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2018 Georgia Code 9-3-95 | Car Wreck Lawyer

TITLE 9 CIVIL PRACTICE

Section 3. Limitations of Actions, 9-3-1 through 9-3-115.

ARTICLE 5 TOLLING OF LIMITATIONS

9-3-95. Disability of one or more with joint right of action; effect of severability.

Where there is a joint right of action and one or more of the persons having the right is under any of the disabilities specified in Code Section 9-3-90, the terms of limitation shall not be computed against the joint action until all the disabilities are removed. However, if the action is severable so that each person may bring an action for his own share, those free from disability shall be barred after the running of the applicable statute of limitations, and only the rights of those under disability shall be protected.

(Ga. L. 1855-56, p. 233, § 24; Code 1863, § 2871; Code 1868, § 2879; Code 1873, § 2930; Code 1882, § 2930; Civil Code 1895, § 3784; Civil Code 1910, § 4379; Code 1933, § 3-806.)

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Five year period of Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 342, §§ 1 and 2 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-2-60), relating to dismissals for want of prosecution, was not a limitation within meaning of former Code 1933, § 3-806 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-3-95). Swint v. Smith, 219 Ga. 532, 134 S.E.2d 595 (1964).

This section may preserve right of one of several coheirs, even when other coheirs, under no disability, will be bound. Doe v. Gullatt, 10 Ga. 218 (1851).

Revival of dormant judgment.

- When judgment obtained by several parties, some of whom are minors, is not divided into separate parts but is for one entire sum in favor of all, if it becomes dormant the time prescribed by law within which suit may be brought on dormant judgments does not begin to run against any of them until disability of each minor ceases to exist. Williams v. Merritt, 109 Ga. 213, 34 S.E. 312 (1899).

Wrongful death of wife and mother.

- Former Civil Code 1910, § 4379 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-3-95) did not apply to an action by a husband and children for homicide of married woman. Williams v. Seaboard Air-Line Ry., 33 Ga. App. 164, 125 S.E. 769 (1924).

Wife held not entitled to benefit from husband's disability.

- Wife, who had a separate right to bring her action for loss of consortium, was not entitled to the benefit of the tolling provision in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-95 based on her husband's disability. Johnson v. Yeager, 188 Ga. App. 588, 373 S.E.2d 763, cert. denied, 188 Ga. App. 912, 373 S.E.2d 763 (1988).

Since deed grantor's action to set aside and cancel warranty deed that the deed grantor conveyed to the deed grantees was severable as to the deed grantor's interest in the property that the deed grantor held as a joint tenant with the deed grantor's husband, the deed grantor could not toll the applicable statute of limitations for bringing the deed grantor's action as the deed grantor could not use the husband's disability to toll the action that the deed grantor could have brought as to the deed grantor's own interest in the property. Pivic v. Pittard, 258 Ga. App. 675, 575 S.E.2d 4 (2002).

Cited in DeKalb Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Hawkins, 288 Ga. App. 840, 655 S.E.2d 823 (2007).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

C.J.S.

- 54 C.J.S., Limitation of Actions, § 135 et seq.

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