O.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 9-3-97 (2019)

Limitations extended for counterclaims and crossclaims

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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The limitations of time within which various actions may be commenced and pursued within this state to enforce the rights of the parties are extended, only insofar as the enforcement of rights which may be instituted by way of counterclaim and cross-claim, so as to allow parties, up to and including the last day upon which the answer or other defensive pleadings should have been filed, to commence the prosecution and enforcement of rights by way of counterclaim and cross-claim, provided that the final date allowed by such limitations for the commencement of such actions shall not have expired prior to filing of the main action.

History

Ga. L. 1964, p. 165, § 1; Ga. L. 1967, p. 226, § 37.

Annotations

Cross references. Counterclaims and cross-claims generally, § 9-11-13.

Law reviews. For article, “The 1967 Amendments to the Georgia Civil Practice Act and the Appellate Procedure Act,” see 3 Ga. St. B.J. 383 (1967).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Counterclaim timely filed. - Counterclaim was timely if filed within the time that a party was obligated to answer the main action as long as the limitations period for the counterclaim had not expired before the main action was filed. When both the main action against a truck driver and the truck driver’s third party complaint against an injured person were filed within the two year statute of limitations period, the injured person’s personal injury counterclaim against the truck driver was not barred even though it was filed beyond the two year period, and the trial court erred in dismissing the counterclaim. Harpe v. Hall, 266 Ga. App. 340, 596 S.E.2d 666, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 314 (2004). Meaning of “main action.” - Word “main” means most important in size or extent and, by definition, only one “main action” in a case can exist. American Credit Corp. v. United States Cas. Co., 49 F.R.D. 314, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13515 (D. Ga. 1969). Counterclaim asserting a violation of the Federal Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq., is subject to the

limitations period of O.C.G.A. § 9-3-97. Vikowsky v. Savannah Appliance Serv. Corp., 179 Ga. App. 135, 345 S.E.2d 621, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 1834 (1986). When plaintiff recommences an action under former Code 1933, § 3-808 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61), the defendant, who previously merely interposed defenses to an original action, may not for the first time seek to affirmatively recover damages by counterclaim, third-party complaint, or cross-claim, when the period provided by the statute of limitation for recovery of such damages has expired. Champion v. Wells, 139 Ga. App. 759, 229 S.E.2d 479, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 1977 (1976). Stipulated extension of time to file an answer did not extend the defendant’s time for filing a counterclaim. Gibson v. Casto, 233 Ga. App. 403, 504 S.E.2d 705. Stipulated extension of time within which to file an answer and defensive pleadings also extends the time to file a compulsory counterclaim which would otherwise be time-barred. Gibson v. Casto, 271 Ga. 667, 523 S.E.2d 564.

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. 51 Am. Jur. 2d, Limitation of Actions, §§ 98 et seq., 225. C.J.S. 54 C.J.S., Limitations of Actions, §§ 80, 314, 354. ALR. Right to dismissal of action for delay in prosecution as affected by filing of, or as affecting, cross complaint, counterclaim, intervention, and the like, 90 A.L.R. 387. Commencement of action as suspending running of limitation against claim which is subject of setoff, counterclaim, or recoupment, 127 A.L.R. 909.

Pleading or attempting to prove by way of setoff, counterclaim, or recoupment, related claim barred by statute of limitations, as waiver of defendant’s plea of limitation against plaintiff’s claim, 137 A.L.R. 324. Claim barred by limitation as subject of setoff, counterclaim, recoupment, cross bill, or cross action, 1 A.L.R.2d 630. Tort claim against which period of statute of limitations has run as subject of setoff, counterclaim, cross bill, or cross action in tort action arising out of same accident or incident, 72 A.L.R.3d 1065.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 7 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1986–2021 · leading case: Gibson v. Casto, 523 S.E.2d 564 (Ga. 1999).
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Gibson v. Casto, 523 S.E.2d 564 (Ga. 1999). · cites it 40× “The Court of Appeals concluded that OCGA § 9-3-97 did not extend the time for filing a counterclaim, despite the stipulation of the parties extending the date to file an answer.”
Harpe v. Hall, 596 S.E.2d 666 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004). · cites it 4× “667 ( 523 SE2d 564 ) (1999), the Supreme Court of Georgia addressed a similar issue by construing OCGA § 9-3-97 and finding that the statute extends the limitations period for “the enforcement of rights which may be instituted by way of counterclaim and cross-claim, so as to…”
Gibson v. Casto, 504 S.E.2d 705 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998). · cites it 6× “This enumeration turns on OCGA § 9-3-97. That statute extends the statute of limitation for counterclaims “so as to allow parties, up to and including the last day upon which the answer or the defensive pleadings should have been filed .”
King v. Goodwin, 626 S.E.2d 165 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006). · cites it 2× “On appeal, King argues that because OCGA § 9-3-97 extends the statute of limitation on any claim instituted by counterclaim until the filing of an answer, and because she was the only person capable of asserting a wrongful death claim on behalf of Jackson’s estate, the trial…”
Equitable Bank v. Brown, 341 S.E.2d 300 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986). · cites it 2× “OCGA § 9-3-97. Concerning the first three checks, however, the limitations period applicable to any claim for the negligent failure to notify of dishonor had clearly expired, and the appellees are now barred from asserting the claim to that extent.”
Vikowsky v. Savannah Appliance Serv. Corp., 345 S.E.2d 621 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986). · cites it 8× “With regard to counterclaims, Georgia law provides that limitations of time are extended to permit the assertion of a counterclaim until the last day upon which an answer is to be filed, OCGA § 9-3-97.”
Wilferd v. Digit. Equity, LLC (N.D. Ga. 2021). · cites it 4× “O.C.G.A. § 9-3-97. See also Gibson v. Casto, 271 Ga.”
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