Idaho Code
Idaho Code § 19-2719 (2026)
Special appellate and post-conviction procedure for capital cases — Automatic stay.
✓ current as of May 2026
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Special appellate and post-conviction procedure for capital cases — Automatic stay.
The following special procedures shall be interpreted to accomplish the purpose of eliminating unnecessary delay in carrying out a valid death sentence.
(1) When the punishment of death is imposed the time for filing an appeal shall begin to run when the death warrant is filed.
(2) The death warrant shall not be filed until forty-two (42) days after the judgment imposing the death sentence has been filed, or, in the event a post-conviction challenge to the conviction or sentence is filed, until the order deciding such post-conviction challenge is filed.
(3) Within forty-two (42) days of the filing of the judgment imposing the punishment of death, and before the death warrant is filed, the defendant must file any legal or factual challenge to the sentence or conviction that is known or reasonably should be known. The defendant must file any claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel within forty-two (42) days of the Idaho supreme court issuing the final remittitur in the unified appeal from which no further proceedings except issuance of a death warrant are ordered.
(4) Any remedy available by post-conviction procedure, habeas corpus or any other provision of state law must be pursued according to the procedures set forth in this section and within the time limitations of subsection (3) of this section. The special procedures for fingerprint or forensic DNA testing set forth in sections 19-4901(a)(6) and 19-4902(b) through (g), Idaho Code, are fully applicable in capital cases and are subject to the procedures set forth in this section, and must be pursued through a petition filed within the time limitations of subsection (3) of this section or by July 1, 2002, whichever is later.
(5) If the defendant fails to apply for relief as provided in this section and within the time limits specified, he shall be deemed to have waived such claims for relief as were known, or reasonably should have been known. The courts of Idaho shall have no power to consider any such claims for relief as have been so waived or grant any such relief.
(a) An allegation that a successive post-conviction petition may be heard because of the applicability of the exception herein for issues that were not known or could not reasonably have been known shall not be considered unless the applicant shows the existence of such issues by (i) a precise statement of the issue or issues asserted together with (ii) material facts stated under oath or affirmation by credible persons with first hand knowledge that would support the issue or issues asserted. A pleading that fails to make a showing of excepted issues supported by material facts, or which is not credible, must be summarily dismissed.
(b) A successive post-conviction pleading asserting the exception shall be deemed facially insufficient to the extent it alleges matters that are cumulative or impeaching or would not, even if the allegations were true, cast doubt on the reliability of the conviction or sentence.
(c) A successive post-conviction pleading asserting the exception shall be deemed facially insufficient to the extent it seeks retroactive application of new rules of law.
(6) In the event the defendant desires to appeal from any post-conviction order entered pursuant to this section, his appeal must be part of any appeal taken from the conviction or sentence. All issues relating to conviction, sentence and post-conviction challenge shall be considered in the same appellate proceeding.
(7) If post-conviction challenge is made under this section, questions raised thereby shall be heard and decided by the district court within ninety (90) days of the filing of any motion or petition for relief timely filed as provided by this section. The court shall give first priority to capital cases. In the event the district court fails to act within the time specified, the supreme court of Idaho shall, on its own motion or the motion of any party, order the court to proceed forthwith, or if appropriate, reassign the case to another judge. When the supreme court intervenes as provided, it shall set a reasonable time limit for disposition of the issues before the district court.
(8) The time limit provided in subsection (7) of this section for disposition of post-conviction claims may be extended only upon a showing of extraordinary circumstances which would make it impossible to fairly consider defendant’s claims in the time provided. Such showing must be made under oath and the district court’s finding that extraordinary circumstances exist for extending the time shall be in writing and shall be immediately reported to the supreme court, which shall at once independently consider the sufficiency of the circumstances shown and determine whether an extension of time is warranted.
(9) When a judgment imposing the penalty of death is filed, the clerk and the reporter shall begin preparation of the transcripts of the trial, and other proceedings, and the clerk’s transcript.
(10) When the procedures specified in this section and section 19-2827, Idaho Code, have been carried out and a remittitur issued, and an execution date set as provided by law, the defendant shall be deemed to have exhausted all state remedies.
(11) Any successive petition for post-conviction relief not within the exception of subsection (5) of this section shall be dismissed summarily. Notwithstanding any other statute or rule, the order of dismissal shall not be subject to any motion to alter, amend or reconsider. Such order shall not be subject to any requirement for the giving of notice of the court’s intent to dismiss. The order of dismissal shall not be appealable.
(12) A stay of execution while the special appellate procedures specified herein are followed and during the pendency of automatic review of death sentences shall be automatically entered by the clerk of the supreme court at the time the district court transmits to the supreme court the report required by section 19-2827, Idaho Code. If the sentence is upheld, the clerk shall dissolve such stay when the remittitur is filed. Thereafter the district court shall set a new execution date.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 106
cases (19 in the last 5 years), 1939–2026 · leading case: Stuart v. State, 232 P.3d 813 (Idaho 2010).
Stuart v. State, 232 P.3d 813 (Idaho 2010). “"`When this Court is presented with a motion to dismiss by the State based upon the provisions of Idaho Code § 19-2719 , the proper standard of review this Court should utilize is to directly address the motion, determine whether or not the requirements of section 19-2719 have…”
State v. Beam, 766 P.2d 678 (Idaho 1988). “that (1) the dual jury procedure used by the trial court deprived him of *680 his constitutional rights; (2) the sentence imposed on him was excessive, unduly harsh and disproportionate to the sentence to be served by his co-defendant, Shawn Scroggins; (3) Idaho's statutory…”
McKinney v. State, 992 P.2d 144 (Idaho 1999). “Asserting that McKinney’s second petition was barred by the operation of I.C. § 19-2719, the statute governing post-conviction procedures in capital cases, the State filed a motion to dismiss in January 1992.”
State v. Payne, 199 P.3d 123 (Idaho 2008). “Finally, Payne argues that the district court erred in summarily denying his petition for post-conviction relief as to his claims for prosecutorial misconduct, lack of a meaningful opportunity to develop his post-conviction arguments and the unconstitutionality of I.C. §…”
State v. Card, 825 P.2d 1081 (Idaho 1991). “es that because a defendant must bring the ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a post-conviction proceeding, and that the trial counsel is responsible for the direct appeal from the conviction, the defendant must then represent himself in a pro se post-conviction petition…”
Timothy Alan Dunlap v. State, 360 P.3d 289 (Idaho 2015). “3d 692, 697 (2011) (Fields IV) (quoting Idaho Code § 19-2719 (5)). Idaho Code section 19-2719 provides that if a defendant fails to timely apply for post-conviction relief, the *293 defendant has “waived such claims for relief as were known, or reasonably should have been known”…”
Maxwell Hoffman v. A.J. Arave, Warden, 236 F.3d 523 (9th Cir. 2001). “PREGERSON, Circuit Judge: 1 Maxwell Hoffman ("Hoffman") appeals the district court's dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, in which he claims, inter alia, that the district court erred in finding that: (1) Idaho Code 19-2719 was an adequate and independent state…”
State v. Erik Virgil Hall, 419 P.3d 1042 (Idaho 2018). “The Court also determined that Idaho Code section 19-2719 provides an adequate process to prevent erroneous results: [I.C. § 19-2719] provides adequate notice to the defendant of exactly what is required of him, and sufficient opportunity for all challenges to be heard.”
Pizzuto v. State, 233 P.3d 86 (Idaho 2010). “Idaho Code § 19-2719 (3) states that “[w]ithin forty-two .”
State v. Rhoades, 820 P.2d 665 (Idaho 1991). “For the foregoing reasons we conclude that the second statement made in response to Shaw's "interrogation" is not subject to suppression under Miranda v.”
Hairston v. State, 156 P.3d 552 (Idaho 2007). “STANDARD OF REVIEW “When this Court is presented with a motion to dismiss by the State based upon the provisions of Idaho Code § 19-2719 , the proper standard of review this Court should utilize is to directly address the motion, determine whether or not the requirements of…”
Sivak v. State, 8 P.3d 636 (Idaho 2000). “Idaho Code § 19-2719 (5) states: If the defendant fails to apply for relief as provided in this section and within the time limits specified, he shall be deemed to have waived such claims for relief as were known, or reasonably should have been known.”
— Idaho Code § 19-2719(11) — 18 cases
Stuart v. State, 232 P.3d 813 (Idaho 2010). “"`When this Court is presented with a motion to dismiss by the State based upon the provisions of Idaho Code § 19-2719 , the proper standard of review this Court should utilize is to directly address the motion, determine whether or not the requirements of section 19-2719 have…”
State v. Card, 825 P.2d 1081 (Idaho 1991). “es that because a defendant must bring the ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a post-conviction proceeding, and that the trial counsel is responsible for the direct appeal from the conviction, the defendant must then represent himself in a pro se post-conviction petition…”
State v. Rhoades, 820 P.2d 665 (Idaho 1991). “For the foregoing reasons we conclude that the second statement made in response to Shaw's "interrogation" is not subject to suppression under Miranda v.”
Porter v. State, 80 P.3d 1021 (Idaho 2003).
Timothy Alan Dunlap v. State, 360 P.3d 289 (Idaho 2015). “3d 692, 697 (2011) (Fields IV) (quoting Idaho Code § 19-2719 (5)). Idaho Code section 19-2719 provides that if a defendant fails to timely apply for post-conviction relief, the *293 defendant has “waived such claims for relief as were known, or reasonably should have been known”…”
— Idaho Code § 19-2719(2) — 2 cases
State v. Aragon, 690 P.2d 293 (Idaho 1984).
Hairston v. State, 156 P.3d 552 (Idaho 2007). “STANDARD OF REVIEW “When this Court is presented with a motion to dismiss by the State based upon the provisions of Idaho Code § 19-2719 , the proper standard of review this Court should utilize is to directly address the motion, determine whether or not the requirements of…”
— Idaho Code § 19-2719(3) — 30 cases
State v. Beam, 828 P.2d 891 (Idaho 1992).
McKinney v. State, 992 P.2d 144 (Idaho 1999). “Asserting that McKinney’s second petition was barred by the operation of I.C. § 19-2719, the statute governing post-conviction procedures in capital cases, the State filed a motion to dismiss in January 1992.”
Timothy Alan Dunlap v. State, 360 P.3d 289 (Idaho 2015). “3d 692, 697 (2011) (Fields IV) (quoting Idaho Code § 19-2719 (5)). Idaho Code section 19-2719 provides that if a defendant fails to timely apply for post-conviction relief, the *293 defendant has “waived such claims for relief as were known, or reasonably should have been known”…”
Stuart v. State, 232 P.3d 813 (Idaho 2010). “"`When this Court is presented with a motion to dismiss by the State based upon the provisions of Idaho Code § 19-2719 , the proper standard of review this Court should utilize is to directly address the motion, determine whether or not the requirements of section 19-2719 have…”
Hooley v. State, 537 P.3d 1267 (Idaho 2023).
— Idaho Code § 19-2719(4) — 22 cases
McKinney v. State, 992 P.2d 144 (Idaho 1999). “Asserting that McKinney’s second petition was barred by the operation of I.C. § 19-2719, the statute governing post-conviction procedures in capital cases, the State filed a motion to dismiss in January 1992.”
Stuart v. State, 232 P.3d 813 (Idaho 2010). “"`When this Court is presented with a motion to dismiss by the State based upon the provisions of Idaho Code § 19-2719 , the proper standard of review this Court should utilize is to directly address the motion, determine whether or not the requirements of section 19-2719 have…”
Fields v. State, 253 P.3d 692 (Idaho 2011).
Erick Virgil Hall v. State, 315 P.3d 798 (Idaho 2013).
Sivak v. State, 8 P.3d 636 (Idaho 2000). “Idaho Code § 19-2719 (5) states: If the defendant fails to apply for relief as provided in this section and within the time limits specified, he shall be deemed to have waived such claims for relief as were known, or reasonably should have been known.”
— Idaho Code § 19-2719(5) — 33 cases
Stuart v. State, 232 P.3d 813 (Idaho 2010). “"`When this Court is presented with a motion to dismiss by the State based upon the provisions of Idaho Code § 19-2719 , the proper standard of review this Court should utilize is to directly address the motion, determine whether or not the requirements of section 19-2719 have…”
Sivak v. State, 8 P.3d 636 (Idaho 2000). “Idaho Code § 19-2719 (5) states: If the defendant fails to apply for relief as provided in this section and within the time limits specified, he shall be deemed to have waived such claims for relief as were known, or reasonably should have been known.”
Zane Jack Fields v. State, 314 P.3d 587 (Idaho 2013).
Hairston v. State, 156 P.3d 552 (Idaho 2007). “STANDARD OF REVIEW “When this Court is presented with a motion to dismiss by the State based upon the provisions of Idaho Code § 19-2719 , the proper standard of review this Court should utilize is to directly address the motion, determine whether or not the requirements of…”
McKinney v. State, 992 P.2d 144 (Idaho 1999). “Asserting that McKinney’s second petition was barred by the operation of I.C. § 19-2719, the statute governing post-conviction procedures in capital cases, the State filed a motion to dismiss in January 1992.”
— Idaho Code § 19-2719(5)(a) — 10 cases
Abdullah v. State, 539 P.3d 947 (Idaho 2023).
Zane Jack Fields v. State, 314 P.3d 587 (Idaho 2013).
Row v. State, 21 P.3d 895 (Idaho 2001).
Timothy Alan Dunlap v. State, 360 P.3d 289 (Idaho 2015). “3d 692, 697 (2011) (Fields IV) (quoting Idaho Code § 19-2719 (5)). Idaho Code section 19-2719 provides that if a defendant fails to timely apply for post-conviction relief, the *293 defendant has “waived such claims for relief as were known, or reasonably should have been known”…”
Abdullah v. State, 503 P.3d 182 (Idaho 2021).
— Idaho Code § 19-2719(5)(b) — 11 cases
Fields v. State, 253 P.3d 692 (Idaho 2011).
Sivak v. State, 8 P.3d 636 (Idaho 2000). “Idaho Code § 19-2719 (5) states: If the defendant fails to apply for relief as provided in this section and within the time limits specified, he shall be deemed to have waived such claims for relief as were known, or reasonably should have been known.”
Zane Jack Fields v. State, 314 P.3d 587 (Idaho 2013).
Pizzuto v. State, 10 P.3d 742 (Idaho 2000).
Abdullah v. State, 539 P.3d 947 (Idaho 2023).
— Idaho Code § 19-2719(5)(c) — 3 cases
Fields v. State, 234 P.3d 723 (Idaho 2010).
Rhoades v. State, 233 P.3d 61 (Idaho 2010).
State v. Leavitt, 120 P.3d 283 (Idaho 2005).
— Idaho Code § 19-2719(5)(e) — 1 case
Rhoades v. State, 233 P.3d 61 (Idaho 2010).
— Idaho Code § 19-2719(6) — 2 cases
State v. Erik Virgil Hall, 419 P.3d 1042 (Idaho 2018). “The Court also determined that Idaho Code section 19-2719 provides an adequate process to prevent erroneous results: [I.C. § 19-2719] provides adequate notice to the defendant of exactly what is required of him, and sufficient opportunity for all challenges to be heard.”
McKinney v. State, 992 P.2d 144 (Idaho 1999). “Asserting that McKinney’s second petition was barred by the operation of I.C. § 19-2719, the statute governing post-conviction procedures in capital cases, the State filed a motion to dismiss in January 1992.”
— Idaho Code § 19-2719(9) — 1 case
Maxwell Hoffman v. A.J. Arave, Warden, 236 F.3d 523 (9th Cir. 2001). “PREGERSON, Circuit Judge: 1 Maxwell Hoffman ("Hoffman") appeals the district court's dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, in which he claims, inter alia, that the district court erred in finding that: (1) Idaho Code 19-2719 was an adequate and independent state…”
— Idaho Code § 19-2719(A) — 1 case
Maxwell Hoffman v. A.J. Arave, Warden, 236 F.3d 523 (9th Cir. 2001). “PREGERSON, Circuit Judge: 1 Maxwell Hoffman ("Hoffman") appeals the district court's dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, in which he claims, inter alia, that the district court erred in finding that: (1) Idaho Code 19-2719 was an adequate and independent state…”
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