§1-14 Words have usual meaning. The
words of a law are generally to be understood in their most known and usual
signification, without attending so much to the literal and strictly
grammatical construction of the words as to their general or popular use or
meaning. [CC 1859, §9; RL 1925, §9; RL 1935, §10; RL 1945, §9; RL 1955, §1-17;
HRS §1-14]
Attorney General Opinions
Cited in construing "child". Att. Gen. Op. 93-1.
Case Notes
Where statute does not refer to renewal of a license and
treats all licenses as similar whether first or subsequent, circumstance that
in popular mind there is a difference not sufficient to alter plain meaning.
12 H. 303, 306.
Where words are defined in statute express declaration of
meaning governs. 15 H. 29, 34; 33 H. 371, 374; 36 H. 170, 178; 37 H. 314, 319,
aff'd 174 F.2d 21; 37 H. 374, reh'g denied. 37 H. 380; 38 H. 16, 28; 49 H.
426, 421 P.2d 294; 4 U.S.D.C. Haw. 664, 667.
Presumption is that words used in usual sense. 25 H. 669,
686; 31 H. 625, 629, aff'd 52 F.2d 411; 41 H. 156, 159; 43 H. 154, 160; 44 H.
519, 530, 356 P.2d 1028; 46 H. 375, 399, 381 P.2d 687. Other cases where usual
sense given or statute cited: 3 H. 793; 5 H. 321; 8 H. 259; 25 H. 747, 754; 39
H. 100, 109. But most known and usual sense may be repelled by the context, 25
H. 669, 686; 34 H. 269, 272, reh'g denied. 34 H. 324, aff'd 105 F.2d 286; or
where would lead to absurdity or inconsistency, 43 H. 154, 157; 44 H. 220, 227,
352 P.2d 846. Compare where strict construction called for. 22 H. 618, 625;
38 H. 421, 426; 44 H. 59, 67, 352 P.2d 335; 45 H. 167, 177, 363 P.2d 990.
Modern meaning given, as distinguished from ancient
restricted meaning. 34 H. 245. Commonly accepted meaning, as distinguished
from fine distinctions of law of future interests. 46 H. 375, 381 P.2d 687.
More natural interpretation may be rejected where would lead
to unconstitutionality. 36 H. 170, 182; 40 H. 257, 259.
While common meaning is general rule, where statute involves
a trade presumption is that words have trade meaning. 45 H. 167, 177, 363 P.2d
990.
There must be substantial justification for disregarding
generally accepted meaning, but court must look to evils which provision
expected to cure. 50 H. 212, 437 P.2d 99.
Words of any statute, usually read in their ordinary and
popular sense. 52 H. 279, 474 P.2d 538.
Usual meaning should be rejected if it results in absurdity.
55 H. 55, 515 P.2d 621.
Statute may be construed contrary to literal meaning where
literal meaning results in absurdity and the words are susceptible of another
construction carrying out the manifest intent. 57 H. 84, 549 P.2d 737.
Whatever is necessarily or plainly implied is as much a part
of the statute as that which is expressed. 58 H. 53, 564 P.2d 436.
Courts are bound to give effect to all parts of a statute if
such a construction can legitimately be found. 60 H. 487, 591 P.2d 607.
Cited in construing "accident". 1 H. App. 625, 623
P.2d 1271.
Cited in construing "decision". 131 H. 513, 319
P.3d 432 (2014).
Mentioned: 9 H. App. 325, 839 P.2d 530.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
59
cases (
3 in the last 5 years), 1968–2025 · leading case:
State v. Aiwohi, 123 P.3d 1210 (Haw. 2005).
State v. Aiwohi, 123 P.3d 1210 (Haw. 2005).
· cites it 12× “to their general or popular use or meaning," HRS § 1-14 (1993), the language of HRS § 707-702 prohibits reckless conduct against a human being who at the time is alive, and does not express any design to include a pregnant woman whose self-abusive conduct affects her fetus.”
State v. Jing Hua Xiao, 231 P.3d 968 (Haw. 2010).
· cites it 12× “Consistent with the mandates of due process, under general principles of statutory construction, "[t]he words of a law are generally to be understood in their most known and usual signification, without attending so much to the literal and strictly grammatical construction of…”
Awakuni v. Awana, 165 P.3d 1027 (Haw. 2007).
· cites it 4× “See HRS § 1-14 ("The words of a law are generally to be understood in their most known and usual signification, without attending so much to the literal and strictly grammatical construction of the words as to their general or popular use or meaning.”
State v. Hicks, 148 P.3d 493 (Haw. 2006).
· cites it 6× “See HRS § 1-14. According to Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 9th edition and the American Heritage On-line Dictionary, “imprison” means “to put in oí-as if in prison; confine.”
State v. Veikoso, 74 P.3d 575 (Haw. 2003).
· cites it 4× “" HRS § 1-14. We, therefore, hold that the term "conviction," as used in HRS § 291-4.”
State v. Codiamat., 317 P.3d 664 (Haw. 2013).
· cites it 14× “In interpreting statutes, HRS § 1-14 (1993) provides that “[t]he woi’ds of the law are generally to be understood in their most known and usual signification, without attending so much to the literal and strictly grammatical construction of the words as to their general or…”
State v. Bayly, 185 P.3d 186 (Haw. 2008).
· cites it 4× “” HRS § 1-14 (1993). To determine what meaning to attach to the term “collision,” we first review relevant easelaw on the meaning of “collision” in other criminal statutes as well as in the context of automobile insurance policies that cover “collisions.”
State v. Haili, 79 P.3d 1263 (Haw. 2003).
· cites it 4× “') Accordingly, we presume that the jury applied the commonly understood meaning of those terms" (citing HRS § 1-14 (1993) ("The words of a law are generally to be understood in their most known and usual signification[.”
Williamson v. Hawai'i Paroling Auth., 35 P.3d 210 (Haw. 2001).
· cites it 4× “" HRS § 1-14 (1993). In this case, "[n]one of the parties contend and [it can]not [be] discern[ed] that the language of HRS § [§ 706-660, -669, -670, 353-62, and -64] is ambiguous inasmuch as, on its face, there is no doubt, doubleness of meaning, or indistinctiveness or…”
Singleton v. Liquor Comm'n, 140 P.3d 1014 (Haw. 2006).
· cites it 4× “Pursuant to HRS § 1-14 (1993), 19 words of a statute are to be generally understood in their most common, general, or popular definition.”
Tamashiro v. Dep't of Human Servs., 146 P.3d 103 (Haw. 2006).
· cites it 4× “3d 1014, 1023 (2006) (citing HRS § 1-14). "Where a term is not statutorily defined [, a court] may rely upon extrinsic aids to determine such intent.”
— Haw. Rev. Stat. § 1-14(1993) — 1 case
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