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2018 Georgia Code 9-6-24 | Car Wreck Lawyer

TITLE 9 CIVIL PRACTICE

Section 6. Extraordinary Writs, 9-6-1 through 9-6-66.

ARTICLE 2 MANDAMUS

9-6-24. What interest required to enforce public right.

Where the question is one of public right and the object is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, no legal or special interest need be shown, but it shall be sufficient that a plaintiff is interested in having the laws executed and the duty in question enforced.

(Code 1933, § 64-104.)

Law reviews.

- For article, "A Taxing Exception: Southern LNG, Inc. v. MacGinnitie's Narrow Interpretation of the Mandamus Exception," see 66 Mercer L. Rev. 855 (2015). For annual survey of administrative law, see 67 Mercer L. Rev. 1 (2015).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

This section is general rule applicable in all instances where question is one of public right and the object is to procure the enforcement of a public duty. Head v. Browning, 215 Ga. 263, 109 S.E.2d 798 (1959) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-6-24).

Principle announced in this section is not confined to mandamus cases. Head v. Browning, 215 Ga. 263, 109 S.E.2d 798 (1959); City of East Point v. Weathers, 218 Ga. 133, 126 S.E.2d 675 (1962) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-6-24).

Mandamus compels performance only where officer's duty to act clear.

- Mandamus is an available legal remedy which may be employed only for the purpose of compelling an officer to perform a specific act where the officer's duty to do so is clear and well defined. Moore v. Robinson, 206 Ga. 27, 55 S.E.2d 711 (1949).

Citizen and taxpayer has an interest in performance of duty by public officers such as will authorize the maintenance of an action at law to compel by mandamus the performance of official duties. Colston v. Hutchinson, 208 Ga. 559, 67 S.E.2d 763 (1951).

A citizen and taxpayer of a municipality, without the necessity for showing any special injury, has standing to sue to prevent officials of the municipal corporation from taking actions or performing acts which they have no authority to do. League of Women Voters of Atlanta-Fulton County, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 245 Ga. 301, 264 S.E.2d 859 (1980).

Citizen and taxpayer may challenge officials' refusal to vacate office.

- Where a citizen, taxpayer, and voter files a petition for the writ of mandamus against the mayor and councilmen of a municipality, asserting that they are extending their terms of office and are predicating their position upon the provisions of an Act of the General Assembly, the voter has such interest and right, and sustains such injury to the voter by the enforcement of terms of the Act, as to authorize the voter to attack the Act as being unconstitutional. Manning v. Upshaw, 204 Ga. 324, 49 S.E.2d 874 (1948).

Citizens suit seeking performance of public duty in completing park.

- Citizens who challenged the use of Special Local Option Sales Tax funds had standing to seek a writ of mandamus under O.C.G.A. § 9-6-24 as the citizens alleged that governmental entities failed to perform their public duty of completing a park that was allegedly promised to voters. Rothschild v. Columbus Consol. Gov't, 285 Ga. 477, 678 S.E.2d 76 (2009).

Zoning ordinances and determinations do not confer public right to the extent that they can be attacked by anyone interested in having the laws executed and the duty in question enforced. Tate v. Stephens, 245 Ga. 519, 265 S.E.2d 811 (1980).

Tenant who held a usufruct under a lease did not have standing to seek equitable relief from a zoning determination involving the leased property. The Stuttering Foundation, Inc. v. Glynn County, 301 Ga. 492, 801 S.E.2d 793 (2017).

Party must have special interest in order to attack or enforce zoning determination. Tate v. Stephens, 245 Ga. 519, 265 S.E.2d 811 (1980).

No standing under O.C.G.A.

§ 9-6-24 if not for enforcement of a public duty. - Appellant's petition for writ of mandamus did not meet the necessary prerequisites for appellant to exercise standing under O.C.G.A. § 9-6-24 where the petition did not seek to procure the enforcement of a public duty, rather, it sought to compel an action to correct what appellant believed to be the wrongful filing of uncertified tax liens under O.C.G.A. § 44-14-572. Brissey v. Ellison, 272 Ga. 38, 526 S.E.2d 851 (2000).

Existence of standing under the statute depended upon whether the appellees owed a public duty which appellants, as members of the public, were entitled to have enforced. Adams v. Ga. Dep't of Corr., 274 Ga. 461, 553 S.E.2d 798 (2001).

District attorney lacked standing to seek a writ of mandamus to prevent a sentencing panel from performing its official duties, based on an allegation that the legislation pursuant to which it acted was unconstitutional; the panel did not have a public duty, enforceable by means of a writ of mandamus, to initiate and pursue litigation which challenged the constitutionality of its statutory authority to reduce certain criminal sentences, however, the district attorney did have standing to seek an injunction preventing the enforcement of former O.C.G.A. § 17-10-6 on constitutional grounds. Moseley v. Sentence Review Panel, 280 Ga. 646, 631 S.E.2d 704 (2006).

Ultra vires activity by municipality established.

- Participants, pension board members, and advocates were authorized to file a declaratory judgment action seeking injunctive relief on behalf of municipal pension funds against the City of Atlanta, as the participants, members, and advocates alleged ultra vires conduct by the city under O.C.G.A. § 9-6-24; the refusal by the city to recognize, implement, or cooperate with the pension boards' decisions to hire a third party administrator and an outside counsel fell outside the scope of the city's lawful powers because Georgia law did not grant the city authority to approve these decisions by the pension board. City of Atlanta v. S. States Police Benevolent Ass'n, 276 Ga. App. 446, 623 S.E.2d 557 (2005).

Taxpayer could seek to compel state revenue commissioner to accept tax returns.

- In a gas company's suit against the state revenue commissioner for mandamus compelling the commissioner to accept its property tax returns under O.C.G.A. §§ 48-1-2(21) and48-5-511(a), remand was proper to determine if the company had an acceptable alternative remedy in its pending county tax appeals under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311, as required by O.C.G.A. § 9-6-20, if the commissioner could be made a party to those appeals by joinder or some other procedure. Southern LNG, Inc. v. MacGinnitie, 294 Ga. 657, 755 S.E.2d 683 (2014).

Cited in Thomas v. Ragsdale, 188 Ga. 238, 3 S.E.2d 567 (1939); Screws v. City of Atlanta, 189 Ga. 839, 8 S.E.2d 16 (1940); City of Atlanta v. Screws, 194 Ga. 214, 21 S.E.2d 424 (1942); Manning v. Upshaw, 204 Ga. 324, 49 S.E.2d 874 (1948); Heard v. Pittard, 210 Ga. 549, 81 S.E.2d 799 (1954); Mabry v. Shikany, 223 Ga. 513, 156 S.E.2d 364 (1967); Fountain v. Suber, 225 Ga. 361, 169 S.E.2d 162 (1969); Merry v. Williams, 281 Ga. 571, 642 S.E.2d 46 (2007); Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 751 S.E.2d 337 (2013); SJN Props., LLC v. Fulton County Bd. of Assessors, 296 Ga. 793, 770 S.E.2d 832 (2015).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 52 Am. Jur. 2d, Mandamus, § 43.

C.J.S.

- 55 C.J.S., Mandamus, §§ 47, 48.

ALR.

- Mandamus to compel enrollment or restoration of pupil in state school or university, 39 A.L.R. 1019.

Determination of canvassing boards or election officials as regards counting or exclusion of ballots as subject of review by mandamus, 107 A.L.R. 618.

Remedies to compel municipal officials to enforce zoning regulations, 35 A.L.R.2d 1135.

Private citizen's right to institute mandamus to compel a magistrate or other appropriate official to issue a warrant, or the like, for an arrest, 49 A.L.R.2d 1285.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 9-6-24

Total Results: 20  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170 (Ga. 2013).

Cited 488 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 18, 2013 | 751 S.E.2d 337, 2013 Fulton County D. Rep. 3507

...ut should have considered it only as legislation for the public good, and subject to future revision and repeal.”). Like our sister states and the federal courts, Georgia recognizes a distinction between public and private rights. See, e.g., OCGA § 9-6-24 (“Where the question is one of public right and the object is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, no legal or special interest need be shown, but it shall be sufficient that a plaintiff is interested in having the laws executed and the duty in question enforced.”); Rothschild II v....
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Sjn Props., LLC. v. Fulton Cnty. Bd. of Assessors, 296 Ga. 793 (Ga. 2015).

Cited 51 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 27, 2015 | 770 S.E.2d 832

...11 or from improper performance” of “official duties.” OCGA § 9-6-20. SJN, as a citizen and taxpayer of Fulton County, clearly has standing to seek the type of mandamus relief it requests here. See OCGA § 9-6-24 (conferring standing to seek mandamus relief on any person “interested in having the laws executed and the duty in question enforced”); Southern LNG, Inc....
...MacGinnitie, 294 Ga. 657 (2) (755 SE2d 683) (2014) (corporate taxpayer had standing to sue for mandamus to compel State Revenue Commissioner to recognize it as a “public utility” for ad valorem tax purposes).6 6 We note that we have previously held that OCGA § 9-6-24 and its predecessor statute confer standing to seek enforcement of public duties not only via mandamus but also by injunction....
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Sons of Confederate Vets. v. Henry Cnty. Bd. of Commissioners (two Cases), 315 Ga. 39 (Ga. 2022).

Cited 42 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 25, 2022

...city manager, this failure violated a duty owed to the public at large, providing the generalized injury to establish the plaintiffs’ standing. The principle recognized in Montgomery was soon codified, see Code of 1933, § 64-104,14 and is now found in OCGA § 9-6-24, which provides: 14 It is important for modern readers to understand the differences between current codification practices and the practices employed in our early codes....
...to procure the enforcement of a public duty, no legal or special interest need be shown, but it shall be sufficient that plaintiff is interested in having the laws executed and the duty in question enforced. Although Montgomery was a mandamus case, and OCGA § 9-6-24 is found in a part of the Georgia Code dealing with mandamus, we have applied this general rule more broadly....
...793, 799 (2) (b) (ii) n.7 (770 SE2d 832) (2015); see also Moore v. Robinson, 206 Ga. 27, 36-37 (1) (55 SE2d 711) (1949) (applying rule to allow for injunctive relief). The taxpayer standing rule expressed by Keen appears similar to Montgomery’s rule now set forth in OCGA § 9-6-24, but it is of the State, the Statutes of the State, the Decisions of the Supreme Court, or the Statutes of England of force in this State[.]” Ga. L. 1858, p. 95. In practice, this meant that many statutes appeared in those codes that had never been individually enacted by the General Assembly; instead, they were legal principles often derived from decisions of this Court. OCGA § 9-6-24 is one of those; indeed, in the 1933 Code where section 64-104 appears, instead of citing an act of the General Assembly that enacted the statute, the Code cited only Montgomery. 45 different.15 Kee...
...at 366. Because we have used the term “taxpayer” loosely in many cases, it has not always been clear what, if any, injury we required to establish standing. See City of East Point v. Weathers, 218 Ga. 133, 135 (126 SE2d 675) (1962) (noting a line of cases, based on predecessor to OCGA § 9-6-24, that did not require taxpayer to show a special injury to sue, and another line of cases requiring some generalized damage to the taxpayer through creation of illegal debt, misappropriation of public funds, and the like).16 But Montgomery 15 See, e.g., Williams, 308 Ga. at 272-274 (3) (b) (i)-(ii) (separately analyzing both taxpayer-injury standing and citizen standing under OCGA § 9-6-24); Gaddy v....
...559, 561 (67 SE2d 763) (1951); Screws v. City of Atlanta, 189 Ga. 839, 842 (1) (8 SE2d 16) (1940) (citizen-taxpayer of Atlanta had sufficient injury to maintain suit to compel city to collect for water furnished to a group for commercial purposes). Because these cases invoked OCGA § 9-6-24 (or its predecessor), the plaintiff’s status as a member of the community was dispositive of standing.17 (iii) Following adoption of the 1983 Constitution, we continued to recognize that community stakeholders, even as “voters,...
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Williams v. Dekalb Cnty., 840 S.E.2d 423 (Ga. 2020).

Cited 42 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 13, 2020 | 308 Ga. 265

...a citizen or as a taxpayer confers standing to seek an injunction against the members of the governing authority in their individual capacities. (i) Citizen standing. Williams, as a citizen of DeKalb County, generally has standing pursuant to OCGA § 9-6-24 to bring a claim seeking to require a public official to perform the public duties that the General Assembly has conferred upon that official.12 See Moseley v. Sentence Review Panel, 280 Ga. 646 (1) (631 SE2d 704) (2006) 12 OCGA § 9-6-24 provides: “Where the question is one of public right and the object is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, no legal or special interest need be shown, but it shall be sufficient that a plaintiff is interested in having the laws...
...principles in this section are not confined in their application to petitions for mandamus relief. See, e.g., SJN Props. v. Fulton County Bd. of Assessors, 296 Ga. 793, 799 n.7 (770 SE2d 832) (2015) (“We note that we have previously held that OCGA § 9-6-24 and its predecessor statute confer standing to seek enforcement of public duties not only via mandamus but also by injunction.”). (“OCGA § 9-6-24 confers standing ....
...Under this circumstance, OCGA § 9- 6-24 does not confer citizen standing on Williams to challenge the validity of acts authorized by the statute or to attack the constitutionality of the statute. See Gaddy v. Dept. of Revenue, 301 Ga. 552, 560 (1) (b) (802 SE2d 225) (2017) (“OCGA § 9-6-24 does not grant standing to challenge the validity of a public duty authorized by statute, and therefore to attack the constitutionality of the statute.” (citation omitted)). (ii) Taxpayer standing....
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Arnold v. Alexander, 914 S.E.2d 311 (Ga. 2025).

Cited 30 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 18, 2025 | 321 Ga. 330

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Barrow v. Raffensperger (two Cases), 308 Ga. 660 (Ga. 2020).

Cited 24 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 14, 2020

...an election that is legally required, which is the duty she claims the Secretary has with regard to the May 19 election for Justice Blackwell’s office. She does not need to establish any special injury to bring that claim as a voter. See OCGA § 9-6-24 (“Where the question is one of public right and the object is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, no legal or special interest need be shown, but it shall be sufficient that a plaintiff is interested in having the laws executed and the duty in question enforced.”); Manning v....
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Cobb Cnty. v. Floam, 901 S.E.2d 512 (Ga. 2024).

Cited 20 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 9, 2024 | 319 Ga. 89

...standing to bring a cause of action to ensure a local government follows the law.”); see also Williams v. DeKalb County, 308 Ga. 265, 272 (3) (b) (i) (840 SE2d 423) (2020) (“Williams, as a citizen of DeKalb County, generally has standing pursuant to OCGA § 9-6-24 to bring a claim seeking to require a public official to perform the public duties that the General Assembly has conferred upon that official.”); League of Women Voters of Atlanta-Fulton County v....
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Black Voters Matter Fund, Inc. v. Kemp, Governor (five Cases), 870 S.E.2d 430 (Ga. 2022).

Cited 18 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 8, 2022 | 313 Ga. 375

...Id. Incongruously, we also quoted a treatise extending the rule to actions against “county, town, or city authorities[.]” Id. (quoting 1 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 260, pp. 347, 348). By the adoption of the 1933 Code, the rule was codified in statute in what is now OCGA § 9-6-24....
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S. Lng, Inc. v. Macginnitie, 294 Ga. 657 (Ga. 2014).

Cited 18 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 3, 2014 | 755 S.E.2d 683

...remedy precluding mandamus if the Commissioner will not be legally bound by the judgments there. Both parties filed supplemental briefs. 2. We start by confirming that Southern has standing to seek a writ of mandamus against the Commissioner under OCGA § 9-6-24, which says: Where the question is one of public right and the object is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, no legal or special interest need be shown [to petition for mandamus], but it shall be sufficient that a plaintiff is interested in having the laws executed and the duty in question enforced. See, e.g., Rothschild v. Columbus Consolidated Govt., 285 Ga. 477, 479 (678 SE2d 76) (2009) (“‘OCGA § 9-6-24 confers standing to seek the writ in those cases wherein the defendant owes a public duty which the plaintiff, as a member of the public, is entitled to have enforced.’” (citation omitted)); Head v. Browning, 215 Ga....
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Atlanta Journal & Atlanta Constitution v. Babush, 257 Ga. 790 (Ga. 1988).

Cited 17 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 5, 1988 | 364 S.E.2d 560, 15 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1261

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Gaddy v. Georgia Dep't of Revenue, 301 Ga. 552 (Ga. 2017).

Cited 16 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 26, 2017 | 802 S.E.2d 225

...r rights have been injured.10 Here, plaintiffs claim they have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statutes in question because they can show injury by virtue of their status as taxpayers. They also claim standing is conferred by OCGA § 9-6-24....
...iffs are injured by the Program by virtue of their status as taxpayers. Consequently, plaintiffs’ taxpayer status fails to demonstrate a special injury to their rights so as to create standing to challenge the Program. *560(b) Standing under OCGA § 9-6-24. Plaintiffs also claim standing is conferred by OCGA § 9-6-24 to any citizen attempting to enforce compliance with the Constitution....
...ot require the plaintiff to show any special interest to have standing to seek to enforce a public duty. But plaintiffs do not seek to enforce any statute. They seek to block enforcement of a statute by having HB 1113 declared unconstitutional. OCGA § 9-6-24 does not grant standing to challenge the validity of a public duty authorized by statute, and therefore to attack the constitutionality of the statute....
...646, 647 (1) (631 SE2d 704) (2006). The trial court did not err in finding plaintiffs lack standing to pursue their constitutional claims, or their prayer for declaratory relief with respect to those claims, either by virtue of their status as taxpayers or by operation of OCGA § 9-6-24. 2....
...nding to bring a claim in Georgia’s courts.” Feminist Women’s Health Center, supra, 282 Ga. at 434 (1). See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Par. VII. Supra, 972 P2d at 618, Par. 37. Further, this Court has previously noted that OCGA § 9-6-24 does not waive sovereign immunity for injunctive relief. See SJN Properties, LLC v. Fulton County Bd. of Assessors, 296 Ga. 793, 799 (2) (b) (ii) n. 6 (770 SE2d 832) (2015) (noting that this Court’s previous opinions holding that OCGA § 9-6-24 confers standing to seek enforcement of public duties by injunction stand abrogated by Ga....
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Adams v. Georgia Dep't of Corr., 553 S.E.2d 798 (Ga. 2001).

Cited 15 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 5, 2001 | 274 Ga. 461, 2001 Fulton County D. Rep. 3001

...After a hearing, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss, and appellants appeal from that order. Appellants urge that, as citizens of Georgia, they have standing to seek enforcement of appellees' duty to obey the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. They cite as authority OCGA § 9-6-24, which provides that, in petitioning for mandamus, "it shall be sufficient that a plaintiff is interested in having the laws executed and the duty in question enforced." OCGA § 9-6-24....
...ischarges public duties `where the question is one of public right and the object is to procure the enforcement of a public duty....' [Cits.]" Brissey v. Ellison, 272 Ga. 38, 39, 526 S.E.2d 851 (2000). Therefore, the existence of standing under OCGA § 9-6-24 ultimately depends upon whether appellees owe a public duty which appellants, as members of the public, are entitled to have enforced....
...947, 949, § 6, as enacted by the General Assembly, electrocution remained the only method for the execution of one convicted of a capital crime committed prior to May 1, 2000. Therefore, when the trial court ruled in this case, appellees' duty was to enforce the provisions of the statute as written. Thus, contrary to OCGA § 9-6-24, appellants seek to prevent, rather than to enforce, the performance of a public duty....
...Appellants' challenge is to the very constitutionality of the underlying enactment pursuant to which appellees are compelled to perform their obligation of carrying out all lawfully imposed criminal sentences. The cases which recognize the existence of standing under OCGA § 9-6-24 involve enforcement of a duty that "is ......
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Powell v. Studstill, 264 Ga. 109 (Ga. 1994).

Cited 15 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 28, 1994 | 441 S.E.2d 52, 94 Fulton County D. Rep. 805

...the appellees is the parent or guardian of such a handicapped child, we will assume, for the sake of argument, that appellees had standing as citizens seeking to "procure the enforcement of a public duty" to demand compliance with the Act. See OCGA § 9-6-24....
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Brissey v. Ellison, 526 S.E.2d 851 (Ga. 2000).

Cited 12 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jan 31, 2000 | 272 Ga. 38, 2000 Fulton County D. Rep. 418

...Constitution and remanded the matter to the Superior Court of Glynn County. The superior court then dismissed the petition for mandamus after concluding that Brissey lacked standing to bring the action since he was not challenging federal tax liens filed against him. [3] Contending that he has standing under OCGA § 9-6-24, Brissey appealed the judgment entered on the order of dismissal....
...andamus a corporation's performance of a public duty, an individual must have a "special interest" (OCGA § 9-6-23); to use mandamus to enforce a private right, one must show a pecuniary loss not compensable in damages. OCGA § 9-6-25. However, OCGA § 9-6-24, upon which appellant Brissey relies, confers standing to seek mandamus on one who does not have a "special interest" in the circumstances that give rise to the petition for judicial relief: "Where the question is one of public right and the object is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, no legal or special interest need be shown, but it shall be sufficient that a plaintiff is interested in having the laws executed and the duty in question enforced." OCGA § 9-6-24....
...619, 502 S.E.2d 719 (1998); Tate v. Stephens, 245 Ga. 519, 265 S.E.2d 811 (1980) (special interest needed to contest zoning determinations). In the case at bar, appellant Brissey's petition for writ of mandamus does not meet the necessary prerequisites to exercise § 9-6-24 standing....
...had a legal remedy under federal law to remove the liens. The trial court also stated its expectation that the superior court clerk would verify that all federal tax liens submitted to the clerk for filing had been properly certified. [4] While OCGA § 9-6-24 has been codified in the "Mandamus" article of Chapter 6 of Title 9, this Court has held that its principles are not confined to mandamus cases, and has authorized its use as a basis for standing to seek injunctive relief to restrain allege...
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Stuttering Found., Inc. v. Glynn Cnty., 301 Ga. 492 (Ga. 2017).

Cited 11 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 19, 2017 | 801 S.E.2d 793

...244, 245 (637 SE2d 385) (2006) (seeking injunctive and declaratory relief). See also Tate v. Stephens, 245 Ga. 519, 520-521 (265 SE2d 811) (1980). The Foundation asserts that this standard applies only to claims for mandamus relief pursuant to OCGA § 9-6-24, relating to the interest required to enforce a public right; and it claims its complaint nevertheless states a claim for mandamus relief pursuant to OCGA § 9-6-25, which states that a plaintiff may enforce a private right by mandamus if i...
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Merry v. Williams, 642 S.E.2d 46 (Ga. 2007).

Cited 11 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 5, 2007 | 281 Ga. 571, 2007 Fulton County D. Rep. 268

...Bradford Merry, a citizen and taxpayer of Augusta-Richmond County, filed this petition for writ of mandamus and for declaratory judgment against the Commission, the Mayor, and each commissioner (Defendants), and for writ of quo warranto against Williams. See OCGA § 9-6-24; League of Women Voters of Atlanta-Fulton County v....
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Moseley v. Sentence Review Panel, 631 S.E.2d 704 (Ga. 2006).

Cited 10 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 26, 2006 | 280 Ga. 646, 2006 Fulton County D. Rep. 1954

...Moseley brought this appeal from that order of the trial court, but he retired prior to the docketing of the case in this Court. The current district attorney of the South Georgia Judicial Circuit has appeared as his counsel of record on the appeal. 1. Moseley contends that he has standing under OCGA § 9-6-24 to challenge the constitutionality of the Panel. However, that provision relates to standing to seek mandamus relief. The purpose of a writ of mandamus is "to compel a due performance [of an official duty], if there is no other specific legal remedy for the legal rights." OCGA § 9-6-20. OCGA § 9-6-24 confers standing to seek the writ in those cases wherein the defendant owes a public duty which the plaintiff, as a member of the public, is entitled to have enforced....
...Because Moseley's complaint does not seek enforcement of the Panel's performance of its public duties, but challenges the validity of the public duties that the General Assembly has authorized it to exercise, the trial court correctly found that he lacked standing under OCGA § 9-6-24 to attack the constitutionality of OCGA § 17-10-6 by means of mandamus....
...Applying this standard, the issue of Moseley's standing as the district attorney to seek injunctive relief against enforcement of the allegedly unconstitutional statute is obviously within the ambit of his enumeration of error. Insofar as Moseley's argument is concerned, his brief does cite OCGA § 9-6-24, which is found under the Chapter of the Code dealing with mandamus, and was codified following the ruling made by this court in [a] mandamus case ...; but the principle there announced is not confined to mandamus cases....
...leaves it as a general rule applicable in all instances where the question is one of public right and the object is to procure the enforcement of a public duty. (Emphasis supplied.) Head v. Browning, 215 Ga. 263, 266(2), 109 S.E.2d 798 (1959). Thus, even though OCGA § 9-6-24 is itself applicable only in mandamus cases, the legal principle set forth therein applies equally when determining standing in other contexts....
...because [it is] discharging duties involving questions of public right, i.e., the enforcement of lawfully imposed sentences of our constitutionally elected, local trial judges." Clearly, this is an invocation of the legal principle set forth in OCGA § 9-6-24, as the authority for Moseley to defend the sentences imposed by the trial courts in his circuit from reduction pursuant to the allegedly unconstitutional OCGA § 17-10-6....
...the trial court ruled on his standing to assert such a claim, I further dissent because Moseley has not challenged that ruling on appeal. Consistent with his pleadings in the trial court, Moseley claimed in his appeal that he had standing under OCGA § 9-6-24 as a citizen seeking to compel enforcement of a public duty involving a public right....
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Rothschild II v. Columbus Consol. Gov't, 678 S.E.2d 76 (Ga. 2009).

Cited 9 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 8, 2009 | 285 Ga. 477, 2009 Fulton County D. Rep. 1906

...[4] None of these prior SPLOST cases required the plaintiffs to prove the merits of their claim that government officials were improperly abandoning a SPLOST purpose in order to establish standing. With regard to standing to bring a mandamus action, we have followed the language of OCGA § 9-6-24, which provides that "[w]here the question is one of public right and the object is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, no legal or special interest need be shown, but it shall be sufficient that [the] plaintiff is interested in ha...
...orced." For example, in Moseley v. Sentence Review Panel, [5] we noted that "[t]he purpose of a writ of mandamus is `to compel a due performance (of an official duty), if there is no other specific legal remedy for the legal rights,'" and that "OCGA § 9-6-24 confers standing to seek the writ in those cases wherein the defendant owes a public duty which the plaintiff, as a member of the public, is entitled to have enforced." Moreover, in Stephens v....
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Bowen v. Griffith, 366 S.E.2d 293 (Ga. 1988).

Cited 9 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Apr 7, 1988 | 258 Ga. 162

...GA § 45-7-8, the sanction of removal from office cannot apply. Remaining issues 8. These holdings do not, however, resolve all the issues of the case. Bowen's demand for judgment seeks "such other and further relief as may be just and proper." OCGA § 9-6-24 provides: Where the question is one of public right and the object is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, no legal or special interest need be shown, but it shall be sufficient that a plaintiff is interested in having the laws executed and the duty in question enforced....

Sjn Props., LLC. v. Fulton Cnty. Bd. of Assessors (Ga. 2015).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 27, 2015 | 258 Ga. 162

...a defect of legal justice would ensue from [the official’s] failure to perform or from improper performance” of “official duties.” OCGA § 9-6-20. SJN, as a citizen and taxpayer of Fulton County, clearly has standing to seek the type of mandamus relief it requests here. See OCGA § 9-6-24 (conferring standing to 5 Were we to hold otherwise, mandamus actions, which by their very nature may be sought only against public officials, would be categorically precluded by sovereign immunity....
...st establish that “(1) no other adequate legal remedy is available to effectuate the relief sought; and (2) the applicant has a clear legal right to such relief.” Bibb County v. 6 We note that we have previously held that OCGA § 9-6-24 and its predecessor statute confer standing to seek enforcement of public duties not only via mandamus but also by injunction....