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Haw. Rev. Stat. § 386-85 (2025)

  Presumptions

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laws through the 2025 session: the 2026 session is not included. The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2025 session: the 2026 session is not included cited 1970–2025 63citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 63 opinions since 1970, 9 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (1) (33 cases).

     §386-85  Presumptions.  In any proceeding for the enforcement of a claim for compensation under this chapter it shall be presumed, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary:

     (1)  That the claim is for a covered work injury;

     (2)  That sufficient notice of such injury has been given;

     (3)  That the injury was not caused by the intoxication of the injured employee; and

     (4)  That the injury was not caused by the wilful intention of the injured employee to injure oneself or another. [L 1963, c 116, pt of §1; Supp, §97-94; HRS §386-85; gen ch 1985]

 

Law Journals and Reviews

 

  Japanese Corporate Warriors in Pursuit of a Legal Remedy:  The Story of Karoshi, or "Death from Overwork" in Japan.  21 UH L. Rev. 169 (1999).

 

Case Notes

 

  Scope and nature of presumption discussed.  51 H. 312, 459 P.2d 541 (1969); 51 H. 632, 466 P.2d 439 (1970).

  Substantial evidence defined.  51 H. 312, 459 P.2d 541 (1969); 53 H. 406, 495 P.2d 1164 (1972).

  Where death might have been caused by preexisting heart condition or by occupational exertions or by both, presumption of paragraph (1) was applicable.  51 H. 312, 459 P.2d 541 (1969).

  Presumption places on employer the burden of going forward with the evidence as well as that of persuasion.  53 H. 32, 487 P.2d 278 (1971); 53 H. 406, 495 P.2d 1164 (1972).

  If employer fails to produce substantial evidence to contrary, presumption dictates that claimant must win.  53 H. 161, 489 P.2d 419 (1971).

  Evidence adduced by employer to show that death by heart attack was not work-connected held not to amount to substantial evidence.  53 H. 406, 495 P.2d 1164 (1972).

  Presumption may be rebutted only by substantial evidence to the contrary.  53 H. 406, 495 P.2d 1164 (1972).

  Presumption applies in §386-89(c) proceeding and places burden on employer.  56 H. 552, 545 P.2d 692 (1976).

  Employer has burden of going forward with evidence and burden of ultimate persuasion, and all reasonable doubt should be resolved in favor of claimant.  57 H. 296, 555 P.2d 855 (1976).

  Proceeding for review brought by claimant under §386-89(c) is a "proceeding for the enforcement of a claim for compensation under this chapter".  57 H. 535, 560 P.2d 1292 (1977).

  If employer fails to present substantial evidence to rebut presumption, employee must prevail.  59 H. 551, 584 P.2d 119 (1978).

  Paragraph (1) applies from outset.  Preliminary showing that injury occurred in course of employment not required.  63 H. 642, 636 P.2d 721 (1981).

  Where labor and industrial relations appeals board failed expressly to acknowledge statutory presumption of compensability in its decision, issue deemed not to be whether board had explicitly referred to the presumption, but whether the presumption had been rebutted by substantial evidence; board’s conclusion that claimant was not engaged in employment-related activity when claimant sustained injury was supported by substantial evidence.  77 H. 100, 881 P.2d 1246 (1994).

  Statutory presumption of paragraph (1) not triggered where claimant conceded that accident was not work-related.  77 H. 152, 883 P.2d 73 (1994).

  Employee's disability was compensable under this chapter where labor appeals board failed to apply statutory presumption in favor of compensability of employee's claim under this section, and employers failed to demonstrate by substantial evidence that employee's disease (1) was not caused by conditions that are characteristic of or peculiar to employee's employment as a dental hygienist, (2) did not result from employee's actual exposure to such conditions, and (3) was not due to causes in excess of the ordinary hazards of employment in general.  94 H. 70, 9 P.3d 382 (2000).

  In any proceeding on a claim for compensation due to an alleged compensable consequence of a work-related injury, this section creates a presumption in favor of the claimant that the subsequent injury is causally related to the primary injury.  94 H. 297, 12 P.3d 1238 (2000).

  Where the paragraph (1) presumption of work-connectedness was neither applicable nor relevant to any issue on appeal, as a matter of law, the appellate court erred in applying the presumption to the issue in the case.  97 H. 86, 34 P.3d 16 (2001).

  Appellate court did not err in applying paragraph (1) presumptions where whether the cause of claimant's permanent disability was work-related or caused by prior injury and other personal and/or psychological stresses was clearly at issue in the proceedings.  97 H. 402, 38 P.3d 570 (2001).

  In order to overcome the paragraph (1) presumption of work-relatedness, the employer must introduce substantial evidence to the contrary; once the trier of fact determines that the employer has adduced substantial evidence to overcome the presumption, it must weigh the evidence elicited by the employer against the evidence elicited by the claimant.  97 H. 402, 38 P.3d 570 (2001).

  Appeals board's decision denying employee's claim not clearly erroneous where employer adduced substantial evidence rebutting the presumption of compensability for employee's alleged stress-related workplace injury through psychiatrist's report that employee suffered from preexisting paranoid schizophrenia that was triggered by wage garnishment, which was not an incident of employment.  98 H. 263, 47 P.3d 730 (2002).

  Department of education failed to present substantial evidence to overcome the statutory presumption of compensability, where evidence overwhelmingly demonstrated that employee's exposure to vog at work, combined with the surrounding circumstances of employee's employment and employee's preexisting condition, resulted in the exacerbation of employee's asthma.  131 H. 545, 319 P.3d 464 (2014).

  Employer failed to present substantial evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption that employee's shoulder injuries were related to a work accident where employer's physicians did not do more than opine generally that employee had injuries predating employee's employment and did not consider how employee's prior injuries might have been affected or aggravated by the work accident.  136 H. 448, 363 P.3d 296 (2015).

  State did not provide substantial evidence sufficient to rebut presumption of workers' compensation coverage for employee's knee injury where the only medical evidence the State presented was medical reports that were conclusory in nature, did not do more than opine generally that employee's injury predated the work incident, and did not provide any reasonable degree of specificity in explaining why the work incident did not cause or aggravate employee's injury.  137 H. 437, 375 P.3d 216 (2016).

  Injury or death arises in course of employment when it takes place within the period of employment, at place where the employee may reasonably be, and while fulfilling duties or engaged in something incidental thereto.  1 H. App. 77, 613 P.2d 927 (1980).

  Pursuant to requirements of §91-12, appeals board should generally state whether or not it has applied presumption of paragraph (1).  But failure to do so in instant case did not prejudice appellant's substantial rights.  1 H. App. 77, 613 P.2d 927 (1980).

  Substantial evidence defined.  1 H. App. 77, 613 P.2d 927 (1980).

  Scope and nature of presumption discussed.  3 H. App. 39, 640 P.2d 1175 (1982).

  Board failed to correctly apply presumption of compensability; decision that claimant's low back condition was not a compensable consequence of a work injury was clearly erroneous in light of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence in the whole record.  94 H. 257 (App.), 12 P.3d 357 (2000).

  In light of the strong presumption of work-relatedness under Hawaii workers' compensation law, as well as the lack of any non-speculative evidence to explain the cause of claimant's injuries from non-witnessed fall while claimant was performing employment duties at claimant's place of employment during working hours, employer failed to satisfy its heavy burden of adducing a "high quantum" of "relevant and credible evidence of a quality and quantity sufficient to justify a conclusion by a reasonable person" that claimant's fall and consequent injuries were not work-related.  101 H. 293 (App.), 67 P.3d 792 (2003).

  Employer presented substantial evidence to rebut the presumption that employee's injuries were work-related where the undisputed evidence showed employee was injured while on unpaid leave, was injured while bowling, an activity that was not part of employee's work duties, at an off work site that was not operated or controlled by employer; employee's attendance there was strictly voluntary; employer did not finance the tournament; employer did not require employees to participate; and employer derived no substantial direct benefit from the bowling tournament beyond the intangible value of improvement in employee morale.  118 H. 239 (App.), 188 P.3d 753 (2008).

  Where employee performed trail maintenance while carrying a thirty- to fifty-pound backpack and claimed work-related injury to knee, and medical doctor explained how injury to employee's knee could have been affected by work, employer did not present substantial evidence that injury was unrelated to employment.  Medical evidence from employer consisted of generalized opinions when the primary focus of medical testimony should have been a discussion on whether the employment effort, whether great or little, in any way aggravated employee's condition.  137 H. 162 (App.), 366 P.3d 1041 (2016).

  Mentioned:  52 H. 242, 473 P.2d 561 (1970); 4 H. App. 26, 659 P.2d 77 (1983).

 

 

The 20 cases that cite Haw. Rev. Stat. § 386-85 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENTamashiro v. Control Specialist, Inc., 34 P.3d 16 (Haw. 2001).
cites § 386-85 90×subsections: (1) 62×cited by 38 cases
Where it cites § 386-85
“Tamashiro petitions this court to reverse the ICA's opinion because, although the ICA correctly construed the word "any" in HRS § 386-85 to mean that the presumption applies to all proceeding conducted under the workers' compensation chapter, the ICA: (1) erroneously relied upon…”
The case’s holding
The credibility of witnesses and the weight of their testimony are within the province of the trier of fact and generally will not be disturbed on appeal.
Later courts cite it for
“the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony are within the province of the trier of fact and, generally, will not be disturbed on appeal.” · 27 citing courts
2
GREENIgawa v. Koa House Restaurant, 38 P.3d 570 (Haw. 2001).
cites § 386-85 54×subsections: (1) 34×cited by 44 cases
Where it cites § 386-85
“HRS § 386-85 (1993) provides: In any proceeding for the enforcement of a claim for compensation under this chapter it shall be presumed, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary: (1) That the claim is for a covered work injury; (2) That sufficient notice of such…”
The case’s holding
The statutory presumption of compensability applies to permanent partial disability proceedings and may be rebutted by substantial evidence showing the disability is not work-related.
Later courts cite it for
“issue before the board was not merely whether and to what extent claimant was permanently disabled, but also whether the disability was a result of the work injury.” · 1 citing court
3
GREENDe Victoria v. H & K Contractors, 545 P.2d 692 (Haw. 1976).
cites § 386-85 40×subsections: (1) 28×cited by 26 cases
Where it cites § 386-85
“" HRS § 386-85. Where, as here, the primary issue is whether or not an injury is related to a work accident, a claimant is entitled to the same presumption on review of a case once closed that his claim is for a covered injury as that in an original hearing.”
The case’s holding
A work-connected injury that lightens up an inactive or dormant condition makes the resulting condition due to the work-connected injury.
Later courts cite it for
“left with a firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been made.” · 2 citing courts
4
GREENNakamura v. State, 47 P.3d 730 (Haw. 2002).
cites § 386-85 22×subsections: (1) 16×cited by 29 cases
Where it cites § 386-85
“2d at 727 (citing HRS § 386-85), and "where there is a reasonable doubt as to whether an injury is work-connected, it must be resolved in favor of the claimant.”
The case’s holding
Medical opinion evidence must possess a reasonable degree of specificity to rebut the statutory presumption of compensability in workers' compensation claims.
Later courts cite it for
“a reasonable degree of specificity is required in order for medical opinion evidence to rebut the presumption of compensability.” · 3 citing courts
5
GREENKorsak v. Hawaii Permanente Med. Grp., Inc., 12 P.3d 1238 (Haw. 2000).
cites § 386-85 18×subsections: (1) 8×cited by 59 cases
Where it cites § 386-85
“Kaiser petitions this court to vacate the ICA’s opinion and affirm the LIRAB’s decision because the ICA: (1) erroneously applied the statutory presumption of compensability under HRS § 386-85 (1993) 1 (the presumption) to an alleged com-pensable consequence of a work injury; (2)…”
The case’s holding
The statutory presumption of compensability applies to all proceedings under the workers' compensation chapter, including claims for subsequent injuries alleged to be compensable consequences of a primary injury.
Later courts cite it for
“contrary to kaiser's assertions that hrs 386-85 applies only to 'initial' proceedings or injuries, we construe the use of the word 'any' to mean that the presumption applies in all proceedings conducted pursuant to the workers' compensation chapter.” · 3 citing courts
6
GREENPanoke v. Reef Dev. of Hawaii, Inc., 363 P.3d 296 (Haw. 2015).
cites § 386-85 16×subsections: (1) 2×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 386-85
“The LIRAB concluded that Reef and Seabright adduced substantial evidence that rebutted the presumption that Panoke’s 1 HRS § 386-85 (1993) provides: In any proceeding for the enforcement of a claim for compensation under this chapter it shall be presumed, in the absence of…”
The case’s holding
The slightest aggravation or acceleration of an injury by employment activity mandates compensation and requires the employer to provide substantial evidence explaining why the accident did not aggravate pre-existing conditions.
Later courts cite it for
“in evaluating whether the burden of producing substantial evidence has been met, 'the slightest aggravation or acceleration of an injury by the employment activity mandates compensation.” · 5 citing courts
7
GREENDefries v. Ass'n of Owners, 999 Wilder, 555 P.2d 855 (Haw. 1976).
cites § 386-85 10×cited by 55 cases
Where it cites § 386-85
“[4] *860 Burden of Proof In reviewing the decision by the appeals board, this court must also take into consideration the burden of proof imposed upon the employer by HRS § 386-85: "Presumptions. In any proceeding for the enforcement of a claim for compensation .”
The case’s holding
A claimant may recover damages for injuries that aggravate or accelerate a pre-existing condition.
Later courts cite it for
“definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” · 3 citing courts
8
GREENIddings v. Mee-Lee, 919 P.2d 263 (Haw. 1996).
cites § 386-85 8×cited by 92 cases
Where it cites § 386-85
“" See HRS § 386-85 (1993). Most significant, we said: The exclusiveness of remedy is the "keystone" of our Workers' Compensation plan and "anything that tends to erode the exclusiveness of either the liability or the recovery strikes at the very foundation of statutory schemes…”
The case’s holding
The statutory exception for wilful and wanton misconduct encompasses reckless conduct and does not require a specific intent to cause injury.
Later courts cite it for
“where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, our only duty is to give effect to the statute's plain and obvious meaning.” · 3 citing courts
9
GREENChung v. Animal Clinic, Inc., 636 P.2d 721 (Haw. 1981).
cites § 386-85 8×subsections: (1) 8×cited by 77 cases
Where it cites § 386-85
“Chung’s heart attack arose out of and in the course of his employment, under HRS § 386-3; (3) whether the presumption contained in HRS § 386-85(1) that a claim is a covered work injury applies to this case; and (4) if the presumption applies, whether the appellants successfully…”
The case’s holding
A claim for compensation is presumed to be for a covered work injury unless the employer presents substantial evidence to the contrary.
Later courts cite it for
“simply requires the finding of a causal connection between the injury and any incidents or conditions of employment.” · 8 citing courts
cites § 386-85 16×subsections: (1) 14×cited by 45 cases
Where it cites § 386-85
“Davies and Company, adduced substantial evidence to overcome the presumption in HRS § 386-85(1) [2] that a causal connection in fact exists between the injury or death and the employment activity.”
The case’s holding
The statutory presumption that a death occurring in the course of employment is work-connected is rebutted only by relevant and credible evidence that the work did not aggravate the condition.
Later courts cite it for
“relevant and credible evidence of a quality and quantity sufficient to justify a conclusion by a reasonable man that an injury or death is not work connected.” · 8 citing courts
11
GREENFlor v. Holguin, 9 P.3d 382 (Haw. 2000).
cites § 386-85 10×subsections: (1) 2×cited by 35 cases
Where it cites § 386-85
“Furthermore, HRS § 386-85 (1993) provides in relevant part that “[i]n any proceeding for the enforcement of a claim for compensation under this chapter it shall be presumed, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary: (l)[t]hat the claim is for a covered work injury.”
The case’s holding
An occupational disease is compensable if caused by conditions peculiar to the employment and the employer fails to rebut the statutory presumption of compensability.
Later courts cite it for
“the presumption has been described as one of the 'keystone principles' of our workers' compensation plan.” · 1 citing court
12
GREENVan Ness v. State, Dep't of Educ.., 319 P.3d 464 (Haw. 2014).
cites § 386-85 7×cited by 22 cases
Where it cites § 386-85
“]” Pursuant to HRS § 386-85 (1993), for any workers’ compensation claim, “it shall be presumed, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary .”
The case’s holding
An injury by disease is compensable if proximately caused by employment, and doubt regarding the cause indicates an absence of substantial evidence to overcome the presumption of compensability.
Later courts cite it for
“doubt as to the cause of the injury represents a salient index of the absence of substantial evidence required to overcome the presumption that the claim is compensable.” · 3 citing courts
13
GREENTate v. GTE Hawaiian Tel. Co., 881 P.2d 1246 (Haw. 1994).
cites § 386-85 6×subsections: (1) 4×cited by 44 cases
Where it cites § 386-85
“HRS § 386-85 (1985) provides in relevant part: Presumptions.”
The case’s holding
An injury sustained while performing a personal errand on employer premises does not arise out of or in the course of employment if the activity provides no benefit to the employer.
Later courts cite it for
“an injury is said to arise in the course of the employment when it takes place within the period of employment, at a place where the employee reasonably may be, and while he or she is fulfilling his or her duties or engaged in something incidental thereto.” · 3 citing courts
14
GREENDavenport v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 59 P.3d 932 (Haw. App. 2001).
cites § 386-85 8×subsections: (1) 4×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 386-85
“In this respect, the HRS § 386-85 presumption applies: “[I]n any proceeding on a claim for compensation due to an alleged compensable consequence of a work-related injury, HRS § 386-85 creates a presumption in favor of the claimant that the subsequent injury is causally related…”
The case’s holding
Psychological injuries resulting from non-disciplinary personnel actions are compensable under workers' compensation statutes.
Later courts cite it for
“a contributing factor to the build up of perceived stress over the years has been davenport's dogged persistence in pursuing these promotion and grievance issues without compromise.” · 1 citing court
15
GREENDiaz v. Oahu Sugar Co., 883 P.2d 73 (Haw. 1994).
cites § 386-85 11×subsections: (1) 11×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 386-85
“Diaz next contends that this court must reverse the Appeals Board’s decision based on the statutory presumption contained in HRS § 386-85(1), which provides that “[i]n any proceeding for the enforcement of a claim for compensation under this chapter it shall be presumed, in the…”
Later courts cite it for
“generally, 'a subsequent injury, whether an aggravation of the original injury or a new and distinct injury, is compensable if it is the direct and natural result of a compensable primary injury.' 1 a. larson, the law of worker's compensation 13.11, at 3-503 (1993).” · 3 citing courts
16
GREENMiyamoto v. Wahiawa Gen. Hosp., 67 P.3d 792 (Haw. App. 2003).
cites § 386-85 16×subsections: (1) 10×cited by 3 cases
Where it cites § 386-85
“The Presumption of Compensability 'HRS § 386-85 (1993) provides, in relevant part, as follows: Presumptions.”
17
GREENMitchell v. BWK Jt. Venture, 560 P.2d 1292 (Haw. 1977).
cites § 386-85 8×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 386-85
“” in De Fries v. Association of Owners, 999 Wilder, supra, we were faced with a problem where a claimant sought to obtain a review of a compensation case under HRS § 386-89(c) (1975 Supp.”
The case’s holding
An administrative board need not rule on every proposed finding if its decision provides reasonably clear findings of fact.
Later courts cite it for
“because they are, in whole or in part, contrary to the facts or the law or because they are immaterial.” · 2 citing courts
18
GREENState v. Hussein. , 229 P.3d 313 (Haw. 2010).
cites § 386-85 2×cited by 70 cases
Where it cites § 386-85
“The dissent does not suggest that the opinions issued in the foregoing cases were merely “dicta” because the decision of the ICA was affirmed.”
The case’s holding
A sentencing court must state its reasons on the record at the time of sentencing for imposing a consecutive sentence rather than a concurrent one.
Later courts cite it for
“circuit courts must state on the record at the time of sentencing the reasons for imposing a consecutive sentence.” · 17 citing courts
19
cites § 386-85 2×cited by 54 cases
Where it cites § 386-85
“” 26 As to the most substantive of his arguments, 27 Appellant contends that the *28 statute allows for the imposition of criminal penalties, but because it “provides no requirement as to a burden of proof for the imposition of administrative penalties,” the “substantial…”
The case’s holding
The clear and convincing evidence standard applies to civil cases involving allegations of fraud or quasi-criminal wrongdoing to protect a party's reputation from erroneous tarnishment.
Later courts cite it for
“this court may disregard a particular contention if an appellant makes no discernable argument in support of that position” · 3 citing courts
20
GREENLawhead v. United Air Lines, 584 P.2d 119 (Haw. 1978).
cites § 386-85 4×cited by 21 cases
Where it cites § 386-85
“As to whether appellee contracted influenza as a result of her employment, and thus, suffered a compensable injury, this court must consider the burden imposed upon the employer by § 386-85: Presumptions. In any proceeding for the enforcement of a claim for compensation under…”
The case’s holding
An injury is compensable under workers' compensation law if it reasonably appears to have resulted from the working conditions.
Later courts cite it for
“an injury is compensable if it reasonably appears to have resulted from the working conditions” · 2 citing courts

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Citing cases by year
197019972025

One bar per year. Tallest: 5 cases in 2002. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Haw.41Haw. App.22
By subsection
(1)33 cases
Tamashiro v. Control Specialist, Inc., 34 P.3d 16 (Haw. 2001).“Tamashiro petitions this court to reverse the ICA's opinion because, although the ICA correctly construed the word "any" in HRS § 386-85 to mean that the presumption applies to all proceeding conducted under the workers' compensation chapter, the ICA: (1) erroneously relied upon…”
Igawa v. Koa House Restaurant, 38 P.3d 570 (Haw. 2001).“HRS § 386-85 (1993) provides: In any proceeding for the enforcement of a claim for compensation under this chapter it shall be presumed, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary: (1) That the claim is for a covered work injury; (2) That sufficient notice of such…”
De Victoria v. H & K Contractors, 545 P.2d 692 (Haw. 1976).“" HRS § 386-85. Where, as here, the primary issue is whether or not an injury is related to a work accident, a claimant is entitled to the same presumption on review of a case once closed that his claim is for a covered injury as that in an original hearing.”
Nakamura v. State, 47 P.3d 730 (Haw. 2002).“2d at 727 (citing HRS § 386-85), and "where there is a reasonable doubt as to whether an injury is work-connected, it must be resolved in favor of the claimant.”
Chung v. Animal Clinic, Inc., 636 P.2d 721 (Haw. 1981).“Chung’s heart attack arose out of and in the course of his employment, under HRS § 386-3; (3) whether the presumption contained in HRS § 386-85(1) that a claim is a covered work injury applies to this case; and (4) if the presumption applies, whether the appellants successfully…”
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(3)2 cases

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