a plaintiff having capacity to sue. Mathews v. Cleveland, 159 Ga. App. 616, 284 S.E.2d 634 (1981).

Second, untimely, motion for substitution of the temporary administrator of a decedent's estate should have been treated either as the equivalent of a meritorious motion for reconsideration of the denial of a timely filed first motion, based on the probate court's correction of its clerical error identifying the decedent, or as a permissible late filing based on excusable neglect. Harvey v. Oliver, 178 Ga. App. 63, 341 S.E.2d 917 (1986).

When an estate's representative dies during the pendency of the litigation, the successor representative must be substituted as a party; substitution of parties does not occur by operation of law but must be effected under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-25. McCarley v. McCarley, 246 Ga. App. 171, 539 S.E.2d 871 (2000).

Failure timely to seek substitution held not excusable neglect.

- When there was no evidence from which the trial court could find excusable neglect as a matter of fact and, as a matter of law, plaintiff's explanation that counsel was confused as to the law in Georgia regarding substitution of an executor of a decedent's estate in place of a deceased defendant did not constitute excusable neglect, the trial court abused the court's discretion in denying the executor's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's suit for their failure to seek substitution of parties within the 180-day limitation period in paragraph (a)(1) of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-25. King v. Green, 189 Ga. App. 105, 375 S.E.2d 53, cert. denied, 189 Ga. App. 912, 375 S.E.2d 53 (1988).

Plaintiff's failure to make a timely substitution of parties was not excused based on the fact that a guardian was representing the decedent's interests in the case prior to the decedent's death. Stephenson v. Ingram, 239 Ga. App. 892, 522 S.E.2d 500 (1999).

Judgment obtained against a deceased defendant is void, and the trial court does not err in vacating the judgment, setting the judgment aside, and dismissing the action, when no party has been substituted since the suggestion of death and no reason has been shown that the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect so as to allow an extension of time. Franklin v. Collins, 167 Ga. App. 596, 307 S.E.2d 66 (1983).

Judgment pending substitution void.

- Summary judgment for the defendant, granted after the plaintiff's death and prior to substitution for the decedent, was void as to the decedent. Allen v. City of Moultrie, 162 Ga. App. 188, 290 S.E.2d 529 (1982).

Transfer of interest during course of litigation contemplated.

- Subsection (c) of this section, providing for substitution of the transferee of interest in the action, applies only when the transfer is made pending or during the course of litigation. Employers' Liab. Assurance Corp. v. Keelin, 132 Ga. App. 459, 208 S.E.2d 328 (1974).

Subsection (c) of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-25 vests discretion in the trial judge to allow the original plaintiff to continue suit either alone or joined by the interest transferee when the transfer of interest occurred after the filing of the suit. Gene Thompson Lumber Co. v. Davis Parmer Lumber Co., 189 Ga. App. 573, 377 S.E.2d 15, cert. denied, 189 Ga. App. 912, 377 S.E.2d 15 (1988).

In an action for default on certain promissory notes in relation to a condominium investment, the trial court did not err in permitting the intervention of the FSLIC as a real party in interest, even though the FSLIC was abolished by a federal act reorganizing the savings and loan system. The trial court can substitute FSLIC's successor, the Resolution Trust Corporation, at any time. Stovall v. FSLIC, 260 Ga. 475, 396 S.E.2d 484 (1990).

From party to nonparty.

- Subsection (c) of this section contemplates a transfer of interest, during litigation, from one who is a party to the case to one who is not, not a purported transfer from one who is not a party to the litigation to one who is. Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Ed. V. Collins Contracting, Inc., 147 Ga. App. 183, 248 S.E.2d 220 (1978).

In an action for conversion, the trial court did not err in failing to direct a verdict in the defendant's favor on grounds that the plaintiff had assigned the plaintiff's interests in accounts receivable to another corporation, and thus was not the proper party to bring suit, when, for all this record showed, the plaintiff was the damaged party; the defendant did not prove otherwise, nor was the defendant the proper party to complain on behalf of the other corporation. Privitera v. Addison, 190 Ga. App. 102, 378 S.E.2d 312, cert. denied, 190 Ga. App. 898, 378 S.E.2d 312 (1989).

Continuance of original action not automatically authorized.

- Subsection (c) of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-25, when operative, does not automatically authorize the continuance of an original action in all cases following the transfer of an interest. If a cause of action does not survive a subsequent transfer of interest, subsection (c), standing alone, would not revive the action. Gene Thompson Lumber Co. v. Davis Parmer Lumber Co., 189 Ga. App. 573, 377 S.E.2d 15, cert denied, 189 Ga. App. 912, 377 S.E.2d 15 (1988).

In a suit by an assignee of a judgment seeking to set aside a fraudulent transfer by the judgment debtor to a corporation, the assignee's fraudulent transfer claim did not survive the assignment of the California judgment based on Georgia's assignment statute, O.C.G.A. § 44-12-24, and was not revived by O.C.G.A. § 9-11-25(c). EMM Credit, LLC v. Remington, 343 Ga. App. 710, 808 S.E.2d 96 (2017).

When transfer of interest, such as assignment, takes place prior to commencement of action, Ga. L. 1968, p. 1104, § 6, (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-11-17) controls and requires that the action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. Employers' Liab. Assurance Corp. v. Keelin, 132 Ga. App. 459, 208 S.E.2d 328 (1974).

Trial court erred in substituting a new plaintiff pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-25 because the alleged transfer of the mortgage company's interest in the security deed to the bank did not occur during the course of the instant litigation as the alleged transfer of the interest in the security deed occurred some two years earlier in 2009; and, thus, O.C.G.A. § 9-11-25 did not apply to the case, and O.C.G.A. § 9-11-17(a) should have been applied as the transfer of an interest took place prior to the commencement of the action; accordingly, the trial court's denial of the motion to vacate the order substituting the bank as the plaintiff had to be reversed. Rogers v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co., 343 Ga. App. 655, 808 S.E.2d 233 (2017).

Action not surviving transfer of interest.

- Action which sought to compel a party to do an affirmative act in regard to property in which the party no longer held an interest could not be continued, absent substitution of parties as provided in subsection (c) of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-25. Georgia Power Co. v. Hunt, 266 Ga. 331, 466 S.E.2d 846 (1996).

Effect of dissolution, merger, or consolidation of corporation.

- After dissolution of a corporation in any manner other than by court decree, or the corporation's merger or consolidation with another corporation, any pending actions by such a corporation can proceed as if the dissolution, merger, or consolidation had never taken place. Rosing v. Dwoskin Decorating Co., 141 Ga. App. 617, 234 S.E.2d 128 (1977).

Merging banks.

- In a suit brought by mortgagors against the mortgagor bank that was taken over by a successor bank, the appellate court erred in dismissing the successor bank's appeal under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-25 for lack of standing based on the trial court's failure to add or substitute it as the defendant because the two corporations were deemed the same entity under federal and state law by virtue of their merger, thus, the claims originally filed by and against the mortgagee bank could continue. Nat'l City Mortg. Co. v. Tidwell, 293 Ga. 697, 749 S.E.2d 730 (2013).

Change of name of board after filing of complaint.

- When action was filed by board under correct name provided by statute then in effect, fact that no motion was made in writing to substitute new name of the board when changed by the legislature did not subject the action to dismissal because subsection (c) of this section provides that such an action may be continued by the original party. Clark v. Board of Dental Exmrs., 240 Ga. 289, 240 S.E.2d 250 (1977).

Suits for violation of Open Meetings Act.

- City councilmembers' claims against a mayor under the Open Meetings Act for a civil penalty under O.C.G.A. § 50-14-6 were subject to dismissal because the complaint only named the mayor in the mayor's official capacity; § 50-14-6 recognized that decisions to comply with the Act were made by individuals, or "persons." The claim for attorney's fees, O.C.G.A. § 15-14-5(b), was in essence against the city and was not subject to dismissal. Lue v. Eady, 297 Ga. 321, 773 S.E.2d 679 (2015).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 1 Am. Jur. 2d, Abatement, Survival, and Revival, § 50 et seq.

19 Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Parties, §§ 196, 243.

C.J.S.

- 35A C.J.S., Federal Civil Procedure, § 192 et seq. 35B C.J.S., Federal Civil Procedure, §§ 788, 819. 67A C.J.S., Parties, § 53 et seq.

ALR.

- Right of beneficiary to bring action under death statute where executor or administrator, who by the statute is a proper party to bring it, fails to do so, 101 A.L.R. 840.

Substitution, or addition, as plaintiff, after limitation period, of assignee, or trustee in bankruptcy, in action commenced by assignor, or bankrupt, within limitation period, but after assignment or bankruptcy, 105 A.L.R. 610.

Death of principal defendant as abating or dissolving garnishment or attachment, 131 A.L.R. 1146.

Construction and application of statutory provision that, in case of transfer of subject matter of action pendente lite, the action may proceed in name of original party, or that the transferee may be substituted, 149 A.L.R. 829.

Effect of death of party to divorce or annulment suit before final decree, 158 A.L.R. 1205.

Right of substitution of successive personal representatives as party plaintiff, 164 A.L.R. 702.

Order granting or denying revival of action after death of party as final order subject to appeal, 167 A.L.R. 261.

Parties to action for specific performance of contract for conveyance of realty after death of party to the contract, 43 A.L.R.2d 938.

Abatement or survival of action for attorney's malpractice or negligence upon death of either party, 65 A.L.R.2d 1211.

Continuance of civil case because of illness or death of party, 68 A.L.R.2d 470.

Construction of Federal Rule 25(a)(1) as permitting substitution, as a party, of personal representative of a nonresident decedent, 79 A.L.R.2d 532.

Validity of exception for specific kind of tort action in survival statute, 77 A.L.R.3d 1349.

Sufficiency of suggestion of death of party, filed under Rule 25(a)(1) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, governing substitutions of party after death, 105 A.L.R. Fed. 816.