§586-5 Period of order; hearing. (a)
A temporary restraining order granted pursuant to this chapter shall remain in
effect at the discretion of the court, for a period not to exceed one hundred
eighty days from the date the order is granted or until the effective date, as
defined in section 586-5.6, of a protective order issued by the court,
whichever occurs first, including, in the case where a temporary restraining
order restrains any party from contacting, threatening, or physically abusing a
minor, for a period extending to a date after the minor has reached eighteen
years of age.
(b) On the earliest date that the business of
the court will permit, but no later than fifteen days from the date the
temporary restraining order is granted, the court, after giving due notice to
all parties, shall hold a hearing on the application requiring cause to be
shown why the order should not continue. In the event that service has not
been effected, the court may set a new date for the hearing; provided that the
date shall not exceed ninety days from the date the temporary restraining order
was granted. All parties shall attend the hearing and may be represented by
counsel. The court shall allow the petitioner to
attend the hearing remotely if the petitioner's allegations include at least
one allegation of domestic abuse as defined in section 586-1. In cases
where the petitioner's allegations do not include at least one allegation of
domestic abuse as defined in section 586-1, the court may allow the petitioner
to attend the hearing remotely, with consideration of factors such as the
petitioner's lack of transportation, child care, and paid time off, as well as
the petitioner's fear of the respondent's presence.
The protective order may include all orders
stated in the temporary restraining order and may provide further relief, as
the court deems necessary to prevent domestic abuse or a recurrence of abuse,
including orders establishing temporary visitation with regard to minor
children of the parties and orders to either or both parties to participate in
domestic violence intervention. [L 1982, c 123, pt of §2; am L 1983, c 186, §1;
am L 1987, c 315, §3; am L 1992, c 290, §3; am L 1998, c 172, §3; am L 2011, c
85, §1; am L 2021, c 27, §2; am L 2023, c 75, §2]
Case Notes
Hawaii violation for breach of a protective order is not
similar to contempt of court for sentencing purposes. 631 F.3d 1021 (2011).
The constitutional right to discipline is inherent in the
right to care, custody, and control of one's children; due process requires the
State provide meaningful standards to guide the application of its laws; the
appropriate standard for family courts to apply in contested chapter 586 show
cause hearings is whether the parent's discipline is reasonably related to the
purpose of safeguarding or promoting the welfare of the minor; in applying such
a standard, circumstances, including factors such as the nature of the
misbehavior, the child's age and size, and nature and propriety of the force
used, should also guide the courts in this State. 126 H. 294, 270 P.3d 1024
(2012).
Although the fifteen-day time period for holding a show-cause
hearing in subsection (b) is directory, the fifteen-day time period is not
permissive, and the family court is obligated to hold a show-cause hearing on a
temporary restraining order (TRO) within fifteen days from the date the TRO is
granted (where service has been effected) unless there is a substantial reason
amounting to good cause for a delay. 122 H. 485 (App.), 228 P.3d 365 (2010).
Subsection (b)'s fifteen-day time period for holding a
show-cause hearing is directory; thus, subsection (b) did not compel
dissolution of the temporary restraining order (TRO) against respondent and the
family court erred in ruling that subsection (b) required the dissolution of
the TRO against respondent because a show-cause hearing was not held within
fifteen days of the issuance of the TRO. 122 H. 485 (App.), 228 P.3d 365
(2010).
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
17
cases (
6 in the last 5 years), 1997–2025 · leading case:
STYKE v. Sotelo, 228 P.3d 365 (Haw. App. 2010).
STYKE v. Sotelo, 228 P.3d 365 (Haw. App. 2010).
· cites it 45× “” Sotelo then orally moved to dismiss the TRO, on the ground that the show-cause hearing was not held within fifteen days of the granting of the TRO, which Sotelo argued was required by HRS § 586-5 (2006). The parties agreed that Judge Bissen could rule on the motion.”
Hamilton Ex Rel. Lethem v. Lethem, 193 P.3d 839 (Haw. 2008).
· cites it 4× “See HRS § 586-5 (2006) (stating that a TRO granted pursuant to chapter 586 shall not exceed ninety days).”
Hamilton Ex Rel. Lethem v. Lethem, 270 P.3d 1024 (Haw. 2012).
· cites it 16× “However, it is not necessary to import the express provision of HRS § 703-309(1) into HRS § 586-5 TRO show cause hearings. 18 *307 A.”
Kie v. McMahel, 984 P.2d 1264 (Haw. App. 1999).
· cites it 10× “" In this regard, we note but do not decide the effect of HRS § 586-5, which provides that "[t]he protective order may include other orders stated in the temporary restraining order and may provide such further relief as the court deems necessary.”
State v. Grindling, 31 P.3d 915 (Haw. 2001).
· cites it 6× “See HRS §§ 586-5, 586-5.5 (Supp.1999). 4 . Hawai'i Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 52(b) states, "Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court.”
Jd v. Pd., 482 P.3d 555 (Haw. App. 2021).
· cites it 6× “Nakasone Presiding Judge 19 HRS § 586-5(a) (2018) provides that, "A temporary restraining order granted pursuant to this chapter shall remain in effect at the discretion of the court, for a period not to exceed one hundred eighty days from the date the order is granted or until…”
State v. Poohina, 40 P.3d 907 (Haw. 2002).
· cites it 2× “5(f) with HRS § 586-4(1) through 4(5) (1993) (enjoining the respondent from contacting, telephoning, entering residence or place of business of petitioner).”
Coyle v. Compton, 940 P.2d 404 (Haw. App. 1997).
· cites it 2× “As previously indicated, HRS § 586-5 addresses the problem of domestic abuse by providing protection for an abused family or *205 household member through the issuance of a restraining order.”
Hill v. Inouye, 976 P.2d 390 (Haw. 1999).
· cites it 2× “HRS § 586-5 (Supp.1997) provides in pertinent part: Period of order; hearing, (a) A temporary restraining order granted pursuant to this chapter shall remain in effect at the discretion of the court, for a period not to exceed ninety days from the date the order is granted.”
Tortorello v. Tortorello, 145 P.3d 762 (Haw. App. 2006).
· cites it 2× “§ 586-5 Period of order; hearing. (a) A temporary restraining order granted pursuant to this chapter shall remain in effect at the discretion of the court, for a period not to exceed ninety days from the date the order is granted.”
Hamilton Ex Rel. Lethem v. Lethem, 260 P.3d 1148 (Haw. App. 2011).
· cites it 4× “HRS § 586-5(b). At the hearing, the petitioner has the burden of proving the allegations by a preponderance of the evidence.”
Wintermeyer v. Wintermeyer, 157 P.3d 535 (Haw. App. 2006).
“The following statutes authorize a protective order: Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) §§ 586-5 and 586-5.5 (Supp.2006). . The Conclusions of Law (CsOL) entered on May 10, 2005 contain CsOL that do not accurately report the law as stated in the cited precedent.”
— Haw. Rev. Stat. § 586-5(a) — 6 cases
State v. Grindling, 31 P.3d 915 (Haw. 2001).
“See HRS §§ 586-5, 586-5.5 (Supp.1999). 4 . Hawai'i Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 52(b) states, "Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court.”
Kie v. McMahel, 984 P.2d 1264 (Haw. App. 1999).
“" In this regard, we note but do not decide the effect of HRS § 586-5, which provides that "[t]he protective order may include other orders stated in the temporary restraining order and may provide such further relief as the court deems necessary.”
State v. Poohina, 40 P.3d 907 (Haw. 2002).
“5(f) with HRS § 586-4(1) through 4(5) (1993) (enjoining the respondent from contacting, telephoning, entering residence or place of business of petitioner).”
Jd v. Pd., 482 P.3d 555 (Haw. App. 2021).
“Nakasone Presiding Judge 19 HRS § 586-5(a) (2018) provides that, "A temporary restraining order granted pursuant to this chapter shall remain in effect at the discretion of the court, for a period not to exceed one hundred eighty days from the date the order is granted or until…”
STYKE v. Sotelo, 228 P.3d 365 (Haw. App. 2010).
“” Sotelo then orally moved to dismiss the TRO, on the ground that the show-cause hearing was not held within fifteen days of the granting of the TRO, which Sotelo argued was required by HRS § 586-5 (2006). The parties agreed that Judge Bissen could rule on the motion.”
— Haw. Rev. Stat. § 586-5(b) — 7 cases
STYKE v. Sotelo, 228 P.3d 365 (Haw. App. 2010).
“” Sotelo then orally moved to dismiss the TRO, on the ground that the show-cause hearing was not held within fifteen days of the granting of the TRO, which Sotelo argued was required by HRS § 586-5 (2006). The parties agreed that Judge Bissen could rule on the motion.”
Jd v. Pd., 482 P.3d 555 (Haw. App. 2021).
“Nakasone Presiding Judge 19 HRS § 586-5(a) (2018) provides that, "A temporary restraining order granted pursuant to this chapter shall remain in effect at the discretion of the court, for a period not to exceed one hundred eighty days from the date the order is granted or until…”
Hamilton Ex Rel. Lethem v. Lethem, 270 P.3d 1024 (Haw. 2012).
“However, it is not necessary to import the express provision of HRS § 703-309(1) into HRS § 586-5 TRO show cause hearings. 18 *307 A.”
Kie v. McMahel, 984 P.2d 1264 (Haw. App. 1999).
“" In this regard, we note but do not decide the effect of HRS § 586-5, which provides that "[t]he protective order may include other orders stated in the temporary restraining order and may provide such further relief as the court deems necessary.”
Hamilton Ex Rel. Lethem v. Lethem, 260 P.3d 1148 (Haw. App. 2011).
“HRS § 586-5(b). At the hearing, the petitioner has the burden of proving the allegations by a preponderance of the evidence.”
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