Designation of joined parties.

- O.C.G.A. § 9-11-19 contemplates that the party joined should be designated as a plaintiff or a defendant. Spivey v. Rogers, 173 Ga. App. 233, 326 S.E.2d 227 (1984).

Failure to name the proper parties is an amendable defect, correctable by the parties or upon the court's own motion. Hanson v. Wilson, 257 Ga. 5, 354 S.E.2d 126 (1987).

Failure to join indispensable parties.

- Should it appear that indispensable parties were not joined, the remedy would not be dismissal but corrective action as provided by O.C.G.A. § 9-11-19. Applied Ecological Sys. v. Weskem, Inc., 212 Ga. App. 65, 441 S.E.2d 279 (1994).

Failure to join necessary parties.

- Although a great aunt and great step-uncle claimed that the trial court failed to join necessary parties in a custody case, the record failed to reveal that this issue was properly presented to the trial court; therefore, this defense was waived. Wiepert v. Stover, 298 Ga. App. 683, 680 S.E.2d 707 (2009), overruled on other grounds, Artson, LLC v. Hudson, 322 Ga. App. 859, 747 S.E.2d 68 (2013) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-28).

Failure to consider factors of O.C.G.A.

§ 9-11-19(b). - Trial court erred in dismissing a customer's action against an organization on the ground that the customer failed to join a corporation as a party because the order did not show that the trial court considered the factors listed in O.C.G.A. § 9-11-19(b), and the corporation was doing business in the state sufficient to confer jurisdiction under O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(1). Wright v. Safari Club Int'l, 307 Ga. App. 136, 706 S.E.2d 84 (2010).

Merger of legal identities.

- Since there was a merger of the legal identity of the parties into one legal entity, a defense under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-19 was not available because there was no longer a bank to be an indispensable party or a real party in interest. NationsBank v. Tucker, 231 Ga. App. 622, 500 S.E.2d 378 (1998).

Right to elect defendant.

- When complainant has right of election as to which defendants the complainant will proceed against, this section has no application. Smith v. Foster, 230 Ga. 207, 196 S.E.2d 431 (1973).

This section, which allows joinder of parties needed for just adjudication, has no application when there is a right of election as to which defendants a plaintiff will proceed against. Adcock v. First Nat'l Bank, 144 Ga. App. 394, 241 S.E.2d 289 (1977).

O.C.G.A. § 9-11-19 has no application when liability is joint and several and the plaintiff has a right of election as to which defendants a plaintiff will proceed against. Sloan v. Southern Floridabanc Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 197 Ga. App. 601, 398 S.E.2d 720 (1990).

Defendant was not estopped from asserting the improper party defense on grounds that the defendant did not comply with O.C.G.A. §§ 9-11-9 and9-11-19, since those sections, which govern the issue of legal capacity and joinder of parties, have no bearing on this matter. Benschoter v. Shapiro, 204 Ga. App. 56, 418 S.E.2d 381, cert. denied, 204 Ga. App. 921, 418 S.E.2d 381 (1992).

Defense similarity to real-party-in-interest objection.

- Real-party-in-interest objection under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-17 is similar to the defense of failure to join an indispensable party under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-19. North Am. Life & Cas. Co. v. Riedl, 209 Ga. App. 883, 434 S.E.2d 820 (1993), rev'd on other grounds, 264 Ga. 395, 444 S.E.2d 736 (1994).

Section inapplicable to one not subject to court's jurisdiction.

- In action at law for recovery of commissions due under contract, subsection (b) of this section had no application to an individual of another county, who was not subject to te jurisdiction of the court. Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Emerson, 121 Ga. App. 427, 174 S.E.2d 211 (1970).

No provision to require person to maintain action.

- While subsection (a) of this section permits a plaintiff, under proper circumstances, to require another person or persons to join with the plaintiff, the subsection makes no provision for a plaintiff to require another person to maintain an action vested solely in such other person, even though its maintenance might result in benefit to the plaintiff. Lawrence v. Whittle, 146 Ga. App. 686, 247 S.E.2d 212 (1978).

No obligation to assert claim.

- O.C.G.A. § 9-11-19 does not require a party who is joined as an indispensable party to assert a claim and submit that claim to the trial court for ruling on the merits. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Millikan, 231 Ga. App. 327, 498 S.E.2d 171 (1998).

Addition of party on motion or by court.

- When there has been a nonjoinder of a necessary party, such party may be added on motion of any party or by the court on the court's own initiative. Guhl v. Tuggle, 242 Ga. 412, 249 S.E.2d 219 (1978).

Joinder of uninsured motorist insurer.

- Even though an uninsured motorist insurer could not bring a subrogation action in the insurer's own name, the insurer should have been permitted to join the action pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-17, or be joined or substituted in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 9-11-19. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Cox, 233 Ga. App. 296, 502 S.E.2d 778 (1998), aff'd, 271 Ga. 77, 515 S.E.2d 832 (1999).

When parties may be changed.

- Parties may be dropped or added by order of court, on motion of any party, or of the court's own initiative, at any stage of the action, including appeal, and on such terms as are just. Guhl v. Tuggle, 242 Ga. 412, 249 S.E.2d 219 (1978); Zappa v. Automotive Precision Mach., Inc., 205 Ga. App. 584, 423 S.E.2d 286 (1992).

Joinder by appellate court.

- Joinder of an indispensable party or real party in interest is so vital that an appellate court, sua sponte if necessary, may consider it, even though the point was not raised in the trial court; and if the indispensable party can be joined, the court should ordinarily permit joinder and not dismiss the action. S.D.H. Co. v. Stewart, 135 Ga. App. 505, 218 S.E.2d 268 (1975).

Failure to name party as cause for dismissal.

- While failure to name a party might be the basis for corrective action as prescribed in this section, it is not cause for dismissal of the complaint under the grounds of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Empire Banking Co. v. Martin, 133 Ga. App. 115, 210 S.E.2d 237 (1974).

Ordinarily, it is error to dismiss a complaint for failure to join an indispensable party; such party should be joined so the case can be considered on its merits. Dismuke v. Stynchcombe, 237 Ga. 420, 228 S.E.2d 817 (1976).

Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) was an indispensable party in the landowner's action for equitable partition since the determination of where the lots begin was a matter of great interest to TVA and any judgment rendered in the absence of TVA would have been inadequate and could have been prejudicial to TVA; thus, the fact that TVA was a wholly-owned corporate agency and instrumentality of the United States over which the federal district court had jurisdiction in civil actions precluded TVA from being joined and dismissal was proper. Dixon v. Cole, 277 Ga. 353, 589 S.E.2d 94 (2003).

Reasonable time to be allowed for joinder or substitution.

- Before trial court can dismiss, based on motion, for failure to join an indispensable party, reasonable time must be allowed after motion is heard and before dismissal for joinder or substitution. Henry v. Moister, 155 Ga. App. 462, 271 S.E.2d 40 (1980).

Summary judgment in same order as adjudication of indispensability improper.

- It is not proper for the trial court to grant summary judgment against a plaintiff for failure to join an individual as an indispensable party in the same order in which the court adjudicates that individual to be indispensable. Frady v. Irvin, 245 Ga. 307, 264 S.E.2d 866 (1980).

Motion to dismiss must be raised.

- When not specifically raised, failure to name an indispensable party will not subject a claim to a motion to dismiss. Empire Banking Co. v. Martin, 133 Ga. App. 115, 210 S.E.2d 237 (1974).

Treatment of question of indispensable party on review.

- When question of an indispensable party is expressly passed upon by the trial court, it will be held on review that the plaintiff had the necessary opportunity to seek the addition of such party, but in the absence of any disclosure by the record of an intent to raise or pass upon such question in the trial court, such defect will be deemed an amendable defect. Smith v. Merchants & Farmers Bank, 226 Ga. 715, 177 S.E.2d 249 (1970); King v. King, 228 Ga. 818, 188 S.E.2d 502 (1972); Gray v. Hall, 233 Ga. 244, 210 S.E.2d 766 (1974); Eder v. American Express Co., 138 Ga. App. 168, 225 S.E.2d 737 (1976); Guhl v. Tuggle, 242 Ga. 412, 249 S.E.2d 219 (1978).

Different statutes of limitation.

- Joinder of causes of action having different statutes of limitation is not authorized. Stapleton v. Palmore, 162 Ga. App. 525, 291 S.E.2d 445, aff'd, 250 Ga. 259, 297 S.E.2d 270 (1982).

Joinder of separate personal injury and loss of consortium claims was properly granted by the trial court. Miller v. Crumbley, 249 Ga. App. 403, 548 S.E.2d 657 (2001).

Consolidation of wrongful death and survivors' actions.

- Rule stated in Stapleton v. Palmore, 250 Ga. 259, 297 S.E.2d 270 (1982), requiring consolidation of wrongful death and survivors' actions arising out of the same accident, is limited to mandate joinder, on the defendant's motion, of all claims which derive from personal injuries sustained by a single individual. Stenger v. Grimes, 260 Ga. 838, 400 S.E.2d 318 (1991);.

Joined party may contest venue.

- If a motion to join is granted and a defendant-in-counterclaim is thereafter served, then the actually "joined [rather than potentially joinable] party" may contest venue by filing a motion to dismiss, which is to be treated by the trial court as a motion to transfer pursuant to Uniform Superior Court Rule 19. If venue is shown to be proper elsewhere, it would then be incumbent upon the trial court to enter an appropriate order. Such an appropriate order might sever the counterclaim for separate trial pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-42(b) and transfer only the severed counterclaim, while retaining jurisdiction and venue over the main action. McCabe v. Lundell, 199 Ga. App. 639, 405 S.E.2d 693 (1991).

Owners not indispensable parties in rezoning case.

- Owners of property that was being rezoned were not indispensable parties under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-19. The owners were selling the property to the rezoning applicants, who were parties; thus, the case could be decided on the merits without prejudicing the rights of the owners. Stendahl v. Cobb County, 284 Ga. 525, 668 S.E.2d 723 (2008).

Cited in Andrews v. Pollard, 121 Ga. App. 69, 172 S.E.2d 857 (1970); Lowe v. Loftus, 314 F. Supp. 620 (S.D. Ga. 1970); Empire Shoe Co. v. Regal Shoe Shops, 123 Ga. App. 796, 182 S.E.2d 796 (1971); Lewis v. Lanigan, 125 Ga. App 437, 188 S.E.2d 148 (1972); Board of Comm'rs v. Department of Pub. Health, 229 Ga. 173, 190 S.E.2d 39 (1972); McGee v. Haynes, 128 Ga. App. 709, 197 S.E.2d 767 (1973); Harris v. Hill, 129 Ga. App. 403, 199 S.E.2d 847 (1973); Frank B. Wilder & Assoc. v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 132 Ga. App. 373, 208 S.E.2d 145 (1974); Burkhead v. Trustees, Firemen's Pension Fund, 133 Ga. App. 41, 209 S.E.2d 651 (1974); Adamson v. James, 233 Ga. 130, 210 S.E.2d 686 (1974); McMichael v. Georgia Power Co., 133 Ga. App. 593, 211 S.E.2d 632 (1974); Coop Mtg. Invs. Assocs. v. Pendley, 134 Ga. App. 236, 214 S.E.2d 572 (1975); Jernigan v. Collier, 234 Ga. 837, 218 S.E.2d 556 (1975); Pendley v. Hunter, 138 Ga. App. 864, 227 S.E.2d 857 (1976); Thomas v. Jackson, 238 Ga. 90, 231 S.E.2d 50 (1976); Little v. Home Transp. Co., 142 Ga. App. 30, 234 S.E.2d 833 (1977); Johnson v. First Nat'l Bank, 143 Ga. App. 384, 238 S.E.2d 747 (1977); Department of Human Resources v. Bagley, 240 Ga. 306, 240 S.E.2d 867 (1977); Lambert v. Allen, 146 Ga. App. 617, 247 S.E.2d 200 (1978); Judd v. Valdosta/Lowndes County Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 147 Ga. App. 128, 248 S.E.2d 196 (1978); Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth. v. Wallace, 243 Ga. 491, 254 S.E.2d 822 (1979); First Nat'l Bank v. Centennial Equities Corp., 245 Ga. 121, 263 S.E.2d 155 (1980); Lakeview Estates Homeowners Corp. v. Hilltop Enters. of Ga., Inc., 153 Ga. App. 323, 265 S.E.2d 120 (1980); Kennedy v. Hannans, 246 Ga. 55, 268 S.E.2d 646 (1980); First Bank & Trust Co. v. Insurance Serv. Ass'n, 154 Ga. App. 697, 269 S.E.2d 527 (1980); Fuller v. Moister, 246 Ga. 397, 271 S.E.2d 622 (1980); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hubbell Metals, Inc., 161 Ga. App. 275, 287 S.E.2d 726 (1982); Dorsey Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Gordon, 162 Ga. App. 608, 292 S.E.2d 452 (1982); McNeal v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 249 Ga. 662, 293 S.E.2d 331 (1982); Nixon v. Gwinnett County Bd. of Realtors, Inc., 249 Ga. 862, 295 S.E.2d 78 (1982); Partridge v. Partridge, 167 Ga. App. 716, 307 S.E.2d 524 (1983); First of Ga. Underwriters Co. v. Beck, 170 Ga. App. 68, 316 S.E.2d 519 (1984); Tarver v. Martin, 175 Ga. App. 689, 334 S.E.2d 18 (1985); Coker v. Casey, 178 Ga. App. 682, 344 S.E.2d 662 (1986); Grissett v. Wilson, 181 Ga. App. 727, 353 S.E.2d 621 (1987); Solid Rock Baptist Church, Inc. v. Freight Terms., Inc., 184 Ga. App. 111, 361 S.E.2d 200 (1987); Dodd v. Simpson, 191 Ga. App. 369, 381 S.E.2d 585 (1989); Dunwoody Homeowners Ass'n v. DeKalb County, 887 F.2d 1455 (11th Cir. 1989); Harper v. DOT, 195 Ga. App. 602, 394 S.E.2d 398 (1990); Kubler v. Goerg, 197 Ga. App. 667, 399 S.E.2d 229 (1990); Hoffman Elec. Co. v. Chiyoda Int'l Corp., 203 Ga. App. 731, 417 S.E.2d 371 (1992); Bundrage v. Standard Guar. Ins. Co., 211 Ga. App. 288, 439 S.E.2d 92 (1993); Banca Nazionale Del Lavoro v. SMS Hasenclever, 211 Ga. App. 360, 439 S.E.2d 502 (1993); Aldalassi v. Drummond, 223 Ga. App. 192, 477 S.E.2d 372 (1996); Altama Delta Corp. v. Howell, 225 Ga. App. 78, 483 S.E.2d 127 (1997); Industrial Mechanical, Inc. v. Siemens Energy & Automation, Inc., 230 Ga. App. 1, 495 S.E.2d 103 (1998); Fulton County Tax Comm'r v. GMC, 234 Ga. App. 459, 507 S.E.2d 772 (1998); J.M. Huber Corp. v. Georgia Marble Co., 239 Ga. App. 271, 520 S.E.2d 296 (1999); Mimick Motor Co. v. Moore, 248 Ga. App. 297, 546 S.E.2d 533 (2001); S. Heritage Ins. Co. v. Greene Ins. Agency, 249 Ga. App. 749, 549 S.E.2d 743 (2001); Marwede v. EQR/Lincoln L.P., 284 Ga. App. 404, 643 S.E.2d 766 (2007); U.S. A. Gas, Inc. v. Whitfield County, 298 Ga. App. 851, 681 S.E.2d 658 (2009); Bishop v. Patton, 288 Ga. 600, 706 S.E.2d 634 (2011); Kammerer Real Estate Holdings, LLC v. PLH Sandy Springs, LLC, 319 Ga. App. 393, 740 S.E.2d 635 (2012), overruled on other grounds, 322 Ga. App. 859 (2013); Rivera v. Washington, 298 Ga. 770, 784 S.E.2d 775 (2016).

Defendant's duty to request joinder.

- Action by spouse for loss of consortium will not be dismissed for failure to join with other spouse's prior negligence action arising out of the same occurrence when the defendant did not request joinder in the earlier action. Stapleton v. Palmore, 250 Ga. 259, 297 S.E.2d 270 (1982), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1226, 104 S. Ct. 2679, 81 L. Ed. 2d 874 (1984).

Despite the claim by the owners of a corporation that the trial court erred in refusing to allow the owners to intervene in the case as the true owners of the property in question, because the owners never properly filed or asserted a motion to intervene, no error resulted; moreover, the owners' argument that the trial court erred in refusing to allow the owners to file the owners' motion to intervene also provided no basis for relief. Rice v. Champion Bldgs., Inc., 288 Ga. App. 597, 654 S.E.2d 390 (2007), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 326 (Ga. 2008).

Time for bringing objection.

- Defense of failure to join an indispensable party may be made at any time up to and including a trial on the merits. Rigdon v. Walker Sales & Serv., Inc., 161 Ga. App. 459, 288 S.E.2d 711 (1982).

Reasonable time allowed for joinder.

- Parties are entitled to a reasonable opportunity to join the indispensable party after the trial court made the court's determination that the party was indispensable. Coe v. Greenville Credit & Inv. Co., 164 Ga. App. 521, 298 S.E.2d 36 (1982).

Joinder not required.

- Trial court did not err in denying a motion for joinder in that, to the extent that the addition of the principals of a real estate developer to the movant's counterclaim was sought because the principals were joint tortfeasors with the developer, no joinder was required. Chaney v. Harrison & Lynam, LLC, 308 Ga. App. 808, 708 S.E.2d 672 (2011).

Test as to whether party indispensable.

- There are two essential tests of an indispensable party: (1) Can relief be afforded the plaintiff without the presence of the other party? (2) Can the case be decided on its merits without prejudicing the rights of the other party? Pickett v. Paine, 230 Ga. 786, 199 S.E.2d 223 (1973).

Adequacy of judgment as primary consideration.

- Primary consideration concerning joinder or nonjoinder is whether any judgment that might be rendered will be adequate in the absence of the parties sought to be joined. Peoples Bank v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 230 Ga. 389, 197 S.E.2d 352 (1973).

Interest in controversy.

- Principles applicable to determination of whether party is merely proper or should be joined as a necessary or indispensable party are comparatively simple, and revolve around the question of interest in the controversy. North Carolina Nat'l Bank v. Peoples Bank, 127 Ga. App. 372, 193 S.E.2d 571 (1972), aff'd, 230 Ga. 389, 197 S.E.2d 352 (1973).

Co-executors of a husband's deceased parents were improperly joined in a wife's action for alimony, and the wife's reliance on the concept of complete relief as a basis for joinder was misplaced, because: (1) even if the wife were to be awarded some interest in the estate, whether the wife would have to enforce that right by litigation was entirely speculative; and (2) if further litigation were to prove necessary, the issues and subject matter of litigation attempting to force a distribution from the estate would not be the same as the issues and subject matter in the wife's present action, which involved the entitlement, as a consequence of the marriage, to support from the husband; thus, the absence of the co-executors from the present litigation would not render the relief afforded the wife partial or hollow because the wife would obtain an interest as full and complete as that presently held by the husband. Searcy v. Searcy, 280 Ga. 311, 627 S.E.2d 572 (2006).

If there are no compelling reasons for joinder of third parties, the third parties are not indispensable to the action, and it is not necessary to join the third parties as parties defendant for a just adjudication of the merits of the action between the original parties. Peoples Bank v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 230 Ga. 389, 197 S.E.2d 352 (1973).

Appellate court, upon remand, ordered trial court to address indispensability of party in motion to dismiss.

- Although dismissal of a complaint was reversed on appeal, because the appeals court was unable to determine whether the trial court had considered the remaining ground of the motion to dismiss for failure to join an indispensable party, the trial court was ordered on remand to make the appropriate findings, if any, with regard to that ground. OFC Capital v. Schmidtlein Elec., Inc., 289 Ga. App. 143, 656 S.E.2d 272 (2008).

Finding as to whether a second responsible party was necessary party in tax refund action was required.

- In an assessment action under O.C.G.A. § 48-2-52, the Georgia Court of Appeals erred by concluding that because the Georgia Department of Revenue voluntarily refunded a tax payment made by a majority owner of a restaurant, the Department could not seek payment from a second responsible party as the voluntary payment doctrine applied to contracts, not tax indebtedness; it was necessary to remand the case to see if the second responsible party was a necessary party to the majority owner's refund action. Ga. Dep't of Revenue v. Moore, 294 Ga. 20, 751 S.E.2d 57 (2013).

Dismissal for failure to add indispensable party.

- Trial court erred in dismissing the siblings' action for failure to add an indispensable party pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-19(a) because the court did not engage in the analysis required pursuant to § 9-11-19; nothing in the record established that even with the siblings, who were already in the case, at least one of the three identified in the trial court's order, the spouse of a deceased sibling, a duly appointed representative of the spouse's estate, or all of the spouse's proven heirs at law, was in fact indispensable under § 9-11-19. Wilcher v. Way Acceptance Co., 316 Ga. App. 862, 730 S.E.2d 577 (2012).

Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion by dismissing a suit for failure to join indispensable parties because the trial court could not exercise personal jurisdiction over the limited liability company members not joined, and after considering all five factors set forth in O.C.G.A. § 9-11-19(b), the trial court concluded that the case involved a dispute between all the members of the company and that the company could not be afforded complete relief in the absence of the other members. Artson, LLC v. Hudson, 322 Ga. App. 859, 747 S.E.2d 68 (2013).

Joint tortfeasors are not indispensable or necessary to an action against one of their number because their liability is both joint and several. North Carolina Nat'l Bank v. Peoples Bank, 127 Ga. App. 372, 193 S.E.2d 571 (1972), aff'd, 230 Ga. 389, 197 S.E.2d 352 (1973).

Joint tortfeasors are not indispensable parties in action against one of them because their liability is both joint and several. Freeman v. Low X-Ray Corp., 130 Ga. App. 856, 204 S.E.2d 803 (1974).

It is not required that all joint tortfeasors be joined together in an action against one, their liability being joint and several. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n v. Carter, 144 Ga. App. 48, 240 S.E.2d 569 (1977), rev'd on other grounds, 241 Ga. 220, 244 S.E.2d 860 (1978).

When the plaintiff sued a billboard company for fraud the plaintiff's motion to join the company's president under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-19(a)(1)(A) was properly denied. If, as the plaintiff alleged, the president acted fraudulently, the president could, at most, be held liable as a joint tortfeasor with the company and thus was not an indispensible party. Merritt v. Marlin Outdoor Adver., LTD., 298 Ga. App. 87, 679 S.E.2d 97 (2009).

Persons who may be joined because of an interest in question of law or fact are proper parties, but they are not necessary or indispensable. North Carolina Nat'l Bank v. Peoples Bank, 127 Ga. App 372, 193 S.E.2d 571 (1972), aff'd, 230 Ga. 389, 197 S.E.2d 352 (1973).

Parties defendant in zoning contest.

- Suit in equity is maintainable against governing zoning authority to contest the validity of a rezoning resolution, with the governing authority as the defendant against which substantial relief is prayed, and the successful rezoning applicant as a party defendant. Riverhill Community Ass'n v. Cobb County Bd. of Comm'rs, 236 Ga. 856, 226 S.E.2d 54 (1976).

Successful rezoning applicant in a zoning contest is a proper, even indispensable, party, and should be joined to obtain complete relief in equity. Riverhill Community Ass'n v. Cobb County Bd. of Comm'rs, 236 Ga. 856, 226 S.E.2d 54 (1976).

Fact that suit for declaratory judgment might be maintained against zoning authority without making rezoning applicant a party does not overcome due process requirement that successful rezoning applicant be afforded notice and opportunity to be heard in a suit contesting the rezoning. Riverhill Community Ass'n v. Cobb County Bd. of Comm'rs, 236 Ga. 856, 226 S.E.2d 54 (1976).

Action to enforce zoning provision.

- County was not indispensable party to landowner's action against neighboring landowner seeking removal of two manufactured homes from commercially zoned land, plus damages; moreover, even if the county were indispensable, a court is to allow reasonable time for joinder before dismissing for nonjoinder, so the court properly denied the defendant's motion for dismissal based on failure to join the county as an indispensable party. Hall v. Trubey, 269 Ga. 197, 498 S.E.2d 258 (1998).

Assignee of interest in note.

- When the holder of a note assigned the holder's entire interest therein to a third person to secure a lesser indebtedness, the assignee held full legal title to the chose in action and was the proper party to bring suit on the note; thus, the assignee's executor was an indispensable party in a suit on note brought by the assignor's trustee in bankruptcy. Henry v. Moister, 155 Ga. App. 462, 271 S.E.2d 40 (1980).

In action for breach of warranty of title brought by last grantee in chain of title against a remote grantor, it is improper to require joinder of intermediate warrantors as parties defendant or as involuntary plaintiffs. Smith v. Smith, 129 Ga. App. 618, 200 S.E.2d 504 (1973).

In a dispute between adjoining landowners over title to approximately six acres of land, the trial court properly denied the adjoining neighbors' motion to implead additional third parties, and motion to add those parties as indispensable third parties under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-19(a), because those individuals had no legal interest in the disputed property at the time the neighbors sought to add them. Pirkle v. Turner, 281 Ga. 846, 642 S.E.2d 849 (2007).

In an action by a tenant against a sublessee, the tenant's landlord should have been joined as a party with an interest relating to the subject of the action. RJV Corp. v. SuperValu, Inc., 223 Ga. App. 585, 478 S.E.2d 592 (1996).

Reformation of deed.

- For purposes of this section, an action to reform a deed is a very different thing from a breach of warranty action, and in such action all who are interested adversely in the reformation should be joined as parties. Smith v. Smith, 29 Ga. App. 618, 200 S.E.2d 504 (1973).

Appellate court reversed the portion of the trial court's order ruling on a bank's motion for a declaratory judgment on the bank's reformation counterclaim because another non-party held an interest in the real property in question via an unrecorded quit claim deed and that individual needed to be added as a party. Salas v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 334 Ga. App. 274, 779 S.E.2d 48 (2015).

Home-buyer was not an indispensable party in an action by the home builder seeking to enjoin a home inspector from trespassing on the builder's properties. Pope v. Pulte Home Corp., 246 Ga. App. 120, 539 S.E.2d 842 (2000).

Holder of interest in property not indispensable.

- In a declaratory judgment action by a city against the owner of an undivided interest in property, and the sole occupant thereof, seeking access to the property in order to conduct a pre-condemnation survey and appraisal, a party holding an interest in the property at issue was not an indispensable party defendant. Aponte v. City of Columbus, 246 Ga. App. 646, 540 S.E.2d 617 (2000).

In action by grantee of junior security deed for surplus funds held by the defendant after exercise of the power of sale under a superior security deed, it was not reversible error for the court to deny the plaintiff judgment on the pleadings, sustain the defense that the grantor was a necessary party, and require the plaintiff to make the grantor a party to the action. Leon Inv. Co. v. Independent Life & Accident Ins. Co., 123 Ga. App. 668, 182 S.E.2d 151 (1971).

Relief from foreclosure.

- To the extent a property owner sought relief from foreclosure, the property owner was obligated to bring such claims against the security deed holder rather than the law firm that handled the foreclosure, and thus the holder was an indispensable party in any dispute concerning sums awarded during the foreclosure. McCalla, Raymer, Padrick, Cobb, Nichols & Clark v. C.I.T. Fin. Servs., Inc., 235 Ga. App. 95, 508 S.E.2d 471 (1998).

Holders of a purported security deed on property that was the subject of an action for equitable partition of real property were appropriate parties to the lawsuit. Blanton v. Duru, 247 Ga. App. 175, 543 S.E.2d 448 (2000).

Executor indispensable in suit against estate.

- Executor of an estate is an indispensable party in a suit against the estate. Estate of Thurman v. Dodaro, 169 Ga. App. 531, 313 S.E.2d 722 (1984).

Distribution of estate.

- Heirs at law, while the heirs might be proper parties, were not necessary or indispensable parties to an action on the distribution of a decedent's estate since there was an administrator selected under former Code 1933, § 113-1202 (see now O.C.G.A. § 53-6-24) and since there were no compelling reasons to join them as parties defendant. Davenport v. Idlett, 234 Ga. 864, 218 S.E.2d 577 (1975).

When heirs who possessed two unprobated wills sued in a dispute over land, the court had authority to determine that an executor was a party necessary for a just adjudication of the case. Morrison v. Stewart, 243 Ga. 456, 254 S.E.2d 840 (1979).

Tax commissioner is indispensable party to action challenging tax statute when, in the commissioner's absence, the remaining defendants would be subject to a substantial risk of incurring inconsistent obligations because of the commissioner's authority to enforce the challenged statute. State v. Golia, 235 Ga. 791, 222 S.E.2d 27 (1976).

Party not indispensable.

- Trial court did not err in adjudicating the validity of a memorandum of agreement on the ground that a county board of tax assessors was an indispensable party to the litigation under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-19(a) because the board did not seek an interest in the action and was not so situated that the disposition of the proceeding, in its absence, could impair or impede the board's ability to protect its interest or leave any of the other parties subject to substantial risk of incurring multiple or inconsistent obligations. Sherman v. Dev. Auth., 317 Ga. App. 345, 730 S.E.2d 113 (2012).

County indispensable party in case claiming improper abandonment of public road because only county had standing to challenge claim.

- Because a landowner dismissed all the claims alleged against a county, a claim that the county improperly abandoned a public road due to the county's failure to comply with O.C.G.A. § 32-7-4 had also been relinquished. Moreover, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-19, the trial court properly recognized that this issue could not be justly adjudicated without the county's participation as a party because only the county had standing to challenge the landowner's claim that the road was a public road. McRae v. SSI Dev., LLC, 283 Ga. 92, 656 S.E.2d 138 (2008).

Agent of defendant insurance company was an indispensable party since the agent was the agent with whom the plaintiff dealt and was the initiating agent on all policies issued to the plaintiff. Southern Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co. v. Douglas, 193 Ga. App. 476, 388 S.E.2d 67 (1989).

In a shareholder derivative action, the trial court erred in dismissing the stockholder's complaint for failing to join the corporation as an indispensable party without allowing a reasonable time for joinder. Kilburn v. Young, 244 Ga. App. 743, 536 S.E.2d 769 (2000).

Shareholder's interests adequately protected by existing parties.

- In a suit by an assignee of a judgment seeking to set aside a fraudulent transfer by the judgment debtor to a corporation, the joinder of the debtors' brothers, who claimed an ownership interest in the corporation, was not necessary for a just adjudication of the merits because the brothers' interests were adequately protected by the other defendants. EMM Credit, LLC v. Remington, 343 Ga. App. 710, 808 S.E.2d 96 (2017).

Dependent child custody proceeding.

- Couple were proper defendants in an action filed by the maternal grandmother seeking custody of the children, irrespective that the couple were not family, because in addition to any temporary guardianship awarded by the juvenile court, it was clear from the record that the couple had physical custody of the children at the time of the hearing on the couple's motion to dismiss the custody petition. Drawdy v. Sasser, 335 Ga. App. 650, 782 S.E.2d 706 (2016).

Corporations and stockholders.

- When the defendant alleged she and former husband had formed a business in which they were to be partners, a significant portion of the business capital came from her separate property and that former husband and stockholder fraudulently caused all stock to be issued in their names, the defendant was entitled to have the stockholder and corporation added as parties in order that complete relief might be afforded and the trial court's failure to add these parties was error. DeGarmo v. DeGarmo, 269 Ga. 480, 499 S.E.2d 317 (1998).

In an action for divorce pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 19-5-1, the trial court properly granted the wife's motion pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 9-11-13(h) and9-11-19(a)(1) to join two corporations as defendants by counterclaim because, by the husband's own design, any property that could be determined to be marital property was inextricably commingled with the property of the corporations and, thus, joinder of the corporations was proper to ensure a just division of marital assets. Gardner v. Gardner, 276 Ga. 189, 576 S.E.2d 857 (2003).

Grantor and first taker of stock not indispensable parties.

- In a fraudulent conveyance action against the grantee of stock brought by a divorced wife who was awarded the stock in the divorce proceeding, the grantor, husband, and first taker, a corporation, were not indispensable parties since neither was necessary for a just adjudication of the merits of the action, and neither was required for complete relief. Halta v. Bailey, 219 Ga. App. 178, 464 S.E.2d 614 (1995).

Failure to join indispensable party is defense which may be raised by motion. Guhl v. Tuggle, 242 Ga. 412, 249 S.E.2d 219 (1978).

Joint obligors.

- Joint obligor is an indispensable party to a suit based on breach of contract, and when joint obligors to a contract are not joined, the case must be dismissed. Turner Outdoor Adv., Ltd. v. Old S. Corp., 185 Ga. App. 582, 365 S.E.2d 149 (1988).

If for lack of jurisdiction, or any other reason, the joint obligor cannot be joined as a party to the action, then the trial court must determine, by considering the factors set forth in subsection (b) of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-19, if the necessary party is also an indispensable party without whom the action should not proceed. Turner Outdoor Adv., Ltd. v. Old S. Corp., 185 Ga. App. 582, 365 S.E.2d 149 (1988).

Cosureties who had set forth in different instruments their separate promises to pay the debt of their principal were not joint contractors or obligors, and one cosurety was not a necessary party in a creditor's action against the other cosurety to recover a debt. Floyd Davis Sales, Inc. v. Central Mtg. Corp., 197 Ga. App. 532, 398 S.E.2d 820 (1990).

Attorney could not be held solely liable to a court reporting service for $851.10, representing court reporting fees owed as the clients the attorney was representing at the time the services were rendered should have been joined in the litigation, pursuant to both O.C.G.A. §§ 9-11-14(a) and9-11-19(a), given that: (1) the clients could have been liable to the attorney for all or part of the court reporting fees; and (2) the attorney's claim that the clients made partial payment for the court reporting services also rendered the clients necessary parties for adjudication of this dispute. Free v. Lankford & Assocs., Inc., 284 Ga. App. 328, 643 S.E.2d 771 (2007), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 560 (Ga. 2007).

In action to enjoin expenditure of public funds, the entity or official appropriating the funds is an indispensable party. Peacock v. Georgia Mun. Ass'n, 247 Ga. 740, 279 S.E.2d 434 (1981).

Mother indispensable in action for wrongful death of child.

- In a wrongful death action brought by a father for the death of his child, the mother was an indispensable party so that issues concerning her negligent supervision of the child could be litigated. Winding River Village Condominium Ass'n v. Barnett, 218 Ga. App. 35, 459 S.E.2d 569 (1995).

Insured parent was not an indispensable party in a declaratory judgment action by an insurer against the parent and other insureds to determine a coverage question since relief could be afforded to the current parties, dismissal would leave the insurer with uncertainty regarding its obligations to other insureds, and the parent could have avoided prejudice from nonjoinder by allowing service to be perfected. Glover v. Allstate Ins. Co., 229 Ga. App. 235, 493 S.E.2d 612 (1997).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 42 Am. Jur. 2d, Injunctions, § 225. 59 Am. Jur. 2d, Parties, § 108 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 35A C.J.S., Federal Civil Procedure, §§ 129 et seq, 212, 213. 67A C.J.S, Parties, §§ 28 et seq., 46 et seq.

ALR.

- Joinder, in one action at law, of persons not jointly liable, one or the other of whom is liable to the plaintiff, 41 A.L.R. 1223.

Joinder of grantees or transferees in different conveyances or transfers in suit to avoid them as in fraud of creditors, 69 A.L.R. 229.

Right of one to notice and hearing motion to add him as a party, or substitute him for an original party, to pending action or proceeding, 69 A.L.R. 1247.

Conflict of laws as to joinder of defendants, or as to the character of liability as joint or several, or joint and several, 77 A.L.R. 1108.

Right of one brought into action as a party by original defendant upon the ground that he is or may be liable to the latter in respect of the matter in suit, to raise or contest issues with plaintiff, 78 A.L.R. 327.

Right of defendant in action for personal injury or death to bring in a joint tort-feasor not made a party by plaintiff, 78 A.L.R. 580; 132 A.L.R. 1424.

May acts of independent tort-feasors, each of which alone causes or tends to produce some damage, be combined to create a joint liability, 91 A.L.R. 759.

Right under or in view of statute to join in tort action at law parties who are severally but not jointly liable to plaintiff, 94 A.L.R. 539.

Right to join master and servant as defendants in action based on wrongful or negligent act of servant, where master's liability rests on doctrine of respondeat superior, 98 A.L.R. 1057; 59 A.L.R.2d 1066.

Principal as necessary or proper party to suit between cosureties or coguarantors for contribution, 99 A.L.R. 640.

Pendency of representative or class suit as ground of abatement of subsequent action by member of class represented, 101 A.L.R. 574.

Concerted action or agreement to resist enforcement of a statute because of doubt as to its constitutionality or construction as ground for joinder of defendants in action or suit by governmental authorities, 107 A.L.R. 670.

Joinder of manufacturer or packer and retailer or other middleman as defendants in action for injury to person or damage to property of purchaser or consumer of defective article, 119 A.L.R. 1356.

Intervention or subsequent joinder of parties as affecting jurisdiction of federal court based upon diversity of citizenship, 134 A.L.R. 335.

Remaindermen as necessary or proper parties to action or proceeding between life tenant and trustee, 136 A.L.R. 696.

Judgment in favor of tort-feasor's insurer in an action by injured person as res judicata in similar action by another person injured in same accident, 137 A.L.R. 1016.

Right of one to recover for personal injury to himself and for death of another killed in the same accident as giving rise to a single cause of action or to separate causes of action, 161 A.L.R. 208.

Mortgagee or lienholder as a proper or necessary party to suit in respect of contract for sale of mortgaged property, 164 A.L.R. 1044.

Joinder or representation of several claimants in action against carrier or utility to recover overcharge, 1 A.L.R.2d 160.

Joinder as defendants, in tort action based on condition of sidewalk or highway of municipal corporation and abutting property owner or occupant, 15 A.L.R.2d 1293.

Appealability of order with respect to or motion for joinder of additional parties, 16 A.L.R.2d 1023.

Joinder of insurer and insured under policy of compulsory indemnity or liability insurance in action by injured third person, 20 A.L.R.2d 1097.

Corporation as necessary or proper party defendant in proceedings to determine validity of election or officer, 21 A.L.R.2d 1048.

Necessary parties defendant to action to set aside conveyance in fraud of creditors, 24 A.L.R.2d 395.

Right of retailer sued by consumer for breach of implied warranty of wholesomeness or fitness of food or drink, to bring in as a party defendant the wholesaler or manufacturer from whom article was procured, 24 A.L.R.2d 913.

One party to intended sale of land as necessary or indispensable defendant in action by the other party to recover deposit from broker or agent, 33 A.L.R.2d 1090.

Right to join principal debtor and guarantor as parties defendant, 53 A.L.R.2d 522.

Spouse of living co-owner of interest in property as necessary or proper party to partition action, 57 A.L.R.2d 1166.

Right to join master and servant as defendants in tort action based on respondeat superior, 59 A.L.R.2d 1066.

Diversity of citizenship, for purposes of federal jurisdiction, in stockholders' derivative action, 68 A.L.R.2d 824.

Waiver of, by failure to promptly raise, objection to splitting cause of action, 40 A.L.R.3d 108.

Propriety of consideration of, and disposition as to, third persons' property claims in divorce litigation, 63 A.L.R.3d 373.

Propriety of state court class action by holders of bonds against indenture trustee, 73 A.L.R.3d 880.

Necessary or proper parties to suit or proceeding to establish private boundary line, 73 A.L.R.3d 948.

Appealability of state court order granting or denying consolidation, severance, or separate trials, 77 A.L.R.3d 1082.

Venue of wrongful death action, 58 A.L.R.5th 535.