O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 9-3-91 (2019)

Disabilities suffered after accrual of cause

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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If any person suffers a disability specified in Code Section 9-3-90 after his right of action has accrued and the disability is not voluntarily caused or undertaken by the person claiming the benefit thereof, the limitation applicable to his cause of action shall cease to operate during the continuance of the disability.

History

Laws 1817, Cobb’s 1851 Digest, p. 567.; Ga. L. 1855-56, p. 233, § 20; Code 1863, § 2868; Code 1868, § 2876; Code 1873,

§ 2927; Code 1882, § 2927; Civil Code 1895, § 3780; Civil Code 1910, § 4375; Code 1933, § 3-802.

Annotations

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Only mental, not physical, disability tolls time limitations. Chapman v.

Burks, 183 Ga. App. 103, 357 S.E.2d 832, 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 1901 (1987).

In an arrestee’s suit alleging state tort claims and a federal claim of deliberate indifference to constitutional rights, it was error to dismiss the complaint as untimely because the arrestee’s allegation of mental incapacity under the tolling provisions was sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss on statute-of-limitations grounds since the arrestee’s allegation that, when the arrestee was released from jail, the arrestee was of such unsound mind that the arrestee was unable to carry on the arrestee’s ordinary life affairs was sufficient. Meyer v. Gwinnett County, 636 Fed. Appx. 487, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 253 (11th Cir. 2016). Toll due to mental incapacity established. - Plaintiff may establish a toll due to mental incapacity based on the claim that, as a result of the occurrence giving rise to the cause of action, the plaintiff became mentally and physically incapacitated so as to be incapable of acting personally in carrying on the plaintiff’s business and in prosecuting the plaintiff’s claim. Lawson v. Glover, 957 F.2d 801, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 15695 (11th Cir. 1987). Toll due to mental incapacity not established. - Tenant failed to show mental incapacity sufficient, under O.C.G.A. §§ 9-3-90(a) and 9-3-91, to toll the statute of limitations in O.C.G.A. § 93-33 because the tenant’s own testimony indicated that, with the exception of a two-week period of hospitalization, the tenant was able to manage the ordinary affairs of life following a tragic sexual assault; accordingly, the landlord was entitled to summary judgment on the tenant’s premises-liability action. Martin v. Herrington Mill, LP, 316 Ga. App. 696, 730 S.E.2d 164, 2012 Ga. App. LEXIS 635 (2012). Imprisonment of potential plaintiff. - This section provides that running of limitation statute is tolled during imprisonment of potential plaintiff. Jones v. Bales, 58 F.R.D. 453, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12766 (D. Ga. 1972), aff’d, 480 F.2d

805, 1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 11519 (5th Cir. 1973). Neither hospitalization nor subsequent imprisonment effected a tolling of the statute of limitations pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 9-3-90 and 9-3-91. Lawson v. Glover, 957 F.2d 801, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 15695 (11th Cir. 1987). Equitable title acquired by infant. - Under this section, even though time may be running against an equitable title, if that title comes to an infant, time will cease to run against it during infancy. Executors of Everett v. Administrators of Whitfield, 27 Ga. 133, 1859 Ga. LEXIS 24 (1859). Burden of proving disability. - Under this section, burden of proving disability rests upon person who alleges it, and in absence of evidence to the contrary, it will be presumed that person was laboring under no disability. Arnold v. Limeburger, 122 Ga. 72, 49 S.E. 812, 1905 Ga. LEXIS 117 (1905). Trial court did not err in refusing to toll the statute of limitations when the plaintiff’s contention by affidavit that the plaintiff suffered from an unspecified, debilitating mental condition lasting either 20 or 28 days following the accident was in direct contradiction to the plaintiff’s deposition testimony. Walker v. Brannan, 243 Ga. App. 235, 533 S.E.2d 129, 2000 Ga. App. LEXIS 445 (2000). Fact question as to mental incapacity. - Genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether a former detainee, who brought claims arising from an arrest and detention for crimes the detainee claimed not to have committed, suffered mental incapacity sufficient to toll the statute of limitations during the threeweek period following the detainee’s release from jail; a jury could conclude that the detainee was able to work only because of prior familiarity with the tasks and mindless deference to coworkers and managers. Meyer v. Gwinnett Cty., 716 Fed. Appx. 857, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 22752 (11th Cir. 2017), writ denied, No. 19-12584-K, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 20517 (11th Cir. July 10, 2019).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. 51 Am. Jur. 2d, Limitation of Actions, § 197 et seq. C.J.S. 54 C.J.S., Limitations of Actions, § 154 et seq. ALR. Duress or undue influence as tolling or suspending statute of limitations, 121 A.L.R. 1294. One wrongfully adjudged or committed as insane as within benefit of provision of statute of limitations allowing time to sue after removal of disability, 166 A.L.R. 960. Proof of unadjudged incompetency which prevents running of statute of limitations, 9 A.L.R.2d 964. Time of existence of mental incompetency which will prevent or suspend running of statute of limitations, 41 A.L.R.2d 726. Appointment of guardian for incompe-

tent or for infant as affecting running of statute of limitations against ward, 86 A.L.R.2d 965. Effect of infant’s marriage after cause of action accrues on running of limitations as against him or her, 91 A.L.R.2d 1272. Imprisonment of party to civil actions as tolling statute of limitations, 77 A.L.R.3d 735. Tolling of state statute of limitations in favor of one commencing action despite existing disability, 30 A.L.R.4th 1092. Effect of appointment of legal representative for person under mental disability on running of state statute of limitations against such person, 111 A.L.R.5th 159. When is person, other than one claiming posttraumatic stress syndrome or memory repression, within coverage of statutory provision tolling running of limitations period on basis of mental disability, 23 A.L.R.6th 697.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 16 cases (5 in the last 5 years), 1987–2025 · leading case: Martin v. Herrington Mill, LP, 730 S.E.2d 164 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012).
Martin v. Herrington Mill, LP, 730 S.E.2d 164 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012). · cites it 6× “And recognizing that her complaint was filed nearly eight months after the applicable two-year statute of limitation 2 had expired, Martin also alleged that the limitation period for her claims was tolled by her mental incapacity, pursuant to OCGA § 9-3-91. A short discovery…”
Dekalb Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Hawkins, 655 S.E.2d 823 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007). · cites it 4× “tantly, Miles does not address the question presented here: how the plain language of the same statutes — OCGA §§ 9-3-33 and 9-3-90 (a) — could be applied to limit the time for filing a minor's claim for the wrongful death of a parent to two years, while allowing another child…”
Walker v. Brannan, 533 S.E.2d 129 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000). · cites it 4× “OCGA § 9-3-91 provides that a disability not caused by the party and suffered after a right of action has accrued shall toll the applicable limitation "during the continuance of the disability.”
Stubbs v. Hall, 840 S.E.2d 407 (Ga. 2020). “) age when a cause of action accrues shall be entitled to the same time after he or she reaches the age of 18 years to bring an action as is prescribed for other persons”); § 9-3-91 (providing that the limitations period for a “cause of action shall cease to operate during the…”
Chapman v. Burks, 357 S.E.2d 832 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987). · cites it 2× “” OCGA § 9-3-91. Section 90 was amended in 1984, Ga.”
Hobbs v. Arthur, 434 S.E.2d 748 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993). · cites it 2× “First, OCGA § 9-3-91 is not relevant because plaintiff claims incapacity from the date the cause of action accrued, not disability after that time, which latter eventuality is addressed by that statute.”
Davis v. Desa Int'l, Inc., 433 S.E.2d 410 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993). · cites it 2× “After a hearing on DESA’s motion, the trial court entered an order finding that the appropriate statute of limitation was OCGA § 9-3-33, and since no tolling occurred under either OCGA § 9-3-90 or OCGA § 9-3-91, the action was barred. We reverse.”
Deen v. Egleston, 601 F. Supp. 2d 1331 (S.D. Ga. 2009). · cites it 2× “Ga.Code Ann. § 9-3-91. Under governing precedent, these savings statutes prevent the statute of limitations from running against a person who is incapacitated because of their mental disability.”
Lackey v. Crittenden, 457 S.E.2d 701 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995). · cites it 2× “” Nor do these unfortunate events invoke the provisions of OCGA § 9-3-91, which by its express terms apply personally to the party with the “right of action.”
Umekki Green v. Georgia Dep't of Health & Human Servs. (11th Cir. 2021). · cites it 3× “§ 45-1-4, and that the statute of limitations should be tolled pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-3-91 due to her mental health impairments.”
Catherine Martin v. Herrington Mill, L. P. (Ga. Ct. App. 2012). · cites it 4× “Thereafter, Herrington Mill filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Martin had failed to show that she had suffered mental incapacity sufficient to toll the statute of limitation, and thus, her claims were time-barred.”
Preston v. Hall (S.D. Ga. 2020). · cites it 2× “§ 9-3-90; (2) the person becomes legally incompetent after the right accrues, O.C.G.A. § 9-3-91; (3) an estate becomes unrepresented, O.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.