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O.C.G.A.Title 9Chapter 9

O.C.G.A. § 9-9-6 (2023)

Application to compel or stay arbitration; demand for arbitration; consolidation of proceedings

Edition and currency
O.C.G.A. 2023 print volume: Georgia laws through the 2023 session at the latest. The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations for this section are from the 2023 print volume of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). Georgia Acts after that are not in this text. The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
Other sources
CURRENTO.C.G.A. 2023 print volume: Georgia laws through the 2023 session at the latest cited 1991–2024 38citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 38 opinions since 1991, 1 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (a) (1 case).

(a) A party aggrieved by the failure of another to arbitrate may apply for an order compelling arbitration. If the court determines there is no substantial issue concerning the validity of the agreement to submit to arbitration or compliance therewith and the claim sought to be arbitrated is not barred by limitation of time, the court shall order the parties to arbitrate. If a substantial issue is raised or the claim is barred by limitation of time, the court shall summarily hear and determine that issue and, accordingly, grant or deny the application for an order to arbitrate. If an issue claimed to be arbitrable is involved in an action pending in a court having jurisdiction to hear a motion to compel arbitration, the application shall be made by motion in that action. If the application is granted, the order shall operate to stay a pending or subsequent action, or so much of it as is referable to arbitration.

(b) Subject to subsections (c) and (d) of this Code section, a party who has not participated in the arbitration and who has not made an application to compel arbitration may apply to stay arbitration on the grounds that:

(1) No valid agreement to submit to arbitration was made;

(2) The agreement to arbitrate was not complied with; or

(3) The arbitration is barred by limitation of time.

(c) A party may serve upon another party a demand for arbitration. This demand shall specify:

(1) The agreement pursuant to which arbitration is sought;

(2) The name and address of the party serving the demand;

(3) That the party served with the demand shall be precluded from denying the validity of the agreement or compliance therewith or from asserting limitation of time as a bar in court unless he makes application to the court within 30 days for an order to stay arbitration; and

(4) The nature of the dispute or controversy sought to be arbitrated; provided, however, that the demand for arbitration may be amended by either party to include disputes arising under the same agreement after the original demand is served.

(d) After service of the demand, or any amendment thereof, the party served must make application within 30 days to the court for a stay of arbitration or he will thereafter be precluded from denying the validity of the agreement or compliance therewith or from asserting limitation of time as a bar in court. Notice of this application shall be served on the other parties. The right to apply for a stay of arbitration may not be waived, except as provided in this Code section.

(e) Unless otherwise provided in the arbitration agreement, a party to an arbitration agreement may petition the court to consolidate separate arbitration proceedings, and the court may order consolidation of separate arbitration proceedings when:

(1) Separate arbitration agreements or proceedings exist between the same parties or one party is a party to a separate arbitration agreement or proceeding with a third party;

(2) The disputes arise from the same transactions or series of related transactions; and

(3) There is a common issue or issues of law or fact creating the possibility of conflicting rulings by more than one arbitrator or panel of arbitrators.

(f) If all the applicable arbitration agreements name the same arbitrator, arbitration panel, or arbitration tribunal, the court, if it orders consolidation under subsection (e) of this Code section, shall order all matters to be heard before the arbitrator, panel, or tribunal agreed to by the parties. If the applicable arbitration agreements name separate arbitrators, panels, or tribunals, the court, if it orders consoli616 dation under subsection (e) of this Code section, shall, in the absence of an agreed method of selection by all parties to the consolidated arbitration, appoint an arbitrator.

(g) In the event that the arbitration agreements in proceedings consolidated under subsection (e) of this Code section contain inconsistent provisions, the court shall resolve such conflicts and determine the rights and duties of various parties.

(h) If the court orders consolidation under subsection (e) of this Code section, the court may exercise its discretion to deny consolidation of separate arbitration proceedings only as to certain issues, leaving other issues to be resolved in separate proceedings.

History

Code 1933, § 7-307, enacted by Ga. L. 1978, p. 2270, § 1; Code 1981, § 9-9-86; Code 1981, § 9-9-6, as redesignated by Ga. L. 1988, p. 903, § 1.

Annotations

Law reviews. For article, “Construction Law,” see 63 Mercer L. Rev. 107 (2011).

For annual survey on trial practice and procedure, see 67 Mercer L. Rev. 257 (2015).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Editor’s notes. - In light of the similarity of the provisions, decisions under former Code Section 9-9-86 are included in the annotations for this Code section. Procedural requirements. - There was no statutory provision requiring clients of defendant company and owner to apply for an order compelling arbitration before seeking arbitration where such an order would have had no effect on the defendants’ absence from the proceedings, and state law does not unequivocally reject ex parte arbitration. Deer Creek, Inc. v. Section 1031 Servs., Inc., 235 Ga. App. 891, 510 S.E.2d 853. Because an agreement contained multiple promises based on multiple considerations, the agreement was not severable; consequently, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 131-8(a), the trial court erred in granting a motion to compel arbitration and stay proceedings. Harris v. SAL Fin. Servs., 270 Ga. App. 230, 606 S.E.2d 293, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 1396 (2004). Procedure when pending matter in another jurisdiction. - Trial court did not err in considering whether under the standards of O.C.G.A. § 9-9-6(a) the court could decide a party’s petition to compel

arbitration because Georgia courts generally apply Georgia law to procedural matters and, therefore, the trial court properly determined that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the petition since an action was pending in Illinois and there was no showing that § 99-6(a) was preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. BDO USA, LLP v. Coe, 329 Ga. App. 79, 763 S.E.2d 742, 2014 Ga. App. LEXIS 622 (2014). Arbitrator decides failure to comply with condition precedent to arbitration. - Question of whether one party waived the party’s right to compel arbitration by failing to comply with a purported condition precedent was a question for the arbitrator to resolve. Web IV, LLC v. Samples Constr., LLC, 349 Ga. App. 607, 824 S.E.2d 107, 2019 Ga. App. LEXIS 101 (2019). Proper remedy when plaintiff refuses arbitration. - A motion for summary judgment is not a proper procedural vehicle by which to seek to enforce an arbitration provision in a limited warranty, because the remedy of a defendant who is aggrieved by the refusal of a plain-

tiff to arbitrate is to apply to the court for a stay of proceedings pending arbitration. Tillman Group, Inc. v. Keith, 201 Ga. App. 680, 411 S.E.2d 794, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 1545 (1991). Plaintiff was not required to proceed under subsection (a) of O.C.G.A. § 9-9-6 simply because defendant declined to participate; instead, it was proper for plaintiff to proceed under subsection (c) of O.C.G.A. § 9-9-6. Yeremian v. Ellis, 239 Ga. App. 805, 521 S.E.2d 596. Party aggrieved by the failure of another to arbitrate may apply for an order compelling arbitration. Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-9-6(a), if a court determines there is no substantial issue concerning the validity of the agreement to submit to arbitration or compliance therewith and the claim sought to be arbitrated is not barred by limitation of time, the court shall order the parties to arbitrate. Yates Paving & Grading Co. v. Bryan County, 265 Ga. App. 578, 594 S.E.2d 756, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 197 (2004), cert. denied, No. S04C1088, 2004 Ga. LEXIS 513 (Ga. June 7, 2004). Practical difficulties that a plaintiff faced in attempting to arbitrate the plaintiff’s dispute with the defendant did not show that there was any defect in the formation of an arbitration provision or that the contract terms themselves were substantively unconscionable. Moreover, both the FAA and Georgia law provided that a party aggrieved by the failure of another to arbitrate under an agreement could apply for an order compelling arbitration, and the plaintiff did not avail oneself of this remedy. Kaspers v. Comcast Corp., 631 Fed. Appx. 779, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 19843 (11th Cir. 2015). Defendant’s refusal to participate in arbitration or to file any response thereto waived defendant’s contentions regarding the validity of the arbitration clause of the contract or compliance therewith. Yeremian v. Ellis, 239 Ga. App. 805, 521 S.E.2d 596. Compelled arbitration authorized. - Trial court correctly granted the construction company’s motion to compel arbitration because the question of whether the contract’s dispute resolution provisions imposed a condition precedent to

arbitration was a threshold issue of procedural arbitrability that arose out of and related to the agreement itself; thus, the issue had to be resolved by an arbitrator rather than by the trial court. Web IV, LLC v. Samples Constr., LLC, 349 Ga. App. 607, 824 S.E.2d 107, 2019 Ga. App. LEXIS 101 (2019). Motion to compel arbitration improperly denied. - Trial court erred in refusing to compel arbitration as to all counts of buyers’ complaint against a seller to recover damages for construction defects in the buyers’ new home because the parties intended to submit the types of claims in dispute to an arbitrator when the parties agreed to submit to arbitration not only construction defect claims but also “all other claims between the parties;” the arbitration clause in the agreement was not limited to claims sounding in contract but applied to “all other claims” without limitation. Order Homes, LLC v. Iverson, 300 Ga. App. 332, 685 S.E.2d 304, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 967 (2009). In the homeowners’ negligent misrepresentation claim, the trial court erred in denying the company’s motion to compel arbitration based on the company’s recommendation of a contractor who provided discounts to its members, such as the homeowners, because the homeowners’ allegations against the company touched a matter - their membership with the company - covered by the arbitration agreement. DBGS, LLC v. Kormanik, 333 Ga. App. 33, 775 S.E.2d 283, 2015 Ga. App. LEXIS 432 (2015). In a legal malpractice case, the trial court erred in refusing to enforce an arbitration clause in the parties’ engagement agreement based on unconscionability because arbitration was favored under Georgia law and there was no evidence that the attorneys took advantage of the client. There was no blanket rule that the attorneys were required to explain the possible disadvantages of arbitration to the client. Summerville v. Innovative Images, LLC, 349 Ga. App. 592, 826 S.E.2d 391, 2019 Ga. App. LEXIS 203 (2019), aff’d in part, 309 Ga. 675, 848 S.E.2d 75, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 599 (2020), overruled in part, Bowen v. Savoy, 308 Ga. 204, 839 S.E.2d 546, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 133 (2020).

An arbitration clause in a contract between an attorney and a client was voidable at the client’s option because of the attorney’s conflict of interest; thus, it was error not to grant the client’s motion to stay arbitration. Moreover, even if the clause were enforceable, the common-law indemnification and contribution claims the attorney sought to arbitrate arose independently of the contract and thus were not covered by the arbitration clause. Harris v. Albany Lime & Cement Co., 291 Ga. App. 474, 662 S.E.2d 160, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 470 (2008). Magistrate court was “a court having jurisdiction to hear a motion to compel arbitration” within the contemplation of subsection (a) of O.C.G.A. § 99-6, for purposes of determining whether a house vendor had waived its right to arbitration by litigating the merits of a breach of warranty claim in the magistrate court without filing a motion to compel arbitration. Tillman Group, Inc. v. Keith, 201 Ga. App. 680, 411 S.E.2d 794, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 1545 (1991). Stay of litigation to arbitrate. - City’s unsuccessful action in petitioning the public service commission to stop a new electric service provider from providing electricity to the water utility was not an action inconsistent with the right to arbitrate, as that action was against a non-party in a regulatory proceeding that lacked jurisdiction to compel arbitration; the issue of whether the city and the water utility’s electric service contract was terminated due to a flood was not involved in the proceedings before the public service commission, and if the water utility had been concerned about its right to arbitrate rather than defaulting on the contract, it could have, but did not, demand a stay of litigation in order to arbitrate. Macon Water Auth. v. City of Forsyth, 262 Ga. App. 224, 585 S.E.2d 131, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 810 (2003). Trial court did not err in enforcing a 30-day limitations period in a contract between a general contractor and a subcontractor for the subcontractor to request arbitration of a dispute between the parties after notice by the contractor of default by the subcontractor and staying arbitration to the subcontractor, when the

subcontractor waited more than 30 days to file for arbitration following the delivery of a decision letter by the contractor that the subcontractor had not complied with the agreement. Holt & Holt, Inc. v. Choate Constr. Co., 271 Ga. App. 292, 609 S.E.2d 103, 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 1602 (2004), cert. denied, No. S05C0872, 2005 Ga. LEXIS 359 (Ga. May 9, 2005). In a dispute over construction of a home in which homeowners sought rescission, the trial court was required to order arbitration, under O.C.G.A. § 9-9-6(a), because the arbitration clause in the parties’ contract specifically provided that they intended to arbitrate even claims seeking rescission, and the homeowners did not challenge the validity of the arbitration clause itself, nor was their claim barred by the limitation of time. D. S. Ameri Constr. Corp. v. Simpson, 271 Ga. App. 825, 611 S.E.2d 103, 2005 Ga. App. LEXIS 186 (2005). Waiver of right to stay arbitration. - Trial court did not err in denying a limited liability company’s (LLC) motion under O.C.G.A. § 9-9-6(b) to stay an arbitration sought by a construction company because the LLC waived the LLC’s right to stay the arbitration by participating in the process for 18 months, and the construction company’s demands for arbitration put the LLC on notice that the LLC’s claims arose out of an understanding between the parties; by participating in and failing to object to the arbitration process, the LLC waived any right the LLC had to stay the proceedings. Atl. Station, LLC v. Vratsinas Constr. Co., 307 Ga. App. 398, 705 S.E.2d 191, 2010 Ga. App. LEXIS 1025 (2010). Waiver of right to compel arbitration. - House vendor, by litigating the merits of the purchasers’ breach of warranty claim in the magistrate court without filing a motion to compel arbitration or otherwise seeking to initiate arbitration proceedings, waived its right to insist upon arbitration. Tillman Group, Inc. v. Keith, 201 Ga. App. 680, 411 S.E.2d 794, 1991 Ga. App. LEXIS 1545 (1991). Judgment staying arbitration was affirmed as an assignee acquired only the rights held by the assignor and the assignor failed to raise an arbitration de-

fense, participated in discovery, and agreed to extend the discovery period in a related case with a limited liability company; the assignor waived its entitlement to arbitration, and the assignee’s entitlement to arbitration was waived. M. Homes, LLC v. Southern Structural, Inc., 281 Ga. App. 380, 636 S.E.2d 99, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 1110 (2006). Trial court properly denied the appellants’ motion to compel arbitration of new claims asserted in an amended petition because the appellants waived the appellants’ right to arbitration under a partnership agreement by failing to assert the right in a timely manner and, instead, participating in almost five years of very costly litigation, which was inconsistent with the right to arbitration. Schinazi v. Eden, 351 Ga. App. 151, 830 S.E.2d 531, 2019 Ga. App. LEXIS 410 (2019), cert. denied, No. S19C1526, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 108 (Ga. Feb. 10, 2020). No right to compel arbitration. - Contractor sued a limited liability com-

pany (LLC) and the company’s owner to recover payment. As the claims asserted by the contractor were “related to” the contractor’s contract with the LLC, even if the claims did not “arise out of” the contract, and the owner was not a party to the contract, the owner’s motion to compel arbitration under O.C.G.A. § 9-9-6(a) was properly denied. Tillman Park, LLC v. Dabbs-Williams Gen. Contrs., LLC, 298 Ga. App. 27, 679 S.E.2d 67, 2009 Ga. App. LEXIS 576 (2009). Consolidation. - Consolidation of arbitration of a doctor’s claims against the doctor’s lawyer with the lawyer’s fee claim against the doctor was not mandatory under O.C.G.A. § 9-9-6(h). Doman v. Stapleton, 256 Ga. App. 4, 567 S.E.2d 348, 2002 Ga. App. LEXIS 777 (2002).

RESEARCH REFERENCES ALR. Which statute of limitations applies to efforts to compel arbitration of a dispute, 77 A.L.R.4th 1071. Consolidation by state court of arbitration proceedings brought under state law, 31 A.L.R.6th 433. What statute of limitations applies to action to compel arbitration pursuant to

§ 301 of Labor Management Relations Act (29 USCS § 185), 96 A.L.R. Fed. 378. Application of equitable estoppel by nonsignatory to compel arbitration - federal cases, 39 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 17. Application of equitable estoppel against nonsignatory to compel arbitration under federal law, 43 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 275.

The 20 cases that cite O.C.G.A. § 9-9-6 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENOdion v. Avesis, Inc., 759 S.E.2d 538 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014).
cites § 9-9-6 12×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 9-9-6
“) certain agreements “relating to arbitration of medical malpractice claims”; that Avesis had not sought to compel arbitration under OCGA § 9-9-6 of the Georgia Arbitration Code; and that the agreement’s arbitration clause did not apply to an action seeking injunctive relief.”
Later courts cite it for
“an agreement between odion and avesis third party administrators established odion as a 'participating provider,' which the agreement defined as an 'optometrist, ophthalmologist or optician who has been approved by avesis to provide covered vision care benefits to certain patients.” · 1 citing court
2
GREENBDO USA, LLP v. Coe, 763 S.E.2d 742 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014).
cites § 9-9-6 42×cited by 2 cases
Where it cites § 9-9-6
“Following a hearing on Coe’s motion to dismiss, the trial court found that the issues that BDO claimed to be arbitrable were then pending before an Illinois court which had jurisdiction to hear a motion to compel arbitration and, therefore, in light of OCGA § 9-9-6 (a), it…”
3
GREENRushing v. Gold Kist, Inc., 567 S.E.2d 384 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002).
cites § 9-9-6 8×cited by 16 cases
Where it cites § 9-9-6
“The trial court granted the motion, concluding that, because Rushing had not timely moved to stay arbitration proceedings after receiving the certified demand letter, he was precluded *117 from denying the validity of the agreement under OCGA § 9-9-6 (d) (Supp. 2001). 1 This…”
Later courts cite it for
“expressly consented to be bound by the cooperative's by-laws” · 2 citing courts
4
GREENKindred Nursing Centers Ltd. P'ship v. Chrzanowski, 791 S.E.2d 601 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016).
cites § 9-9-6 4×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 9-9-6
“Georgia law provides that a party may seek an order compelling arbitration, and upon a challenge to the validity of the agreement, the trial court “shall summarily hear and determine that issue and, accordingly, grant or deny the application for an order to arbitrate.”
Later courts cite it for
“every person is presumed to have all his mental faculties and to be of normal and ordinary intelligence, and where it is contended that one who executed a contract was not competent to execute it, the burden is upon she who asserts the incompetency.” · 1 citing court
5
GREENDoman v. Stapleton, 568 S.E.2d 509 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002).
cites § 9-9-6 6×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 9-9-6
“See OCGA § 9-9-6 (e). When Stapleton filed his arbitration demand in June 2000, the *391 trial court could have ordered the consolidation of the two proceedings, since the award from the earlier proceeding had not yet been approved, but the trial court was not required to do so…”
Later courts cite it for
“arbitration is a matter of contract, meaning that arbitrators derive their authority to resolve disputes only from the parties' agreement.” · 3 citing courts
6
GREENTillman Park, LLC v. Dabbs-Williams Gen. Contractors, LLC, 679 S.E.2d 67 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009).
cites § 9-9-6 6×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 9-9-6
“2 OCGA § 9-9-6 (a). 3 OCGA § 9-9-6 (b). 4 See OCGA § 9-9-6 (a).”
Later courts cite it for
“contract construction is a three-step process.” · 1 citing court
7
GREEND. S. Ameri Constr. Corp. v. Simpson, 611 S.E.2d 103 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005).
cites § 9-9-6 4×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 9-9-6
“The court denied Ameri’s motion, citing OCGA § 9-9-6 (a). It found that the Simpsons “have potentially effectively rescinded the contract, which creates a substantial issue about the validity of the Agreement and the arbitration clause therein.”
8
GREENWeb IV, LLC v. Samples Constr., LLC, 824 S.E.2d 107 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019).
cites § 9-9-6 4×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 9-9-6
“Samples Construction subsequently filed a motion to stay litigation and compel arbitration under the Georgia Arbitration Code, OCGA § 9-9-6. Web IV objected, arguing in pertinent part that Samples Construction waived any right to compel arbitration because the parties never…”
9
GREENOrder Homes, LLC v. Iverson, 685 S.E.2d 304 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009).
cites § 9-9-6 2×cited by 31 cases
Where it cites § 9-9-6
“” 8 Under OCGA § 9-9-6 (a), “[a] party aggrieved by the failure of another to arbitrate” may move the court to compel arbitration; and “[i]f the court determines there is no substantial issue concerning the validity of the agreement to submit to arbitration or compliance…”
The case’s holding
A non-signatory party may invoke the arbitration provisions of a contract through equitable estoppel when bringing claims arising out of the contract against a signatory party.
Later courts cite it for
“in enacting the gac, the general assembly established a clear public policy in favor of arbitration.” · 5 citing courts
10
GREENTillman Grp., Inc. v. Keith, 411 S.E.2d 794 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991).
cites § 9-9-6 4×cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 9-9-6
“If the application is granted, the order shall operate to stay a pending or subsequent action, or so much of it as is referable to arbitration.”
Later courts cite it for
“litigating the merits of the appellees' claim . . . without filing a motion to compel arbitration or otherwise seeking to initiate arbitration proceedings, the appellant waived its right to insist upon arbitration.” · 1 citing court
11
GREENS. Telecom, Inc. v. Level 3 Commc'ns, LLC, 671 S.E.2d 283 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008).
cites § 9-9-6 4×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 9-9-6
“at 362-363 (noting trial court’s authority to determine whether claim subject to arbitration would be time-barred); see also OCGA § 9-9-6 (a) (if a claim “is barred by limitation of time, the court shall summarily hear and determine that issue and, accordingly, grant or deny the…”
Later courts cite it for
“limitation clauses reducing the time permitted to assert claims under a written contract from six years to twelve months are enforceable in georgia.” · 2 citing courts
12
GREENYeremian v. Ellis, 521 S.E.2d 596 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999).
cites § 9-9-6 10×cited by 4 cases
Where it cites § 9-9-6
“He contends that all he received was a November 4, 1997 “notice” from the AAA scheduling the arbitration hearing date and, in that regard, directs our attention to the record which contains such notice. However, the record also contains a letter from Yeremian to the AAA dated…”
13
GREENJames Darren Summerville v. Innovative Images, LLC, 826 S.E.2d 391 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019).
cites § 9-9-6 2×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 9-9-6
“2d 601 (2016), quoting OCGA § 9-9-6 (a). Whether the contracting parties have submitted a particular dispute to arbitration and the validity of the arbitration provision are questions for judicial determination unless the parties clearly and unmistakably provided otherwise in…”
Later courts cite it for
“declined to adopt a blanket rule that an arbitration clause in an attorney-client contract is unconscionable and against public policy if the attorney did not explain the potential disadvantages of the clause to his prospective client before execution of the contract.” · 1 citing court
14
GREENGoshayeshi v. Mehrabian, 501 S.E.2d 265 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998).
cites § 9-9-6 4×cited by 15 cases
Where it cites § 9-9-6
“) OCGA § 9-9-6 (b). Further, when served with a demand for arbitration, the served party must apply for a stay of arbitration within 30 days of service, or “he will thereafter be precluded from denying the validity of the agreement.”
15
GREENGoodrich v. Southland Homes Corp., 449 S.E.2d 154 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994).
cites § 9-9-6 4×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 9-9-6
“Finally, Goodrich argues that the trial court’s confirmation of he award was improper because Southland’s demand for arbitration *792 failed to notify Goodrich of her right to seek a stay of arbitration as required by OCGA § 9-9-6 (c) (3). Decided October 5, 1994.”
16
GREENSchinazi v. Eden., 830 S.E.2d 531 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019).
cites § 9-9-6 2×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 9-9-6
“If the court determines there is no substantial issue concerning the validity of the agreement to submit to arbitration or compliance therewith and the claim sought to be arbitrated is not barred by limitation of time, the court shall order the parties to arbitrate.”
Later courts cite it for
“we defer to the trial court's findings of fact upon which its denial was based unless those findings are clearly erroneous.” · 3 citing courts
17
GREENAustin Reg'l Home Care, Inc. v. Careminders Home Care, Inc., 810 S.E.2d 676 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018).
cites § 9-9-6 2×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 9-9-6
“In its order, the trial court also included a provision which stated: In accordance with OCGA § 9-9-6 (a), this Order shall operate to stay this action and all aspects of this litigation, and the Clerk is hereby ordered to administratively close this file such that it does not…”
18
GREENHolt & Holt, Inc. v. Choate Constr. Co., 609 S.E.2d 103 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004).
cites § 9-9-6 2×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 9-9-6
“Because Holt failed to avail itself of its right to arbitrate the decision within 30 days, it is bound by it.”
19
GREENBrown v. Premiere Designs, Inc., 597 S.E.2d 466 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004).
cites § 9-9-6 2×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 9-9-6
“7 Here, the absence of a record or transcript precludes review of the Browns’ claims of error committed by the arbitrator, thereby necessitating an affirmance of the state court’s refusal to vacate the arbitration award on any of these grounds.”
Later courts cite it for
“the absence of a . . . transcript precludes review of . . . claims of error committed by the arbitrator, thereby necessitating an affir-mance of the state court's refusal to vacate the arbitration award on any of these grounds.” · 1 citing court
20
GREENNorth Augusta Assocs. Ltd. P'ship v. 1815 Exch., Inc., 469 S.E.2d 759 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996).
cites § 9-9-6 2×cited by 24 cases
Where it cites § 9-9-6
“, and the Georgia Arbitration Code (GAC), OCGA § 9-9-6 et seq., the trial court must make a threshold decision that the parties have complied with conditions precedent to arbitration before issues may proceed to arbitration.”
The case’s holding
Where parties contractually agree to be bound by state arbitration law, a court may apply that state law, provided it does not conflict with the Federal Arbitration Act.
Later courts cite it for
“state law may apply where parties agree to be bound by state arbitration law, so long as that law does not conflict with the faa.” · 2 citing courts

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
199120072024

One bar per year. Tallest: 5 cases in 2014. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Ga. Ct. App.3511th Cir.1Ga.1N.D. Ga.1
By subsection
(a)1 case
Tyler Kaspers v. Comcast Corp., 631 F. App'x 779 (11th Cir. 2015).
(e)1 case
Georgia Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Excalibur Reinsurance Corp., 4 F. Supp. 3d 1362 (N.D. Ga. 2014).

Show all 38 citing cases (list view) →

Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: O.C.G.A. 2023 print volume: Georgia laws through the 2023 session at the latest. Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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