Intervention not required where plaintiff's and defendant's interests identical.

- Where the interests of the plaintiff and the defendant in the receivership proceedings are identical, the proceedings are collusive, and are an exception to the general rule that parties must intervene in receivership proceedings to enforce liens on the property in the hands of the receiver. City Bank & Trust Co. v. Graf, 175 Ga. 340, 165 S.E. 238 (1932).

Where plaintiff failed to intervene, the plaintiff could not have order discharging receivers vacated and set aside, especially where the plaintiff delayed filing the plaintiff's petition for considerably over a year after the receivers were discharged; nor could the plaintiff have that judgment set aside so as to reinstate the receivership and have an accounting for the money that the plaintiff paid to one of the receivers, so that the plaintiff could insist upon the plaintiff's right to a judgment against the receivers and against the surety on their bond. Castleberry v. Long, 176 Ga. 293, 167 S.E. 883 (1933).

Where shareholders and former directors seek to intervene in a receivership proceeding 15 months after the judgment they wish to set aside was rendered and after all depositors and creditors of the defunct bank have been paid, there was no abuse of discretion in denying their motion. Cipolla v. FDIC, 244 Ga. 444, 260 S.E.2d 482 (1979).

Construction with statutory provisions.

- Order assigning a case to another judge pursuant to Ga. Unif. Super. Ct. R. 3.3 did not violate O.C.G.A. §§ 9-8-1,9-8-5, and9-11-24 as: (1) neither O.C.G.A. § 9-11-24 nor O.C.G.A. § 9-8-1 applied to the assignment; (2) the receiver transferred the property to a corporation before it was sold to a limited liability company (LLC), and the receiver was not named as a defendant; (3) the appellate court was unable to determine the extent that the property remained subject to orders in the receiver case, and equitable remedies affected the rights of the receiver; (4) the LLC's action was against the corporation and its managing declarant, not the receiver, and included claims for monetary damages; and (5) the managing declarant failed to show a legal or factual basis for questioning the assigned judge's staffing to support the complex litigation. Leventhal v. Cumberland Dev., LLC, 267 Ga. App. 886, 600 S.E.2d 616 (2004).

Disposal of interest after filing suit may block intervention.

- Where the plaintiff in the main suit had transferred all the plaintiff's interest to a third person before the filing of the petitions for intervention, it was not error to sustain a motion, made at the instance of counsel for defendant and the transferee, to dismiss the main petition and disallow the intervention. Branan v. Baxter & Co., 122 Ga. 222, 50 S.E. 45 (1905).

Plaintiff lacks right to complain of disallowance.

- Fact that court disallowed an intervention filed by a third person in an equitable proceeding affords to the plaintiff therein no legal ground of complaint. Gammage v. Powell, 101 Ga. 540, 28 S.E. 969 (1897).

Intervenor takes case as the intervenor finds it, and where the relief prayed grows out of a decree rendered before the filing of the intervention, the intervenor cannot be heard to attack the decree on any ground which might properly have been the subject matter of a plea by the defendant. Seaboard Air-Line Ry. v. Knickerbocker Trust Co., 125 Ga. 463, 54 S.E. 138 (1906).

An intervening creditor in an equitable suit takes the pleadings as made by the original party as the intervening creditor finds them when made a party thereto. United Bonded Whse., Inc. v. Jackson, 208 Ga. 552, 67 S.E.2d 761 (1951).

Intervening bondholder could not object to stockholder dismissing its exceptions to auditor's finding as to there being no usury, nor use the exceptions as the basis for an appeal to the appellate court. Weed v. Gainesville, Jefferson & S.R.R., 119 Ga. 576, 46 S.E. 885 (1904).

Intervenors must bear portion of litigation expenses.

- Under the rules of equity pleading, parties having claims against property in the hands of a receiver are admitted as intervenors upon their own application as parties plaintiff, only upon condition that they aver a willingness to bear their portion of the expense of litigation; this is the condition upon which they are admitted as parties upon their own prayer, and being so admitted, courts of equity have power to tax them with their pro rata share of the expenses of litigation. United Bonded Whse., Inc. v. Jackson, 208 Ga. 552, 67 S.E.2d 761 (1951).

Cited in Clarke v. Ingram, 107 Ga. 565, 33 S.E. 802 (1899); Hearn v. Clare, 131 Ga. 374, 62 S.E. 187 (1908); Jones v. Ezell, 134 Ga. 553, 68 S.E. 303 (1910); Blumenfeld v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 168 Ga. 327, 147 S.E. 581 (1929); Isaac Silver & Bros. Co. v. Kalmon, 175 Ga. 244, 165 S.E. 434 (1932); Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. v. Salvation Army, 177 Ga. 890, 172 S.E. 33 (1933); Collier v. Gormley, 178 Ga. 142, 172 S.E. 340 (1933); Head v. Trustees of Jesse Parker Williams Hosp., 190 Ga. 360, 9 S.E.2d 171 (1940); Masters v. Pardue, 91 Ga. App. 684, 86 S.E.2d 704 (1955); McCoy v. Bovee, 300 Ga. 759, 796 S.E.2d 679 (2017).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 66 Am. Jur. 2d, Receivers, §§ 265, 394, 395, 397.

C.J.S.

- 75 C.J.S., Receivers, §§ 122 et seq., 296 et seq.