cites § 18-115 10×cited by 148 cases
- Where it cites § 18-115
- “While I.C. § 18-115 includes language concerning the discretion and soundness of a defendant's mind, it is clear that those elements are simply a part of all of the circumstances or conditions which manifest the intent of the defendant.”
- The case’s holding
- The absence of a formal insanity defense does not violate constitutional due process when statutory safeguards like competency requirements and mens rea protections remain in place.
- Later courts cite it for
- “absence of the insanity defense ... does not violate any constitutional protections” · 1 citing court
cites § 18-115 14×cited by 16 cases
- Where it cites § 18-115
- “McDougall calls our attention to I.C. § 18-115, which reads: "The intent or intention *1029 is manifested by the circumstances connected with the offense, and the sound mind and discretion of the accused.”
- Later courts cite it for
- “in every crime or public offense there still must exist either a union of act and intent, or criminal negligence.” · 4 citing courts
cites § 18-115 4×cited by 153 cases
- Where it cites § 18-115
- “§ 18-114 and also contains language from I.C. § 18-115 allowing the jury to determine intent from the circumstances connected with the offense as well as the state of mind of the defendant at the time of the crime.”
- The case’s holding
- There is no legal distinction between malice and malice aforethought.
- Later courts cite it for
- “reversal is not required where an instruction does not contain a misstatement of the law.” · 2 citing courts
cites § 18-115 2×cited by 211 cases
- Where it cites § 18-115
- “Additionally, I.C. § 18-115 provides that “intent or intention is manifested by the commission of the acts and surrounding circumstances connected with the offense.”
- The case’s holding
- Probable cause for felony domestic battery is established if the defendant's conduct and the surrounding circumstances allow a reasonable inference that the defendant willfully inflicted a traumatic injury.
cites § 18-115 4×cited by 85 cases
- Where it cites § 18-115
- “" Section 18-115, Idaho Code, defines "intent" as an element that is "manifested by the circumstances connected with the offense, and the sound mind and discretion of the accused.”
- The case’s holding
- A trial court may use a dual jury procedure to protect the constitutional rights of co-defendants and promote judicial economy without violating due process.
- Later courts cite it for
- “continues to recognize the basic common law premise that only responsible defendants may be convicted.” · 2 citing courts
cites § 18-115 2×cited by 261 cases
- Where it cites § 18-115
- “" Second, as was already highlighted: [T]he legislative abolition of intent in its alternative definition of murder by torture is clearly in conflict with the first definition, that which was properly adopted from the California Supreme Court, and also in headlong conflict with…”
- The case’s holding
- A motion for an evidentiary hearing based on newly discovered evidence must show the evidence is material, unknown at trial, likely to produce an acquittal, and discovered through due diligence.
- Later courts cite it for
- “substantial doubt about the reliability of the finding of guilt and could not, in the exercise of due diligence, have been presented earlier.” · 2 citing courts
cites § 18-115 2×cited by 80 cases
- Where it cites § 18-115
- “Beyond that, the legislative abolition of intent in its alternative definition of murder by torture is clearly in conflict with the first definition, that which was properly adopted from the California Supreme Court, and also in headlong conflict with § 18-114: "In every crime…”
- The case’s holding
- The purpose of sequestering a jury is to protect the jurors from prejudicial influence (State v. Stuart).
- Later courts cite it for
- “it was stipulated at the sentencing hearing that when sentencing the defendant the court would consider evidence presented at the preliminary hearing and trial along with the presentence investigation report.” · 1 citing court
cites § 18-115 4×cited by 17 cases
- Where it cites § 18-115
- “Although the State’s witnesses testified that the defendant was intoxicated on the day in question, the question of whether his intoxication so affected him that he could not have had the necessary intent to commit the offense was for the jury.”
cites § 18-115 4×cited by 15 cases
- Where it cites § 18-115
- “On occasion, Byington took some of the children four-wheeling and snowmobiling.”
- Later courts cite it for
- “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” · 3 citing courts
cites § 18-115 4×cited by 29 cases
- Where it cites § 18-115
- “I.C. § 18-115 provides: "The intent or intention is manifested by the circumstances connected with the offense, and the sound mind and discretion of the accused * * *.”
- The case’s holding
- Under Idaho law, the test of criminal accountability is whether the defendant could distinguish right from wrong; irresistible impulse is not a defense.
cites § 18-115 2×cited by 31 cases
- Where it cites § 18-115
- “We next consider Kay’s assertion that there was a lack of evidence to support the State’s allegation in the information that he acted with the intent that the victim be “kept and/or detained against her will.”
- The case’s holding
- Statements made to medical professionals are admissible for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment if they describe medical history, symptoms, or the source of pain.
cites § 18-115 2×cited by 29 cases
- Where it cites § 18-115
- “I.C. § 18-115. At issue is the measure of proof necessary to prove the element of “intent to keep or conceal [the child] from its parent.”
- The case’s holding
- Fornication is not a necessarily included offense of lewd conduct with a minor because a child under sixteen cannot legally consent to sexual intercourse.
- Later courts cite it for
- “a child under sixteen cannot as a matter of law give her consent,” · 1 citing court
cites § 18-115 2×cited by 24 cases
- Where it cites § 18-115
- “” I.C. § 18-115 states that “[t]he intent or intention is manifested by the circumstances connected with the offense, and the sound mind and discretion of the accused.”
- The case’s holding
- Specific intent refers to a state of mind that defines a crime and serves as an element thereof, whereas general intent is satisfied by knowingly performing proscribed acts.
- Later courts cite it for
- “a general criminal intent requirement is satisfied if it is shown that the defendant knowingly performed the proscribed acts, but a specific intent requirement refers to that state of mind which in part defines the crime and is an element thereof.” · 4 citing courts
cites § 18-115 2×cited by 9 cases
- Where it cites § 18-115
- “are principals in any crime so committed.” However, there is also a requirement that “[i]n every crime or public offense there must exist a union, or joint operation, of act and intent.”
- The case’s holding
- Accomplice corroboration may be slight and circumstantial and need not alone sustain a conviction or corroborate every detail of the accomplice's testimony.
- Later courts cite it for
- “be sufficient to sustain a conviction on its own, nor must it corroborate every detail of the accomplice's testimony.” · 2 citing courts
cites § 18-115 1×cited by 24 cases
- The case’s holding
- Counsel's failure to challenge a defendant's competency to stand trial is not ineffective assistance absent a reasonable probability the defendant would have been found incompetent under the Dusky standard.
- Later courts cite it for
- “hoffman has not proved an ineffective assistance claim based on his counsels' failure to challenge his competency because there is not a reasonable probability that hoffman would have been found incompetent.” · 2 citing courts
cites § 18-115 2×cited by 7 cases
- Where it cites § 18-115
- “” I.C. § 18-115. 6 . We take this opportunity to caution against the routine inclusion of definitions when the instructions containing the elements of an offense already define the terms they contain, when the definition conflicts with another instruction, or when no definition…”
- Later courts cite it for
- “even absent a timely objection to the trial court, claims of instructional error are reviewable for the first time on appeal under the fundamental error doctrine.” · 1 citing court
cites § 18-115 2×cited by 38 cases
- Where it cites § 18-115
- “The State correctly points out that “the intent *204 or intention is manifested by the circumstances connected with the offense * * *” I.C. § 18-115. The State argues that the following facts are relevant in this regard: 1.”
- The case’s holding
- Intent to deliver a controlled substance cannot be inferred or presumed solely from the quantity and variety of substances found on a defendant's person.
- Later courts cite it for
- “a public offense has been committed and that there is probable or sufficient cause to believe that the defendant committed such offense....” · 1 citing court
cites § 18-115 2×cited by 12 cases
- Where it cites § 18-115
- “I.C. § 18-115. The intent of the accused is a question of fact for the jury to determine.”
cites § 18-115 2×cited by 30 cases
- Where it cites § 18-115
- “He *1086 is presumed to know not only what he does, but also the consequences of his acts.”
- The case’s holding
- Knowledge of the accident resulting in injury is an essential element of the hit-and-run offense, so an information omitting it is fatally defective.
cites § 18-115 2×cited by 8 cases
- Where it cites § 18-115
- “I.C. § 18-115. The intent of the accused is a question of fact for the jury to determine.”
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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.