O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 9-3-29 (2019)

Breach of restrictive covenant

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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(a) All actions for breach of any covenant restricting lands to certain uses shall be brought within two years after the right of action accrues, excepting violations for failure to pay assessments or fees, which shall be governed by subsection (b) of this Code section. This Code section shall apply to rights of action which may accrue as a result of the violation of a building set-back line. (b) In actions for breach of covenant which accrue as a result of the failure to pay assessments or fees, the action shall be brought within four years after the right of action accrues. (c) For the purpose of this Code section, the right of action shall accrue immediately upon the erection of a permanent fixture which results in a violation of the covenant restricting lands to certain uses or the violation of a set-back line provision. When an alleged violation or complaint is based upon a continuous violation of the covenant resulting from an act or omission, the right of action shall accrue each time such act or omission occurs. This Code section shall not be construed so

as to extend any applicable statute of limitations affecting actions in equity.

History

Ga. L. 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 238, §§ 1, 2; Ga. L. 1991, p. 665, § 1; Ga. L. 1995, p. 727, § 1; Ga. L. 2017, p. 352, § 1/SB 46.

Annotations

Law reviews. For comment, “Injunction Remedy for

Breach of Restrictive Covenants: An Economic Analysis,” see 45 Mercer L. Rev. 543 (1993). For annual survey of real property law, see 68 Mercer L. Rev. 231 (2016).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS This section applies specifically to covenants, and does not include other land restrictions, such as conditions subsequent. Munford, Inc. v. Citizens & S. Nat’l Bank, 151 Ga. App. 112, 258 S.E.2d 766, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 2451 (1979). Section inapplicable to easements. - O.C.G.A. §§ 9-3-29 and 44-5-60 limit the enforceability of restrictive covenants and hence are inapplicable to a cause of action which is based upon the alleged existence of easements. Estate of Seamans v. True, 247 Ga. 721, 279 S.E.2d 447, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 843 (1981). Action on assessments. - Corporation’s failure to file a declaratory judgment action within two years of the filing of a supplementary declaration containing a ceiling on assessments against additional property owners did not waive its right to challenge the ceiling’s validity in a timely action for damages for failure to pay assessments. Martin’s Landing Found., Inc. v. Landing Lake Assocs., 707 F.2d 1329, 1983 U.S. App. LEXIS 26424 (11th Cir. 1983). O.C.G.A. § 9-3-29, rather than the statute of limitations applicable to written contracts, applied to an action by a homeowners association to collect past due condominium assessments. Heard v. Whitehall Forest E. Homeowners Ass’n, 230 Ga. App. 61, 495 S.E.2d 318. Waiver. - There is no waiver when there is no knowledge of the breach of the restrictive covenant by those who have a right to enforce it. Devins v. Leafmore Forest Condominium Ass’n, 200 Ga. App. 158, 407 S.E.2d 76, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 778 (1991), cert. denied, No. S91C1374, 1991 Ga. LEXIS 549 (Ga. Sept. 6, 1991).

Downstream landowners’ claims of negligence, strict liability, trespass and nuisance, based on discharge of wastewaters into a creek related to continuing abatable acts by the defendant and the statute of limitations only precluded the plaintiffs’ recovery for injurious acts which occurred more than four years prior to the plaintiffs’ filing suit. Culbertson v. Coats Am., Inc., 913 F. Supp. 1572, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20668 (N.D. Ga. 1995). Continuing nuisance theory does not apply to a claim for breach of a restrictive covenant. Helmley v. Liberty County, 242 Ga. App. 881, 531 S.E.2d 756, 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS 381 (2000). Accrual of cause of action. - O.C.G.A. § 10-1-401(a)(1) did not bar a home buyer’s claim under the Fair Business Practices Act, O.C.G.A. § 10-1-390 et seq., because the buyer did not suffer any actual damages at the time of the alleged violation and could not have suffered any such damages at least until the homebuilder conveyed the house to the buyer without complying with code requirements or used the contractual language in question to deny liability; therefore, the buyer’s cause of action did not accrue until less than two years prior to the date suit was filed. Tiismann v. Linda Martin Homes Corp., 279 Ga. 137, 610 S.E.2d 68, 2005 Ga. LEXIS 146 (2005). Suit alleging violation of a restrictive covenant was timely under O.C.G.A. § 93-29(a) because the suit accrued when a real estate developer failed to build a fence between abutting properties, as required by the covenant, and the suit was filed within two years of accruing. Lesser

v. Doughtie, 300 Ga. App. 805, 686 S.E.2d 416, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 1271 (2009). Under the express language of O.C.G.A. § 9-3-29, the limitation period begins to run immediately upon a property owner’s first use of the owner’s property in violation of a restrictive covenant; thus, to the extent that Black Island Homeowners Assn. v. Marra, 263 Ga. App. 559 (2003) and Marino v. Clary Lakes Homeowners Assn., 322 Ga. App. 839 (2013) apply the

continuing nuisance theory to determine when the statute of limitation begins to run under § 9-3-29, those cases are overruled. S-D RIRA, LLC v. Outback Prop. Owners’ Ass’n, 330 Ga. App. 442, 765 S.E.2d 498, 2014 Ga. App. LEXIS 846 (2014), cert. denied, No. S15C0643, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 341 (Ga. May 11, 2015), cert. denied, No. S17C0778, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 509 (Ga. June 5, 2017).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. 20 Am. Jur. 2d, Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions, §§ 112 et seq., 264, 265, 276 et seq. 51 Am. Jur. 2d, Limitation of Actions, § 112 et seq. C.J.S. 21 C.J.S., Covenants, §§ 24 et seq., 50. 54 C.J.S., Limitations of Actions, § 82 et seq., 215. ALR. Limitation of actions: when does statute begin to run against action based on removal of lateral or subjacent support, 26 A.L.R. 1235. When does statute of limitations commence to run against action for breach of covenant against encumbrances, 99 A.L.R. 1050. Suit to rescind contract as one based on contract or covenant within statute of limitations, 114 A.L.R. 1525. Continuing character, as regards limitation of actions, of breach of lessee’s duty under oil and gas lease to protect against drainage by surrounding wells, 138 A.L.R. 257. Use of property by college fraternity or sorority as violation of restrictive covenant, 7 A.L.R.2d 436.

Time when statute of limitation starts to run against breach of covenant running with land and requiring affirmative acts by covenantor, 17 A.L.R.2d 1251. Commencement of running of statute of limitations respecting actions by owners of right of re-entry, or actions against third persons by reversioners, 19 A.L.R.2d 729. Covenant restricting use of land, made for purpose of guarding against competition, as running with land, 25 A.L.R.3d 897. Validity and construction of restrictive covenant requiring consent to construction on lot, 40 A.L.R.3d 864. Change of neighborhood as affecting restrictive covenants precluding use of land for multiple dwelling, 53 A.L.R.3d 492. Restrictive covenant limiting land use to “private residence” or “private residential purposes”: interpretation and application, 43 A.L.R.4th 71. Waiver of right to enforce restrictive covenant by failure to object to other violations, 25 A.L.R.5th 123. Laches or delay in bringing suit as affecting right to enforce restrictive building covenant, 25 A.L.R.5th 233.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 16 cases, 1991–2018 · leading case: S-D Rira, LLC v. Outback Prop. Owners' Ass'n, 765 S.E.2d 498 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014).
S-D Rira, LLC v. Outback Prop. Owners' Ass'n, 765 S.E.2d 498 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014). · cites it 46× “See OCGA § 9-3-29 (a). And OCGA § 9-3-29 (c) specifically provides that the right of action accrues “immediately upon the violation of the covenant restricting lands to certain uses.”
Black Island Homeowners Ass'n. v. Marra, 588 S.E.2d 250 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003). · cites it 10× “13 It follows that we must reverse the trial court’s final judgment as to Counts 1 and 3 and remand so that the trial court can address these claims on the merits. The final judgment as to Counts 2 and 4, which the Association did not challenge, is affirmed.”
Miles v. Ashland Chem. Co., 410 S.E.2d 290 (Ga. 1991). · cites it 4× “" Compare, OCGA § 9-3-29 29 in which the General Assembly defined when a cause of action "accrues.”
Marino v. Clary Lakes Homeowners Ass'n, 747 S.E.2d 31 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013). · cites it 4× “Consequently, the Marinos contend that the limitation period expired on October 14, 2005, thereby barring the Association’s enforcement action, which was not filed until April 15, 2011.”
Tiismann v. Linda Martin Homes Corp., 610 S.E.2d 68 (Ga. 2005). · cites it 2× “See OCGA § 9-3-29. “ ‘[T]he true test to determine when the cause of action accrued is to ascertain the time when the plaintiff could first have maintained his action to a successful result.”
Helmley v. Liberty Cnty., 531 S.E.2d 756 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000). · cites it 4× “7 OCGA § 9-3-29 (a). 8 (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 9-3-29 (c).”
Wyndham Lakes Homeowners Ass'n v. Gray, 692 S.E.2d 704 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010). · cites it 4× “We note that OCGA § 9-3-29 (b) provides that “[i]n actions for breach of covenant which accrue as a result of the failure to pay assessments or fees, the action shall be brought within four years after the right of action accrues.”
Culbertson v. Coats Am., Inc., 913 F. Supp. 1572 (N.D. Ga. 1995). · cites it 2× “State Law Claims Coats American argues that plaintiffs’ state law claims of negligence, strict liability, trespass and nuisance are barred by the statute of limitations.”
Devins v. Leafmore Forest Condo. Ass'n of Owners, 407 S.E.2d 76 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991). · cites it 2× “Plaintiff relies upon the statute of limitation set forth in OCGA § 9-3-29 and his past violations of the restrictive covenants in the condominium declaration which prohibit the leasing of less than the entire condominium unit and which limit occupancy of the unit to persons…”
Liberty Cmty. Mgmt., Inc. v. Hall (In Re Hall), 454 B.R. 230 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2011). · cites it 2× “If the assessments are reduced or there are excessive defaults, lawns may go unmown and pools may go uncleaned — all of which can lead to reduced property values for the individual units.”
Marks Et Al. v. Flowers Crossing Cmty. Ass'n, Inc., 773 S.E.2d 814 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015). · cites it 4× “OCGA § 9-3-29 sets out the statute of limitations applicable to actions for breach of a restrictive covenant.”
Lesser v. Doughtie, 686 S.E.2d 416 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009). · cites it 6× “Relying upon OCGA § 9-3-29, the appellees contended that Lesser’s suit involved the breach of a restrictive covenant which necessarily had to be filed within two years “after the right of action accrue[d].”
— 9-3-29(b) — 1 case
Liberty Cmty. Mgmt., Inc. v. Hall (In Re Hall), 454 B.R. 230 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2011). “If the assessments are reduced or there are excessive defaults, lawns may go unmown and pools may go uncleaned — all of which can lead to reduced property values for the individual units.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.