O.C.G.A.
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
(a) If a claim sought to be arbitrated would be barred by limitation of time had the claim sought to be arbitrated been asserted in court, a party may apply to the court to stay arbitration or to vacate the award, as provided in this part. The court has discretion in deciding whether to apply the bar. A party waives the right to raise limitation of time as a bar to arbitration in an application to stay arbitration by that party’s participation in the arbitration. (b) Failure to make this application to the court shall not preclude a party from asserting before the arbitrators limitation of time as a bar to the arbitration. The arbitrators, in their sole discretion, shall decide
whether to apply the bar. This exercise of discretion shall not be subject to review of the court on an application to confirm, vacate, or modify the award except upon the grounds hereafter specified in this part for vacating or modifying an award.
History
Code 1933, § 7-306, enacted by Ga. L. 1978, p. 2270, § 1; Code 1981, § 9-9-85;
Code 1981, § 9-9-5, as redesignated by Ga. L. 1988, p. 903, § 1.
Annotations
JUDICIAL DECISIONS Role of arbitrator. - Court of Appeals erroneously held that the arbitrator, and not the court, should have decided whether arbitration was barred by res judicata, as: (1) no presumption existed that an arbitrator was in a better position than a court to apply a legal doctrine such as res judicata; (2) the parties did not
expressly reserve the issue for arbitration; and (3) there was no presumption under Georgia law that the application of a procedural bar such as res judicata was a matter to be determined exclusively by an arbitrator. Bryan County v. Yates Paving & Grading Co., 281 Ga. 361, 638 S.E.2d 302, 2006 Ga. LEXIS 1033 (2006).
RESEARCH REFERENCES ALR. Which statute of limitations applies to efforts to compel arbitration of a dispute, 77 A.L.R.4th 1071.
What statute of limitations applies to action to compel arbitration pursuant to § 301 of Labor Management Relations Act (29 USCS § 185), 96 A.L.R. Fed. 378.
Notes of Decisions
Bryan Cnty. v. Yates Paving & Grading Co., 638 S.E.2d 302 (Ga. 2006).
· cites it 12× “See OCGA§ 9-9-5 (a) (trial court has discretion *363 to determine whether “a claim sought to be arbitrated would be barred by limitation of time had the claim sought to be arbitrated been asserted in court.”
Archer W. Contractors, LLC v. Holder Constr. Co., 751 S.E.2d 908 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013).
· cites it 10× “First, the Georgia Arbitration Code, in *176 OCGA § 9-9-5 (a), 3 specifically grants the trial court “discretion in deciding whether to apply” a bar by limitation of time — a provision that has no analogue in the FAA, and which does not apply to the instant case.”
Gannett Fleming, Inc. v. Corman Const., 243 Md. App. 376 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2019).
“§ 9-9-5 (a) (West 2019) (“If a claim sought to be arbitrated would be barred by limitation of time had the claim sought to be arbitrated been asserted in court, a party may apply to the court to stay arbitration or to vacate the award.”
Gs Cleantech Corp. v. Cantor Colburn, LLP (Ga. Ct. App. 2022).
· cites it 10× “After GS CleanTech Corporation and GreenShift Corporation (collectively, “the Client”) threatened to seek arbitration in Georgia of legal malpractice claims against their former lawyers, Cantor Colburn (“the Firm”), the Firm filed in the Superior Court of Fulton County a…”
Hillcrest Foods, Inc. v. Brian E. Mikeals (Ga. Ct. App. 2021).
· cites it 6× “2 were time-barred by the statute of limitations under OCGA § 9-9-5 (a)3 and, therefore, the American Arbitration Association (AAA) lacked jurisdiction.”
Archer W. Contractors, LLC v. Holder Constr. Co. (Ga. Ct. App. 2013).
· cites it 10× “First, the Georgia Arbitration Code, in OCGA § 9-9-5 (a),3 specifically grants the trial court “discretion in deciding whether to apply” a bar by limitation of time – a provision that has no analogue in the FAA, and which does not apply to the 3 OCGA § 9-9-5 (a) provides: “If a…”
— 9-9-5(a) — 1 case
Bryan Cnty. v. Yates Paving & Grading Co., 638 S.E.2d 302 (Ga. 2006).
“See OCGA§ 9-9-5 (a) (trial court has discretion *363 to determine whether “a claim sought to be arbitrated would be barred by limitation of time had the claim sought to be arbitrated been asserted in court.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.