No mention of particular uses.

- Grantor's reserved rights or interest in land were not rendered unenforceable since the deed contained no language stating that the fee owner had to use the land for any particular uses, but rather stated that the fee owner could put the owner's land to any use whatsoever as long as the use did not violate the grantor's rights under the deed. Matera Investors, Inc. v. Sunset Lake Fishing & Hunting Club, 696 F. Supp. 1510 (M.D. Ga. 1988).

The 1993 amendment of subsection (d) of O.C.G.A. § 44-5-60 providing an automatic continuation of covenants could not be applied retrospectively. Appalachee Enters., Inc. v. Walker, 266 Ga. 35, 463 S.E.2d 896 (1995), overruled on other grounds, Bickford v. Yancey Dev. Co., 276 Ga. 814, 585 S.E.2d 78 (2003).

Covenant on the development corporation's property dating from 1977 requiring a minimum lot size of two acres was not renewed by O.C.G.A. § 44-5-60(d)(1), which was enacted in 1993, because § 44-5-60(d)(1) did not apply retroactively; as a result, the covenant expired in 1997. Bickford v. Yancey Dev. Co., 258 Ga. App. 371, 574 S.E.2d 349 (2002), aff'd, 276 Ga. 814, 585 S.E.2d 78 (2003).

The 1993 revision to O.C.G.A. § 44-5-60(d)(1), providing for the automatic 20-year renewal of restrictive covenants affecting subdivisions containing 15 or more plots, applies only to those restrictive covenants that are established under law after July 1, 1993; as for all restrictive covenants established before July 1, 1993, those covenants are governed by O.C.G.A. § 44-5-60(b), and thus are deemed unenforceable after a period of 20 years. Bickford v. Yancey Dev. Co., 276 Ga. 814, 585 S.E.2d 78 (2003).

Application to covenants statute postdates.

- There is no abridgment of constitutional rights when statute is applied to covenants it postdates. House v. James, 232 Ga. 443, 207 S.E.2d 201 (1974) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-5-60).

Cited in Rowan v. Newbern, 32 Ga. App. 363, 123 S.E. 148 (1924); Warlick v. Rome Loan & Fin. Co., 194 Ga. 419, 22 S.E.2d 61 (1942); Delray, Inc. v. Reddick, 194 Ga. 676, 22 S.E.2d 599 (1942); Davies v. Curry, 230 Ga. 190, 196 S.E.2d 382 (1973); Home Mart Bldg. Ctrs., Inc. v. Wallace, 144 Ga. App. 19, 240 S.E.2d 582 (1977); Antill v. Sigman, 240 Ga. 511, 241 S.E.2d 254 (1978); Rolleston v. Sea Island Properties, Inc., 254 Ga. 183, 327 S.E.2d 489 (1985); Moreland v. Henson, 256 Ga. 685, 353 S.E.2d 181 (1987); Benton v. Gaudry, 230 Ga. App. 373, 496 S.E.2d 507 (1998); Arbor Station Homeowners Servs. v. Dorman, 255 Ga. App. 866, 567 S.E.2d 102 (2002); CPI Phipps, LLC v. 100 Park Ave. Partners, L.P., 288 Ga. App. 614, 654 S.E.2d 690 (2007); Atlanta Development Authority v. Clark Atlanta University, Inc., 298 Ga. 575, 784 S.E.2d 353 (2016).

Owner may impose restrictions on portion of land sold for benefit of land retained.

- If the owner of realty sells a portion thereof, imposing on a vendee restrictions relating to the use of the estate conveyed, a restriction is imposed for the benefit of the land retained, and an implied inhibition is created as to the use of the portion of the land conveyed, thus creating a covenant running with the land. O'Neill v. Myers, 148 Ga. App. 749, 252 S.E.2d 638 (1979).

Covenant must relate to and concern interest created to run with land.

- To constitute a covenant running with the land, there must first be an interest or estate therein granted, the covenant must relate to the interest or estate granted, and the act to be done must concern the interest created or title conveyed. If the covenant is of a collateral nature to the land, and is incapable in law of attaching to the interest or estate granted, it is a personal obligation, and will not bind or pass to assignees, even if the assignees are expressly named. Johnson v. Myers, 226 Ga. 23, 172 S.E.2d 421 (1970).

Covenants could be automatically renewed.

- Purchaser of a 10-acre lot in a subdivision was bound by restrictive covenants governing the cutting of trees and dividing of lots in the subdivision because the covenants had never been abolished and provided for their automatic renewal; O.C.G.A. § 44-5-60 did not prohibit renewal and render the covenants unenforceable. Gilbert v. Canterbury Farms, LLC, Ga. App. , 815 S.E.2d 303 (2018).

Covenant binds subsequent owner with or without notice.

- When there is a covenant running with the land, then the covenant binds any subsequent owner thereof with or without notice, for the reason that the subsequent owner takes no greater title than the predecessor had to convey. O'Neill v. Myers, 148 Ga. App. 749, 252 S.E.2d 638 (1979).

On appeal from an order in a declaratory judgment action, the trial court did not err in finding, upon cross-motions for summary judgment, that restrictive covenants which had been made applicable to the subdivision over 20 years earlier remained in effect and prohibited a buyer from re-subdividing certain tracts into residential lots with less than five acres, but did err in ruling that interpretation of the covenants was a legal matter for the court, rather than a factual matter for the jury. Britt v. Albright, 282 Ga. App. 206, 638 S.E.2d 372 (2006), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 199 (Ga. 2007).

Both restrictions in deeds, and restrictions on plat mentioned in deed, binding.

- Plaintiffs were entitled to the benefit of the express building line restrictions in the deeds in the defendant's chain of title, as well as the restrictions indicated by a dotted line on the plat mentioned in the deeds, and the defendants were charged with notice and bound by such restrictions. Jones v. Lanier Dev. Co., 190 Ga. 887, 11 S.E.2d 11 (1940).

Enforcement of general warranty by subsequent grantee.

- When a general warranty given by grantor and the grantor's cotenant to grantee did not expressly prohibit its transmission to subsequent owners, the subsequent grantee could sue the grantor and the grantor's cotenant for the breach of their general warranty. Northside Title & Abstract Co. v. Simmons, 200 Ga. App. 892, 409 S.E.2d 885, cert. denied, 200 Ga. App. 896, 409 S.E.2d 885 (1991).

Expired covenants not subject to automatic renewal.

- Restrictive covenant, established in 1977, expired in 1997, and was no longer enforceable against any property owner in the subdivision; O.C.G.A. § 44-5-60(d)(1), the covenant automatic renewal law, did not apply retroactively to extend the covenant. Bickford v. Yancey Dev. Co., 276 Ga. 814, 585 S.E.2d 78 (2003).

Homeowners not bound by change to association covenants.

- In a HOA's action against homeowners for violation of a garage storage covenant, in which it was determined that the owners were not bound by the covenant under O.C.G.A. § 44-5-60(d)(4) or O.C.G.A. § 44-2-226(a), and the HOA dismissed the HOA's remaining claim, the owners were the prevailing party entitled to attorney fees under the declaration; however, the trial court did not err in denying attorney fees under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(b). Marino v. Clary Lakes Homeowners Ass'n, 331 Ga. App. 204, 770 S.E.2d 289 (2015).

Subsequent purchaser of property benefited by mutual covenant entitled to enforce restriction.

- When property is adjoined by a vacant lot and benefits by a mutual covenant to keep the vacant lot unenclosed and unimproved, subsequent purchasers of the property, who purchase by warranty deed conveying the property "with all appurtenances thereto," have the right to enforce in equity the restriction against enclosing or improving the vacant lot. Godfrey v. Huson, 180 Ga. 483, 179 S.E. 114 (1935).

Subsequent grantee may, under mutual warranty deed, recover taxes paid.

- When A and B make mutual warranty deeds to each other to separate pieces of property after the lien for taxes for the year has become fixed, a subsequent grantee from either may, under the warranty so made, recover the amount of any taxes such purchaser may have been forced to pay. An agreement that each should pay the taxes on their respective tracts is but an agreement to do that which they are already bound to do. McRae v. Sewell, 47 Ga. App. 290, 170 S.E. 315 (1933).

Purchaser's action for breach maintainable against any grantor, if privy in estate.

- Purchaser may maintain an action for breach of warranty against any grantor of the premises who is the purchaser's privy in estate, and the action may be maintained as well when a paramount outstanding title prevents one from obtaining possession, as when an ouster results from the necessity of yielding possession in response to such a paramount title. Quitman Furn. & Hdwe. Co. v. Rountree, 14 Ga. App. 382, 80 S.E. 904 (1914). See also Smith v. Williams, 117 Ga. 782, 45 S.E. 394, 97 Am. St. R. 220 (1903); Croom v. Allen, 145 Ga. 347, 89 S.E. 199 (1916).

An unrestricted express warranty of title being a covenant running with the land, a purchaser may maintain an action thereon against any prior grantor making such a warranty, if one is a privy in estate. McEntyre v. Merritt, 49 Ga. App. 416, 175 S.E. 661 (1934).

Last grantee may sue any or all warrantors.

- In an action for damages on account of a deficiency in acreage brought against a defendant who, on the date the property was conveyed to the plaintiff, had conveyed the property by warranty deed to the person conveying to the plaintiff, the general warranty of title in the deed executed by the defendant was a covenant running with the land, the benefit of which accrued to the plaintiff, even though the legal title had been taken by the defendant merely as an accommodation to the plaintiff's grantor, since the evidence failed to show that there was any agreement or understanding between the plaintiff and the defendant that the plaintiff was to occupy the status of grantor by taking over the contract made between the plaintiff and the defendant. Long v. Sullivan, 52 Ga. App. 318, 183 S.E. 71 (1935).

When there has been a breach of the warranty of title to land, the last grantee has a right of action against, and may sue the grantee's immediate warrantor, the remote or original warrantor, or any intermediate warrantor, or any or all of them in one action. Smith v. Smith, 129 Ga. App. 618, 200 S.E.2d 504 (1973).

Right to recover cannot exist in intermediate warrantor and last warrantee at same time.

- In bringing an action for breach of the warranty of title, the last grantee has the right to select whom the grantee will name as the defendants, in much the same manner as a plaintiff may select which of the joint tortfeasors the plaintiff will sue, but the right to recover for a breach of warranty cannot exist in an intermediate warrantor and the last warrantee at the same time. Smith v. Smith, 129 Ga. App. 618, 200 S.E.2d 504 (1973).

Suit for breach maintainable against vendor's vendor.

- Suit for breach of warranty of title to land may be maintained not only against the plaintiff's vendor, but also against the vendor of the latter. Reese v. Manget, 53 Ga. App. 637, 186 S.E. 880 (1936).

Intermediate covenantor mending breach entitled to recover from prior grantors.

- While the right of action passes out of an intermediate warrantor when the warrantor relinquishes title to the land, and into the assignee, nevertheless, if it should occur that the intermediate covenantor is placed under the legal necessity of paying the lien, or mending the breach, and the intermediate covenantor actually does so, the right to recover for the amount paid out is thereby restored to the intermediate covenantor, and to that extent alone the intermediate covenantor is remitted to the intermediary's rights under the intermediary's own warranties from prior grantors, and the intermediate covenantor in turn may recover from them the amounts so paid. Robertson v. Webster, 79 Ga. App. 30, 52 S.E.2d 511 (1949).

Restrictions based upon extraneous agreement must be established by clear evidence beyond reasonable doubt.

- As a general rule, the owner of land in fee has the right to use the land for any lawful purpose. When neither the owner's deed nor any deed in the owner's chain of title contains any restrictions, but restrictions as to the land's use and alienation are sought to be placed thereon, based upon an extraneous agreement by a predecessor in title and by notice to the owner, the restrictions must be established by evidence that is clear and beyond a reasonable doubt. England v. Atkinson, 196 Ga. 181, 26 S.E.2d 431 (1943).

Parol evidence generally inadmissible to vary effect of unrestricted covenant.

- In the absence of fraud or mistake, parol evidence is generally inadmissible to contradict or vary the effect of an unlimited and unrestricted covenant in a deed generally warranting the title to the conveyed land. Long v. Sullivan, 52 Ga. App. 318, 183 S.E. 71 (1935).

Equity may interpose injunction if clear breach, regardless of damages.

- To warrant relief by an injunction in the case of a covenant restricting erections upon the premises conveyed, it is not essential that the plaintiff should show any actual damage resulting from the breach of covenant of which plaintiff complains, and if a clear breach is shown, equity may interpose its preventive aid regardless of the question of damages, since the covenantee is entitled to the benefit of the covenant. Smith v. Pindar Real Estate Co., 187 Ga. 229, 200 S.E. 131 (1938).

Equity will interfere by injunction to prevent the breach of an express, negative covenant, even though no substantial injury is caused by such a breach, and will also interfere even though the damages, if any, may be recoverable at law. Smith v. Pindar Real Estate Co., 187 Ga. 229, 200 S.E. 131 (1938).

Expiration of covenants.

- Covenants that were adopted in 1975 expired in June 1995 after 20 years pursuant to subsection (b) of O.C.G.A. § 44-5-60, and were not automatically renewed under subsection (d) of § 44-5-60. Canterbury Forest Ass'n v. Collins, 243 Ga. App. 425, 532 S.E.2d 736 (2000).

In an agreement by a private water company to provide water to the homes built in a subdivision, because the agreement constituted a restrictive covenant limiting each lot owner's options for obtaining water necessary for the use and enjoyment of his or her property, the terms of the agreement ceased to be enforceable in 2011 as the agreement expired after 20 years when the homeowners failed to renew the covenant as required by a former provision of this statute. Double Branches Ass'n v. Jones, 331 Ga. App. 159, 770 S.E.2d 252 (2015).

Evidence failed to show implied general restriction.

- On the issue whether there was an implied restriction, limiting the lots of the defendants to residential purposes, and precluding their building of a theater, there was no error in directing the verdict in their favor since the evidence failed to show such an implied general restriction. Jones v. Lanier Dev. Co., 190 Ga. 887, 11 S.E.2d 11 (1940).

For a discussion of covenants which will run with the land, see Goldberg v. Varner, 72 Ga. App. 673, 34 S.E.2d 722 (1945).

Compliance with expired covenants.

- When landowners, unaware that restrictive covenants had expired, relied on an agreement to extend the covenants and took no action to enact new covenants or otherwise protect their property interests, such forbearance, combined with their continued compliance with and enforcement of the covenants, bound defendant and other landowners personally to comply with the covenants. Canterbury Forest Ass'n v. Collins, 243 Ga. App. 425, 532 S.E.2d 736 (2000).

Expiration of 20 year period by operation of law.

- Provisions in an easement agreement constituted restrictive covenants because the provisions barred the owner from using any portion of the owners' approximately two-acre property, except for part on which the owners' current building was located, for anything other than a driveway, thoroughfare, or parking lot; those provisions had therefore expired by operation of law, 20 years after creation. Davista Holdings, LLC v. Capital Plaza, Inc., 321 Ga. App. 131, 741 S.E.2d 266 (2013).

Homeowners association's amendment to declaration of protective covenants imposed new restrictions and thus was inapplicable to property owner.

- Trial court did not err in granting an owner summary judgment on a home owners association's counterclaims seeking an order requiring the owner to evict tenants and to pay fines for violating its declaration of protective covenants because O.C.G.A. § 44-5-60(d)(4) rendered an amendment to the declaration inapplicable to the owner since it imposed a greater restriction on the owner's use of the land to which the owner did not consent; the amendment, which prohibited the leasing of residences, went beyond a mere restriction on occupancy because it prohibited a specific use of the property, residential leasing, to anyone chosen by the owner, which was specifically within the owner's ownership rights when the property was purchased. Charter Club on the River Home Owners Assoc. v. Walker, 301 Ga. App. 898, 689 S.E.2d 344 (2009), cert. denied, No. S10C0808, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 526 (Ga. 2010).

Impairment of contracts.

- Statute is not violative of the federal and Georgia Constitutions for the impairment of contracts. Rowland v. Kellos, 236 Ga. 799, 225 S.E.2d 302 (1976) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-5-60).

Broad zoning powers given to counties and municipalities override the state and federal constitutional provisions against the passage of laws impairing the obligation of contracts. Payne v. Borkat, 244 Ga. 615, 261 S.E.2d 393 (1979).

Application of this statute to restrictive covenants in deeds created before the underlying statute was passed, so as to render those covenants unenforceable 20 years after the statute took effect, does not unconstitutionally impair the parties' right to contract. Payne v. Borkat, 244 Ga. 615, 261 S.E.2d 393 (1979) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-5-60).

Necessity of determining whether particular covenant prohibits building or use.

- It is necessary in a given case to determine whether a particular restrictive covenant merely prohibits the erection of a building other than a residence (building restriction), or whether the covenant also prohibits the use of that structure for a nonresidential purpose (use restriction). Payne v. Borkat, 244 Ga. 615, 261 S.E.2d 393 (1979).

Municipalities required to provide reasonable and adequate substitute for covenants.

- This statute, which provides that restrictive covenants are void after the passage of 20 years in municipalities where zoning ordinances are in effect, requires municipalities to provide a reasonable and adequate substitute for covenants to protect the property interests of residents. City of Smyrna v. Parks, 240 Ga. 699, 242 S.E.2d 73 (1978) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-5-60).

Section not given retrospective operation.

- Statute does not purport to have effect retrospectively, and the settled rule for the construction of statutes is not to give them a retrospective operation, unless the language so imperatively requires. Smith v. Pindar Real Estate Co., 187 Ga. 229, 200 S.E. 131 (1938) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-5-60).

Existing covenant not terminated.

- Statute, properly construed, was not intended to operate retrospectively, and would not have the effect of terminating a covenant that was already in existence as a valid and binding contract between the parties. Dooley v. Savannah Bank & Trust Co., 199 Ga. 353, 34 S.E.2d 522 (1945) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-5-60).

Automatic covenant renewals valid.

- Trial court erred in finding subdivision covenants did not renew because, while the original term of the covenants was restricted by the later passage of local zoning laws and O.C.G.A. § 44-5-60, the automatic renewal provision in subsection (d) did not apply to the covenants; furthermore, the covenant provision for automatic renewal for 15-year terms, unless two-thirds of the property owners agreed to terminate or modify the covenants, was not contrary to law or public policy. Turtle Cove Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Jasper County, 255 Ga. App. 560, 566 S.E.2d 368 (2002).

Section limits period of enforcing covenants to 20 years.

- This statute does not declare restrictive covenants running for more than 20 years to be void, but limits the period in which the covenants can be enforced to 20 years. McKinnon v. Neugent, 225 Ga. 215, 167 S.E.2d 593 (1969) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-5-60).

When zoning laws in effect for 20 years.

- Restrictive covenants which have run more than 20 years within a municipality or county in which zoning laws have been in effect for more than 20 years are rendered unenforceable. House v. James, 232 Ga. 443, 207 S.E.2d 201 (1974).

Existing covenants rendered unenforceable 20 years after 1962 amendment.

- Restrictive covenants in existence prior to the 1962 amendment to this statute in those areas of counties for which zoning laws have been adopted are rendered unenforceable beginning 20 years after the enactment of the amendment. Rowland v. Kellos, 236 Ga. 799, 225 S.E.2d 302 (1976) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-5-60).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 20 Am. Jur. 2d, Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions, § 28 et seq. 23 Am. Jur. 2d, Deeds, § 237.

C.J.S.

- 21 C.J.S., Covenants, § 73 et seq.

ALR.

- Unfounded outstanding claims to or against real property as breach of covenants of deed, 5 A.L.R. 1084.

Outstanding title or claim in grantee as breach of covenants in deed, 10 A.L.R. 441.

Validity and effect of condition of dedication that remaining property shall not be subject to assessments for improvements, 16 A.L.R. 499; 37 A.L.R. 1357.

Record of deed or contract for conveyance of one parcel with covenant or easement affecting another parcel owned by grantor constructive notice to subsequent purchaser or encumbrancer of latter parcel, 16 A.L.R. 1013.

Equitable or incipient easement as breach of covenant against encumbrances, 16 A.L.R. 1066.

Reservation in grant of land of right to hunt and fish with like right to the grantee, as limiting the right of the grantee actual owners of the land, 32 A.L.R. 1533.

Affirmative covenants as running with land, 41 A.L.R. 1363; 102 A.L.R. 781; 118 A.L.R. 982; 68 A.L.R.2d 1022.

Encumbrance undischarged and unenforced as affecting rights and damages under a covenant against encumbrances, 44 A.L.R. 410.

Breach of covenant which does not run with the land as affecting right of remote grantee to recover under separate covenant that does, 45 A.L.R. 513.

Acquiescence by purchaser of lot in restricted district in violations of restrictions as to some lots as waiver of right to insist upon it as to others, 46 A.L.R. 372; 85 A.L.R. 936.

Reservation by grantor of the right to require payment for existing party wall when used, 52 A.L.R. 494.

Garage, or filling station, as breach of restrictive covenants, 54 A.L.R. 659; 99 A.L.R. 541.

Change of neighborhood in restricted district as affecting enforcement of restrictive covenant, 54 A.L.R. 812; 4 A.L.R.2d 1111.

Restrictions on use of real property, or remedies in respect of them, as affected by zoning law, 54 A.L.R. 843.

Part of structure that must be beyond line to amount to violation of building-line restriction, 55 A.L.R. 332; 172 A.L.R. 1324.

Nature of conveyance or covenants which will create estoppel to assert after-acquired title or interest in real property, 58 A.L.R. 345; 144 A.L.R. 554.

Encroachment of building upon adjoining property or street as breach of covenant in deed of property on which building is located, 60 A.L.R. 234.

Structure intended as an outbuilding, but temporarily used as a residence, as breach of restrictive covenant respecting character or cost of residence, 60 A.L.R. 253.

Express covenant restricting property conveyed as raising a corresponding implied covenant as to property retained by the grantor, 60 A.L.R. 1216; 144 A.L.R. 916.

Easement as breach of covenant against encumbrances, 64 A.L.R. 1479.

Right of one not otherwise damaged by violation of restrictive covenant to relief in equity or at law upon theory restriction reduced price received for property affected, 66 A.L.R. 1324.

Rights in ditch company as appurtenance of land irrigated, 70 A.L.R. 1008.

Change of conditions subsequent to judgment enforcing restrictive covenant, 76 A.L.R. 1358.

Covenants in oil and gas lease as running with the land, 79 A.L.R. 496.

What is a "manufacturing" business or enterprise within covenant restricting the use of real property, 81 A.L.R. 1047.

Use of premises for physical treatment or other personal service as violation of covenant against use of property for "business" purposes, 97 A.L.R. 624.

Personal liability of covenantor for breach of restrictive covenant by grantee of property, 98 A.L.R. 779.

Measure of damages for breach of covenant of title in conveyance or mortgage of real property, 100 A.L.R. 1194.

Character as a conditional limitation or condition subsequent, or as a covenant, of provision or recital in deed a purpose for which land is to be used, as affected by fact that was voluntary or for a merely nominal consideration, 116 A.L.R. 76.

Restrictions on use of real property imposed by deed or plat as affected by antecedent mortgage or other lien upon the property or release from or enforcement thereof, 119 A.L.R. 1117.

Validity and effect of reservation in deed of the right to proceeds, or part of the proceeds, of a future sale or condemnation of the property or part thereof, 123 A.L.R. 1474.

Construction and application of restrictive covenants relating specifically to schools, 124 A.L.R. 448.

Lodging or boardinghouse conducted as a business, or taking roomers or boarders as incidental to principal use of premises a home, as within prohibition of zoning statute or ordinance or restrictive covenant, 124 A.L.R. 1011.

"Tourist home" or tourist camp as violation of restrictive covenant as to use of real property, 127 A.L.R. 853.

Use of cemetery grounds for purposes other than interment, 130 A.L.R. 130.

Outstanding right of dower as breach of covenant of title or against encumbrances in deed or mortgage of real estate, 141 A.L.R. 482.

Provisions of deed restricting type of buildings or other use of property, as covenant or condition, 142 A.L.R. 197.

Building restrictions, by covenant or condition in deed or by zoning regulation, as applied to religious groups, 148 A.L.R. 367.

Benefit of provision in deed which limits or qualifies grant or reservation of mineral rights, as passing to subsequent grant or encumbrancer of land, upon the theory that it is a covenant running with the land, or upon the ground that it creates an interest in the land and passes as such, 151 A.L.R. 818.

Restrictive covenants as applicable to land itself apart from buildings, 155 A.L.R. 528.

Covenant restricting "erection," "construction," etc., as including limitation on use structure, 155 A.L.R. 1007.

Provision of building restriction which permits garage or other outbuilding as applicable to lot on which there is no other building, 162 A.L.R. 1098.

What amounts to constructive eviction which will support action for breach of covenant of warranty or for quiet enjoyment, 172 A.L.R. 18.

Computation of number or percentage of owners signing restrictive agreement affecting real property, 173 A.L.R. 316.

Construction and application of covenant restricting use of property to "residence" or "residential purposes", 175 A.L.R. 1191.

Change of neighborhood in restricted district as affecting restrictive covenant; decisions since 1927, 4 A.L.R.2d 1111.

Continued value of restrictive covenant to the dominant owner in protection of his property from competition as basis for its enforcement notwithstanding changes of neighborhood conditions, 2 A.L.R.2d 601.

Restrictive covenants, conditions, or agreements in respect of real property discriminating against persons on account of race, color, or religion, 3 A.L.R.2d 466.

Omission from deed of restrictive covenant imposed by general plan of subdivision, 4 A.L.R.2d 1364.

Oral agreement restricting use of real property as within statute of frauds, 5 A.L.R.2d 1316.

Use of property by college fraternity or sorority as violation of restrictive covenant, 7 A.L.R.2d 436.

Garage as part of house with which it is physically connected within zoning regulations or restrictive covenant, 7 A.L.R.2d 593.

Time when statute of limitation starts to run against breach of covenant running with land and requiring affirmative acts by covenantor, 17 A.L.R.2d 1251.

Covenant of lessee to insure as running with the land, 18 A.L.R.2d 1051.

Covenant in conveyance requiring erection of dwelling as prohibiting use of property for business or other nonresidential purpose, 32 A.L.R.2d 1207.

Use of premises for parking place as violation of restrictive covenant, 80 A.L.R.2d 1258.

Covenant in lease to arbitrate, or to submit to appraisal, as running with the leasehold so as to bind assignee, 81 A.L.R.2d 804.

Conveyance "subject to" restrictions set forth in a recorded or other indicated instrument as imposing the restrictions on the land conveyed, 84 A.L.R.2d 780.

Reservation or exception in deed in favor of stranger, 88 A.L.R.2d 1199.

Hospital, sanitarium, home for aged, nursing home, or the like, as violation of restrictive covenant, 94 A.L.R.2d 726.

When statute of limitations starts to run against action for breach of covenant of warranty or of seisin, 95 A.L.R.2d 913.

Validity, construction, and effect of contractual provision regarding future revocation or modification of covenant restricting use of real property, 4 A.L.R.3d 570.

Construction of covenant or condition in conveyance of land relating to "permanent" maintenance of location of building or other structure, 7 A.L.R.3d 650.

Right of owners of parcels into which dominant tenement is or will be divided to use right of way, 10 A.L.R.3d 960.

Validity of provisions for amortization of nonconforming uses, 22 A.L.R.3d 1134.

Covenant restricting use of land, made for purpose of guarding against competition, as running with land, 25 A.L.R.3d 897.

Zoning or other public restrictions on the use of property as affecting rights and remedies of parties to contract for the sale thereof, 39 A.L.R.3d 362.

Validity and construction of restrictive covenant requiring consent to construction on lot, 40 A.L.R.3d 864.

Meaning of terms "city," "town," or the like as employed in restrictive covenants not to compete, 45 A.L.R.3d 1339.

Who may enforce restrictive covenant or agreement as to use of real property, 51 A.L.R.3d 556.

Change of neighborhood as affecting restrictive covenants precluding use of land for multiple dwelling, 53 A.L.R.3d 492.

Erection of condominium as violation of restrictive covenant forbidding erection of apartment houses, 65 A.L.R.3d 1212.

What constitutes a "structure" within restrictive covenant, 75 A.L.R.3d 1095.

Use of property for multiple dwellings as violating restrictive covenant permitting property to be used for residential purposes only, 99 A.L.R.3d 985.

Restrictive covenants as to height of structures or buildings, 1 A.L.R.4th 1021.

Validity, construction, and effect of restrictive covenants as to trees and shrubbery, 13 A.L.R.4th 1346.

Validity of zoning and building regulations restricting mobile homes or trailers to established mobile home or trailer parks, 17 A.L.R.4th 106.

Validity and construction of restrictive covenant prohibiting or governing outside storage or parking of housetrailers, motor homes, campers, vans, and the like, in residential neighborhoods, 32 A.L.R.4th 651.

Zoning: occupation of less than all dwelling units as discontinuance or abandonment of multifamily dwelling nonconforming use, 40 A.L.R.4th 1012.

Restrictive covenant limiting land use to "private residence" or "private residential purposes": interpretation and application, 43 A.L.R.4th 71.

Validity of provisions for amortization of nonconforming uses, 8 A.L.R.5th 391.

Waiver of right to enforce restrictive covenant by failure to object to other violations, 25 A.L.R.5th 123.

Laches or delay in bringing suit as affecting right to enforce restrictive building covenant, 25 A.L.R.5th 233.