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2018 Georgia Code 9-8-13 | Car Wreck Lawyer

TITLE 9 CIVIL PRACTICE

Section 8. Receivers, 9-8-1 through 9-8-14.

ARTICLE 4 QUO WARRANTO

9-8-13. Award of attorneys' and receivers' fees; how determined.

  1. In all cases where a receiver is appointed under the laws of this state to take charge of the assets of any person, firm, or corporation and a fund is brought into court for distribution, the court having jurisdiction thereof shall award to counsel filing the petition and representing the moving creditor or creditors, out of the fund, no greater sum as fees for services rendered in filing the petition and bringing the fund into court than the services are actually worth, taking as a basis therefor the amount represented by the counsel in the original petition and the assets brought into the hands of the receiver by the services of counsel not including the assets turned over to the receiver by defendants under order of the court.
  2. In all cases where a receiver is appointed to take charge of the assets of any person, firm, or corporation, the court having jurisdiction thereof shall award to the receiver as full compensation for his services, out of the fund coming into his hands, not more than 8 percent of the first $1,000.00, 4 percent of the excess up to $5,000.00, 3 percent of the amount above $5,000.00 and not exceeding $10,000.00, and 2 percent of all sums over $10,000.00. Where the business of an insolvent person, firm, or corporation is continued and conducted by a receiver, the judge may allow such compensation as may be reasonable for such services in lieu of commissions, not exceeding the compensation paid by persons in the usual and regular conduct of such business.
  3. In all cases, the presiding judge or other competent tribunal shall allow such compensation to the attorney or attorneys filing the original petition and to the receiver or receivers appointed thereunder as their services are reasonably worth.

(Ga. L. 1897, p. 55, §§ 1, 2; Ga. L. 1898, p. 86, §§ 1, 2; Civil Code 1910, §§ 5488, 5489; Code 1933, §§ 55-314, 55-315.)

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Proper construction of phrase, "not including assets turned over to the receiver by defendants under order of the court," is that it refers to assets other than those "brought into the hands of the receiver by the services of counsel." The statute must be given this construction; otherwise the two expressions as to the "assets" to be considered would be so antagonistic as to nullify each other. Greyling Realty Corp. v. Lawson, 179 Ga. 188, 175 S.E. 453 (1934) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-8-13).

Assets have not been "brought into the hands of the receiver by the services of such counsel," where defendants are possessed of assets of which the plaintiffs and their counsel are entirely ignorant and which are therefore not within the contemplation of the petition. Greyling Realty Corp. v. Lawson, 179 Ga. 188, 175 S.E. 453 (1934).

This section merely states "a basis" for fees and does not exclude consideration of other things which must be material in determining what the services are "actually worth." Greyling Realty Corp. v. Lawson, 179 Ga. 188, 175 S.E. 453 (1934) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-8-13).

Power of courts of equity to fix compensation of their own receivers is well established, and results necessarily from the relation which the receiver sustains to the court, the receiver being its officer or agent, deriving the receiver's functions only from that source; in the absence, therefore, of any legislation regulating the receiver's salary or compensation, the matter is left entirely to the determination of the court from which the receiver derives the receiver's appointment. Edwards v. United Food Brokers, Inc., 196 Ga. 241, 26 S.E.2d 348 (1943).

Attorney fees can be awarded only when receivership is granted. Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Ayers, 105 Ga. App. 804, 126 S.E.2d 448 (1962).

From receivership assets, the judge may award reasonable counsel fees to the attorney whose service brought the fund into court for the benefit of those creditors who share in its distribution; and this applies to counsel for the debtor where counsel's service is beneficial rather than injurious to the client's creditors. Chas. S. Martin Distrib. Co. v. Cooper, 211 Ga. 64, 84 S.E.2d 1 (1954).

Shareholder action for judicial dissolution.

- In an action by plaintiff-shareholder seeking judicial dissolution due to a shareholder deadlock, plaintiff was not entitled to attorney's fees under O.C.G.A. § 9-8-13 since the court did not appoint a receiver and bring a fund into court for distribution. Industrial Distrib. Group, Inc. v. Waite, 268 Ga. 115, 485 S.E.2d 792 (1997), rev'g Industrial Distrib. Group, Inc. v. Waite, 222 Ga. App. 233, 474 S.E.2d 28 (1996).

Compensation of receiver determined by court.

- The compensation of the receiver, and the party or parties to be charged with the payment of the compensation, are matters to be determined exclusively by the court from which the receiver receives appointment. Hall v. Stulb, 126 Ga. 521, 55 S.E. 172 (1906).

Because the corporations and the corporates' principals did not comply with Ga. Ct. App. R. 25(c)(2) by providing legal authority to support their contentions, the trial court properly set the receiver's fees pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-8-13, half of which was to be paid by the corporations and the corporations' principal jointly and severally. D.C. Micro Dev., Inc. v. Briley, 310 Ga. App. 309, 714 S.E.2d 11 (2011).

Award of attorney's fee is matter in discretion of court in which the receivership is obtained. Broyles v. Baumstark, 87 Ga. App. 155, 73 S.E.2d 257 (1952).

Determination of nature of services and excessiveness and apportionment of fees rests largely in discretion of trial court. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Stephens, 226 Ga. 867, 178 S.E.2d 170 (1970).

Trial court's award of receiver's fee not disturbed unless discretion abused.

- The taxing of administrative expense in equitable proceedings is left to the discretion of the trial judge, and the trial judge's action in such matters will not be disturbed unless a manifest abuse of such discretion is shown. Edwards v. United Food Brokers, Inc., 196 Ga. 241, 26 S.E.2d 348 (1943).

No abuse of discretion where fees not unreasonably excessive.

- No matter what amounts a judge might have settled upon for fees under this section, if the judge did not exceed the range in which there could be room for reasonable and experienced minds to differ, the Supreme Court cannot declare an abuse of discretion. Greyling Realty Corp. v. Lawson, 179 Ga. 188, 175 S.E. 453 (1934) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-8-13).

Agreement to pay compensation to receiver by interested party is void unless approved by court. Hall v. Stulb, 126 Ga. 521, 55 S.E. 172 (1906).

Temporary receiver appointed without notice to defendant is not entitled to compensation out of property where the appointment was subsequently vacated and plaintiff's petition dismissed. Aetna Steel & Iron Co. v. Hamilton, 133 Ga. 85, 65 S.E. 145 (1909).

If appointment of temporary receiver at instance of plaintiff is rescinded as improvident, taking of compensation against plaintiff is not abuse of discretion. Capital City Tobacco Co. v. Anderson, 138 Ga. 667, 75 S.E. 1040 (1912).

Considerations which should control in fixing compensation are the value of the property in controversy; the particular benefit derived from the receiver's efforts and attention; time, labor, skill required, and experience in the proper performance of the duties imposed; their fair value measured by common business standards; and the degree of integrity and dispatch with which the work of the receivership is conducted. Edwards v. United Food Brokers, Inc., 196 Ga. 241, 26 S.E.2d 348 (1943).

In appraising value of services of plaintiffs' counsel, number of things should be considered, including the amount of the indebtedness to the plaintiffs and other creditors, the value of the assets or funds brought into court by the services of the attorneys, the intricacy of the facts and circumstances and of the legal questions involved, the degree of professional skill and ability required and exercised, the time and labor necessarily expended, and the benefit to the plaintiffs and the class represented. Greyling Realty Corp. v. Lawson, 179 Ga. 188, 175 S.E. 453 (1934).

It was not error for court to deny application of attorneys for allowance of fees where a suit was brought by individual holders of bonds issued by a corporation in receivership, and the suit resulted in no benefit to the corporation or to its bondholders, either by increasing the funds in the hands of the receivers or by subjecting additional property to the receivership. Christian Women's Benevolent Ass'n v. Atlanta Trust Co., 181 Ga. 576, 183 S.E. 551 (1936).

Error to amend order fixing counsel's fees at request of bankruptcy trustee.

- Where court made an order fixing fees of counsel for the receiver and where, pending the receivership case, the firm was adjudicated a bankrupt in a bankruptcy court, and the trustee in bankruptcy thereafter filed an intervention in the receivership case, praying that the judgment awarding fees to counsel be modified, it was error to amend the first order fixing the fees of counsel by reducing them. Joel v. Nix, 175 Ga. 96, 165 S.E. 10 (1932).

Cited in Adams v. Aycock, 11 Ga. App. 793, 76 S.E. 161 (1912); Keating v. Fuller, 151 Ga. 66, 105 S.E. 844 (1921); Turner v. Shupin, 166 Ga. 806, 144 S.E. 274 (1928); Johnston v. Higdon, 44 Ga. App. 313, 161 S.E. 382 (1931); Sims v. Ramsey, 186 Ga. 732, 198 S.E. 770 (1938); Mendenhall v. Stovall, 191 Ga. 452, 12 S.E.2d 589 (1940); Georgia Veneer & Package Co. v. Florida Nat'l Bank, 198 Ga. 591, 32 S.E.2d 465 (1944); Rogers v. Taintor, 199 Ga. 192, 33 S.E.2d 708 (1945); United Bonded Whse., Inc. v. Jackson, 207 Ga. 627, 63 S.E.2d 666 (1951); Broyles v. Baumstark, 87 Ga. App. 155, 73 S.E.2d 257 (1952); Nesmith v. J & G Shoes, Inc., 244 Ga. 244, 260 S.E.2d 3 (1979); Caldwell v. State, 253 Ga. 400, 321 S.E.2d 704 (1984).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 66 Am. Jur. 2d, Receivers, § 212 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 75 C.J.S., Receivers, § 468 et seq.

ALR.

- Priority of receiver's compensation over expenses, taxes, or receiver's certificates, 24 A.L.R. 1174.

Right of invalidly appointed receiver to compensation as such, 34 A.L.R. 1356.

Liability of one procuring appointment of receiver for expenses of receivership, 68 A.L.R. 878.

Attorneys' fees or other expenses incurred in unsuccessfully resisting appointment or attempting removal of receiver for corporation as proper claim against receiver, 89 A.L.R. 1531.

Power, after institution of bankruptcy proceedings, of court in which receivership or assignment proceedings have previously been begun, to allow or pay fees or other compensation or expenses connected therewith, 90 A.L.R. 1217.

Priority as between receiver's fees and wages earned during receivership, 128 A.L.R. 385.

Costs and other expenses incurred by fiduciary whose appointment was improper as chargeable against estate, 4 A.L.R.2d 160.

Reimbursement of expenses, other than for professional services, to official creditors' committees, or members thereof, in Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings, under Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (11 USCS §§ 101 et seq.), 109 A.L.R. Fed. 842.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 9-8-13

Total Results: 2  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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Caldwell v. State, 321 S.E.2d 704 (Ga. 1984).

Cited 11 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 11, 1984 | 253 Ga. 400

...But those cases were decided under a statute, Code of 1910, § 5423 ( § 37-1105 of the Code of 1933), which was repealed by the Civil Practice Act. Ga. L. 1966, p. 609 at 688. Thus we conclude that while as an interlocutory matter the trial court had the authority to order the receiver paid from the seized funds, OCGA § 9-8-13 (b), because the seizure must be dissolved and the receiver dismissed, the defendant's accounts must be reimbursed the costs which were charged to them....
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Indus. Distrib. Grp., Inc. v. Waite, 485 S.E.2d 792 (Ga. 1997).

Cited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 9, 1997 | 268 Ga. 115, 97 Fulton County D. Rep. 2021

...ht of first refusal of all stock sold to existing stockholders, and ordered all future stock to be issued pro rata. No party appealed the judgment. Subsequently, the trial court found that Waite was entitled to $100,000 in attorney's fees under OCGA § 9-8-13 and Georgia Veneer & Package Co. v. Florida Nat'l Bank. [2] The Court of Appeals affirmed on the theory that Waite's action preserved a common fund and thus authorized an equitable award of attorney's fees under OCGA § 9-8-13(c). [3] 1. As a general rule, Georgia law does not provide for the award of attorney's fees to the prevailing party unless authorized by statute or contract. [4] OCGA § 9-8-13, cited by the trial court as the statutory authority for the fees award, provides in subsection (a): In all cases where a receiver is appointed under the laws of this state to take *794 charge of the assets of any person, firm, or corporati...
...In this case, neither statutory requirement was met. The trial court denied Waite's request for the appointment of a receiver and did not establish a common fund. Therefore, Waite is not entitled to a fees award under subsection (a) of the receivership statute. 2. OCGA § 9-8-13(c), which the Court of Appeals cited, provides: "In all cases, the presiding judge or other competent tribunal shall allow such compensation to the attorney or attorneys filing the original petition and to the receiver or receivers appointe...
...ich allows the award of attorney's fees to a plaintiff who sues as an individual shareholder. [8] Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur, except CARLEY, J., who dissents. CARLEY, Justice, dissenting. In this case, the trial court cited both OCGA § 9-8-13 and Georgia Veneer & Package Co....
...591, 32 S.E.2d 465 (1944) as authority for its award of attorney's fees to Alvis Waite and, on appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed that award. Industrial Distribution Group, Inc. v. Waite, 222 Ga.App. 233, 234(1), 474 S.E.2d 28 (1996). I concur in Divisions One and Two of the majority opinion, holding that OCGA § 9-8-13 is not authority for the award, since a receiver was not appointed....
...It is not clear, however, that the trial court did consider Georgia Veneer & Package Co. as alternative authority. It appears that the trial court may have misinterpreted Georgia Veneer & Package Co. as being only decisional authority supporting a statutory award of attorney's fees under OCGA § 9-8-13, rather than properly interpreting that decision as authority for the award under the alternative non-statutory "substantial benefit" doctrine applicable in equity cases....
...the ruling based upon a proper exercise of its discretion. See Stribbling v. Ga. Ry. & Power Co., 139 Ga. 676, 687(3), 78 S.E. 42 (1913). Accordingly, although I agree with the majority that the award of attorney's fees was not authorized under OCGA § 9-8-13, I dissent to the majority's failure to remand with direction that the trial court reconsider its award under the "substantial benefit" doctrine previously recognized in Georgia Veneer & Package Co....