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Call Now: 904-383-7448The governing authority of any county, municipality, or combination thereof may expend public funds to perform any public service or public function as authorized by this Constitution or by law or to perform any other service or function as authorized by this Constitution or by general law.
- Art. IX, Sec. V, Paras. I, II.
- For article surveying legislative and judicial developments in Georgia local government law for 1978-79, see 31 Mercer L. Rev. 155 (1979). For annual survey of local government law, see 35 Mercer L. Rev. 233 (1983). For article, "Privatization of Rural Public Hospitals: Implications for Access and Indigent Care," see 47 Mercer L. Rev. 991 (1996).
Initially, county officials could not bind the county by the creation of a debt for payment of which it had no power to levy a tax. Thus, county officials were not authorized to purchase vaccine matter for inoculation of persons against smallpox. Daniel v. Putnam County, 113 Ga. 570, 38 S.E. 980, 54 L.R.A. 292 (1901).
Equity will grant an injunction if county exceeds taxing ability. Mitchell v. Lasseter, 114 Ga. 275, 40 S.E. 287 (1901); DeVaughn v. Booten, 146 Ga. 836, 92 S.E. 629 (1917).
- Citizens and taxpayers of counties have such an interest as will authorize them to maintain actions to enjoin the unlawful distribution of public funds of counties or to recover county funds which were allegedly illegally disbursed. Nelson v. Wainwright, 224 Ga. 693, 164 S.E.2d 147 (1968).
- Before the writ of mandamus will issue to compel county commissioners to issue their warrant upon county treasurer to pay a debt, it must appear that the debt comes within the classes provided in this paragraph. Brunson v. Caskie, 127 Ga. 501, 56 S.E. 621, 9 L.R.A. (n.s.) 1002 (1907); Barksdale v. Hayes, 134 Ga. 348, 67 S.E. 852 (1910); Clark v. Reynolds, 136 Ga. 817, 72 S.E. 254 (1911); Daniel v. Hutchinson, 169 Ga. 492, 150 S.E. 681 (1929) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. IV, Para. II).
- Since a county is declared to be an "employer" under Ch. 9, T. 34, and has constitutional authority to raise funds therefor, the conclusion is demanded that all county employees in all counties are covered by workers' compensation. Rosser v. Meriwether County, 125 Ga. App. 239, 186 S.E.2d 788 (1971).
Cited in Harrison v. Rainey, 227 Ga. 240, 179 S.E.2d 923 (1971); Inman Park Restoration, Inc. v. Urban Mass Transp. Admin., 414 F. Supp. 99 (N.D. Ga. 1975); Decatur Tax Payers League, Inc. v. Adams, 236 Ga. 871, 226 S.E.2d 69 (1976); Ledbetter Bros. v. Floyd County, 237 Ga. 22, 226 S.E.2d 730 (1976); Peacock v. Georgia Mun. Ass'n, 247 Ga. 740, 279 S.E.2d 434 (1981); Clayton County v. Otis Pruitt Homes, Inc., 250 Ga. 505, 299 S.E.2d 721 (1983); Malcom v. Newton County, 244 Ga. App. 464, 535 S.E.2d 824 (2000).
- In light of the similarity of the provisions, decisions under former Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. II and antecedent provisions, which set forth specific purposes for which county and municipal expenditures were authorized, are included in the annotations for this paragraph.
County authorities have no power to make a contract with a bank, constituting it the fiscal agent of the county, regarding the payments of warrants on the county treasurer. Lettice v. American Nat'l Bank, 133 Ga. 874, 67 S.E. 187 (1910).
- Where suit was brought by a surveyor, who was appointed by the Governor to run a disputed line between two counties under Ga. L. 1908, p. 96 (see now O.C.G.A. Art. 2, Ch. 3, T. 36), to recover from one of such counties one-half of the charge for such survey, there was no error in dismissing the suit on general demurrer (now motion to dismiss). Robert v. Wilkinson County, 137 Ga. 601, 73 S.E. 838 (1912); Smith v. Baker County, 142 Ga. 168, 82 S.E. 557 (1914).
Costs of publication of annual statement of the county treasurer not valid expense of county. Howard v. Early County, 104 Ga. 669, 30 S.E. 880 (1898).
- This paragraph broadens the taxing power which the legislature may confer upon counties sufficiently to embrace all expenses for constructing and maintaining bridges and roads. Smith v. Floyd County, 85 Ga. 420, 11 S.E. 850 (1890) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. IV, Para. II).
Taxation to pay a judgment for personal injuries caused by unrepaired bridge permitted. Dearing v. Shepherd, 78 Ga. 28 (1886).
There is no limitation on amount of taxes which may be assessed and collected within the year for building and repairing bridges within counties of this state, excepting the cost of erecting the bridges. Settle v. Howell, 174 Ga. 792, 164 S.E. 189 (1932).
- The board of regents, through the college of agriculture, controls the general scope of the agricultural extension work and is empowered to employ and discharge county agents, while the counties may, if they choose to levy the tax therefor, supplement the salaries of the county agents. Royal Indem. Co. v. Humphries, 90 Ga. App. 567, 83 S.E.2d 565 (1954).
- County commissioners can expend county funds for limited purpose of paying salary of personnel to aid and assist in administration of county government. Whatley v. Taylor County, 224 Ga. 669, 164 S.E.2d 121 (1968).
- While county commissioners cannot expend public money beyond the specified purposes enumerated in the Constitution, large discretion is vested in the county commissioners in the expenditure of public money within the specified purposes enumerated in the Constitution. Whatley v. Taylor County, 224 Ga. 669, 164 S.E.2d 121 (1968).
Supreme Court will not interfere with the discretionary action of county commissioners within the sphere of their legally delegated powers, unless such action amounts to an abuse of discretion. Whatley v. Taylor County, 224 Ga. 669, 164 S.E.2d 121 (1968).
- Rather, payment of retirement benefits for county school employees from general county funds is authorized by this paragraph and by Ga. Const. 1976, Art. X, Sec. I, Para. I (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. III), as it represents a separate and distinct public purpose. Lomax v. McBrayer, 248 Ga. 753, 286 S.E.2d 35 (1982) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. IV, Para. II).
- Given the general and broad powers of counties authorized by this paragraph and Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1 (see now O.C.G.A. § 32-4-41) to levy taxes and expend funds for the construction and maintenance of roads, it is reasonable to imply authority to develop facilities for production of asphalt for use in the county road system. Ledbetter Bros. v. Floyd County, 237 Ga. 22, 226 S.E.2d 730 (1976) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. IV, Para. II).
Uniform Airport Act is not void as violative of this paragraph of the Constitution. Swoger v. Glynn County, 179 Ga. 768, 177 S.E. 723 (1934) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. IV, Para. II).
This paragraph does not limit use of tax proceeds to providing "facilities" for a transit system. Camp v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 229 Ga. 35, 189 S.E.2d 56 (1972) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. IV, Para. II).
- Salaries of judges of the city courts may be properly classed as expenses of court within the meaning of this paragraph. Clark v. Eve, 134 Ga. 788, 68 S.E. 598 (1910) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. IV, Para. II).
Salaries of judges of the superior courts cannot be classed as expenses of the court. Clark v. Hammond, 134 Ga. 792, 68 S.E. 600 (1910).
Costs of publishing the general presentments of the grand jury are not expenses of court. Houston County v. Kersh & Wynne, 82 Ga. 252, 10 S.E. 199 (1899).
A superior court judge cannot appoint and pay a detective, or employ a special officer to detect an escaped prisoner. Maxwell v. Cumming, 58 Ga. 384 (1877).
- The term "litigation" does not include litigation arising out of violations of a prohibitory liquor law. Koger v. Hunter, 102 Ga. 76, 29 S.E. 141 (1897).
Litigation does not include engagement of counsel to resist legislative action. DeVaughn v. Booten, 146 Ga. 836, 92 S.E. 629 (1917).
Litigation does not include a proceeding before the state prison commission (now Board of Corrections) for removal of the warden in charge of the convicts in a given county, instituted by a majority of the commissioners of roads and revenues (board of county commissioners) of such county. Humber v. Dixon, 147 Ga. 480, 94 S.E. 565 (1917).
- Where it was the right and, therefore, the duty of a public official to, in good faith, raise the question as to the validity of the "Voters Registration Act," former Ga. L. 1949, p. 1204 (now Art. 6, Ch. 2, T. 21), the official need not do so at the official's own expense, since it is the county's funds sought to be protected and not the official's own funds. The Constitution, when enumerating the purposes for which counties could levy and collect taxes, used the word "litigation" and that language was intended to cover just such a situation as is here presented. Richmond County v. Harper, 206 Ga. 517, 57 S.E.2d 595 (1950).
- Contract by county with a hospital in the county, to provide a ward for hospitalization and medical treatment of indigent sick, is neither gratuity nor otherwise prohibited unless in violation of statutory limitations on the levy of taxes to support such a contract. Brock v. Chappell, 196 Ga. 567, 27 S.E.2d 38 (1943).
It can never be a valid county purpose to provide revenue to a municipality because municipalities are not citizens of nor creatures of counties - they are an entirely different form of government. City Council v. Mangelly, 243 Ga. 358, 254 S.E.2d 315 (1979).
General Assembly must have express constitutional authorization for allowing a county to impose a tax for a particular purpose. City Council v. Mangelly, 243 Ga. 358, 254 S.E.2d 315 (1979).
List of purposes for which the state may tax in Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. I and Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. IV (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. III, Para. I and Para. II) is the only purposes of taxation the state may validly delegate to its creatures power to tax. City Council v. Mangelly, 243 Ga. 358, 254 S.E.2d 315 (1979).
Though the purposes listed in Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. I (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. III, Para. I) are capable of delegation, the right of the state to tax to grant funds to municipalities is not capable of delegation to counties or to any other subdivision of the state. City Council v. Mangelly, 243 Ga. 358, 254 S.E.2d 315 (1979).
State may not grant to counties the right to tax and to give part of the proceeds to municipalities, and consequently this may not be "such other public purpose[s] as may be authorized by the General Assembly" within the meaning of this paragraph or the similar language of Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. I (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. IV). City Council v. Mangelly, 243 Ga. 358, 254 S.E.2d 315 (1979) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. IV, Para. II).
Purposes for which a county may tax are listed in this paragraph, and Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. I (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. IV) and taxation by counties for the purpose of sharing the resulting revenue with cities does not appear in that list. City Council v. Mangelly, 243 Ga. 358, 254 S.E.2d 315 (1979) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. IV, Para. II).
- The authority of county governments to expend public funds is enumerated in this paragraph. Expenditure of county funds to procure passage or defeat of constitutional amendments is not specifically permitted. Further, the Supreme Court has decided that an advertising campaign to influence vote approval of a constitutional amendment is not authorized as a facet of administration of county government. McKinney v. Brown, 242 Ga. 456, 249 S.E.2d 247 (1978) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. IV, Para. II).
- There is no conflict between the taxing powers of a county as set forth in Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. I (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. IV) with the authority contained in this paragraph. 1958-59 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 39.(see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. IV, Para. II).
Express powers of a county to levy taxes must be used for prescribed purposes and none other; thus, taxes levied by a county for any one of the enumerated purposes cannot be used for any of the other enumerated purposes. 1958-59 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 125.
Fourteen purposes listed in this paragraph are exclusive, and any attempt to use county funds except for these purposes would be null and void. 1967 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 67-123.(see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. IV, Para. II).
Test of the "public nature" of the expenditure should be judged by the tangible benefits accruing to the county. 1977 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U77-34.
- This paragraph authorizes the legislature, by a local bill to district the territory of a county for fire protection purposes and to authorize such county to levy a tax upon the taxable property within such district for the purpose of providing and maintaining such fire protection, provided the limits or boundaries of such fire protection district are clearly set forth in the local bill. 1958-59 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 39.(see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. IV, Para. II).
- All counties and those municipalities having the requisite charter authority may enter into cooperative agreements with one another for the purchase and use of equipment to be employed in jointly administered riot control programs. 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-141.
- The expenditure of public funds for a county wide "straw vote" or public opinion referendum, absent some statutory or constitutional premise, is prohibited. 1990 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U90-20.
Expenditure of tax funds by the county to secure reports, recommendations, plans, or surveys would not violate this paragraph, inasmuch as the information required as a result of the contemplated agreements would be a proper expense incurred in the administration of the county government. 1963-65 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 273.
- If a county desires funds for acquisition of a right of way, the first source for this money is from tax moneys collected for this particular purpose; if a county has made no provision in its levy of taxes for acquisition and construction of roads or if all taxes collected pursuant to a levy for this purpose have been expended, then the county must derive its funds from either surplus funds derived from taxes levied for other purposes, if there is a residue, or from funds arising from sources other than taxation. 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-231.
Laws of this state do not authorize setting aside of moneys in a "special fund" to purchase a right of way for county roads. 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-231.
- In those cases in which moneys have been raised for a specific purpose and all demands and debts properly chargeable to the particular fund have been paid, a surplus from such fund then becomes a general fund; this residue may be lawfully applied to payments of any legitimate liabilities against the county. 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-231.
County may apply funds arising from other sources than taxation to defray expenses for any authorized public purpose; the only exception to this principle is that these funds derived from other sources, such as fees and costs, must not be earmarked by statute to be applied in some other particular direction. 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-231.
- Insofar as it were a tax supported function, provision by the county of sewerage facilities to a private nursing home would be an invalid exercise of power in the absence of enabling legislation. 1962 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 77.
- Where county taxes are levied under this paragraph and under paragraph (10) of former Code 1933, § 92-3701 (see now O.C.G.A. § 48-5-220), the expenses and salaries of the county and home demonstration agent would be paid by the general governing body of the county, i.e., usually the board of county commissioners (of roads and revenues). 1958-59 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 127 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. IV, Para. II).
- The expenditure of funds for coverage of state or local employees of public hospitals and institutions of higher learning by unemployment compensation would be authorized by Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VII, Sec. II, Para. I (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VII, Sec. III, Para. I), and subparagraphs (7) and (8) of this paragraph to provide necessary welfare benefits as specified by the General Assembly. 1971 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 71-35 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. IV, Para. II).
- Since the Constitution limits county taxation and expenditures to welfare programs as provided by law, and the only welfare provided by law which may include this type of day care services is the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program, there would be no authority for a county to appropriate money for private day care center which is not operated as a service for eligible children. 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U75-1.
County is authorized to use county equipment and to expend county funds in maintenance of watershed improvement structures where such projects are in furtherance of the county's authorization to conserve natural resources, serve a flood prevention need, and provide additional public benefits. 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 75-29.
- A county can participate in a retirement annuity for its employees contracted through an insurance company with the understanding that payments for public school teachers and personnel, their dependents and survivors, shall be paid from education funds. 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-474; 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U75-37.
- Neither the State Board of Education nor local boards of education can lawfully use school funds for room and board (other than school lunches) or for medical (including psychiatric) treatment or services beyond such evaluation as is necessary to placement and the determination of the proper educational program for a given child. 1979 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 79-1.
- The expression "for educational purpose" is to be given the broadest significance; the expression is ". . . broad enough to cover all things necessary or incidental to the furtherance of education . . .," but the scope of the expression does not extend to any measure that might incidentally prove to be of assistance to a program of education. 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 75-33.
- The expenditure of public school funds by a county board of education to run sewer lines from its schools to city sewer lines on nearby city streets, and to purchase sewage disposal services from the city, would not violate any constitutional or statutory provision of the State of Georgia. 1967 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 67-85.
It is illegal for a county school board to expend school funds to help defray tax collection expenses of county tax commissioner. 1965-66 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 65-3.
School funds may not legally be used to purchase uniforms for school lunch personnel. 1967 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 67-182.
- The language "books, records, and accounts of the public school system over which any such board has jurisdiction" is broad enough to lead a school board to conclude that it could utilize public school funds to procure a private audit not only of educational funds, but also of all noneducational funds under the board's jurisdiction however, such use would be unconstitutional by this paragraph. 1963-65 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 731 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. IV, Para. II).
- Answering of the question of whether a given expenditure can be said to be an expenditure "for school purposes" is exceedingly difficult and an area as broad as "medical services" is not one which can be said to be either wholly within or wholly without the outer limits of a lawful expenditure "for school purposes." 1977 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 77-52.
- Some forms of medical service have such direct and substantial relationship to the educational process as to render it unlikely a court would not authorize expenditure of school funds for such service at least where arguably authorized by statute. 1976 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 76-44.
School funds cannot lawfully be expended to provide pupils with full medical care. 1976 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 76-44.
Common school funds can lawfully be used for support of "community school program," which programs are ordinarily conducted after normal school hours and consist of various activities of an educational nature provided for the general citizenry without violating constitutional prohibitions of the expenditure of school funds for purposes other than "school" or "educational" purposes. 1977 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 77-60.
Local school boards may spend state and local tax funds to maintain debate program; these expenditures may include payment of debate meet registration fees for individuals and schools. 1981 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 81-20.
- Individual and school registration fees and costs for student room and board while they are away from home at centrally located debate meets are necessary and incidental to the educational process and may be paid with funds derived from local taxation. 1981 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 81-20.
- In view of the inherent nature of library facilities as a learning tool and the pervasive relationship between educational authorities and library systems on both state and local governmental levels, together with the stated legislative policy that establishment of a public library service is to be part of the provisions for public education in this state, the use of common school funds for construction of public library facilities is an expenditure for educational purposes. 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 75-33.
- Expenditure of school funds for payment of rewards offered for information concerning damage to and destruction of school property is not an expenditure for educational purposes, and therefore not a lawful use of general school funds. 1974 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 74-122.
- Neither state nor local school funds may be used to provide lunches for children not enrolled in the public school program. 1974 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 74-155.
No direct provision of law prohibits a local school system from providing school lunches for children not enrolled in the public school program, assuming full reimbursement is made to the school system for expenses incurred in the providing of such service. 1974 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 74-155.
- Expenditures for an annual physical examination of the School Superintendent, for a faculty banquet, and for payment of insurance premiums for members of a high school football team would be improper objects for the expenditure of common school funds. 1971 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 71-12.
County may not lawfully expend county funds to reimburse sheriff's surety for payments made to satisfy judgment against sheriff. 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U75-22.
- The ordinary (now judge of probate court) does not have the authority needed to distribute electorate sample ballots prior to the next general election; even if such authority were contained in Ch. 2, T. 21, it is extremely doubtful whether public funds could be used. 1968 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 68-4.
- 56 Am. Jur. 2d, Municipal Corporations, Counties, and Other Political Subdivisions, §§ 163 et seq., 386 et seq., 495 et seq. 71 Am. Jur. 2d, State and Local Taxation, § 36 et seq.
- 20 C.J.S., Counties, § 259 et seq.
- Use of public funds or exercise of taxing power to promote patriotism, 30 A.L.R. 1035.
Validity of privilege or occupation tax on business of severing natural resources from soil, 32 A.L.R. 827; 52 A.L.R. 187; 60 A.L.R. 101; 156 A.L.R. 692.
Encouragement or promotion of industry not in nature of public utility, carried on by private enterprise, as public purpose for which tax may be imposed or public money appropriated, 112 A.L.R. 571.
Constitutionality and construction of statute which provides for the use of the general funds or credit of the municipality in event of default or delay in payment of, or inability to collect, or insufficiency of, special assessments for local improvements, 135 A.L.R. 1287.
Validity of governmental borrowing or expenditure for purposes of acquiring, maintaining, or improving stadium for use of professional athletic team, 67 A.L.R.3d 1186.