Idaho Code
Idaho Code § 49-944 (2026)
Standards for windshields and windows of motor vehicles — Prohibited acts — Penalty.
✓ current as of May 2026
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Standards for windshields and windows of motor vehicles — Prohibited acts — Penalty.
(1) It is unlawful for any person to place, install, affix, or apply any window tinting film or sunscreening device to the windows of any motor vehicle, except as follows:
(a) Nonreflective window tinting film or sunscreening devices shall not be applied to the windshield below the AS-1 line; if no AS-1 line is identifiable on the windshield, nonreflective window tinting film or sunscreening devices shall not be applied to the windshield below a line extending six (6) inches below and parallel to the exposed windshield;
(b) Nonreflective window tinting film or sunscreening devices that have a light transmission of not less than thirty-five percent (35%) with a tolerance limit of plus or minus three percent (3%) and a luminous reflectance of no more than thirty-five percent (35%) with a tolerance limit of plus or minus three percent (3%) may be applied to the front side vents, front side windows to the immediate right and left of the driver, and the rear window;
(c) Nonreflective window tinting film or sunscreening devices that have a light transmission of not less than twenty percent (20%) with a tolerance limit of plus or minus three percent (3%) and a luminous reflectance of no more than thirty-five percent (35%) with a tolerance limit of plus or minus three percent (3%) may be applied to the side windows to the rear of the driver;
(d) Window tinting films or sunscreening devices are materials or devices that are designed to be used in conjunction with approved vehicle glazing materials for the purpose of reducing the effects of the sun;
(e) Light transmission is the ratio of the amount of total light, expressed in percentages, that is allowed to pass through the product or material to the amount of total light falling on the product or material;
(f) Luminous reflectance is the ratio of the amount of total light, expressed in percentages, that is reflected outward by the product or material to the amount of total light falling on the product or material.
(2) No person shall operate on the public highways, sell, or offer to sell any motor vehicle with a windshield or windows that are not in compliance with the provisions of this section.
(3) The Idaho state police may promulgate rules in order to implement the provisions of this section.
(4) Nonreflective window tinting film or sunscreening devices that have a light transmission of not less than seventy percent (70%) plus or minus three percent (3%) for the front windshield and not less than twenty percent (20%) plus or minus three percent (3%) for the windows, with a luminous reflectance of no more than thirty-five percent (35%) plus or minus three percent (3%) in each instance, is permitted for a motor vehicle operated by, or carrying as a passenger, a person who possesses written verification from a licensed physician that the operator or passenger must be protected from exposure to sunlight or heat for medical reasons associated with past or current treatment; such written verification shall be carried in the vehicle.
(5) Nothing in this section shall be construed to make illegal the operation or sale of any motor vehicle, the windshield or windows of which are composed of, covered by, or treated with any material, substance, system, or component with which the motor vehicle was sold when new or could have been equipped for sale when new as standard or optional equipment from the manufacturer or authorized dealer under any United States government statute or regulation governing such sale at the time of manufacture.
(6) Any person convicted of a violation of the provisions of this section shall be guilty of an infraction.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 8
cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1997–2023 · leading case: United States v. Billy Howard Stanfield, 109 F.3d 976 (4th Cir. 1997).
United States v. Billy Howard Stanfield, 109 F.3d 976 (4th Cir. 1997). “1 (1982-96); Idaho Code § 49-944 (1) (Michie 1948-96); West’s Smith-Hurd Illinois Comp.”
State v. Farrell, 453 P.3d 273 (Idaho Ct. App. 2019). “The charge arose after Officer Reese stopped the vehicle in which Farrell was a passenger based on a suspicion that the windows were tinted darker than permitted by Idaho Code § 49-944 (1). After making the traffic stop, Officer Reese identified the occupants of the vehicle,…”
State v. Debra Joan Noeller (Idaho Ct. App. 2016). “Although we hold the district court erred in finding I.C. § 49-944 applies only to vehicles registered in Idaho, we affirm the district court’s order granting the motion to suppress because the stop was unreasonably extended and Noeller’s consent to search was ineffective.”
State v. Garitone, 539 P.3d 1007 (Idaho Ct. App. 2023). “However, the statement is followed by an explanation of why the evidence Farrell submitted with his motion to suppress, consisting of an affidavit from the registered owner of the vehicle and “dealer documentation” indicating that the rear window-tint of the vehicle fell within…”
Tucker v. United States, 708 A.2d 645 (D.C. 1998). “§ 55-9-107(a)(6) (1996); Idaho Code § 49-944 (5) (1996); Ky.Rev. Stat-Ann.”
Hernandez v. United States (D. Idaho 2021). “Additionally, while law enforcement stopped and cited Hernandez for a window- tint violation under Idaho Code § 49-944 , he also failed his sobriety test.”
United States v. Stanfield (4th Cir. 1997). “1 (1982-96); Idaho Code§ 49-944(1) (Michie 1948- 96); West's Smith-Hurd Illinois Comp.”
Tucker v. United States, 704 A.2d 845 (D.C. 1997). “§ 55-9-107(a)(6) (1996); Idaho Code § 49-944 (5) (1996); Ky.Rev.Stat.”
— Idaho Code § 49-944(1) — 3 cases
State v. Farrell, 453 P.3d 273 (Idaho Ct. App. 2019). “The charge arose after Officer Reese stopped the vehicle in which Farrell was a passenger based on a suspicion that the windows were tinted darker than permitted by Idaho Code § 49-944 (1). After making the traffic stop, Officer Reese identified the occupants of the vehicle,…”
State v. Debra Joan Noeller (Idaho Ct. App. 2016). “Although we hold the district court erred in finding I.C. § 49-944 applies only to vehicles registered in Idaho, we affirm the district court’s order granting the motion to suppress because the stop was unreasonably extended and Noeller’s consent to search was ineffective.”
United States v. Stanfield (4th Cir. 1997). “1 (1982-96); Idaho Code§ 49-944(1) (Michie 1948- 96); West's Smith-Hurd Illinois Comp.”
— Idaho Code § 49-944(1)(b) — 2 cases
State v. Garitone, 539 P.3d 1007 (Idaho Ct. App. 2023). “However, the statement is followed by an explanation of why the evidence Farrell submitted with his motion to suppress, consisting of an affidavit from the registered owner of the vehicle and “dealer documentation” indicating that the rear window-tint of the vehicle fell within…”
State v. Farrell, 453 P.3d 273 (Idaho Ct. App. 2019). “The charge arose after Officer Reese stopped the vehicle in which Farrell was a passenger based on a suspicion that the windows were tinted darker than permitted by Idaho Code § 49-944 (1). After making the traffic stop, Officer Reese identified the occupants of the vehicle,…”
— Idaho Code § 49-944(2) — 1 case
State v. Debra Joan Noeller (Idaho Ct. App. 2016). “Although we hold the district court erred in finding I.C. § 49-944 applies only to vehicles registered in Idaho, we affirm the district court’s order granting the motion to suppress because the stop was unreasonably extended and Noeller’s consent to search was ineffective.”
— Idaho Code § 49-944(5) — 1 case
State v. Farrell, 453 P.3d 273 (Idaho Ct. App. 2019). “The charge arose after Officer Reese stopped the vehicle in which Farrell was a passenger based on a suspicion that the windows were tinted darker than permitted by Idaho Code § 49-944 (1). After making the traffic stop, Officer Reese identified the occupants of the vehicle,…”
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