"Setting apart" explained.

- "Setting apart" of debtor's exempt property is a mere identification of property to which exemption shall be applied, the burden of securing which is put on the debtor. In re Trammell, 5 F.2d 326 (N.D. Ga.), petition denied, 8 F.2d 451 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 270 U.S. 649, 46 S. Ct. 349, 70 L. Ed. 780 (1925).

Purpose of Constitution in providing that certain property shall be exempt from levy and sale was not to prohibit any other species of property from being declared exempt, but to guarantee the exemption of the property specified for the benefit of the persons entitled thereto, to be set aside in the manner to be provided by the General Assembly. Southall v. Blount, 182 Ga. 368, 185 S.E. 321 (1936).

Provision not exhaustive as to other species of property which may be exempted.

- Even if the legislature may not amend the homestead exemptions provided for in the Constitution so as to lessen or extend the exemption as to the species of property therein dealt with, the constitutional provisions are not exhaustive as to other species of property. Southall v. Blount, 182 Ga. 368, 185 S.E. 321 (1936).

Exemption provided for in this paragraph does not include money as subject to exemption. Southall v. Blount, 182 Ga. 368, 185 S.E. 321 (1936).

Legislature, in enacting former Code 1933, § 51-601, was dealing with different species of property from that dealt with in the Constitution. Southall v. Blount, 182 Ga. 368, 185 S.E. 321 (1936).

Former Code 1933, § 46-213, relating to exemption of benefits to be paid by fraternal benefit societies, is not violative of this paragraph providing for exemption from levy and sale of the property of certain specified persons, realty or personalty, or both, to the value in the aggregate of $1,600.00; such provision not being a limitation upon legislative power as to a species of property not therein dealt with and not being applicable to cases of exemption of "money or other benefit" payable by a fraternal benefit society. Southall v. Blount, 182 Ga. 368, 185 S.E. 321 (1936).

Applicant for homestead is not authorized to take both statutory and constitutional homesteads. Worley v. Arnold, 74 Ga. App. 772, 41 S.E.2d 568 (1947).

Judgment debtor claiming invalid statutory homestead entitled to constitutional homestead.

- When statutory homestead claimed by a judgment debtor is valid, and the debtor cannot thereafter take constitutional homestead, but, if the former was invalid the debtor was entitled to the latter. Worley v. Arnold, 74 Ga. App. 772, 41 S.E.2d 568 (1947).

No valid conveyance of land during existence of homestead.

- When a homestead was set apart to the head of a family, under the Constitution of 1877, in land belonging to the head of the family, the head of the family could not make a valid conveyance of the land during the existence of the homestead, and a deed so made was void. Dorsey v. Dorsey, 189 Ga. 662, 7 S.E.2d 273 (1940).

Creditor may seek to have exempted property subjected to payment when debtor has waived exemption.

- When a debtor has not set aside household and kitchen furniture as prescribed in Ga. L. 1924, p. 57, § 1 (see now O.C.G.A. § 44-13-42), and when the debtor has executed a note to a creditor waiving this exemption, the creditor may seek to have the exempted property subjected to the payment of the debtor's note. Turner v. Caudill, 175 Ga. 170, 165 S.E. 24 (1932).

Homestead right can be asserted against purchaser with notice.

- Real estate paid for in full with other realty previously set apart in due and proper manner under the homestead and exemption laws of this state, and dealt with by the head of the family and the spouse (there being no other beneficiaries of the homestead) as exempted property, takes the place of the latter and is impressed with the homestead character, and such homestead right can be asserted against a purchaser with notice. Amerson v. Cox, 173 Ga. 477, 160 S.E. 506 (1931).

Cited in Aspinwall v. Latimer, 174 Ga. 712, 164 S.E. 50 (1932); Blackshear Mfg. Co. v. Carter, 180 Ga. 828, 181 S.E. 155 (1935); McDaniel v. Kelley, 61 Ga. App. 105, 5 S.E.2d 672 (1939); Pass v. Pass, 195 Ga. 155, 23 S.E.2d 697 (1942); Rose v. Crane Heating Co., 198 Ga. 295, 31 S.E.2d 717 (1944).

Delinquent state tax collection.

- A taxpayer's assertion of the statutory homestead exemption contained in a former law would not prevent the Revenue Department from levying upon the taxpayer's personal automobile to satisfy delinquent state taxes. 1983 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 83-14.

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 31 Am. Jur. 2d, Exemptions, §§ 1 et seq., 24 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 35 C.J.S., Exemptions, § 1 et seq.

ALR.

- Validity of mortgage executed by entryman on public land before patent, 41 A.L.R. 938.

Loss of homestead rights by wife through absence enforced by act of husband, 42 A.L.R. 1162; 129 A.L.R. 305.

Deposit of exempt funds as affecting debtor's exemption, 67 A.L.R. 1203.

Estoppel to claim, or waiver of, homestead by direction of judgment debtor to levy on real estate, 101 A.L.R. 851.

One who supports (or is under a duty to support) in whole or part relatives who do not live with him as "head of family," "householder," etc., within homestead exemption statute, 118 A.L.R. 1386.

Debtor's exemption of personalty as attaching to proceeds of sale or exchange thereof, 119 A.L.R. 467.

Creation of homestead right in real estate as affecting previous mortgage, trust deed, or purchase money or vendor's lien, 123 A.L.R. 427.

Constitutionally permissible classification or discrimination in debtors' exemption statutes, 128 A.L.R. 107.

Exemption of motor vehicle from seizure for debt, 37 A.L.R.2d 714.

Enforcement of claim for alimony or support, or for attorneys' fees and costs incurred in connection therewith, against exemptions, 54 A.L.R.2d 1422.

What state exemption law, in point of time, governs bankrupt's exemption rights, 61 A.L.R.2d 748.

Wife as head of family within homestead or other property exemption provision, 67 A.L.R.2d 779.

What is "necessary" furniture entitled to exemption from seizure for debt, 41 A.L.R.3d 607.