§712-1251 Possession in a motor vehicle;
prima facie evidence. (1) Except as provided in subsection (2), the
presence of a dangerous drug, harmful drug, or detrimental drug in a motor
vehicle, other than a public omnibus, is prima facie evidence of knowing
possession thereof by each and every person in the vehicle at the time the drug
was found.
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to:
(a) Other occupants of the motor vehicle if the
substance is found upon the person of one of the occupants therein;
(b) All occupants, except the driver or owner of the
motor vehicle, if the substance is found in some portion of the vehicle
normally accessible only to the driver or owner; or
(c) The driver of a motor vehicle who is at the time
operating it for hire in the pursuit of the driver's trade, if the substance is
found in a part of the vehicle used or occupied by passengers. [L 1972, c 9, pt
of §1; gen ch 1993]
Revision Note
In subsection (2)(a), "or" deleted pursuant to §23G-15.
COMMENTARY ON §712-1251
Subsection (1) of this section establishes a rule of prima
facie evidence regarding the possession of a dangerous drug, harmful drug, or
detrimental drug when it is found in a motor vehicle. Section 701-117 sets
forth the definition of "prima facie evidence". Subsection (2)
provides that the evidentiary rule does not apply to various occupants of a
vehicle under certain circumstances. If the substance is found upon the person
of one of the occupants, then the evidentiary rule does not apply to other occupants
of the vehicle. If it is found in some area of the vehicle normally accessible
only to the driver, the rule applies only to the driver. If a drug is found in
the part of a hired or chauffeured vehicle used or occupied by passengers, the
evidentiary rule does not apply to the driver but does apply to the passenger
or passengers.
When any of the specified substances is found in a vehicle,
but not upon the person of one of the occupants, it is almost impossible for
the prosecutor to prove actual possession by direct evidence. However, the
inference, in the absence of contrary evidence which raises a reasonable doubt
in the mind of the trier of fact, is overwhelming that if, for example, the
substance is in that portion of the vehicle to which only the driver and owner
have access, that the substance is in fact in the possession and under the
control of the owner-occupant or driver-occupant. The same holds true for the
other provisions of subsections (1) and (2). Therefore, subsections (1) and
(2) are designed and provided to let the prosecutor get the case to the jury in
situations where direct evidence is difficult to obtain and the weight of a
logical inference is sufficient to warrant a special evidentiary rule.
Case Notes
Section permits but does not require the inference of guilt,
and is constitutional as applied to dealership quantities of drugs. 61 H. 99,
595 P.2d 1072 (1979).
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
8
cases (
2 in the last 5 years), 1979–2021 · leading case:
State v. Brighter, 595 P.2d 1072 (Haw. 1979).
State v. Brighter, 595 P.2d 1072 (Haw. 1979).
· cites it 38× “He now alleges error in the giving of a jury instruction relating to the statutory inference set out in HRS § 712-1251 (1976). 1 Appellant contends that the inference permitted by that statute constitutes a violation of due process.”
State v. Pone, 892 P.2d 455 (Haw. 1995).
· cites it 8× “For reasons not relevant to our analysis, the Brighter court salvaged the constitutionality of HRS § 712-1251 by construing it narrowly and thus found “no impropriety per se in the content of State’s Requested Instruction No.”
State v. Mundell, 822 P.2d 23 (Haw. App. 1991).
· cites it 10× “6 Defendant argues that HRS § 712-1251 (1985) demonstrates a legislative intent to require that a person actually possess narcotics on his person in order to violate the penal code prohibitions.”
Rivas v. United States, 783 A.2d 125 (D.C. 2001).
· cites it 2× “) (save certain limited exceptions, "the presence of a dangerous drug, harmful drug, or detrimental drug in a motor vehicle, other than a public omnibus, is prima facie evidence of knowing possession thereof by each and every person in the vehicle at the time the drug was found.”
State v. Bumanglag, 634 P.2d 80 (Haw. 1981).
· cites it 6× “2d 1072 (1979), was whether an inference of a knowing possession of a dangerous, harmful, or detrimental drug drawn from the presence of such a drug in a motor vehicle, premised on HRS §§ 712-1251 21 and 701-117, was constitutionally firm.”
State v. Mitchell, 965 P.2d 149 (Haw. App. 1998).
· cites it 8× “2d 1072 (1979) (holding invalid a jury instruction regarding HRS § 712-1251, regarding the state of mind necessary for possession of contraband drugs for personal use); State v.”
State v. Salvas, 483 P.3d 312 (Haw. App. 2021).
· cites it 8× “The charges for Possession of a Dangerous Drug were sufficient Sarmiento's final point of error is that the Circuit Court "lacked jurisdiction" over Counts 1 and 3, Possession of a Dangerous Drug, because the felony information document was deficient for not alleging…”
State v. Salvas, 479 P.3d 924 (Haw. App. 2021).
· cites it 2× “24 NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER Regarding the Defendants' relationship, the State argued that one of its theories of the case was that the items found in Salvas's vehicle were constructively possessed by both Defendants (see HRS §712-1251…”
— Haw. Rev. Stat. § 712-1251(1) — 2 cases
State v. Pone, 892 P.2d 455 (Haw. 1995).
“For reasons not relevant to our analysis, the Brighter court salvaged the constitutionality of HRS § 712-1251 by construing it narrowly and thus found “no impropriety per se in the content of State’s Requested Instruction No.”
State v. Brighter, 595 P.2d 1072 (Haw. 1979).
“He now alleges error in the giving of a jury instruction relating to the statutory inference set out in HRS § 712-1251 (1976). 1 Appellant contends that the inference permitted by that statute constitutes a violation of due process.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.