Editor's notes.

- Georgia Laws 1972, p. 510, made substantial revisions to certain sections of this chapter dealing with discovery. Prior to the 1972 amendment, this Code section was substantially the same as former Code 1933, § 38-2108. Hence, decisions based on this Code section prior to its 1972 amendment should be consulted with care.

In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1910, § 5886 and former Code 1933, Ch. 21, T. 38 are included in the annotations for this Code section.

Interrogatories serve two purposes: first, to ascertain facts and procure evidence or to secure information as to which it obtains; and, second, to narrow the issues. Thornton v. State Hwy. Dep't, 113 Ga. App. 351, 148 S.E.2d 66 (1966) (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 38-2105 and 38-2108).

Scope of discovery as broad as general discovery provision.

- Scope of discovery under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-33 is as broad as the scope of examination under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-26(b) (general discovery provision). Armstrong v. Strand, 167 Ga. App. 723, 307 S.E.2d 528 (1983).

Scope same as for request to produce.

- Scope of permissible discovery by interrogatories under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-33 is the same as by request to produce under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-34(a). E.H. Siler Realty & Bus. Broker, Inc. v. Sanderlin, 158 Ga. App. 796, 282 S.E.2d 381 (1981).

Interrogatories are addressed to the opposite party, not to counsel, and counsel cannot be ineluctably bound to use all witnesses whose names are given, or precluded from the using of others whose existence may later be discovered. Nathan v. Duncan, 113 Ga. App. 630, 149 S.E.2d 383 (1966) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-2108).

Trial court is authorized to determine that the number of interrogatories, including subparts, is within the number authorized by O.C.G.A. § 9-11-33. Shannon v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, 168 Ga. App. 279, 308 S.E.2d 682 (1983).

Number of interrogatories allowed.

- Without leave of court, a party may not serve a total of more than 50 interrogatories and such limit is a cumulative, not a "per set" limit. Copher v. Mackey, 220 Ga. App. 43, 467 S.E.2d 362 (1996).

Discretion of trial court.

- Trial judge has broad control over the use and limitations of discovery procedures, and unless there is a clear abuse of this discretion, the appellate courts will not interfere. Jackson v. Gordon, 122 Ga. App. 657, 178 S.E.2d 310 (1970).

It is not necessary to cite authority for propounding of interrogatories in the instrument propounding them. Sparks Specialty Co. v. Moss, 110 Ga. App. 585, 139 S.E.2d 345 (1964) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-2108).

Taking of discovery documents into jury room.

- Rule that interrogatories and depositions should not be taken into the jury room does not apply to documents which are introduced as documents and not orally, under the best evidence rule. Dunagan v. Elder, 154 Ga. App. 728, 270 S.E.2d 18 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-2101).

Appellate court will be slow to find error in requiring attendance of a witness instead of permitting the witness's interrogatories to be read. Baker v. Lyman, 53 Ga. 339 (1874).

Taking of interrogatories is limited to service on an adverse party, to be answered by the party served, and cannot be construed as conferring on the plaintiff the absolute right to establish the plaintiff's case by the plaintiff's own written interrogatories. Reynolds v. Reynolds, 217 Ga. 234, 123 S.E.2d 115 (1961), overruled on other grounds, Scherer v. Scherer, 249 Ga. 635, 292 S.E.2d 662 (1982) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-2108).

Interrogatories should be sufficiently specific as to require specific answer. Nathan v. Duncan, 113 Ga. App. 630, 149 S.E.2d 383 (1966) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-2108).

Scope and usage of interrogatories formerly broader.

- Prior to the 1972 amendment to this section, the scope and usage of interrogatories was much broader. Carter v. Tatum, 134 Ga. App. 345, 212 S.E.2d 439 (1975).

Request for "all documentary evidence to be introduced at trial" too broad.

- Interrogatories requesting the listing of all documents relied upon to demonstrate and support facts relevant to the litigation would be within the permissible scope of discovery under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-33, but one requesting "all documentary evidence which will be introduced at trial" would not. E.H. Siler Realty & Bus. Broker, Inc. v. Sanderlin, 158 Ga. App. 796, 282 S.E.2d 381 (1981).

Dismissal or default judgment appropriate following failure to answer or object.

- Failure of a party to file answers or objections to interrogatories within the statutory period may itself constitute justification for such harsh sanctions as dismissal of the offending party's pleadings or entry of default judgment in favor of the party seeking discovery. Ross v. White, 175 Ga. App. 791, 334 S.E.2d 371 (1985).

Trial court did not err in entering a default judgment against sellers pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-37(b)(2) without conducting a hearing on willfulness because the sellers did not file answers to a broker's request for interrogatories and production of documents within the time period prescribed by O.C.G.A. §§ 9-11-33(a)(2) and9-11-34(b)(2), and the sellers only filed a response to the request after the trial court's grant of the broker's initial motion to compel and for sanctions. Cochran v. Kennelly, 306 Ga. App. 838, 703 S.E.2d 411 (2010).

Propounding party not entitled to names of those to be called as witnesses at trial.

- While the party who propounds interrogatories is entitled to the names and addresses of the other party's witnesses who have knowledge of relevant facts, the party is not entitled to the specific names of those persons who will be called as witnesses at the trial of the case. E.H. Siler Realty & Bus. Broker, Inc. v. Sanderlin, 158 Ga. App. 796, 282 S.E.2d 381 (1981).

Sanctions proper.

- In a negligence case, a trial court did not abuse the court's discretion by striking the defendants' joint answer and counterclaim as a sanction for discovery abuse because the evidence established that the defendants intentionally and in bad faith concealed damaging evidence by repairing the tractor trailer and destroying information from the computer units involved in the accident, provided false answers to interrogatories, and the plaintiff was prejudiced by the misconduct. Howard v. Alegria, 321 Ga. App. 178, 739 S.E.2d 95 (2013).

Cited in Hodges v. Youmans, 122 Ga. App. 487, 177 S.E.2d 577 (1970); Hopkins v. Allen, 123 Ga. App. 330, 180 S.E.2d 919 (1971); Johnson v. O'Donnell, 123 Ga. App. 375, 181 S.E.2d 291 (1971); Smith v. Byess, 127 Ga. App. 39, 192 S.E.2d 552 (1972); HFC v. Ensley, 127 Ga. App. 876, 195 S.E.2d 236 (1973); Smith v. Bass, 131 Ga. App. 557, 206 S.E.2d 541 (1974); Swindell v. Swindell, 233 Ga. 854, 213 S.E.2d 697 (1975); Snead v. Pay-Less Rentals, Inc., 134 Ga. App. 325, 214 S.E.2d 412 (1975); Lee v. Morrison, 138 Ga. App. 332, 226 S.E.2d 124 (1976); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Echols, 138 Ga. App. 593, 226 S.E.2d 742 (1976); Shannon Co. v. Heneveld, 138 Ga. App. 756, 227 S.E.2d 412 (1976); Williams v. Trust Co., 140 Ga. App. 49, 230 S.E.2d 45 (1976); Fountain v. Marta, 147 Ga. App. 465, 249 S.E.2d 296 (1978); Record Shack of Atlanta, Inc. v. Daugherty, 147 Ga. App. 753, 250 S.E.2d 154 (1978); Interstate Fire Ins. Co. v. Mayer, 147 Ga. App. 751, 250 S.E.2d 158 (1978); Mayer v. Interstate Fire Ins. Co., 243 Ga. 436, 254 S.E.2d 825 (1979); Wetherington v. Koepenick & Horne, Inc., 153 Ga. App. 302, 265 S.E.2d 107 (1980); Massengale v. Georgia Power Co., 153 Ga. App. 476, 265 S.E.2d 830 (1980); Rucker v. Blakey, 157 Ga. App. 615, 278 S.E.2d 158 (1981); Bullard v. Ewing, 158 Ga. App. 287, 279 S.E.2d 737 (1981); Eunice v. Citicorp Homeowners, Inc., 167 Ga. App. 335, 306 S.E.2d 395 (1983); Danger v. Strother, 171 Ga. App. 607, 320 S.E.2d 613 (1984); Ross v. White, 175 Ga. App. 791, 334 S.E.2d 371 (1985); Albers v. Brown, 177 Ga. App. 620, 340 S.E.2d 260 (1986); Hiney v. Bennaman, 177 Ga. App. 753, 341 S.E.2d 284 (1986); Riches to Rags, Inc. v. McAlexander & Assocs., 249 Ga. App. 649, 549 S.E.2d 474 (2001); McKesson HBOC, Inc. v. Adler, 254 Ga. App. 500, 562 S.E.2d 809 (2002).

Full answer to question asked required.

- In making an answer, the party to whom interrogatories are directed is required to go no further than is required in making a full answer to the questions asked. Nathan v. Duncan, 113 Ga. App. 630, 149 S.E.2d 383 (1966) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-2108).

Party making answer is bound to give truthful answers to the interrogatories, and must see to it that its answers are truthful as of the time of trial as well as of the time of answering the interrogatories. Nathan v. Duncan, 113 Ga. App. 630, 149 S.E.2d 383 (1966) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-2108).

Promptly supplement where necessary.

- Subsequently acquired information that should be given in a supplemental answer should be supplied promptly, as the purpose and spirit of this discovery procedure is to eliminate the element of surprise. Nathan v. Duncan, 113 Ga. App. 630, 149 S.E.2d 383 (1966) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-2108).

Supplementation of list of witnesses to occurrence.

- Interrogatory may seek the names, addresses, occupations, places of employment, etc., of all witnesses to an occurrence, and if the party to whom this interrogatory is directed learns of other witnesses to the occurrence after making an answer, the party should promptly supply that information by way of a supplemental answer, regardless of whether the interrogatories are specifically made continuing. Nathan v. Duncan, 113 Ga. App. 630, 149 S.E.2d 383 (1966) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-2108).

Compelling party to answer interrogatories and produce requested documents did not constitute an unauthorized commingling of discovery procedures since there was a clear delineation as to each discovery procedure and the law applicable to each procedure was cited. Whisenaut v. Gray, 189 Ga. App. 314, 375 S.E.2d 619, cert. denied, 189 Ga. App. 913, 375 S.E.2d 619 (1988).

Interrogatories are not pleadings, and counsel cannot answer the interrogatories. Gregory v. King Plumbing, Inc., 127 Ga. App. 512, 194 S.E.2d 271 (1972).

Personal answer under oath required.

- Plain and unambiguous terms of this section require a party to answer personally a party opponent's interrogatories under oath. Gregory v. King Plumbing, Inc., 127 Ga. App. 512, 194 S.E.2d 271 (1972).

Separately and fully in writing.

- Interrogatories served on a party must be answered by the party separately and fully in writing under oath. Gregory v. King Plumbing, Inc., 127 Ga. App. 512, 194 S.E.2d 271 (1972).

Unsworn writing by counsel does not constitute an answer to an interrogatory. Williamson v. Lunsford, 119 Ga. App. 240, 166 S.E.2d 622 (1969).

Stipulation for admission of answers without signature.

- When defendant's attorney stipulated that answers to interrogatories signed by the attorney but not by the defendant were presented "for the reliance of all concerned," it was not error for the court to construe this as a stipulation that the answers could be used in evidence without the formality of the deponent's signature under oath. Woodson v. Burton, 241 Ga. 130, 243 S.E.2d 885 (1978).

Party may answer or object.

- Party has the choice of answering an interrogatory or making objection in the manner set forth. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Greene, 116 Ga. App. 783, 159 S.E.2d 87 (1967) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-2108).

Each interrogatory must be either answered or objected to, and the reason for the objection must be stated; a blanket statement referring without explanation to all questions indifferently is not a compliance with this requirement. Tennesco, Inc. v. Berger, 144 Ga. App. 45, 240 S.E.2d 586 (1977).

Answers to interrogatories are hearsay and inadmissible at the trial unless the answers fall within some recognized exception to the hearsay rule. Carter v. Tatum, 134 Ga. App. 345, 212 S.E.2d 439 (1975).

Answers to interrogatories are not evidence unless introduced.

- Answers to interrogatories are not considered evidence unless introduced as such at the trial. Fender v. Colonial Stores, Inc., 138 Ga. App. 31, 225 S.E.2d 691 (1976).

When answers to interrogatories admissible.

- Answers to interrogatories are admissible for purposes of impeaching the testimony of the person making them, or as an admission of the person making them (as interrogatories are always answered by a party) or as an admission of another party if the party making the answers is the party's agent or servant. Carter v. Tatum, 134 Ga. App. 345, 212 S.E.2d 439 (1975).

Admission of answers to establish loss impermissible.

- Admission of plaintiff's answers to questions asked by third party defendant, offered in an attempt to establish the loss incurred by the plaintiff and a statement relating to what was told to the plaintiff by another person, when the plaintiff personally was not present at the trial, would violate both the purpose and intent of the Civil Practice Act (see now O.C.G.A. Ch. 11, T. 9). Carter v. Tatum, 134 Ga. App. 345, 212 S.E.2d 439 (1975).

Inconsistent testimony not barred.

- Although the rules of evidence would allow use of answers to interrogatories for impeachment purposes, the rules would not necessarily estop introduction of inconsistent testimony. Benn v. McBride, 140 Ga. App. 698, 231 S.E.2d 438 (1976).

Position taken in an answer to an interrogatory should not be a bar to taking a different position at the trial. Benn v. McBride, 140 Ga. App. 698, 231 S.E.2d 438 (1976).

Fact that answers are in opinion form does not affect admissibility.

- When the defendant did not object to the questions, as provided in O.C.G.A. § 9-11-33, but attempted to answer the questions, the answers are admissible as admissions of a party-opponent. The fact that the questions may be in opinion form does not change this result. Everson v. Franklin Disct. Co., 248 Ga. 811, 285 S.E.2d 530 (1982).

Signature at end of interrogatories sufficient.

- Literal interpretation of paragraph (a)(2) of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-33 mandates that each answer be signed, but the reasonable and logical interpretation suggests and practice demands only that the deponent sign at the end of the interrogatory. Atlanta Cas. Co. v. Flewellen, 164 Ga. App. 885, 300 S.E.2d 166 (1982), rev'd on other grounds, 250 Ga. 709, 300 S.E.2d 673 (1983).

Party may not give an evasive answer to an interrogatory and later, on motion by the adverse party to require a proper answer, raise an objection which the party should have earlier raised to the original interrogatory. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Greene, 116 Ga. App. 783, 159 S.E.2d 87 (1967) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-2108).

No provision for striking of answers.

- Rules on depositions and discovery contain no provision for striking answers to interrogatories prior to tender in evidence at trial. Harden v. Clarke, 123 Ga. App. 142, 179 S.E.2d 667 (1970).

Dismissal of action for plaintiff's failure to answer interrogatories within the requisite time limits was not an abuse of the trial court's discretion. Morton v. Retail Credit Co., 124 Ga. App. 728, 185 S.E.2d 777 (1971), later appeal, 128 Ga. App. 446, 196 S.E.2d 902 (1973).

Use of unverified responses in finding triable issue of fact.

- Appellate court's reliance on the appellant's unverified responses to interrogatories to establish that a triable issue existed in an appeal of a summary judgment motion did not constitute error as a matter of law on the grounds that the invalid responses were inadmissible as evidence. An unverified response to interrogatories is not so evasive and incomplete as to be treated as a complete failure to enter. Therefore, a mere technical failure to comply with an order compelling discovery, or an inadequate discovery response after entry of such an order, does not justify the extreme sanction of default or dismissal of the complaint. Kemp v. Rouse-Atlanta, Inc., 207 Ga. App. 876, 429 S.E.2d 264 (1993).

Response to discovery requests inappropriate.

- Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion by granting the plaintiff's motion to compel because the court properly determined that the production of over 156,000 pages of documents with insufficient organization, coupled with the failure of the defendants to identify which documents were responsive to which of the plaintiff's requests for production of documents, was inconsistent with the defendants' discovery obligations. Hull v. WTI, Inc., 322 Ga. App. 304, 744 S.E.2d 825 (2013).

Factors to be considered on objections to interrogatories.

- In exercising discretion on consideration of objections to interrogatories, the trial court may consider such factors as the relevancy of the questions propounded, whether or not the interrogatories are timely filed, whether prejudice would result, and whether such interrogatories were filed for purposes other than a bona fide effort of discovery. Jackson v. Gordon, 122 Ga. App. 657, 178 S.E.2d 310 (1970).

Mere duplication not grounds for objection.

- Though repetitiousness and redundancy in interrogatories has been deemed objectionable, the fact that some questions are somewhat duplicative, without more, does not subject the questions to objection. Munn v. Munn, 116 Ga. App. 297, 157 S.E.2d 77 (1967) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1201).

Waiver for failure to object.

- When timely objection is not made to interrogatories, right to object is waived. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Greene, 116 Ga. App. 783, 159 S.E.2d 87 (1967) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-2108).

Failure to file timely objections to interrogatories constitutes waiver of the right to object. Drew v. Hagy, 134 Ga. App. 852, 216 S.E.2d 676 (1975).

When a party fails to file any answer or objection to interrogatories within the 30 days permitted for answering, the party waives the right to object to the interrogatories. Ale-8-One of Am., Inc. v. Graphicolor Servs., Inc., 166 Ga. App. 506, 305 S.E.2d 14 (1983).

Recording not required.

- Interrogatories and answers to interrogatories are matters of proof or evidence and as such are not required to be recorded. 1981 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U81-50.

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 23 Am. Jur. 2d, Depositions and Discovery, § 116 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 26B C.J.S., Depositions, §§ 47 et seq., 116 et seq. 27 C.J.S., Discovery, §§ 44, 62, 74 et seq., 86 et seq., 104, 105. 35A C.J.S., Federal Civil Procedure, §§ 573, 574, 611, 678 et seq., 697 et seq., 733, 736.

ALR.

- Statute providing for examination before trial of party to action or anticipated action as applicable to corporation party, 66 A.L.R. 1269.

Attorney as agent within statute providing for discovery examination of party or his agent, 136 A.L.R. 1502.

Statements of parties or witnesses as subject of pretrial or other disclosure, production, or inspection, 73 A.L.R.2d 12.

Time for filing and serving discovery interrogatories, 74 A.L.R.2d 534.

Propriety of discovery interrogatories calling for continuing answers, 88 A.L.R.2d 657.

Propriety of answer to interrogatory merely referring to other documents or sources of information, 96 A.L.R.2d 598.

Production and inspection of premises, persons, or things in proceeding to perpetuate testimony, 98 A.L.R.2d 909.

Party's right to use, as evidence in civil trial, his own testimony given upon interrogatories or depositions taken by opponent, 13 A.L.R.3d 1312.

Discovery, in products liability case, of defendant's knowledge as to injury to or complaints by others than plaintiff, related to product, 20 A.L.R.3d 1430.

Taking deposition or serving interrogatories in civil case as waiver of incompetency of witness, 23 A.L.R.3d 389.

Dismissal of state court action for failure or refusal of plaintiff to answer written interrogatories, 56 A.L.R.3d 1109.

Answers to interrogatories as limiting answering party's proof at state trial, 86 A.L.R.3d 1089.

Admissibility of computerized private business records, 7 A.L.R.4th 8.

Judgment in favor of plaintiff in state court action for defendant's failure to obey request or order to answer interrogatories or other discovery questions, 30 A.L.R.4th 9.

Propriety of state court's grant or denial of application for pre-action production or inspection of documents, persons, or other evidence, 12 A.L.R.5th 577.

Right to perpetuation of testimony under Rule 27 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 A.L.R. Fed. 924.