City Court of Atlanta does not violate the exclusivity and uniformity provisions.

- The City Court of Atlanta, under 1996 Ga. Laws 627, does not violate the exclusivity and uniformity provisions of the Georgia Constitution. The court rejected the defendant's contention that the phrase "system of state courts" found in the preamble of the 1996 Act amounts to an unconstitutional attempt by the General Assembly to place the City Court of Atlanta in the class of "state court," under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. I, Para. V, while restricting its jurisdiction. Wickham v. State, 273 Ga. 563, 544 S.E.2d 439 (2001).

Legislature has provided for uniform practice in courts of record by passage of Ga. L. 1966, p. 609, § 1 (see now O.C.G.A. Ch. 11, T. 9) and by providing that it shall apply in all courts of record. The legislature cannot, then, proceed to declare that the practice in some courts of record shall be different. Gresham v. Symmers, 227 Ga. 616, 182 S.E.2d 764 (1971).

General Assembly is authorized to reduce juries in state courts from 12 to six without violating this paragraph. McSears v. State, 247 Ga. 48, 273 S.E.2d 847 (1981) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. I, Para. V).

Number of sessions of superior courts may be increased. Mulherin v. Kennedy, 120 Ga. 1080, 48 S.E. 437 (1904); Burge v. Mangum, 134 Ga. 307, 67 S.E. 857 (1910).

General Assembly cannot strip powers of superior court judge.

- General Assembly may not enact any law stripping any superior court judge of jurisdiction and powers conferred upon the judge by the Constitution. Fulton County v. Woodside, 222 Ga. 90, 149 S.E.2d 140 (1966).

Judges of superior court are coequal in jurisdiction and authority. Fulton County v. Woodside, 222 Ga. 90, 149 S.E.2d 140 (1966).

Magistrate judges and variance by local law.

- As the constitution permits selection and terms of offices of magistrate judges to be varied by local law, the provisions of O.C.G.A. §§ 15-10-20,15-10-23,15-10-100,15-10-105 and Ga. L. 1983, p. 4027, are not unconstitutional. In re Magistrate Court, 262 Ga. 334, 418 S.E.2d 42 (1992).

Judges in multi-judge circuits have coequal jurisdiction and authority, yet are subject to reasonable rules designed to expedite the business of the court by adopting a manner or method for distribution of the business of the court among the judges. Fulton County v. Woodside, 222 Ga. 90, 149 S.E.2d 140 (1966).

Georgia Constitution does not require random and equal distribution of cases among the judges of a multi-judge circuit; it merely requires certain uniformity among courts. Lumpkin v. Johnson, 270 Ga. 392, 509 S.E.2d 621 (1998).

There is no constitutional requirement of uniformity among judges within one court, since the term "courts" refers to the entire court and not to the judge or judges of the court. Cobb County v. Campbell, 256 Ga. 519, 350 S.E.2d 466 (1986).

Lawyer serving as superior court judge subject to disbarment.

- That a lawyer was also a judge of the superior court and hence a constitutional officer and must have practiced law seven years at the time of the lawyer's election and was prohibited from practicing law while serving as judge, did not mean that the lawyer cannot at the same time be disbarred and the lawyer's license to practice law canceled as was provided in former Code 1933, Ch. 5, T. 9 (see now O.C.G.A. Art. 2, Ch. 19, T. 15). The two proceedings were provided for the accomplishment of entirely different results. Each must be pursued to accomplish the result which it was intended to accomplish. Gordon v. Clinkscales, 215 Ga. 843, 114 S.E.2d 15 (1960).

Assignments can restrict authority of judge, but not of courts.

- Assignment of nonjury, or criminal, or jury, or other kinds of cases to judge does restrict the judge's authority and powers to that type of cases during that assignment, but this in no way limits, detracts from, or otherwise controls the jurisdiction of the court which is a separate entity from and larger in scope than the judge or judges of that court. Fulton County v. Woodside, 222 Ga. 90, 149 S.E.2d 140 (1966).

Cited in McDonald v. Vaughn, 130 Ga. 398, 60 S.E. 1060 (1908); Meyers v. Whittle, 171 Ga. 509, 156 S.E. 120 (1930); Wages v. Morgan, 174 Ga. 158, 162 S.E. 380 (1932); Jones v. Boykin, 185 Ga. 606, 196 S.E. 900 (1938); Moyers v. State, 186 Ga. 446, 197 S.E. 846 (1938); Robert v. Steed, 207 Ga. 41, 60 S.E.2d 134 (1950); City of Atlanta v. Sims, 210 Ga. 605, 82 S.E.2d 130 (1954); Gordon v. Clinkscales, 215 Ga. 843, 114 S.E.2d 15 (1960); Burpee v. Logan, 216 Ga. 434, 117 S.E.2d 339 (1960); Simmons v. State, 226 Ga. 110, 172 S.E.2d 680 (1970); Sellers v. Home Furnishing Co., 235 Ga. 831, 222 S.E.2d 34 (1976); Hopkins v. Hopkins, 237 Ga. 845, 229 S.E.2d 751 (1976); State v. Andrews, 240 Ga. 531, 242 S.E.2d 153 (1978); Williams v. Richmond County, 241 Ga. 89, 243 S.E.2d 55 (1978); McKeighan v. Long, 154 Ga. App. 171, 268 S.E.2d 674 (1980).

Editor's notes

- In light of the similarity of the provisions, decisions under former Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VI, Sec. IX, Para. I and antecedent provisions are included in the annotations for this paragraph.

Superior court has jurisdiction of cases transferred from abolished city court. Macon, D. & S.R.R. v. Calhoun, 138 Ga. 165, 74 S.E. 1030 (1912); Macon, D. & S.R.R. v. Calhoun, 11 Ga. App. 338, 75 S.E. 343 (1912).

Practice of either City Court of Atlanta or City Court of Savannah may be changed to adapt to existing conditions. Welborne v. State, 114 Ga. 793, 40 S.E. 857 (1902).

Right to adapt to existing conditions is subject to the limitation of Ga. Const. 1877, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. VII (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. IV). Binns v. Ficklen, 130 Ga. 377, 60 S.E. 1051 (1908).

Justice court and court of notary public are identical. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Carter, 11 Ga. App. 499, 75 S.E. 842 (1912).

Civil Court of Fulton County is not subject to rules of uniformity laid down in this paragraph. McBrayer v. Automobile Fin., Inc., 95 Ga. App. 116, 97 S.E.2d 184 (1957) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. I, Para. V).

Paragraph not violated by Code 1895, § 2372 relating to benevolent institutions. Kennedy v. Meara, 127 Ga. 68, 56 S.E. 243 (1906) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. I, Para. V).

Local Act creating the Municipal Court of Macon and permitting oral charges to the jury does not violate this paragraph. Robinson v. Odom, 168 Ga. 81, 147 S.E. 569 (1929) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. I, Para. V).

Act establishing county criminal courts (Ga. L. 1929, p. 394) does not violate this paragraph. Jordan v. State, 172 Ga. 857, 159 S.E. 235 (1931) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. I, Para. V).

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the provisions, decisions under former Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VI, Sec. II, Para. VII and antecedent provisions, relating to the Supreme Court's power to make rules as to hearing and determining cases, are included in the annotations for this paragraph.

Supreme Court had authority under this paragraph to determine cases under such regulations as were prescribed by it. This was so because this paragraph prevailed over former Code 1933, § 24-3801 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-2-4). Fuller v. State, 232 Ga. 581, 208 S.E.2d 85 (1974) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. I, Para. V).

Validity of laws setting rules of practice and procedure.

- The rules of procedure and practice recommended by the Supreme Court pursuant to Ga. L. 1945, p. 145 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-2-18), are matters over which the legislature has always exercised jurisdiction. This paragraph does not change the jurisdiction but refers only to rules for the operation of the Supreme Court which the Supreme Court alone can adopt. The 1953 amendment, Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess. p. 279 (now repealed) is valid. Gordy v. Dunwody, 210 Ga. 810, 83 S.E.2d 7 (1954) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. I, Para. V).

This paragraph does not invest Supreme Court with power to prescribe rules of procedure and practice in trial courts. Gordy v. Dunwody, 210 Ga. 810, 83 S.E.2d 7 (1954) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. I, Para. V).

Supreme Court cannot adopt questions presented for review in appellant's brief as being specifications of error since the brief is not a part of the record but a requirement of the court under its authority to make rules for the determination of cases. Windsor v. Southeastern Adjusters, Inc., 221 Ga. 329, 144 S.E.2d 739 (1965).

ALR.

- Construction and application of constitutional provision against special or local laws regulating practice in courts of justice, 135 A.L.R. 365.

Power of court to prescribe rules of pleading, practice, or procedure, 158 A.L.R. 705.