Liquor permits.

- Section of DeKalb County Code requiring all employees of an establishment holding a license for consumption of beer or wine, except busboys, cooks, and dishwashers, to have permits was not unconstitutional and did not exceed the county's powers of home rule. Kariuki v. DeKalb County, 253 Ga. 713, 324 S.E.2d 450 (1985), overruled on other grounds, Russell v. City of E. Point, 261 Ga. 213, 403 S.E.2d 50 (1991).

Acts of board of education.

- A county acts through its officers and agents. In matters pertaining to education, it acts through its board of education. When the board of education acts upon matters lawfully within its jurisdiction, it is the county acting through its corporate authority, and a county is not liable to suit for any cause of action unless made so by statute. But when the board of education, through its members, acts beyond the scope of its lawful jurisdiction and commits an actionable wrong, the act so committed is not "county action," and in such a case a suit may be maintained in the courts of this state against the wrongdoers. Duffee v. Jones, 208 Ga. 639, 68 S.E.2d 699 (1952).

Liability of county to suit generally.

- This paragraph subjects the counties of this state to suit, but not to suits upon all causes of action. It does not make them generally liable to suits, like individuals or as municipal corporations. Being political subdivisions of the state, they cannot be sued unless made subject to suit expressly or by necessary implication. Decatur County v. Praytor, Howton & Wood Contracting Co., 163 Ga. 929, 137 S.E. 247 (1927) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. I).

County liability based on Constitution or statute.

- The constitutional provision that a county is a body corporate and the statutory provision that a county, as a body corporate, may be sued in any court, do not authorize a suit against a county for damages where the county is not made liable for such damages by the Constitution or by statute. Revels v. Tift County, 235 Ga. 333, 219 S.E.2d 445 (1975).

County is not liable on an implied contract. Smith v. Baker County, 142 Ga. 168, 82 S.E. 557 (1914); Decatur County v. Roberts, 159 Ga. 528, 126 S.E. 460 (1925).

Requirements to enjoin county board action.

- In order to enjoin a county board's action in selecting a solid waste disposal site, plaintiffs are required to show an abuse of discretion or a constitutional violation. Lindsey v. Guhl, 237 Ga. 567, 229 S.E.2d 354 (1976).

Suit must name county as corporate body to proceed against county with suit.

- Where a suit is brought against the board of county commissioners alleging that the building of a certain road has injured the plaintiff, the suit is intended as one against the county, and where the petition does not name as a defendant the county as a corporate body but instead only names the board of commissioners, who are its agents, the petition cannot be amended and must be dismissed. Merritt v. Dixon, 222 Ga. 432, 150 S.E.2d 644 (1966).

An action must be brought in name of the county. Smith v. Fuller, 135 Ga. 271, 69 S.E. 177, 1912A Ann. Cas. 70 (1910); Henry v. Means, 137 Ga. 153, 72 S.E. 1021 (1911).

Injunction against county governing officials proper.

- Though suits by and against a county are properly brought in the name of the county, an injunction may be sought in a court of equity in an action which is brought against the governing officials of the county. Olley Valley Estates, Inc. v. Fussell, 232 Ga. 779, 208 S.E.2d 801 (1974).

Legislature can designate the ordinary (now judge of probate court) as the county official to whom bond of a sole commissioner should be made payable, and can provide that the ordinary should sue on the bond in the event of default. Ordinarily, the sole commissioner would be the person who would institute suits in the name of the county, but this is not such a case. This is not a suit by the county, but is one by the ordinary for the use of the county. The bond was a contract between the ordinary, and the sole commissioner and the surety. McRae v. Sears, 183 Ga. 133, 187 S.E. 664 (1936).

County can bring action to collect delinquent payments due county facility.

- Where county had the legislative authority, by implication, to maintain a hospital for the benefit of paupers and incidentally make charges for the use thereof by persons able to pay in order to help bear the expenses of maintaining said hospital and in accord with a plain and single rule of natural right and justice, such county could bring an action for said charges; such suit was properly brought in the name of the county. Oliver v. Hall County Mem. Hosp., 62 Ga. App. 95, 8 S.E.2d 138 (1940).

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the provisions, decisions under former Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. I and antecedent provisions, which provided that the General Assembly could create tribunals and officers for the transaction of county matters subject to uniformity throughout the state, are included in the annotations for this paragraph.

Ga. L. 1919 p. 288, § 147 (see now O.C.G.A. § 20-2-101) is not violative of this paragraph. Olliff v. Hendrix, 172 Ga. 497, 158 S.E. 11 (1931) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. I).

This paragraph was not violated when term of clerk of city court shortened. Collins v. Russell, 107 Ga. 423, 33 S.E. 444 (1899) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. I).

Creation of County Commissioners of Ware County did not violate this paragraph. Crawley v. State, 150 Ga. 86, 102 S.E. 898 (1920); Smith v. Duggan, 153 Ga. 463, 112 S.E. 458 (1922); Rhodes v. Jernigan, 155 Ga. 523, 117 S.E. 432 (1923), overruled on other grounds, Lucas v. Woodward, 240 Ga. 770, 243 S.E.2d 28 (1978) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. I).

Former Code 1933, Ch. 23-25, making treasurer ex-officio officer of commission did not violate this paragraph. McFarlin v. Board of Drainage Comm'rs, 153 Ga. 766, 113 S.E. 447 (1922) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. I).

For an invalid Act appointing a county treasurer for an unexpired term, see McCants v. Layfield, 149 Ga. 231, 99 S.E. 877 (1919).

This paragraph and Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. VII (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. I) must be construed together. They confer upon the General Assembly power to create boards of commissioners with such powers as the General Assembly may grant, without regard to uniformity in the powers conferred; and the constitutional prohibition under Ga. Const. 1976, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. VII (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. IV, Para. IV), which declares that no special law shall be enacted in any case for which provision has been made by an existing general law, is not violated by the creation of such boards. Sanders v. Wilkinson County, 69 Ga. App. 676, 26 S.E.2d 467 (1943); Bowen v. Lewis, 201 Ga. 487, 40 S.E.2d 80 (1946); Robert v. Steed, 207 Ga. 41, 60 S.E.2d 134 (1950) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. I).

Ga. Const. 1976, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. VII (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. IV), regarding special laws, has been construed together with Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. VII (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. I), and this paragraph, to impose little restriction on the General Assembly in creating and defining duties of county commissioners by special Act. The General Assembly has the power to pass separate and distinct laws creating county commissioners for every county in Georgia; and the provisions of general laws enacted by the legislature do not apply to such officers, unless made so by the special laws creating them. Smith v. Abercrombie, 235 Ga. 741, 221 S.E.2d 802 (1975) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. I).

Constitutional requirement of uniformity is not applicable to law relating to the powers and duties of county commissioners. Deason v. DeKalb County, 222 Ga. 63, 148 S.E.2d 414 (1966).

Legislation enacted by General Assembly with respect to creation of tribunals or offices for transaction of county matters must be uniform throughout the state. Such tribunals or offices must be of the same name, jurisdiction, and remedies. Toole v. Anderson, 177 Ga. 814, 171 S.E. 714 (1933).

Different political subdivisions and processes.

- There is nothing that prohibits a state from creating different kinds of political subdivisions and providing a different process for selecting and removing officials in those subdivisions. Smith v. Abercrombie, 235 Ga. 741, 221 S.E.2d 802 (1975).

General Assembly has power to pass separate and distinct laws creating county commissioners for every county in Georgia; and the provisions of general laws enacted by the legislature do not apply to such officers, unless made so by the special laws creating them. Humthlett v. Reeves, 211 Ga. 210, 85 S.E.2d 25 (1954).

Effect of joint construction of this paragraph and Ga. Const. 1976, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. VII (Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. IV).

- There is no general law in this state regulating the creating of county commissioners and fixing their jurisdiction, powers, and duties, but all such Acts are special laws; and construing together Ga. Const. 1976, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. VII (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. IV), and this paragraph, as they must be construed, there is no limitation or restriction upon the General Assembly in the creation of such commissioners, and in fixing their jurisdiction, powers, and duties. Hutchins v. Candler, 209 Ga. 415, 73 S.E.2d 191 (1952) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. I).

Different construction sometimes warranted.

- There is good reason to construe the provision found in this paragraph as being separate and distinct in its requirements from the provisions of Ga. Const. 1976, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. VII (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. IV), prohibiting the passing of special laws where there was already an existing general law. Toole v. Anderson, 177 Ga. 814, 171 S.E. 714 (1933) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. I).

The provisions of this paragraph are more nearly akin to those in Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. I (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Para. I), than Ga. Const. 1976, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. VII (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. IV). Toole v. Anderson, 177 Ga. 814, 171 S.E. 714 (1933) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. I).

Setting compensation for county officers.

- This paragraph allows nonuniformity when the legislature fixes compensation of county treasurers. McCall v. Wilkins, 145 Ga. 342, 89 S.E. 219 (1916); Clayton County v. Worsham, 239 Ga. 135, 236 S.E.2d 80 (1977) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. I).

The General Assembly is not governed by Ga. Const. 1976, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. VII (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. IV) in fixing the compensation of tax commissioners. Clayton County v. Worsham, 239 Ga. 135, 236 S.E.2d 80 (1977).

This paragraph applies to a grand jury inasmuch as it is a tribunal created for transacting county business and considering county matters. Bussell v. Youngblood, 239 Ga. 553, 238 S.E.2d 89 (1977) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. I).

Special laws for discharging county employees.

- Even though a general law provides a manner for discharging county police by county commissioners, a special law relating to the subject is valid. Deason v. DeKalb County, 222 Ga. 63, 148 S.E.2d 414 (1966).

County administrator has authority, previously vested in county commissioners, to hire and fire. Spell v. Blalock, 243 Ga. 459, 254 S.E.2d 842 (1979).

General Assembly may confer upon county commissioner power and authority to contract for a cadastral survey, and if commissioner may contract for such a survey under the authority of the General Assembly, the same authority may provide a method whereby revenue will be provided to pay any reasonable cost thereof. Hutchins v. Candler, 209 Ga. 415, 73 S.E.2d 191 (1952).

Diversity in operation between counties.

- The general rule is that laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation throughout the state; however, the Constitution made an exception as to county commissioners, which sanctions the utmost diversity consistent with the needs of the particular county that may require them. Hutchins v. Candler, 209 Ga. 415, 73 S.E.2d 191 (1952).

Rationale for constitutionality of §§ 48-5-297,48-5-299, and 48-5-306. - Former Code 1933, §§ 92-6911 and 92-6913 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 48-5-297,48-5-299, and48-5-306), providing for a cadastral survey in certain counties, would not have been unconstitutional, illegal, and void, as contended, even had such Acts named a certain county rather than having fixed a classification based on population, since the purpose of such Acts was to confer upon the proper governing authority of counties falling within the classification fixed additional powers and duties. Hutchins v. Candler, 209 Ga. 415, 73 S.E.2d 191 (1952).

Local law violated Constitution.

- An Act which created the office of chief tax assessor and the board of tax assessors review in the City of Augusta and Richmond County was not authorized by Ga. L. 1956, pp. 453-456, a local amendment to this paragraph, and was in violation of Ga. Const. 1976, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. VII (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. IV). Dobson v. Brown, 225 Ga. 73, 166 S.E.2d 22 (1969) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. I).

School board members.

- Term limitations of Telfair County Tenure Law, 1963 Ga. Laws 705, do not apply to school board members because the Tenure Law amends Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX and not Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VIII; thus, a member who was serving a third consecutive term was not subject to the Tenure Law. Dyal v. Pope, 283 Ga. 463, 660 S.E.2d 725 (2008).

Right to bring suit.

- Contention that it was right of ordinary (now judge of probate court), rather than board of county commissioners, to bring suit to recover money allegedly paid illegally to sheriff was without merit. Sanders v. Wilkinson County, 69 Ga. App. 676, 26 S.E.2d 467 (1943).

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the provisions, decisions under former Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. VII and antecedent provisions, which provided that the General Assembly had the power to create and define the duties of county commissioners, are included in the annotations for this paragraph.

This paragraph should be construed in connection with Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. VI (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. I). Sanders v. Wilkinson County, 69 Ga. App. 676, 26 S.E.2d 467 (1943) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. I).

This paragraph confers upon the General Assembly the power to create boards of commissioners with such powers as the General Assembly may grant, without regard to uniformity in the powers conferred; and that the constitutional prohibition under Ga. Const. 1976, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. VII (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. IV), which declares that no special law shall be enacted in any case for which provision has been made by an existing general law, is not violated by the creation of such boards. Robert v. Steed, 207 Ga. 41, 60 S.E.2d 134 (1950) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. I).

Restrictions on General Assembly in defining county commissioner's role.

- This constitutional power to create commissioners and define their duties, does not serve in anyway or manner to abrogate the inhibition against delegation of legislative authority. By analogy, the General Assembly may be constitutionally authorized to set up and create various state boards, departments, bureaus and the like, but this authority standing alone will not permit the General Assembly to delegate its legislative authority to such lawfully constituted authorities. Bibb County v. Garrett, 204 Ga. 817, 51 S.E.2d 658 (1949) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. I).

Ga. Const. 1976, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. VII (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. IV), regarding special laws, has been construed together with this paragraph and Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. VI, to impose little restriction on the General Assembly in creating and defining the duties of county commissioners by special Act. The General Assembly has the power to pass separate and distinct laws creating county commissioners for every county in Georgia; and the provisions of general laws enacted by the legislature do not apply to such officers, unless made so by the special laws creating them. Smith v. Abercrombie, 235 Ga. 741, 221 S.E.2d 802 (1975) (decided under Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. I; see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. I).

Granting administrative power to regulate and control.

- The prohibition against delegation of legislative powers does not preclude the General Assembly from vesting in some other authority administrative power to regulate and control. Bibb County v. Garrett, 204 Ga. 817, 51 S.E.2d 658 (1949).

Purpose of Ga. Const. 1976, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. VII (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. IV) is to ordain the uniform operation throughout the state of all general laws; but the Constitution made an exception as to county commissioners in this paragraph, which sanctions utmost diversity consistent with needs of the particular county that "may require them." Bradford v. Hammond, 179 Ga. 40, 175 S.E. 18 (1934).

This paragraph and

§ 36-1-4 subject to qualification by special Act. - Under Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. VI, this paragraph, and former Code 1933, §§ 23-1713 and 23-1714 (see now O.C.G.A. § 36-1-14), so far as they refer to county commissioners, are subject to qualification by special Acts, and the special Acts need not be uniform. Moore v. Whaley, 189 Ga. 647, 7 S.E.2d 394 (1940) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. I).

Instance of section being unconstitutional as special law unwarranted.

- Act relating to the board of county commissioners of a named county, which provided that county commissioners should not "purchase directly or indirectly materials, livestock, supplies or other articles for any department of the county, from himself or from any copartnership in which he may be interested directly or indirectly, nor from any person directly or indirectly, in his employ in any capacity whatsoever," that if on prescribed investigation any commissioner was found guilty of having violated such provisions the commissioner should be removed from office by written order of the judge or ordinary (now judge of probate court), trying such charges, was not unconstitutional on the ground that it was a special law enacted in a case for which provision had been made by an existing general law, to-wit former Code 1933, §§ 23-1713 and 23-1714 (see now O.C.G.A. § 36-1-14), relating to purchases in behalf of counties by county commissioners and removal for violation of the inhibition therein declared. Robitzsch v. State, 189 Ga. 637, 7 S.E.2d 387 (1940).

This provision was contained in the Constitution of 1877 and the Constitution of 1868, as well as that of 1945. Hutchins v. Candler, 209 Ga. 415, 73 S.E.2d 191 (1952) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. I).

Legislature has power to pass separate and distinct Acts for any counties which require county commissioners, and does not require these Acts to be uniform in operation. Bradford v. Hammond, 179 Ga. 40, 175 S.E. 18 (1934); Hutchins v. Candler, 209 Ga. 415, 73 S.E.2d 191 (1952).

Uniform law not required.

- This paragraph and Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. VI, do not require passage of a general uniform law defining the duties of county commissioners. Pulaski County v. Pollock, 83 Ga. 270, 9 S.E. 1065 (1889); Sayer v. Brown, 119 Ga. 539, 46 S.E. 649 (1904); Deason v. DeKalb County, 222 Ga. 63, 148 S.E.2d 414 (1966) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. I).

Different grants of power.

- The General Assembly may grant to and define powers of county board of commissioners that are different from and contrary to a general statutory grant of powers to county governing authorities. SCA Servs. of Ga., Inc. v. Fulton County, 238 Ga. 154, 231 S.E.2d 774 (1977).

Intimation to contrary regarding granting of power in Conley v. Poole, 67 Ga. 254 (1884) was obiter.

- Smith v. Duggan, 153 Ga. 463, 112 S.E. 458 (1922); Rhodes v. Jernigan, 155 Ga. 523, 117 S.E. 432 (1923), overruled on other grounds, 240 Ga. 770, 243 S.E.2d 28 (1978).

It has been said that there is no limit to the power of the General Assembly to define the powers of the county board of commissioners. Decatur County v. Roberts, 159 Ga. 528, 126 S.E. 460 (1925); Bowen v. Lewis, 201 Ga. 487, 40 S.E.2d 80 (1946); Hutchins v. Candler, 209 Ga. 415, 73 S.E.2d 191 (1952).

In defining the power, other provisions of the state Constitution must not be violated. Board of Comm'rs v. Mayor of Americus, 141 Ga. 542, 81 S.E. 435 (1914).

Method of laying out public roads in a county prescribed by former Code 1933, Ch. 95-2 (see now O.C.G.A. Ch. 4, T. 32) was passed by virtue of this paragraph. Commissioners of Decatur County v. Curry, 154 Ga. 378, 114 S.E. 341 (1922) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. I).

Commissioners legally authorized to exercise municipal powers. Churchill v. Walker, 68 Ga. 681 (1882).

Contracts.

- An implied power is conferred by a statute granting jurisdiction to county authorities to contract in regard to the details. Wright v. Floyd County, 1 Ga. App. 582, 58 S.E. 72 (1907).

Contract with a citizen to investigate unreturned taxable property is void. Decatur County v. Roberts, 159 Ga. 528, 126 S.E. 460, answer conformed to, 33 Ga. App. 437, 126 S.E. 557 (1925).

Act creating board of county commissioners not infringement on power of probate court judge.

- Since the General Assembly has constitutional authority to create a board of county commissioners, and since the ordinary (now judge of probate court) is given jurisdiction over county matters only when such a board has not been created, a contention that an Act creating such a board unconstitutionally infringes upon and restricts power and authority of an ordinary, a duly elected, qualified, commissioned and acting county official during the official's term of office is without merit. Bleckley v. Vickers, 225 Ga. 593, 170 S.E.2d 695 (1969).

Ordinary (now judge of probate court) sits for county purposes only in those counties where jurisdiction over county matters and county affairs has not been granted by legislative Act to a county commissioner or board of county commissioners. Bleckley v. Vickers, 225 Ga. 593, 170 S.E.2d 695 (1969).

Power to prescribe powers includes power to limit.

- The authority of the General Assembly to prescribe powers of the ordinary (now judge of probate court) over county affairs necessarily includes authority to increase or diminish such powers. Bleckley v. Vickers, 225 Ga. 593, 170 S.E.2d 695 (1969).

Mode of choosing county officer's legislature's discretion.

- There is no limit on this power. Nor does the Constitution point out how these officers shall be chosen. It leaves the whole matter to the discretion of the legislature. In other words, the people have not seen fit to restrict themselves to the mode of the choice of such officers. Bleckley v. Vickers, 225 Ga. 593, 170 S.E.2d 695 (1969).

General Assembly may confer upon county commissioner power and authority to contract for a cadastral survey, and if the commissioner may contract for such a survey under the authority of the General Assembly, the same authority may provide a method whereby revenue will be provided to pay any reasonable cost thereof. Hutchins v. Candler, 209 Ga. 415, 73 S.E.2d 191 (1952).

Specificity of amending Act sufficient for validation.

- The description of an Act to be amended as an Act to amend an Act creating a board of county commissioners for a specific county, so as to provide for commissioner districts, etc., unmistakably identifies the law to be amended, reveals the legislative intent, and is valid. Stembridge v. Newton, 213 Ga. 304, 99 S.E.2d 133 (1957).

Municipal corporations engaging in traditional private business.

- In absence of special circumstances, it is not within the constitutional power of the legislature to authorize a municipal corporation (county) to engage in a business which can be and ordinarily is carried on by private enterprise merely for the purpose of obtaining an income or deriving a profit therefrom, but it should be allowed to go into business only on the theory that thereby the public welfare will be subserved. 1965-66 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 66-176 (decided under former §§ 2-5801, 2-6201 and 2-6501).

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the provisions, opinions under former Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. VI and antecedent provisions, which provided that the General Assembly could create tribunals and officers for county matters subject to uniformity throughout the state, are included in the annotations for this paragraph.

Distinction between constitutional provisions in invalidation of special laws.

- A "special" law is invalidated by the second clause of Ga. Const. 1976, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. VII (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. IV) only where a general law covering the subject already exists, while the first clause of Ga. Const. 1976, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. VII (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. IV), Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. I (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Paras. I, II) and this paragraph, invalidate any special legislation, even where general laws dealing with their respective subject matters exist. 1954-56 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 375 (decided under Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. I; see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. I).

Mingling of county police and sheriff's department.

- When county police department is established and law enforcement functions of sheriff are transferred to such department, the sheriff or the sheriff's deputies may not become members of the police department so as to exercise the police power. 1970 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U70-28.

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the provisions, opinions under former Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. VII and antecedent provisions, which provided that the General Assembly had the power to create and define the duties of county commissioners, are included in the annotations for this paragraph.

Uniformity not required.

- This paragraph authorizes the General Assembly to provide for boards of commissioners for counties and defines their duties with no requirement of uniformity, so the General Assembly can grant to and define powers of the county board of commissioners different from and contrary to a general statutory grant of powers to county governing authorities since Ga. Const. 1976, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. VII (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. IV) does not apply to statutes defining the powers of a county governing authority. 1978 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U78-11 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. I).

Payment of taxes not required for political candidates.

- Construing Ga. Const. 1976, Art. III, Sec. V, Para. VII (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. IV), Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. VIII (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. III), and this paragraph, the payment of taxes is not required of any candidate for a state office except that members of the General Assembly may not be seated if in default for taxes; whether candidates for county offices are eligible to run where they are behind with payment of taxes depends upon the office and the legislative Acts relating to that office or officer. 1954-56 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 311 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. I).

Grants of power to counties and municipalities strictly construed.

- Counties and municipal corporations can only exercise such powers as are conferred by law, and grants of such powers must be strictly construed. 1980 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U80-25.

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 56 Am. Jur. 2d, Municipal Corporations, Counties, and Other Political Subdivisions, §§ 2, 4, 8.

C.J.S.

- 20 C.J.S., Counties, § 1 et seq.

ALR.

- Power of municipalities or other political subdivisions to engage in a joint project or enterprise, 123 A.L.R. 997.