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2018 Georgia Code 9-11-67 | Car Wreck Lawyer

Link to State of Georgia Official Statute 2018 Georgia Code Annotated (sourced from legal.resource.org)
O.C.G.A. 9-11-67 Case Law from Google Scholar Amendments to OCGA 9-11-67

TITLE 9 CIVIL PRACTICE

Section 11. Civil Practice Act, 9-11-1 through 9-11-133.

ARTICLE 8 PROVISIONAL AND FINAL REMEDIES AND SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

9-11-67. Deposit in court.

In an action in which any part of the relief sought is a judgment for a sum of money or the disposition of any other thing capable of delivery, a party, upon notice to every other party, and by leave of court, may deposit with the court all or any part of such sum or thing to be held by the clerk of the court, subject to withdrawal, in whole or in part, at any time thereafter upon order of the court, upon posting of sufficient security. Where the thing deposited is money, interest thereupon shall abate.

(Ga. L. 1966, p. 609, § 67.)

Cross references.

- Recovery of interest upon damages for breach of contract, § 13-6-13.

U.S. Code.

- For provisions of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 67, and annotations pertaining thereto, see 28 U.S.C.

Law reviews.

- For annual survey of trial practice and procedure, see 56 Mercer L. Rev. 433 (2004).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Prejudgment and postjudgment interest.

- In a contract action, a party was not entitled to prejudgment and postjudgment interest when deposits were made pursuant to the requirements of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-67. Sacha v. Coffee Butler Serv., Inc., 215 Ga. App. 280, 450 S.E.2d 704 (1994).

Trial court's order granting the motion for supercedeas bond was reversed to the extent that the order abated post-judgment interest because abatement of the post-judgment interest was prohibited by the supersedeas, and the trial court erred in so ordering. Northside Bank v. Mountainbrook of Bartow County Homeowners Ass'n, 338 Ga. App. 126, 789 S.E.2d 378 (2016).

Unconditional deposit required to relieve defendant from liability.

- Check deposited in the clerk's office without leave of court, which was made out to the plaintiffs with an endorsement that "the undersign [sic] payees accept the amount of this payment in full satisfaction of all claims against drawer to property located at [the premises in issue]," failed to comply with the requirements of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-67 because it attempted to impose conditions on its acceptance, thereby rendering the money unavailable to the plaintiffs for withdrawal. Thus, the deposit did not relieve the defendant from all liability for postjudgment interest on the sums deposited in the court, and the trial court did not err by entering judgment therefor. Gunnin v. Parker, 198 Ga. App. 864, 403 S.E.2d 822, cert. denied, 198 Ga. App. 897, 403 S.E.2d 822 (1991).

Failure to deposit funds into registry.

- Since the county in a condemnation proceeding did not deposit funds into the registry as required by a consent decree, the requirements of the statute were not complied with; therefore, the trial court did not have authority to abate prejudgment interest by making the court's order retroactive to the date of the consent decree. Threatt v. Forsyth County, 250 Ga. App. 838, 552 S.E.2d 123 (2001).

Violation by attorney deemed contempt.

- When, in a divorce proceeding, the husband's attorney violated O.C.G.A. § 9-11-67 and pertinent court rules, the court properly awarded attorney's fees paid to the wife personally by the husband's attorney either on the basis that the actions of the latter constituted contempt, or as a sua sponte award of attorney's fees. Cohen v. Feldman, 219 Ga. App. 90, 464 S.E.2d 237 (1995), overruled on other grounds by Williams v. Cooper, 280 Ga. 145, 625 S.E.2d 754 (2006).

Cited in Hudson v. Omaha Indem. Co., 183 Ga. App. 847, 360 S.E.2d 406 (1987); Cheeks v. Novatel Carcom, Inc., 200 Ga. App. 664, 409 S.E.2d 229 (1991); Great S. Midway, Inc. v. Hughes, 223 Ga. App. 643, 478 S.E.2d 400 (1996); Threatt v. Forsyth County, 262 Ga. App. 186, 585 S.E.2d 159 (2003); Schoenbaum Ltd. Co., LLC v. Lenox Pines, LLC, 262 Ga. App. 457, 585 S.E.2d 643 (2003); Sanders v. Riley, 296 Ga. 693, 770 S.E.2d 570 (2015).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 23 Am. Jur. 2d, Deposits in Court, § 1 et seq.

8B Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Deposits In Court, § 1 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 26B C.J.S., Deposits in Court, § 1 et seq. 35B C.J.S., Federal Civil Procedure, § 1153.

ALR.

- Who bears loss of funds held by third person, or deposited in court, awaiting outcome of litigation, 2 A.L.R. 463.

Liability of clerk of court or his bond for money paid into his hands by virtue of his office, 59 A.L.R. 60.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 9-11-67

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Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. Woodard, 300 Ga. 848 (Ga. 2017).

Cited 48 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 6, 2017 | 797 S.E.2d 814

Peterson, Justice. This appeal in a personal injury case arising from an automobile accident is before this Court on certified questions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. At issue is the proper interpretation of OCGA § 9-11-67.1, which governs the formation of settlement agreements pursuant to a pre-suit “offer to settle a tort claim for personal injury, bodily injury, or death arising from the use of a motor vehicle and prepared by or with the assistance of an attorney on behalf of a claimant or claimants” (a “Pre-Suit Offer”). OCGA § 9-11-67.1(a). We conclude that OCGA § 9-11-67.1 does not prohibit a claimant from conditioning acceptance of a Pre-Suit Offer upon the performance of some act, including a timely payment....
...The Woodards selected T. Shane Peagler of the Law Offices of Michael Lawson Neff, PC., to represent them in the matter. On June 19, 2014, Peagler sent Conn a letter making a settlement offer, under the heading, “Offer to Settle Tort Claims Made Pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-67.1 and OCGA § 51-12-14.” In his letter, Peagler said that the Woodards offered a limited release of their claims against the Dempseys and Grange in exchange for the $ 100,000 policy limit. The letter contained a list of demands under the boldface heading, “Note: The following items must be noted and fully and strictly complied with in order to accept this offer[.]” Among those demands were the following: • “Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-67.1, you have 30 days from your receipt of this offer to accept it.” • “Your acceptance of this offer must be in writing to me at the above address shown in my letterhead....
...“All three affidavits must be received in my office within ten (10) days after your written acceptance of this offer to settle. Timely compliance with this paragraph is an essential element of acceptance.” • “Ifpayment is not tendered in cash pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-67.1 (f)(1), payment in the amount of $50,000 must be made payable to ‘Boris and Susan Woodard and Michael L....
...Neff, their attorney for the wrongful death of their daughter, Anna Woodard,’ within ten (10) days after your written acceptance of this offer to settle. Timely payment is an essential element of acceptance.” • “Ifpayment is not tendered in cash pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-67.1 (f)(1), payment in the amount of $50,000 must be made payable to ‘Boris Woodard and Michael L....
...equired Grange to remit payment timely as a condition of acceptance, which Grange failed to satisfy. Grange argued that Georgia law rendered void the Woodards’ attempt to require timely payment as a condition of acceptance. Both parties cited OCGA § 9-11-67.1, which provides in relevant part as follows: (a) Prior to the filing of a civil action, any offer to settle a tort claim for personal injury, bodily injury, or death arising from the use of a motor vehicle and prepared by or with the as...
...t issued settlement checks payable to the Woodards in a timely manner. The district court denied Grange’s motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment to the Woodards. Grange appealed to the Eleventh Circuit, which concluded that OCGA § 9-11-67.1 was “arguably ambiguous with respect to its requirements.” Grange Mut....
...On the other hand, the court continued, subsection (c) arguably permits the parties to reach an agreement as they see fit, including “by contracting around” the procedure set forth in subsections (a) and (b). Id. Noting there were no published state or federal court decisions interpreting OCGA § 9-11-67.1, id....
...at 1299, the Eleventh Circuit certified the following questions to this Court: (1) Under Georgia law and the facts of this case, did the parties enter a binding settlement agreement when the insurer Grange accepted the Woodards’ offer in writing? (2) Under Georgia law, does OCGA § 9-11-67.1 permit unilateral contracts whereby offerors may demand acceptance in the form of performance before there is a binding, enforceable settlement contract? (3) Under Georgia law and the facts of this case, did OCGA § 9-11-67.1 permit the Woodards to demand timely payment as a condition of accepting their offer? (4) Under Georgia law and the facts of this case, if there was a binding settlement agreement, did the insurer Grange breach that agreement as to payment, and what is the remedy under Georgia law? Id. at 1300-1301. *8522. Analysis a. Background principles of law The Eleventh Circuit’s certified questions call on us to interpret key provisions of OCGA § 9-11-67.1.1 When we consider the meaning of a statute, we must presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant....
...They are therefore to be construed in connection and in harmony with the existing law[.]” Botts v. Southeastern Pipe-Line Co., 190 Ga. 689, 700-01 (10 SE2d 375) (1940) (citation and punctuation omitted). This principle is critical to our understanding of the statute. In enacting OCGA § 9-11-67....
...Epic Healthcare Mgmt. Co., 901 SW2d 216, 220 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995); see also Friedrich Kessler et al., Contracts: Cases and Materials 370-71 (3ded. 1986) (quoting Sixth Interim Report of the EnglishLaw Revision Committee 23 (1937)).2 *854b. Consideration of OCGA § 9-11-67.1 “The common-law rules are still of force and effect in this State, except where they have been changed by express statutory enactment or by necessary implication.” Humphreys v. State, 287 Ga. 63, 70 (4) (694 SE2d 316) (2010) (citation and punctuation omitted). Considered in this light, we conclude that the plain language of OCGA § 9-11-67.1 does not expressly or by necessary implication contravene these common law principles....
...table protein, while providing that Code section does not apply to serving of meat products that “do not contain such an amount of extenders” as to require additional labeling in accordance with other laws). And here, part of the context of OCGA § 9-11-67.1 is the common law of contracts discussed above....
...solutely meaningless[.]” Scott v. Mayor & Council of Mt. Airy, 186 Ga. 652, 653-54 (2) (198 SE 693) (1938) (citations and punctuation omitted). But our interpretation does not leave the statute without meaning. In understanding the work that OCGA § 9-11-67.1 performs, it is helpful to recall the legal environment in which it was enacted....
...onstitutes an offer to which an insurer must *857respond,5 when an insurer’s inquiry about medical liens amounts to a counteroffer,6 and how much time an offeror must provide for a response in order to trigger an insurer’s duty to respond.7 OCGA § 9-11-67.1 speaks to those issues. In subsection (a), OCGA § 9-11-67.1 sets forth certain terms that, at a minimum, must be included in a Pre-Suit Offer, and, in subsection (b), sets forth how those terms must be accepted. OCGA § 9-11-67.1 provides in subsection (d) that the recipient of a Pre-Suit Offer may seek “reasonable clarification” on the topic of liens and other terms without transforming what would otherwise be an acceptance into a counteroffer. In subsections (a) (1) and (g), OCGA § 9-11-67.1 sets minimum time frames that a Pre-Suit Offer must allow for acceptance and payment, respectively, cabining a claimant’s ability to “set up” an insurer for a bad faith claim with unreasonably short deadlines....
...for an administrative error. Under our reading, the statute effectuates real and meaningful changes to, or at least helpful clarifications of, the existing law.8 *858Grange suggested at oral argument that, as long as the claimant “invokes” OCGA § 9-11-67.1 in making his or her offer, the claimant is not entitled to make a “non-conforming offer,” i.e., one that has terms additional to those set forth in subsection (a).9 We disagree. Nothing in the text of the statute supports a reading that OCGA § 9-11-67.1 applies only to some Pre-Suit Offers....
...And our reading of subsection (a) defeats Grange’s definition of “non-conforming” — merely adding terms does not take the offer beyond subsection (a)’s scope. 3. Response to certified questions For the foregoing reasons, we answer Question (2) in the affirmative. Yes, OCGA § 9-11-67.1 permits “unilateral” contracts whereby Pre-Suit Offers may demand acceptance in the form of performance (in addition to the statutorily mandated written acceptance) before there is a binding enforceable settlement contract. And, with respect to the general issue of law behind Question (3) (although we decline to consider it in the context of the facts of this case), we conclude that OCGA § 9-11-67.1 does not preclude a Pre-Suit Offer from demanding timely payment as a condition of acceptance....
...a national holiday, given that the demand letter was not plaintiff’s counsel’s only effort to settle the matter). The dissent suggests that our reading of the statute is wrong because it undermines the General Assembly’s goal in passing OCGA § 9-11-67.1 —that is, to reduce bad faith claims....
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First Acceptance Ins. Co. of Ga., Inc. v. Hughes, 826 S.E.2d 71 (Ga. 2019).

Cited 23 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 11, 2019 | 305 Ga. 489

...199, 558 S.E.2d 432 (2001), and Alexander Underwriters General Agency v. Lovett , 182 Ga. App. 769, 357 S.E.2d 258 (1987), are disapproved to the extent that they are inconsistent with this opinion. Although not applicable to the bodily injury claim at issue here, which arose in 2008, OCGA § 9-11-67.1, adopted in 2013, provides that "[p]rior to the filing of a civil action, any offer to settle a tort claim for personal injury, bodily injury, or death arising from the use of a motor vehicle and prepared by or with the assistance of an...
...y on behalf of a claimant or claimants shall be in writing," and contain certain material terms. These terms include "[t]he time period within which such offer must be accepted, which shall be not less than 30 days from receipt of the offer[.]" OCGA § 9-11-67.1 (a) (1). This Code Section applies to "causes of action for personal injury, bodily injury, and death arising from the use of a motor vehicle on or after July 1, 2013." OCGA § 9-11-67.1 (h). We also explained in Prior that, "[i]f without consideration a continuing offer is made, although the person making it may state a time within which it may be accepted, there is no binding contract, and he may withdraw the offer before acceptance....
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Mark Turner Props., Inc. v. Evans, 554 S.E.2d 492 (Ga. 2001).

Cited 16 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 5, 2001 | 274 Ga. 547, 2001 Fulton County D. Rep. 3324

...o the trial court of the entire sum eventually fixed by the judgment. See Ingram v. The Methodist Church Dist. Bd. of Missions & Church Extension, 219 Ga. 100, 101(1), 131 S.E.2d 848 (1963); Laroche v. Kinchlo, 150 Ga. 296, 103 S.E. 713 (1920); OCGA § 9-11-67 (contemplating a party's deposit with the trial court of any part of a sum of money expected to be awarded as part of a judgment)....
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Taylor, Exr. v. The Devereux Found., Inc. (& Vice Versa), 885 S.E.2d 671 (Ga. 2023).

Cited 11 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 15, 2023 | 316 Ga. 44

...hat the imposition of post-judgment interest “violates basic principles of equity” because Devereux was not to blame for several of the delays between the jury’s verdicts and the court’s ruling on the attorney fees amount, we note that OCGA § 9-11-67 provides a way for a party to abate the accrual of interest....
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Sanders v. Riley, 296 Ga. 693 (Ga. 2015).

Cited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 16, 2015 | 770 S.E.2d 570

...On October 21, 2011, Stonebridge filed a complaint in interpleader in Macon County Superior Court against Shalanda and Curtis and later deposited the proceeds from Mr. Riley’s Stonebridge life insurance policies into the registry of the court; two months later, AGAC did the same. See OCGA §§ 9-11-67, 23-3-90. On November 14, 2011, Curtis filed a petition for letters of administration over Mr....
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First Acceptance Ins. Co. of Georgia, Inc. v. Hughes, 305 Ga. 489 (Ga. 2019).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 11, 2019

...t must be done within a reasonable time.”) (citations omitted);6 Wilkins v. Butler, 187 Ga. App. 84, 84 (369 SE2d 267) (1988) (same). 5 Although not applicable to the bodily injury claim at issue here, which arose in 2008, OCGA § 9-11-67.1, adopted in 2013, provides that “[p]rior to the filing of a civil action, any offer to settle a tort claim for personal injury, bodily injury, or death arising from the use of a motor vehicle and prepared by or with the assistance of a...
...ehalf of a claimant or claimants shall be in writing,” and contain certain material terms. These terms include “[t]he time period within which such offer must be accepted, which shall be not less than 30 days from receipt of the offer[.]” OCGA § 9-11-67.1 (a) (1). This Code section applies to “causes of action for personal injury, bodily injury, and death arising from the use of a motor vehicle on or after July 1, 2013.” OCGA § 9-11-67.1 (h). 6 We also explained in Prior that, “[i]f without consideration a continuing offer is made, although the person making it may state a time within which it may be accepted, there is no binding contract, and he may withdraw the offer before acceptance....

Sanders v. Riley, Adm'r (Ga. 2015).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 16, 2015

...6 interpleader in Macon County Superior Court against Shalanda and Curtis and later deposited the proceeds from Mr. Riley’s Stonebridge life insurance policies into the registry of the court; two months later, AGAC did the same. See OCGA §§ 9-11-67, 23-3-90. On November 14, 2011, Curtis filed a petition for letters of administration over Mr....
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Hunt v. Richmond Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 292 Ga. 497 (Ga. 2013).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 4, 2013 | 739 S.E.2d 306, 2013 Fulton County D. Rep. 395

...ated under federal law to withhold certain amounts on such an award of wages; the order enjoined Hunt “from taking any action of any description to perfect, or collect, or levy upon, the Civil Court judgment,” and permitted the Board, under OCGA § 9-11-67,2 to deposit funds into the registry of the superior court sufficient to satisfy the Civil Court of Richmond County’s judgment, which the Board did....
...Long, for appellant. Fletcher, Harley & Fletcher, Leonard O. Fletcher, Jr., Tucker, Everitt, Long, Brewton & Lanier, Troy A. Lanier, for appellee. Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur. See Ga. Const, of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. X, Par. I (5). OCGA § 9-11-67 reads: In an action in which any part of the relief sought is a judgment for a sum of money or the disposition of any other thing capable of delivery, a party, upon notice to every other party, and by leave of court, may deposit with the...
...But see Barlow v. State, 279 Ga. 870, 872 (621 SE2d 438) (2005), in which the out-of-term clarifying order did not vary the earlier order granting a new trial. The Board could also have pursued, in the Civil Court of Richmond County, an order under OCGA § 9-11-67, which would abate interest on the sum deposited, see Chouinard v....